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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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TURKEY

PART IX

JANUARY TO JUNE 1925

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ERRATA.

No. 162, page 159, line 5: After "Tkhub" read "[*sic*]."
No. 187, page 181, line 1: For "No. 247" read "No. 477."

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART IX.

[E 56/56/44] No. 1.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 5, 1925.)

(No. 956.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 904 of the 24th December regarding the Græco-Turkish differences over the application of the Exchange of Populations Convention, I have the honour to report some information given to a member of my staff by M. Politis, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires at Angora, now on a short visit to Constantinople, which throws interesting light on the Tewfik Rushdi–Exindaris negotiations.

2. M. Politis said that the Turkish Government had succeeded in representing the breakdown in these negotiations as entirely due to the Greek Government, and had raised an outcry in the Turkish press on this account. In reality the Greek Government had asked for the modification of the clause (not reproduced in the summary given in paragraph 4 of my despatch under reference) providing for the evacuation within a time limit of Greek refugees settled in Moslem houses in Western Thrace. This modification amounted to the substitution of "gradually" for the time limit mentioned. On the other hand, the Turks had insisted on the withdrawal from the convention of any mention of the right of absent Ottoman-Greek refugees, who were eventually proved to be "établis," to return to Constantinople.

3. Since my despatch under reference was written, attacks in the press and interpellations in the Assembly have concentrated on the Greek treatment of Moslems and their properties in Western Thrace, on the failure of the Greek Government to liquidate fairly the property of exchanged Moslems, or to execute the declaration relating to Moslem properties in Greece (document No. IX in the Lausanne Treaty instruments). This campaign ended in a decision of the Turkish Government to begin by way of reprisals the sequestration and exploitation of the immovable property to Turkey of absentee Hellenic subjects, and the payment of the proceeds of such exploitation to exchanged Moslems, who had suffered by the Greek Government's failure to carry out the Exchange of Populations Convention.

4. M. Politis stated that in fact the Turkish Government had been pushed reluctantly into this measure by the campaign which they had themselves begun or at any rate allowed to go on. His own strong impression was that the Turkish Government were only too anxious to avoid foreign complications with Greece or anyone else. He did not believe that the Government would actually proceed to carry out the threatened measure of reprisals, which in itself amounted to very little. Ever since the Greek defeat the Turkish Government had in fact sequestrated Hellenic property in Anatolia, and these sequesters had in only a few cases been removed. In many cases, *e.g.*, Hellenic coal mines at Heraclea, the Turkish Government was actually exploiting Hellenic property already and was probably pocketing some at any rate of the proceeds.

5. M. Politis concluded by saying that M. Exindaris was expected back this week from Athens with fresh instructions, and he certainly gave the impression that these

instructions would in fact enable the suspended negotiations with Tewfik Rushdi to be successfully concluded, in which case the Turkish Government would probably gladly drop its policy of so-called reprisals.

I have, &c
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 58/58/44] No. 2.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 5, 1925.)

(No. 958.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1924.

IN my despatch No. 939 of 24th December I mentioned the possibility that the Turkish Government had been brought to active negotiations regarding the position of the Ottoman Debt by the pressure of financial necessity. It is extraordinary how little is known in Constantinople of the real financial position of the Turkish Government. Sir A. Block has, I believe, drawn up a report for the Council of Foreign Bondholders and promised me a copy, but he has left for France without sending it to me, and such facts as I can give you are mere straws in the wind. They all come to me from good authority, but I am quite alive to the risk of drawing general inferences from them.

2. The budget for the current year provided for a deficit of £T. 11,000,000. The sums allotted to each Ministry were published in the press, but it is only in the last few days that Colonel Woods has been able to obtain with difficulty a printed copy of the whole budget. Even now, of course, it only expresses the ostensible intentions of the Turkish Government and gives no picture of the state of the national finance. A statement of the accounts of past years is, so far as I can ascertain, non-existent, and I have not heard that the Assembly has ever even asked for one. I am told that the accountancy of the State administrations is so chaotic that nobody knows where they are, and I imagine that the Government must be carrying on from hand to mouth. Turkish Ministers, when asked how they are getting on, always say that there is considerable underspending in the departments, so that they always have something in hand; this is doubtless true in some Ministries, for it requires a certain amount of efficiency for a department to spend its credits according to programme, but it is also a fact that a few weeks ago the Assembly, after a perfunctory discussion, voted supplementary credits of £T. 15,000,000—rather more than 10 per cent. of the whole expenditure of the State as estimated in the budget. So far as revenue is concerned, the Minister of Finance claims to have received some windfalls from the abandoned properties, which I should think surprising, as houses and land cannot be easily realised in these days; Abdel Khalik Bey, however, admits that he expects no more cash from this source for some time. In other revenues, the Turkish Government has collected £T. 330,000 as tax on spirits, where the Debt Administration used to collect £T. 600,000. In this, as in the case of the tithe, they have demolished the old system without waiting to construct the new. The tithe used to be raised on the gross production of each individual cultivator; it is now calculated on the surplus amount each village has for sale outside the village. It must be far more difficult to collect, and M. des Closières tells me that the Turkish Government is losing £T. 10,000,000 over it this year. To fill the gap, the land tax has been multiplied sixfold, but this tax never gave anything but a small yield, and its efficient collection depends on the cadastral survey, which is non-existent. There is corruption everywhere, and Colonel Woods tells me it is rampant in the customs. Officials are paid so little that they cannot live on their salaries, and yet the State cannot afford to pay them more. The vicious circle is complete, and revenue, expenditure and all administrations are equally prejudiced.

3. Yet, if these are true facts, the inevitable consequence must be that somewhere a heavy floating debt is accumulating, though I do not know where. I cannot believe that the Ottoman Bank is making large advances; officials and pensioners at Constantinople are still paid, and the bills for goods purchased abroad, especially those for the army, have so far been met punctually. I am told that in the eastern vilayets nothing is paid for, and the report of chaos prevailing there enclosed in your despatch No. 1301 of the 20th instant affords some confirmation; but it hardly accounts for the discrepancy, and I can only admit to being puzzled.

4. Be the truth what it may, it is pretty clear that more capital will have to be put into Turkey before any interest is likely to come out. The Turks will, I anticipate, make a loan an essential condition of any settlement of the debt question; and bondholders and lenders, under the influence of such impressions as I have detailed above, will require the most stringent guarantees for past and future loans. Some sort of advisers might conceivably meet the requirements of European financiers, but, though the Turks freely admit the need of foreign help, their efforts to obtain it have not hitherto been of a promising nature. There are a very few foreign experts working unobtrusively in Turkey on adequate salaries, notably a German-Swiss in the Agricultural Bank, and I think one or two in the Posts and Telegraphs; but usually the foreigners engaged are cheap men of a low type. In every case the Turkish authorities carefully and even ostentatiously avoid consulting the foreign Government in the selection of their experts. When Ali Haidar, Prefect of Angora, wanted foreigners to help in the modernisation of his town, he went to Berlin and recruited thirty or forty Germans by advertising in the papers. The men are of the foreman type and are paid about £10 a month in gold, and there have been endless difficulties with them ever since (and even before) they arrived. When the Ministers decided last spring to engage Hungarian engineers for the railways they sent someone to Budapest with orders to find the men and have them sent to Turkey within a fortnight. Of course, the engineers have proved complete failures, and the Hungarian Minister has had great difficulty in saving them from dismissal. To afford satisfaction to a European lender, an adviser would surely have to have wide executive powers clearly laid down in some formal agreement, perhaps even in a treaty. The Turks are as yet far from any such conception, and *à fortiori* still further from any idea of surrendering the control and administration of any special revenues to a foreign body such as the Council of the Debt. It is useless to show how valuable advisers may be in the future or what inestimable services the Debt Administration has rendered in the past. The Turk may be unhappy under present misgovernment, but he consoles himself with the thought that at last he has swept the foreigner out of every position of privilege and influence in the country, and at last Turkey is really governed by the Turk. It is hard to believe that any section of opinion outside Constantinople is yet ready for the great reversal of policy involved in derogation from this principle.

5. The inference to be drawn is that negotiations between the Government and the bondholders in the near future are likely to end in failure and that things must get worse before they can get better. The prospect seems equally gloomy for both parties.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 59/55/44] No. 3.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 5, 1925.)

(No. 959.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 955 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report information given by the Greek Chargé d'Affaires at Angora to a member of my staff regarding the position of the new Patriarch.

2. M. Politis declared that owing to the popular clamour the Turkish Government had actually at one moment decided to order the immediate expulsion of Mgr. Constantine from Turkey, should he be elected Patriarch, without waiting for any pronouncement by the League of Nations Mixed Commission. M. Politis had at once sought an interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and strongly protested. At first the latter refused to listen to him, saying that it was purely an affair of internal politics. M. Politis thereupon reminded him of Ismet Pasha's pledge of the 10th January, 1923, at Lausanne, and enquired if the Turkish Government realised the effect which a decision tantamount to making that pledge ineffective would have, not only in Athens but also in London. According to M. Politis, Chukri Kaya then changed his tone and discussed the question for two and a half hours. As a result of that conversation, Chukri Kaya had promised to ask the Minister of the Interior to modify the instructions sent to the police at

Constantinople, not only in the direction of leaving Mgr. Constantine, if elected, free to carry on his duties, until a legal decision had been reached by the Mixed Commission under the Exchange of Populations Convention, but also in the sense of acting with greater circumspection in their treatment of the Synod and the Patriarchate as a whole.

3. Some colour is lent to this version of what happened by the facts that the press campaign about the expulsion of the Patriarchate has suddenly subsided, and that to-day's papers produce a communiqué from Athens, issued by the Turkish Legation there, to the effect that the Turkish Government respects the Œcumenical Patriarchate as an institution purely religious and devoid of all political character, and that as regards the new Patriarch the Turkish Government observes a strictly neutral attitude, his case being a matter for the Mixed Commission.

4. M. Politis stated that the Greek case for the retention of the present Patriarch here, though, perhaps, technically exchangeable, rested on the argument set forth in my despatch No. 940 of the 24th December, namely, that Ismet Pasha's pledge of the 10th January (see pp. 326–7 of the Lausanne Conference Blue Book) related to the Patriarchate as an institution, and that its members, wherever they travelled or were sent to serve, were really still part of the institution at Constantinople. M. Politis added that at first difficulties had been raised by the neutral members of the Mixed Commission, who argued that they could only take cognisance of the text of the Exchange of Populations Convention, where no mention was made of the Patriarchate or Metropolitans. M. Politis had retorted that if that argument were valid the neutral members of the commission would have to endorse the passports of Greeks on Tenedos and Imbros if the Turks suddenly decided to expel them, because their exemption from the exchange was only secured by article 14 of the main Treaty of Lausanne and not by the convention itself. Clearly the commission must be guided by common sense, and take account of the whole framework of the Lausanne settlement.

5. M. Politis now thinks that all the neutral members are in favour of pronouncing against the exchangeability of the new Patriarch and, indeed, of any members of the Synod, but he is still a little doubtful of General de Lara.

6. The change in the Turkish Government's attitude M. Politis ascribes to his opportune reminder to Chukri Kaya Bey of Great Britain's interest in the matter, and he is, I think, anxious to create generally, but unostentatiously, the impression here that Great Britain is behind Greece. As the political aspect of the Patriarchate cannot be entirely separated from the religious, and as the Greek Government are doubtless chiefly anxious about the former, I think it is fortunate that the whole question seems to have been steered into the hands of an impartial judicial body like the Mixed Commission, whose decision, it is to be hoped, all parties will accept.

7. The reflection also seems justified that the Greek Government is no longer incapable of fighting its own diplomatic battles and defending its own interests with the Turkish Government, without the assistance of any of the Great Powers.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 10620/7840/44**] No. 4.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1925.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 869 of the 26th November last, enclosing copies of a memorandum prepared by the Allied Juridical Commission in Constantinople, regarding the Turkish infractions of the minorities clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne. The memorandum was taken to Rome by the British delegation to the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held there last month, and formed the subject of several informal conversations both with the French delegation and with the Director of the Minorities Section of the League.

2. As a result of these conversations, I am inclined to consider that the case, in its present form, is not a sufficiently convincing one to justify the action which

has been proposed. It is, in fact, possible that the Turkish Government may be able to put forward some kind of plausible defence in regard to practically all the infractions of which they would be accused. For example, as regards the Abandoned Property Laws, the Turkish Government would no doubt argue that the law was of universal application, and was not directed specially against the minorities, who are in fact not mentioned therein; while, as regards the question of the return of Ottoman Armenians to Turkey, that the question formed the subject of lengthy discussions at Lausanne, which led to no undertaking on the part of the Turks that the persons concerned would be allowed to re-enter the Turkish State.

3. Such lines of defence would not be convincing, and in view of the known facts of the case would indeed be disingenuous and misleading. But there is little doubt that it will be necessary on future occasions to bring Turkish infractions of the minorities clauses of the treaty before the League, and I am, therefore, of opinion that the first occasion on which such action is taken should be one where the case against the Turkish Government is overwhelmingly clear and of such a nature as not to admit even of a plausible defence. I understand that this view is shared by the Director of the Minorities Section of the League, and that there is a serious risk that if the case is brought forward in its present form, the only result may be to weaken the hands of the League in dealing with future cases of a similar nature.

4. The Council of the League will, however, be dealing to some extent with the question of the treatment of minorities in Turkey and in Greece at its next meeting in March, when it will consider the reports received from the Greek and Turkish Governments on the treatment of the Turkish and Greek minorities in Western Thrace and Constantinople respectively. This will offer an occasion for any other representations in regard to the minorities question which it may be decided to make. If, therefore, any further information of a more convincing nature in connection with the Turkish treatment of minorities can be obtained before that date, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to reconsider their attitude and possibly to reopen the question with the French and Italian Governments with a view to a joint communication on the subject to the Council of the League. It is possible that such further information may be obtainable in regard to the expulsions of Ottoman Christians from South-Eastern Anatolia to Syria and elsewhere, which, as you are aware, have formed the subject of considerable previous correspondence between this Department and His Majesty's mission.

5. I shall, therefore, be glad if you will consider this question again in the light of the present despatch, and report to me before the middle of next month whether any further information of the nature referred to above is likely to be available.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[**E 194/194/44**] No. 5.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 7, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that, since the 17th December, the date of my despatch No. 924, two changes in the Turkish Cabinet have taken place. In the first place it has been decided by the Assembly that a separate Ministry of Marine shall be constituted, and one Ihsan Bey, Deputy for Jebel-i-Bereket, has been selected to fill the new post. Apart from the technical side of this question, on which I am reporting separately, the only political importance of this event is the personality of Ihsan Bey. I am given to understand that he is one of the President's most devoted personal henchmen, and his appointment must indicate a strengthening in Fethi Bey's Government of those influences opposed to the liberalism which Fethi Bey himself seems to profess. The other, and the more important, change is the resignation of Rejeb Bey, Minister of the Interior, which was announced on the 4th instant, and took the public somewhat by surprise. The reason alleged in the letter of resignation is that a majority of the Cabinet had decided that in future prefects of large towns such as Constantinople and Angora should be elected instead of being appointed by the Government. This was one of the items in the programme of the new Progressive party which was more or less adopted by the People's party,

and, put shortly, it means that Constantinople shall be allowed to manage her own municipal affairs instead of having them managed for her by Angora. To this measure Rejeb cannot assent, and he therefore resigns. As he is the most capable of Fethi's lieutenants, his disappearance from office weakens the Government; probably also it means that Fethi's premiership is drawing to its close and that Rejeb is preparing or being prepared to succeed him at the head of a new Cabinet more reactionary in character and readier to adopt the vigorous methods which are favoured by Mustafa Kemal. Jemil Bey, Deputy for Rodosto and hitherto secretary-general of the People's party, succeeds Rejeb at the Interior. I have as yet no information as to his personality worth reporting.

2. That Fethi himself is being pushed in the direction of reaction is shown by the decision taken a week ago to close the two small newspapers, the "Tok Seuz" and the English "Orient News." Concerning the latter I have reported to you separately. The article of the press law in virtue of which these journals are closed authorises the Council of Ministers temporarily to suspend papers whose writings are of a nature to imperil the internal or external security of the State. Intrinsically the Government's action is of minor importance, but it is clearly regarded by the papers of Constantinople as a serious menace for the future liberty of the press. Editorial articles criticise the Government severely and express disappointment that Fethi, whom they regarded as a moderate man, should have allowed himself to be drawn into the path of repression. In the Assembly on the 4th January Fethi made a speech in reply to an interpellation on the subject in which, so far as the "Tok Seuz" is concerned, he covered the action taken by pointing to its strict legality, strongly disavowing at the same time any ulterior aims against the liberty of the press. A considerable part of his speech was devoted to the case of the "Orient News," in which he made the point that from foreign journals who enjoy the hospitality of Turkish soil the courtesy may be expected of avoiding the use of immoderate language. The speech made a good impression on the Deputies, but, on the whole, it rather confirmed the view that the closing of the insignificant "Orient News" was only meant to cover with an anti-foreign, and therefore rather popular, appearance a menace really addressed to the Opposition press of Constantinople in general.

3. From the first it was clear that Fethi's Cabinet was transitional in character, and it then looked as if the President, alarmed at the defections from his own party, was trying to draw nearer to the new Opposition. This view is probably erroneous. Mustafa Kemal, by appointing Fethi to the Premiership, took pressure off the Progressives with the result that they have made little or no apparent progress in the last weeks and their sails are hanging limp in the air. He is now preparing again to follow courses which he has really never abandoned, and I can only feel surprised that he should be readjusting his policy so soon.

4. The Assembly continues its regular sittings which, from the newspaper accounts, are of exemplary dullness. Occasionally there is some tub-thumping over Greek misdemeanours in Western Thrace, but more usually the subjects for discussion are of parochial interest only—provision of school books, the Fresco bar incident, a grant-in-aid to some calamity-stricken town, or the disposal of the furniture from the ex-Imperial palaces. There is an atmosphere of unreality in these proceedings when one thinks of the vast legislative work of reconstruction and readaptation that has for months past been urgently necessary. The fiscal, educational and judicial systems all require remodelling, and a new code of family law must be created; doubtless, projects are under preparation, but my colleagues from Angora tell me that they never hear them spoken of.

5. The President of the Republic, accompanied by Latife Hanum, has left Angora and is now making a stay at Koniah. How the journey will be extended, if at all, and what its object is, are questions wrapt in mystery, on which the press has exhausted its speculations. One theory, for which I cannot vouch, is that the Government intends to appropriate to the use of the State the very considerable properties of the Bektashi and Mevlevi Dervishes, whose centre has always been at Koniah and in that part of Anatolia.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 195/58/44] No. 6.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 18.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 7, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum with enclosures, which has been prepared by Sir Adam Block in regard to the Turkish budget estimates for the past and coming years.

2. Copies of Annexes 4 and 5 are not enclosed as they are identical with those already sent in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

Sir Adam Block to Mr. Lindsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 5, 1925.

BY direction of Sir Adam Block, I beg to enclose herewith, for your information, copy of a memorandum which he has prepared on the budget of Turkey for the years 1924–25 and 1925–26.

In this memorandum special notice must be taken of the credits, to the amount of £T. 20 million, shown on the last page, affected to extraordinary purposes, such as railway construction, &c.

I have, &c.
(For Sir Adam Block),
V. GARIBIAN, *Secretary.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

Memorandum on the Budget of Turkey for the Years 1924–25 *and* 1925–26.

REVENUE for the year 1924–25 was estimated at £T. 129·2 million and expenditure at £T. 140·4 million, showing thus a deficit of £T. 11·2 million. After the budget was approved by the Chamber of Deputies supplementary credits were voted during the year for £T. 16 million.

In pre-war times the Ministry of Finance, in presenting the budget, showed its receipts for the past year and receipts for nine months of the current year, but no accounts are now forthcoming at all, regarding the actual results of the current year, which finishes the 29th February next, and it is impossible to ascertain how the deficit has been covered. The Minister of Finance has stated that certain credits would not be required, and that receipts would in some cases be higher than had been anticipated, but, in the absence of definite figures, these statements are of little value, and it is not unlikely that the surmise is correct that the Government has, to a certain extent, availed itself of secret reserves and has utilised the proceeds of the sale of property abandoned by the deported populations.

The receipts of 1924–25 were estimated, as stated above, at £T. 129·2 million, an increase of £T. 35·5 million on the preceding year. The figures given are at the least exceedingly optimistic, and, as a matter of fact, many items where an increase was expected have shown a decrease.

Taking the global figure of receipts and allowing for loss of territory by the war and the depreciation of the Turkish lira, there is a drop of 13 per cent. in 1924–25 compared with the receipts of the last pre-war period. The indirect taxation produces 39 per cent. of the total receipts, whereas before the war it produced 20 per cent. The increase is due to the new consumption taxes and to the increase in the value of the articles taxed *ad valorem*.

It is to be noted that it is to the advantage of the Government, which pleads poverty as an excuse for not paying its creditors, to show a deficit. Taking the population at 13·2 millions (this figure is the Government estimate; I consider it far too high), the burden of taxation works out at £1 6*s*. per head, or £T. 11 paper currency. Before the war it was £T. 1·41 gold, or £T. 11·28 paper currency. Annexed is a table showing the burden of taxation per head in England, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Turkey (Annex 1*).

* Not printed.

Passing to expenditure, the budget of 1924–25 showed a decrease of £T. 6,368,000 as against the preceding year.

The war having come to an end, the "national defence" credit is reduced by 46 per cent., viz., to £T. 27·3 million. On the other hand, the expenditure on the navy and on railway construction has been increased. The aggregate amount affected to army and navy represents 24 per cent. of the total expenditure.

No provision was made for the external debt on the ground, it is stated, that the distribution of the debt has not yet been defined. The additional credit required for this purpose would amount to about £T. 60 million for payment in the currencies mentioned in the various loan contracts.

I annex a table showing a comparison between the receipts for 1924–25 and 1923–24 (Annex 2*) and a table showing expenditure for 1924–25 and 1923–24 (Annex 3*).

The budget for next year, 1925–26, is on a still more generous scale. The receipts are estimated at £T. 145·3 million and expenditure at £T. 162·3 million, the deficit being £T. 17 million.

It can be reasonably assumed that the Minister of Finance would not have budgeted for £T. 145·3 million of receipts as against £T. 129·2 million in 1924–25, viz., an increase of £T. 16 million, had he not the conviction, acquired perhaps from his knowledge of the actual revenue of the current year, that the estimate of that year has been actually exceeded, and the fact that he faces a deficit next year, seemingly without perturbation, shows either that he believes his estimate of receipts is still capable of expansion or that he is wilfully underestimating his receipts in order again to show to the public the desperate financial situation of the country, which would justify Turkey in demanding a reduction of the debt charges.

If the above budgetary estimates are correct there is a deficit of £T. 11 million in 1924–25 and supplementary credits for £T. 16 million; the deficit of 1925–26 being of £T. 17 million, the total deficit in the two years amounts to £T. 44 million. How is this possible?

The notable increases in the estimated receipts for 1925–26 are :—

	£T.
Land tax	6,000,000
Professional tax ("temettu")	1,000,000
Customs	4,500,000
Tobacco revenue	5,700,000
Sale of State lands	6,500,000
Consumption tax (petroleum, sugar, tea, &c.)	3,100,000
	26,800,000

Exception can be taken to several of these items, more especially to items 1, 4 and 5, but there is no doubt that a better control in the Customs Department, where very extensive corruption exists, and in the collection of the consumption tax, together with an improvement in trade, may justify a certain optimism.

The increase in the land tax is attributed to the new law on the collection of the tithe, which includes the sextupling (or more?) of the land tax. Time will show if this will produce £T. 6 million. It has been asserted that the tax collectors will have difficulty in extracting the tax from the landowners in outlying districts, who may be without sufficient ready cash to meet the new demand, and further, that from lands which have been reassessed during late years the increase is so heavy that the landowner will be unable to stand the strain, which on rural property will be 24 per cent. on the estimated value of the land. The produce of the land, if exported or sold, is still subject to a tax of 10 per cent.

A tax on profits is to replace "temettu" (the professional tax). In view of commercial depression, it may be doubted whether the estimated increase of £T. 1,000,000 is justified.

The receipts from tithe, spirits, posts and telegraphs show a decrease of—

	£T.
Tithes	8,150,000
Spirits	2,100,000
Posts and telegraphs	1,330,000
Total	11,580,000

The tithe suffers a decrease of £T. 8,150,000. The system of adjudication and the farming of the tithe is to be abolished. Products to be exported or consumed in towns will pay 10 per cent. (instead of 12½ per cent.), and products consumed by the peasantry itself or in the villages are exempt from all taxes. Hence the estimated decrease. There will certainly be to the producer an alleviation of his burdens, but contraband and an increase in the number of officials required to carry out the operations necessitated by the new law may still further reduce the benefits of the State.

Passing to the expenditure, the draft budget for next year shows an increase on the current year of £T. 21,856,000. The items showing an increase are :—

	£T.
National defence	6,421,000
Pensions	1,817,000
Public debt	1,535,000
Justice	1,376,000
Customs	1,294,000
Foreign affairs	1,170,000
Police and gendarmerie	1,547,000
Public education	1,007,000
Health	1,593,000
Interior	923,000
Total	18,683,000
Other Departments	3,173,000
Total	21,856,000

Of the above sum £T. 8,641,325 are for increase of salaries. The number of officials rises from 74,477 to 79,673.

For the first time the present Government has made some provision for the service of the external debt. A sum of £T. 2·2 million has been provided. It would require for the integral payment of the annuities (excluding arrears) a sum fifteen times as great, if the currency of the contracts is to be respected.

No mention is made of the sum of 40 million francs required to buy out the existing Tobacco Régie Company, probably because this sum is to be deducted from the net revenue of the last year of the Régie.

The budget of next year, in the same manner as that of the current year, contains certain extraordinary credits as follows :—

	£T. Million.
Construction of the railway Samsoun–Sivas–Angora	8·0
Construction of the railway Diarbekir–Arghana	1·0
Construction of the railway Kutahia–Tavchanli ...	2·0
Railway repairs	2·0
Construction of a harbour at Mersina	0·2
Irrigation works at Brussa	0·4
Exchange of populations	6·4
Total	20·0

I annex a table showing estimates of receipts (Annex 4*) for next year compared with the estimates of the current year's budget, and a comparative table (Annex 5*) of estimated expenditure.

ADAM BLOCK.

Constantinople, December 1924.

[E 197/197/44] No. 7.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 7, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 270 of the 26th March last, I have the honour to report that in its session of the 22nd ultimo the Grand National Assembly

* Not enclosed.

discussed a short Bill of four articles for the creation of a separate Ministry of Marine.

2. Article 1 of the Bill, laying down that naval affairs should be taken from the Ministry of National Defence, and that a Ministry of Marine should be set up to deal with them, was accepted without difficulty.

3. Article 2: "The Naval Staff is under the orders of the Chief of the Naval Staff, and is attached to the Department of the Chief of the General Staff," gave rise to a heated debate, in which the Prime Minister intervened to explain the reasons for attaching the Naval Staff to the General Staff. Fethi Bey stated that the defence of the country against foreign aggression, whether by land or sea or air, was one, and must therefore be concentrated in the hands of the General Staff. The Government were convinced of the advantage of having a separate Ministry of Marine to carry out reforms in the navy, to have ships repaired, and to deal with the question of the training of naval officers. The Ministry of National Defence had not the time to deal efficiently with such matters. Fethi Bey urged the creation of a Ministry of Marine with a budget of £T. 5,000,000 or £T. 6,000,000, otherwise, he said, the country might find itself without a navy at the end of a few years.

4. The debate was continued in the Grand National Assembly on the 29th ultimo, when Fethi Bey, replying to a criticism that the Bill gave the Ministry of Marine two heads, stated that the Minister of Marine would deal with the fleet and the General Staff with the co-ordination of the movements of the fleet in time of war. After some further discussion, the Bill was passed without amendment by 138 votes to 24.

5. Article 3, stating that the law enters into force from the date of its promulgation, and article 4, entrusting the Council of Ministers with the carrying out of the law, are the articles with which Turkish laws of the present régime invariably end.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 8.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 12, 1925.

MY despatch No. 959 of 31st December.

Greek Chargé d'Affaires informs me that his Government are alarmed by turn which question of patriarchate seems to be taking.

League of Nations' representatives on Mixed Commission have drafted resolution whereby they admit technical liability of present Patriarch to exchange, but consider other issues raised by whole question of patriarchate to be such that decision is outside their competence.

Turks will accept this resolution, but Greeks, fearing that Turkish Government will abuse situation so created to get rid of Patriarch before signatories of Lausanne Treaty can intervene, have delayed final decision of commission by reference to Athens.

Greek fears are, I think, exaggerated, and draft resolution of commission has, at any rate, merit of preventing Patriarch leaving the country as an exchanged person, as its terms will preclude commission from giving necessary visa for his departure.

Clearly, however, League of Nations' representatives are shelving a responsibility which it would be much better that they should take, and, unless some intervention follows their decision, Turkish Government may be driven to revive pressure on Patriarch to leave.

M. Politis has therefore urged his Government to take matter up in Paris, Rome and London in order that Lausanne signatories may either intervene directly or may induce League of Nations to instruct their representatives on Mixed Commission to take cognisance of Ismet's Lausanne pledge and decide issue themselves.

In my own opinion latter solution would be much better than direct intervention by Powers. I am not clear, however, by what procedure it can be effected, since matter is still technically before Mixed Commission, and since legal competence of League and their members on Mixed Commission in this issue may be considered

open to doubt. In any case, I believe it probable that any sign that Great Powers or His Majesty's Government were alive to necessity of strict fulfilment of Ismet's pledge and were watching issue would prevent Turks taking any hasty action should Mixed Commission pass proposed resolution. I also think League's representatives on Mixed Commission are unduly timid and do not realise how difficult it will be for Turkish Government to reject any League decision.

No. 9.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January* 13, 1925.

MY telegram No. 3.

Copy goes to Athens by bag to-morrow.

[**E 276/175/44**] No. 10.

Memorandum on Zekiai Bey's Suggestions regarding Mosul.

THE upshot of the Turkish Minister's conversations with Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir G. Lloyd is that if only we will agree to restore Mosul to Turkey she will be ready to conclude a close economic and political *entente* with us, greatly to our advantage.

2. A similar hint was conveyed to Lord Curzon at Lausanne by Ismet Pasha, who indicated that if Turkey got satisfaction as regards Mosul she would concede anything else for which we might ask in the treaty. The present reappearance of an offer of this kind certainly shows (even when due allowance has been made for the usual Turkish love of "bazaar" methods in negotiation) that the Turks still attach real importance to the Mosul question, and the emphasis laid by the Turkish Minister on the Kurdish question as a vital interest for Turkey suggests that, while this can hardly be their only concern in the matter, it does weigh with them a great deal from the point of view of their prestige with the Kurds in their own territory. Their anxiety in this respect is intelligible and may be genuine.

3. For us, the Turkish Minister's overtures raise two sets of questions: (*a*) Is it now possible or desirable to withdraw the matter from the League of Nations and try to settle it direct by a bargain of this kind with the Turks? and (*b*) what is the value of the economic advantages (railways, oil, &c.) which the Minister holds out to us?

4. Dealing first with (*a*), it was decided some three or four weeks ago, in view of the arguments advanced by Mr. Lindsay, to abandon the idea of direct negotiations which had been raised by the Turkish Minister at his first interview with the Secretary of State, and to inform the Minister, if he reverted to the subject, that His Majesty's Government prefer to leave the matter in the hands of the League. The question, therefore, arises whether the latest proposals of the Turkish Minister justify a departure from that decision.

5. In the first place, it seems doubtful whether His Majesty's Government now have the right to negotiate direct with the Turks on this subject. The Treaty of Lausanne provided for a period of nine months within which the two Governments should endeavour to reach direct agreement. That period expired last July, after the breakdown of the Constantinople Conference, owing to the refusal of the Turks to recede one inch from their claim to the whole of the Mosul Vilayet. The dispute was then referred, in accordance with the treaty, to the Council of the League, and the Council, after hearing what the Turks and we had to say, formally accepted the task of finding a solution and appointed a commission to investigate the matter and furnish proposals for a settlement.

6. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that we still have the right to negotiate direct with the Turks and to settle the matter out of court by a deal which involves the cession of Mosul to Turkey, such a procedure involves several serious difficulties:—

(*a*.) We have solemnly claimed, in the case which we presented to the Council of the League, that the severing of the Mosul Vilayet from Irak would create an absurdity from the racial, economic and strategic points of

view. If we now give up Mosul in exchange for other advantages, how can we justify this *volte-face* to the League and the world in general?

(*b.*) A surrender of Mosul to Turkey would be regarded by the Irakis as a shameless desertion. Last summer the Irak Constituent Assembly made great difficulties about accepting our treaty with King Feisal, and finally tacked on to their resolution a rider to the effect that their acceptance was conditional on their getting satisfaction as regards Mosul. The Irakis are now more than ever restive against our control, though we have gone to great lengths in order to meet their aspirations towards independence, &c., and a Turco-British deal over Mosul would be most damaging to our prestige.

(*c.*) We should incur a still more disagreeable responsibility as regards the Christian populations in the northern part of the Mosul Vilayet, who would be exposed to the full vigour of Turkish vengeance if they were now handed back to the tender mercies of Angora.

(*d.*) Past experience of efforts to reach direct agreement with the Turks is discouraging. First, there was the breakdown of the Constantinople Conference; then, after the end of the nine months period, the Turks expressed their preference for direct negotiation without going to the League, but when pressed for concrete proposals failed to produce any; then came their unsavoury negotiations with Lord Inverforth behind our back; then their overtures to the late Prime Minister, with which it has been decided not to proceed; and, finally, since the change of Government, an attempt (of which the precise details are unknown to us) to exert pressure on His Majesty's Government by the offer to a British group of a concession for the Mosul oil on the return of Mosul to Turkey.

(*e.*) The commission appointed by the League has already been at work for about two months, has visited London, Constantinople and Angora, and is about to arrive in Irak in order to investigate matters on the spot. Things having gone so far, it would be, to say the least of it, discourteous to the commission and the Council to ignore all the work they have undertaken at our and the Turks' request, just when the commission is in the midst of its labours.

(*f.*) Our recent experience at Brussels shows how much easier it is for the Turks to accept decisions by the Council of the League affecting the Irak frontier—even though they involve the withdrawal of Turkish troops—than to comply with similar demands from us alone. We might therefore be throwing away a trump card if we made serious concessions to the Turks now, instead of waiting for the recommendations of the commission and the decision of the Council, which may very possibly be favourable to our claims and yet be accepted by the Turks. And even in the improbable event of the Turks rejecting a decison of the Council which is favourable to us, we should be in a far stronger position than they, as we have undertaken to accept the decision of the Council unconditionally, whatever it may be.

7. Turning now to (*b*), the Turkish *quid pro quo* is, on the face of it, extremely generous, but it suffers from an invidious similarity to the offers incorporated in the French Franklin-Bouillon Treaty and the American Chester Concession. In return for the Mosul Vilayet, His Majesty's Government are offered an alliance with Turkey, or, at any rate, undying gratitude embodied in a full measure of political friendship and economic preference. Examination of these offers does not greatly commend them. The suggestion of an alliance no doubt emanates solely from the eager imagination of the Turkish Minister, but even if it possessed a more substantial basis it would not be likely to recommend itself to a British Government or Parliament. The last thing we want is to resume the onerous, but thankless, office of the guardian of Turkey against Russia. It is a Victorian heirloom that we are well rid of. As for the gratitude of Turkey, her entry into the war against us after all we had done for her during the previous fifty years proves it an illusory asset.

8. There remain the more practical proposals of the attribution to British enterprise of (1) oil rights in the restored Mosul Vilayet, and (2) railway rights in Turkey. As regards the first, it may be presumed that, in the unlikely event of the restoration of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey, His Majesty's Government would continue to assert the validity of the original Turkish "concession" to the Turkish

Petroleum Company, although they might avail themselves of the Turkish offer in order to confirm the original and not altogether convincing document. This offer would therefore present a certain advantage should the Turks fulfil their side of the bargain, which is always a hazardous assumption.

9. As regards the Bagdad Railway, which Zekiai light-heartedly offers to His Majesty's Government, this is a Turkish utility undertaking, of which the majority of the shares are held by the French and by the Reparation Commission. In proposing to hand it over to British enterprise, the Turks quite typically ignore the rights of the present shareholders. They also—and equally characteristically—ignore article 10 of the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty, by which the Bozanti–Nisibin section of the railway was allotted to the French. Of the other Turkish railways, the most important is the Anatolian, on a majority shareholding of which a British group, the Anglo-Turkish Trust Company, hold an option. This company has for the past two years been engaged in vain attempts to induce the Turkish Government to restore the line to them as representatives of the shareholders. The former's refusal to do so is perhaps the best of a number of indications that the policy of the Turkish Government is to retain their hold on their own railway and other enterprises, although, on this condition, they are prepared to allow new foreign capital to be sunk in them, and possibly to admit the assistance of foreign experts. As a matter of fact, we do not want the Bagdad Railway; it has always been understood, although the understanding has never been formally stated, that the French would control this line. We do want, and we are entitled, to control the Anatolian, but this right has never been admitted by the Turks, who no doubt realise its bargaining value—a value which is enormously enhanced by the Turkish system when the same concession can be pledged to M. Franklin-Bouillon in a formal agreement, promised to Admiral Chester, and none the less offered to His Majesty's Government. It seems fairly clear that all the Turks want, and all we should get, from the railways offer would be the privilege of investing further British capital, possibly in accordance with the advice of British technical advisers, in the existing and prospective development of the Turkish railway system. It is most unlikely that we should get any real control over these undertakings, and even questionable whether we should be able to extract any returns on the investment.

10. Some of these considerations might well be adumbrated to Zekiai Bey. He might be reminded that a considerable portion of the Bagdad Railway was pledged to the French under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, and asked what that devoted friend of his country, General Mougin, would think of his present suggestion. The similarity of his proposals to the terms of the Chester Concession might be drawn to his attention. The difficulties of the British group interested in the Anatolian Railway might be recalled to him. And, lastly, there might be represented to him the feelings of the unfortunate British holders of Turkish Consolidated Bonds and Constantinople Municipal Loan.

11. Finally, Zekiai Bey's authority in the whole matter is open to grave doubt. We know that in his previous attempt to achieve the same end through the late Government and Lord Inverforth the initiative came mainly from himself, and that he had some difficulty in inducing Ismet to sanction his approaches to the latter gentleman. We have no guarantee that his present offers of alliances, the development of oil resources and the financing and controlling of all Turkish railways are inspired or endorsed by his Government. Still less that any obligations that he might assume would be honoured by subsequent Turkish Governments. We are only too painfully familiar with the Turkish manœuvres of bargaining with one Power at the expense of others and of exploiting consequent complications to evade the fulfilment of promises. For a variety of reasons, therefore, Zekiai's advances should be received with the utmost caution. The very method of indirect approach through private business interests is open to suspicion and objection, and is typical of Turkish diplomacy, with its offensive assumption that His Majesty's Government can be induced by the offer of financial and economic advantages to betray Irak and flout the League.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
January 14, 1925.

[E 291/55/44] No. 11.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 13, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 3 of the 12th January and my despatch No. 959 of the 31st December, I have the honour to report some further information regarding the present position of the discussion of the question of the Greek Patriarch in the Mixed Commission of the Exchange of Populations. This information was given in confidence to a member of my staff by M. Petersen, the Swedish substitute delegate, on the sub-committee of the commission who are examining the issue.

2. After long discussions the neutral members of the sub-committee have drafted a formula which in substance affirms the technical liability to exchange of the individual Mgr. Constantine according to the terms of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations; but, in view of the obligations understood to have been undertaken by the Turkish Government at Lausanne with regard to the patriarchate, the Mixed Commission regard the issues raised by the case of Mgr. Constantine to be outside their powers to decide.

3. According to M. Petersen, this draft, if passed as a resolution by the main commission, would effectively prevent the present Patriarch being "exchanged," because no one can be sent out of the country as an "exchanged" person without the visa of the commission. At the same time, the commission relieve themselves of the duty of interpreting the obligation taken by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne to maintain the patriarchate, which will then be a matter, they feel, for the Great Powers to settle with the Turkish Government. The draft also satisfies the Turkish representatives on the commission, who are prepared to accept it, because, at any rate, it admits the "exchangeability" of Mgr Constantine under the terms of the convention. On the other hand, the Greek representative on the sub-committee has asked for ten days' delay in order to return to Athens and consult his Government. This has been agreed to. He has given it to be understood that he wishes to propose to his Government a personal suggestion of his own—that the patriarchate be removed altogether to Mount Athos. Outside the sub-committee he has explained to the neutral members that, in his opinion, the draft resolution, by its admission of Mgr. Constantine's exchangeability, would again rouse Turkish opinion against the patriarchate and drive the Government either to make its position here intolerable or to force the present Patriarch to leave the country in spite of the refusal of the Mixed Commission to visa his passport.

4. M. Petersen and his colleagues doubt whether the suggestion regarding Mount Athos has been seriously put forward. They believe that the Greek Government is anxious to delay matters in order that somehow or other the League of Nations or the Great Powers may be able to intervene before, even, any final decision is taken by the Mixed Commission. On the other hand, my information leads me to believe that in local Greek circles connected with the patriarchate the possibility of having to move the patriarchate to Mount Athos *is* being seriously considered.

5. Whatever policy the Greek Government intend their representatives to adopt, it seems unfortunately probable that the neutral members of the Mixed Commission are about to give another display of timidity, similar to that which they showed in the early stages of the *établis* dispute. On technical legal grounds they have perhaps a better case for rejecting the responsibility of a decision, but they are unaware of the strength of their position (a strength founded on the attitude of both the Greek and Turkish Governments towards the League of Nations), and they do not appreciate how much they could do to relieve the tension of Græco-Turkish relations by taking up a firm and decided attitude on the issues which come before them and pushing matters through quickly, if necessary, to a majority decision.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 362/362/65] No. 12.

Note communicated by M. de Fleuriau.

NÉGOCIATIONS franco-turques au sujet de transports militaires sur les tronçons syrien et turc de l'ancien Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

Le Gouvernement français insiste pour faire ajouter au texte déjà accepté par le Gouvernement turc la formule : "Il va de soi que la présente convention ne porte pas atteinte aux obligations imposées par la Société des Nations et, en cas de guerre, par les règles de la neutralité." On a fait remarquer au Gouvernement turc que la Cour de Justice de La Haye donnerait certainement raison à la thèse française No. 1.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 20 janvier 1925.

[E 429/175/44] No. 13.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 21, 1925.*

THE Turkish Minister, whom I had not seen since my first reception of the Diplomatic Corps, called upon me this afternoon by appointment made at his request.

2. Zekiai Bey observed that he had had more than one conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, but this was his first opportunity of speaking to me about the relations between our two countries. It appeared to him that Turkey offered a great sphere for economic collaboration between the two countries. Were there, he asked himself, any political obstacles to such economic collaboration? He saw no insuperable obstacles either on the Turkish or on the British side. He thought, therefore, that such a collaboration was possible, and that the "little affair" of Mosul ought not to interpose an obstacle. All depended upon the attitude of the British Government and whether it was disposed to see Turkey established as a strong and stable Power.

3. I replied that there was no desire on the side of His Majesty's Government or the British people except to cultivate friendly relations with Turkey as now established.

4. Encouraged by this expression of our general policy, the Turkish Minister approached the question which really lay at the root of his demand for an interview. Why could we not settle together the question of the Mosul boundary without waiting for the decision of the League of Nations? For Turkey this was a vital matter. She could not acquiesce in the division of the Kurds. If we could agree to cede Mosul to Turkey, arrangements in regard to economic interests could easily be made. We might, he indicated, have the exploitation of the oil-fields and a guarantee from Turkey, as far as she was concerned, of the integrity of Irak as thus delimited.

5. I told Zekiai Bey that I regretted that the Turkish Government and our own had been unable to reach an accord on this subject at Lausanne. In spite of Lord Curzon's express declarations, the Turkish Government appeared still to be under the illusion that the policy of the British Government was influenced by some interest in the oil-fields which might be found in that quarter. This was a complete delusion, but, putting that misapprehension aside, and turning to the substance of his proposal, what was the actual position? We had agreed to refer our difference to the League of Nations. We had stated our case in our capacity as the mandatories of Irak and trustees for the people of that country, and it was impossible that I should bargain away their rights or interests against economic concessions to Britain or British citizens. Having once referred the matter to the League, we had better await the League's decision, which His Majesty's Government had in advance pledged themselves to accept.

6. Zekiai Bey then began to suggest that if the decision of the League was adverse Turkey might be unable to acquiesce. I told him that I could not suppose that in this he was speaking the mind of his Government. It would be a serious thing for the Turkish Government to defy the British Empire, a still more serious thing, perhaps, for Turkey to place itself in opposition to the body which represented, as far as anything could represent, the consensus of civilised opinion. I was sure that there was too much wisdom in the councils of Angora for them to take so very grave a decision.

7. Zekiai Bey turned around this point for some time, developing Turkish difficulties, suggesting an exchange of populations and so forth; but I declined to alter my position. I was wholly at one with him in desiring friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain. I saw great economic advantages, especially for Turkey, in a cordial friendship between us, though I warned him incidentally that there could be no idea of a loan from the British Government; but I added that I did not think that we could usefully take up again the fruitless discussions of Lausanne, and that we should be wiser to await and to accept the decision of the Council of the League.

8. The Minister then asked me whether I refused to consider any proposals for an understanding. I told him that if the Turkish Government authorised him to make specific proposals I would, of course, give them most serious consideration, but I deprecated his making any such proposals if their basis was to be the cession of Mosul in return for economic concessions, for to such proposals I could only return a negative; and, in the second place, I insisted that if any proposals were to be made they must not be mere feelers on his part, for which the time had gone by, but proposals definitely authorised by his Government and by which that Government was prepared to stand.

9. Before leaving, Zekiai Bey asked whether, in the event of Turkey deciding to join the League of Nations, Great Britain would support a request by her for a permanent seat on the council. I told him that this was a request which apparently was going to be made to me by every country in turn. I could only say to him, as to others, that I must reserve our liberty till the question arose at Geneva.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[**E 412/55/44**] No. 14.

Memorandum from the Italian Embassy.—(*Received January* 23.)

(Translation.)

THE Turkish delegation has addressed to the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations a demand for the removal from Constantinople of the new Œcumenical Patriarch Constantine, asserting that this individual is included in the category of persons subject to exchange.

The Greek Legation in Rome has suggested to the Royal Government that it would be suitable that the League of Nations, in order rapidly to settle the possible dispute involved, which threatens to constitute a new obstacle to the re-establishment of normal and peaceful conditions in the Near East, should give proof of its interest in the question by drawing the attention of the Mixed Commission, which may be considered as an organ of the League, to the dispositions of the Lausanne agreements regarding the maintenance of the patriarchate at Constantinople. The Royal Embassy would be glad to know the views of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

Italian Embassy, London,
January 22, 1925.

[**E 415/55/44**] No. 15.

M. Caclamanos to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 24.)

Sir, *Greek Legation, London, January* 21, 1925.

FOLLOWING my note of the 29th December last, I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to draw the kind attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the continued danger of the expulsion of the newly elected Œcumenical Patriarch, Mgr. Constantine, and many of the prelates constituting the Holy Synod, on the ground that they are to be submitted to the stipulations for the exchange of populations embodied in the convention signed between Greece and Turkey on the 30th January, 1923, at Lausanne and constituting an integral part in the Lausanne Treaty.

The Greek Government think that if His Britannic Majesty's Government, as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, would be so kind as to suggest to

the secretary-general of the League of Nations to remind the neutral members of the Mixed Commission, now sitting in Constantinople and dealing with the question of the exchange of populations, that the Turkish delegation at the Conference of Lausaunne has given solemn pledges about the maintenance of the patriarchate in Constantinople, and that such declarations are to supersede any consideration deriving from the above-mentioned convention of the 13th January, 1923, a very important step to a favourable solution of the question and the maintenance of the patriarchate in Constantinople would be made.

The Greek Government venture to hope that the British Government, in their interest to the consolidation of peace and good understanding in the Near East, could see their way to make this suggestion to the secretary-general of the League of Nations, whose friendly intervention in the question will not fail to have, in their opinion, a conclusive result, impressing the Turkish Government that one of the important decisions reached at the Lausanne Conference could not be violated without attracting the attention of Governments who took part in the Conference of Lausanne.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

[**E 435/194/44**] No. 16

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 26.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 20, 1925.

I REPORTED in my despatch No. 17 of the 7th instant that Rifat Bey had resigned from the post of Minister of the Interior. Two or three days later it became evident that an acute Cabinet crisis had broken out in Angora as a result of Rejeb's withdrawal. The question at issue, you will recollect, was whether the prefects (*Anglicé* mayors) of Constantinople and Angora should, as now, be appointed by the Government, or, as the Prime Minister desired, be elected in some manner. Reference to a meeting of the People's party was necessary, and it was clear that Rejeb, who is a fine fighting politician, had the bulk of the party behind him and would be able to secure a decision in favour of his own view and against that of his late chief, Fethi Bey. For twenty-four hours it seemed as if Fethi would have to resign at once, and that a further split in the People's party might take place, this time over the definite issue of the prefects. Prolonged meetings of the Cabinet took place, and there was an incessant exchange of telegrams with the President, who was then at Koniah. What passed is of course not known, but in the end the Ghazi called a halt on the extremists of the Popular party, and it was forthwith decided that there should be no crisis. At the meeting of the party the proceedings passed off in a quiet manner; both Fethi and Rejeb explained their points of view, and the former announced that as a compromise measure the Government had decided to pass a law providing that prefects should be appointed by the Government from among the elected members of the municipal councils, a solution of the question which is probably distasteful to Fethi, and certainly entirely unsatisfactory to Constantinople and to the Opposition party in the Assembly. As to the President, he may have been unwilling to face the risk of a further disintegration of the Popular party, or he may have felt unready just yet to find a successor to Fethi Bey. Perhaps he was actuated by both motives; and as a result Fethi gets another lease of life as Prime Minister.

2. Mustafa Kemal himself is still on tour. He remained for ten days or so at Koniah, and as he took occasion to throw some bouquets at the Buyuk Chelebi (the hereditary head of the Mevlevi Dervishes) it may be inferred that there is no present intention of secularising the properties of the Dervish orders. From Koniah he has proceeded to Adana, and beyond it to Deurt Yol. There is still no indication of any definite reason for the journey, and there is no ground for regarding this visit to the Syrian frontier as in any sense an anti-French demonstration. Perhaps like that of last summer to the eastern provinces, it is an electioneering tour, the pleasure of which would be enhanced by the prospect of escaping from Angora at a particularly inclement season.

3. I reported in my despatch No. 924 of the 17th December that Nureddin Pasha, a reactionary, had been elected Deputy for Broussa, beating the official

candidate of the Popular party, and that the validity of the election was disputed on the ground that the Pasha had not duly resigned from his position as general in the army. The question came up for decision in the Assembly on the 18th January, and it turns on the interpretation of laws obscure in their meaning, as only Turkish laws can be. The serious lawyers of the Popular party took no part in the debate, and the progressives mostly spoke in favour of Nureddin's election, though he is a reactionary and by no means one of them. Finally, however, the back benchers of the Popular party took charge of the proceedings, and the vote went for invalidation by 130 odd to 56. The figures seem to show that there was some cross voting, and though the big battalions did win, it is creditable that some effort was made to settle the issue on non-party lines.

4. On the whole the past fortnight has been quiet and uneventful, and the press of the town has mainly occupied itself with the questions of how precisely Constantinople will get rid of her present prefect, and whether or not Mustafa Kemal's brother-in-law, when in a state of intoxication, did insult the wife of the Hungarian Minister at the "Rose Noire." These, however, are matters engrossing indeed, but not sufficiently august to occupy space in an official despatch.

5. Two or three weeks ago Ismet Pasha came down from Angora and established himself in Halki, one of the Prinkipo islands, to convalesce. I asked Nusret Bey at the time whether the Pasha received visitors, and said I would like to call on him if he did. A couple of days ago an appointment was made, and yesterday I paid my visit, accompanied by Mr. Forbes Adam, who had known the Pasha at Lausanne. His Excellency received us with great affability, and was clearly anxious to be friendly; we chatted very pleasantly for half an hour, but though more than once I brought the talk to the verge of politics he was not anxious to follow, and I did not care to force the pace; so that nothing passed worth repeating. After what I had heard of his health I was surprised to find him so alert and looking so well. Mr. Forbes Adam thinks he looks better now, or at any rate less tired, than he did at Lausanne, and that his deafness is not perceptibly worse. The Pasha himself said he had suffered only from overwork, and that the rest and the change of climate were working wonders with him. The doctors came twice a week, consulted over him, and told him he would have to stay some months in Halki, but he was thinking of rebelling against them.

6. A reliable Turk who lives on the island tells me that the Pasha was visibly weak when he arrived, that the improvement in his appearance is striking, and that he has put on 5 kilos. in weight. I think he is making a fine recovery, and that he should be ready to resume office by the time the President is ready to part with Fethi Bey.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 362/362/65] No. 17.

Sir Eyre Crowe to M. de Fleuriau.

My dear Ambassador, *Foreign Office, January* 26, 1925.

I WRITE to thank you for the information contained in your note of the 20th January about the Franco-Turkish negotiations in regard to military traffic on the Syrian and Turkish sections of the Bagdad Railway, and at the same time to request you to be so good as to express to your Government the cordial appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the courtesy and consideration that inspired its communication to us.

You mention a text already accepted by the Turkish Government. In view of the vital importance of the question to Irak, we should be very glad if the French Government would tell us whether the arrangement being negotiated is such as will eventually be communicated to the League of Nations under the covenant.

Believe me, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

No. 18.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 12th January: Œcumenical Patriarchate.

Greeks have now formally asked us to approach the League, but I do not consider that it can properly be asked to intervene. Its direct responsibility ceased with appointment of neutral members of Mixed Commission, and it has no *locus standi* for either interpreting or enforcing provisions of Lausanne settlement except where an appeal to it is specifically provided for. Nor does gravity of dispute appear to be such as to justify appeal under article 11 of covenant.

At the same time, after all the trouble we took at Lausanne to extract Ismet's pledge in respect of the retention of patriarchate, we cannot remain inactive if Turks now attempt to evade their undertaking.

As soon. therefore, as your French and Italian colleagues, whose Governments I am approaching, receive necessary instructions, you are authorised to join with them in informal representations to the Turkish Government, drawing their attention to the formal pledge given by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, and pointing out that any attempt on their part to reduce the position of the patriarchate in such a way as to interfere with its normal constitution and activities would be regarded by the Allied Powers as a violation of their solemn promise.

[E 415/55/44] No. 19.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 332.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1925.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith copies of correspondence* with the Greek Minister and the Italian Ambassador regarding the position of the newly-elected Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople, whom the Turkish Government are endeavouring to expel from Turkey on the ground of his technical liability to exchange under the Exchange of Populations Convention of Lausanne I also enclose a copy of a telegram which I have addressed to Mr. Lindsay on this subject.†

2. I request that your Lordship will approach the French Government in this matter, and suggest to them that they should instruct their representative at Constantinople as soon as possible to join with his British and Italian colleagues in making the proposed representations to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 415/55/44] No. 20.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Marquis della Torretta.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, January* 29, 1925.

WITH reference to your note of the 22nd instant, regarding the position of the new Œcumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have now received a note from the Greek Minister asking that His Majesty's Government should approach the League with a request for its intervention in this matter.

2. His Majesty's Government are, however, doubtful whether such a course is practicable, more especially as the League has always maintained, and with apparent justice, that its responsibility in connection with the Mixed Commission ceased with the appointment of the neutral members of that body.

3. M. Caclamanos has therefore been informed that His Majesty's Government do not consider that this question is one in regard to which an appeal can properly be addressed to the League of Nations at the present stage.

4. On the other hand, in view of the importance which was attached during

* Nos. 14, 15, 20 and 21. † No. 18.

the course of the Lausanne Conference to the retention of the Œcumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople and of Ismet Pasha's solemn pledge on that occasion, the Allied Powers cannot well remain inactive in the face of any Turkish action likely to reduce the position of the patriarchate, or to lead to its ultimate extinction or removal. His Majesty's Government are therefore instructing His Majesty's representative at Constantinople to concert with his Allied colleagues in the matter and, should they receive the necessary instructions from their Governments, to join with them in drawing the attention of the Turkish Government to the formal pledge given by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, and in pointing out that any attempt to interfere with the normal constitution and activities of the patriarchate would be regarded by the Allied Powers as a violation of the pledge concerned.

5. I am informing M. Caclamanos that instructions in this sense are being sent to Mr. Lindsay, and shall be glad to learn, at an early date, whether the Italian Government see their way to issue similar instructions to their representative at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 415/55/44] No. 21.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. Caclamanos.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 29, 1925.

WITH reference to your note of the 21st instant, regarding the position in Constantinople of the newly-elected Œcumenical Patriarch, Mgr. Constantine, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government do not consider that this question is one in regard to which an appeal can properly or usefully be addressed to the League of Nations at the present stage.

2. His Majesty's Government are, however, instructing His Majesty's representative at Constantinople to concert with his Allied colleagues in the matter, and, should the latter receive the necessary instructions from their Governments, to join with them in drawing the attention of the Turkish Government to the formal pledge given by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, and in pointing out that any attempt to reduce the position of the patriarchate in such a way as to interfere with its normal constitution and activities would be regarded by the Allied Powers as a violation of the pledge concerned.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 22.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January* 30, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 13.

Mixed Commission passed, the day before yesterday, a resolution generally in terms of draft referred to in my telegram No. 3, paragraph 1.

Early this morning Patriarch was expelled by Turks, leaving by train. His passport has not been visé by Mixed Commission.

I will comment later.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 23.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, January* 31, 1925.

NEWS of expulsion of Patriarch was received here yesterday evening during sitting of Chamber and formed immediate subject of debate.

Prime Minister stated that the attitude of the mixed commission was contrary to regulations of commission and to the Treaty of Lausanne, since Greece had

formally declared that she could not be party to a treaty which contemplated departure of Patriarch. His language was otherwise patriotic, but conciliatory, and he suggested that Chamber should address to friendly countries protest against Turkish action.

Attitude of Government was reserved.

General Pangalos made warlike speech, leaders of parties being, however, more sensible.

Later I saw Prime Minister as well as President of the Republic at dinner given by the latter. I pressed on them both the necessity of seeking issue by peaceful means. Prime Minister said that he would propose to Turkish Government reference of whole question to The Hague. M. Chambrun, the new French Minister, gave similar advice.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1.)

No. 24.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, January* 31, 1925.

MY telegram No. 14.

This morning's papers, irrespective of party, express utmost indignation at what they term barbarous act of the Turks in defiance of Christian Powers.

Veniselist press threatens that time may come when Greece can no longer put up passively with Turkish provocation. Royalist press, with usual lack of initiative, attributes situation to mistakes of their opponents. I learn from editor of " Hestia," who is intimate with Prime Minister, that latter considers present juncture a most critical point in Græco-Turkish relations and as embodying threat of war. Greek Government would do everything to avoid hostilities, and for that reason desired to appeal to The Hague and to the League of Nations.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 2.)

[E 585/585/44] No. 25.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 28, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that a number of Hungarian students have just paid a ten days' visit to this town as guests of the Turkish Government. Although money is so hard to find for things of seemingly greater importance, a handsome credit was forthcoming, and the students, in the intervals of visiting schools, hospitals and the usual sights, were entertained without stint at lunches, dinners and teas. Altogether, the visit seems to have been a great success. The students arrived able to sing Turkish patriotic songs, and at least one of their number was capable of giving expression in a public speech in Turkish to his admiration for the recent struggle of the Turkish people, which, he said, he and his companions had come to study and which they hoped to imitate. As a trophy they brought a shield of their own contrivance for presentation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but, as the Ghazi is still touring in Cilicia, they had to leave it with the prefect of the city for delivery.

2. The visit, so far as I am aware, had no object more specific than to keep alive a tradition of sympathy between the two peoples, which has of late years been fostered by the exchange of such courtesies and by the war. Both sides like to dwell on their Turanian connection, distant though it is; and the Turks, having no supporters at present, are no doubt glad to cultivate a friendship which may serve them in the event of any Balkan disturbance. My Hungarian colleague, M. de Tahy, who is an active man, has thrown himself with some zest into these festivities, and I think the visit will have some small effect in strengthening relations between the two countries.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 590/55/44] No. 26.

Note communicated by M. Caclamanos, February 2.

EARLY in the morning of the 30th January, the Turkish authorities of Constantinople, acting upon instructions from Angora, encircled the Patriarchal Palace at Phanar and forced the Œcumenical Patriarch, Mgr. Constantine VI, to leave under escort of Turkish police agents.

He was taken to the railway station of Sirkedje and thence expelled on a train bound for Greece, under a continuous escort, his Holiness having already reached Greek territory.

1. It is only too obvious that such action on the part of the Turkish authorities distinctly constitutes a *coup*, not only because the Œcumenical Patriarch could not be assimilated to a civilian under the obligation of exchange, but because even in this case the civilian himself could not be expelled, in accordance with the regulations of the exchange, without being supplied with a special passport by the Mixed Commission, which, however, it is known that the commission was decided not to issue.

The news of the forcible expulsion of the Œcumenical Patriarch has created the deepest consternation in the whole of Greece, where feeling is running high.

The Greek Government are lodging a strong protest in Angora stressing the solemn pledges given by Turkey at Lausanne to the effect that they would respect the Œcumenical Patriarchate, and therefore the person of the Patriarch himself.

One might add that by their unprecedented action the Turks have totally ignored the undertaking given by them during the recent session of the League of Nations Council at Rome that, pending the decision of the forthcoming session of the council in March on the question of the minorities in Constantinople and Thrace, they would carefully abstain from any action directed against these minorities.

2. In order further to give an earnest of their conciliatory intentions, the Greek Government are proposing that the question should immediately be referred to the High Court of International Justice at The Hague. Only in the event of this course being rejected by Turkey would Greece have resort to the League of Nations direct, under article 11 of the covenant.

3. It should be borne in mind that of the whole population of Greece, at the present moment one quarter consists of refugees who have lived under the secular tradition of looking to the Œcumenical Patriarch, not merely as their venerated ecclesiastical primate, but as the supreme spiritual leader of the nation. It would hardly be excessive to say that the feeling with regard to the person of the Patriarch compares, for this section of the Greek people, with that of the Catholics towards the Pope.

Of course the miseries suffered by the refugees and their plight in general contribute to dispose them more acutely, the rest of public opinions being also influenced by them, and there are no fewer than sixty delegates in the National Assembly issued from their ranks. Their voice not unnaturally has a wider bearing on the whole of the National Assembly.

4. It will, therefore, be realised that the situation in Greece has become extremely delicate and there would be no reason for astonishment were even a bellicose current to develop, which could not be readily checked by the present Government, already in danger of being overturned.

Greek Legation, London,
January 31, 1925.

No. 27.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 1, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 15.

Since receipt of news of expulsion of Patriarch, Prime Minister has not concealed from me that, apart from external dangers, Turkish action threatens his own position as well as internal tranquillity of the country. He is, in fact, afraid popular excitement may offer opportunity for one or other of the military leaders

to proclaim dictatorship of the type already too well known. Meeting of Chamber on the 30th January permitted General Pangalos to make bellicose speech, and Prime Minister has postponed further sitting until to-morrow, when feeling will be calmer. He is above all nervous lest refugee Deputies, whose sentiment is particularly affected by expulsion, may turn against him.

He told me he might be forced by public opinion to adopt attitude in the Chamber which would be considered provocative.

There have been rumours, not entirely without foundation, of breaking off of relations with Turkey or withdrawing Greek representative, or at any rate appealing to League of Nations under article 11.

In concert with my French colleague, I have discouraged such a conception of the situation and recommended extreme caution.

My immediately following telegram contains résumé of note to Turkish Government, which should be presented at Angora to-day and appears more satisfactory.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 3.)

No. 28.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February 1, 1925.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is résumé of Greek note :—

1. It recalls declaration made by Turks at Lausanne on 10th January, 1923, concerning rights of Patriarch, and also fact that Greece signed above treaty.

2. It insists that mixed commission is alone competent to settle all questions (including procedure) which concern minorities subject to exchange. Patriarch could not leave without visa of commission.

3. It alludes also to the decision of League of Nations, taken at Rome 13th December last, by which Turkish Government was invited to avoid all action prejudicial to rights of Greek minorities in Constantinople.

4. Finally, note protests against attack on head of Orthodox Church and liberties of Greek minority in Constantinople, and proposes to appeal to Hague Tribunal in accordance with article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 4.)

No. 29.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February 2, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 15.

Mass meeting, attended by about 50,000 people, passed resolution yesterday appealing to signatories of Treaty of Lausanne not to permit breach of treaty by Turks, and calling on Government to maintain firm attitude.

Crowd subsequently demonstrated against Turkish Legation, shouting for war, but order was maintained by police. Demonstration was not on scale similar to ones at the time of plebiscite.

Dismissal of 1923 class, which is due in three weeks, has been held up.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 30.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 1, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 15.

Turks have acted more rapidly than even M. Exindaris, whom I saw night before expulsion, anticipated.

At present Angora has not indicated how it defends its action. Turks may argue that Mixed Commission's resolution admitted exchangeability of present Patriarch, who was elected by Greeks in spite of doubt as to his status and with knowledge of risks, and that it merely disclaimed commission's competency to decide other issue; that Turkish Government are sole judges of proper interpretation of unilateral declaration made by their representatives at Lausanne and that they are prepared to fulfil that pledge in so far as Greeks elect to patriarchate non-exchangeable Ottoman Greek.

A plausible legal case might perhaps be made out on these lines, although Turkish action is quite contrary to the spirit of Lausanne settlement, as well as to understanding with Mixed Commission regarding necessity of their visa for passports of departing exchangeable Greeks, and nothing can justify Turkish *coup* before issue had been decided by legal or diplomatic procedure.

In any case, Turks, having presented us with *fait accompli*, will not now care much about soundness of their defence, and Powers must, I think, accept fact that nothing short of forcible action on their part is likely to bring present Patriarch back. I do not think issue intrinsically justifies such action, or that, even if the Powers were ready to take it, interests of Greek Church or Greeks would to-day necessarily be served thereby.

Allied protest, however strongly worded and although undoubtedly justified on question of principle, will not affect the situation in practice, and I still think intervention by League or reference to The Hague Court is best solution from all points of view.

With this object in view, would it not be possible to invoke articles 42 (last paragraph) and 44 of Treaty of Lausanne? Patriarchate certainly seems a religious establishment within meaning of former article, and Ismet's pledge could be invoked in support.

Possibly, if this procedure be followed, you may think it better not to intervene here at all in the first instance, since it could be suggested to Greek Government that [? omitted: justification] might be found for action under last paragraph of article 44 for them to take matter straight to International Court of Justice. Application of exchange convention on the one hand and Ismet's pledge and minority articles on the other seem eminently matters for judicial decision.

In suggesting initiation of action by Greek Government I am influenced by fact that there is undoubtedly strong party in local Greek circles who wished for removal of Patriarchate to Athos (see my despatch No. 940) and who may have deliberately forced issue by electing exchangeable prelate. Greek Government probably do not share this view, but it may be wiser in the circumstances to let Greeks themselves show their hand by taking the lead. Alternative 4. If you consider Allied part in securing Ismet's pledge at Lausanne demands immediate action by Allies here, protest could be made by Allied representatives, who might inform Turkish Government that their Governments were raising with Council of the League question of breach of minority clauses.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 2.)

No. 31.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 2.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 1, 1925.

MY telegram No. 22.

Greek representative on Mixed Tribunal tells me that Greek Government have addressed strong protest to Turkish Government requesting that matter be referred to Hague Court. If Turkish Government refuse this, Greek Government propose to appeal to the League of Nations under article 11 of covenant. Turkish press unanimously approves of expulsion of Patriarch.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 3.)

No. 32.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, February* 2, 1925.

MY despatch No. 261.

Following is summary of French Government's reply:—

Matter is complicated by particular case of Patriarch, and it must be borne in mind that recent decision of Mixed Commission whereby Patriarch was declared "exchangeable" has furnished Turkish Government with pretext for its action.

Under these circumstances, French Government consider that it is of first importance that present excited state of feeling should be calmed down. With this end in view, French Government consider that urgent representations should be made to Turkish Government not to carry out further expulsions, especially as regards members of Holy Synod. At the same time, it should be suggested to Greek Government that it should nominate a *locum tenens* from those prelates who are unaffected by Exchange Convention.

Greek Government may, if it sees fit, appeal to The Hague Court regarding interpretation of 1923 convention, of decision of Mixed Commission, and of undertaking of Ismet Pasha at Lausanne concerning patriarchate.

Note adds that French Ambassador in London will explain French Government's views.

Text by bag to-morrow.

No. 33.

Consul-General, Salonica, to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, February* 3, 1925.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL asks me to inform you that blow aimed by Turkish Government at patriarchate is causing great indignation amongst all classes of the population of Macedonia and Thrace, who unanimously demand reinstatement of Patriarch.

Governor-General seems to fear popular excitement and growing demonstrations may influence Government's decisions and result in some untoward action being taken.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 34.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir M. Cheetham (*Athens*).

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 3, 1925.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 16 of 1st February: Expulsion of Œcumenical Patriarch from Constantinople.

Your action approved.

You should inform Greek Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government fully approve of moderation shown by his Government, and would regard with disapproval and disquiet any provocative policy. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

Such representations are likely to prove more effective if made independently. You should therefore act immediately, without waiting to consult your colleagues.

No. 35.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February* 4, 1925.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 22.

Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has made following communication to Athens press:—

1. Mixed Commission of Exchange informed Constantinople authorities in December 1924 that Mgr. Constantine was subject to exchange, having been born in Anatolia and settled at Constantinople after October 1918. Mixed Commission has recognised above.
2. Turkish Government has merely put into execution decision of commission, and would have no objection if person properly qualified by terms of Treaty of Lausanne were elected as Patriarch.
3. Turkish Government, though animated by spirit of friendship for Greece, cannot admit foreign intervention in a purely domestic affair.

Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs tells me that in spite of its unusual form he considers above communication represents general view of Turkish Government, although it does not, of course, constitute reply to note of Greek Government.

Suggestion in second paragraph of Turkish communication would be unpalatable here.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 6.)

No. 36.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February* 4, 1925.

MY telegram No. 16.

Internal situation seems easier. There is reason to believe that Prime Minister's pacific views are making headway, and he has so far been successful in deferring discussion in Chamber. Attention of General Condylis is now distracted by local Communist activities. Public anxiety is somewhat allayed by reported approval by Paris and London of Greek policy of proposing to appeal to The Hague.

No. 37.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (*Constantinople*).

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, February* 4, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 1st February: Expulsion of Œcumenical Patriarch.

French Government suggest that, with a view to prevent question from assuming wider proportions, Allied representatives at Constantinople should invite the Turkish Government to refrain from expelling any other members of Synod, whether technically exchangeable or not.

In view of Turkish action hitherto, it seems improbable that Turks will agree to this, and policy of putting forward proposal calculated to meet with rebuff appears questionable. You may, however, use your discretion in joining your Allied colleagues in such representations to Turkish Government as you consider likely to ease situation.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 15; Rome, No. 24; and Paris, No. 46 (by bag).)

No. 38.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir M. Cheetham (*Athens*).

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, February* 4, 1925.

MY telegram No. 13 of 3rd February: Expulsion of Œcumenical Patriarch.

Please concert with your French colleague in suggesting unofficially to Greek Government that they might consider desirability of endeavouring to secure appointment of *locum tenens* for Patriarchate from among non-exchangeable members of Synod to sit in Constantinople until question of principle is solved.

You should point out that this course would prevent question of removal of Patriarchate as institution from becoming acute at this moment, and would therefore help to calm situation pending possible reference of case of Mgr. Constantine to Hague Court, to which, however, it seems extremely doubtful whether Turkish Government will agree.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 23; Rome, No. 25; and Paris, No. 47 (by bag).)

No. 39.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 4, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 13.

(R.) I spoke to the Prime Minister this morning in the exact sense of your instructions. He said that no declaration of war would be made while he remained in office, but that he might not be able to control events. He referred again to strength of feeling amongst refugees, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, and to doubtful attitude of General Condylis (see Salonica telegram of 3rd February to you. (End of R.)

Though Prime Minister said nothing to this effect, I think he had hoped for some expression of support. He asked if I thought Italy would conform her attitude to that of England and France. I said I had no information.

No. 40.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 4, 1925.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I find it hard to believe that there is any enthusiasm for war amongst the people, and it is possible that difficulties of the situation may be purposely exaggerated to impress Europe. On the other hand, there might be danger of serious complications if military leaders obtain control. Chief difficulty of Government seems to be to rebut argument that concessions made now will merely lead to further Turkish demands, resulting finally in expulsion of all Greeks from Turkey.

I understand that General Mazarakis, Chief of General Staff, is opposed to hostilities.

No. 41.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 4, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 14.

I have so far acted entirely on my own account, although I was aware that French Minister held similar views to mine.

No. 42.

Sir A. Young to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, February* 4, 1925.

I ENQUIRED of Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday what was thought here with regard to expulsion of Patriarch from Constantinople. He told me that Greek Government had invited Jugoslavia and Roumania as Orthodox countries to join with them in making protest at Angora. As Minister for Foreign Affairs was absent in his constituency, no decision had yet been taken.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs' personal opinion was that, as Jugoslavia had no diplomatic relations with Turkey, it would be difficult to take such a step. He thought support to Greeks might be given by mobilising a press campaign against Turks.

In fact, this press campaign has already begun.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 43.

Sir A. Young to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February* 4, 1925.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

There are indications that the Patriarch incident will be made the most of in order to make Greece feel how necessary to her is alliance with this country.

The campaign against the Turks also comes in handy for restraining electors of South Serbia from voting for Turkish section of the Opposition *bloc*.

(Repeated to Athens.)

[E 590/55/44] No. 44.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. Mélas.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 5, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of M. Caclamanos' note of the 2nd instant, relative to the expulsion from Constantinople of the recently elected Œcumenical Patriarch, and to inform you, in reply, that this question is receiving the careful attention of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 728/55/44] No. 45.

Note by Sir Eyre Crowe.

THE Turkish Minister called upon me to-day in order to explain once more the attitude of his Government in the matter of the Œcumenical Patriarch. He threw no new light on the subject, but he said that he was charged by his Government to declare that they had received reports from Greece which tended to show that the Greek Government were beginning to take measures of mobilisation and were preparing for war. In consequence it would be necessary for Turkey to make her own preparations if the danger from attack became serious. In this connection they had informed the Serbian and Bulgarian Governments that, should Turkey be forced to go to war and invade Greek territory, it was their firm intention in no case to annex any part of such territory, but, at the end of the war, to evacuate it and leave it undisturbed. The Turkish Government, however, still entertained the firm hope that any conflict would be avoided, and they expressed the wish that His Majesty's Government should mediate with the Greek Government for this purpose.

I told the Turkish Minister that I had no reason to doubt that the Turkish view of the alleged warlike preparations in Greece were entirely unfounded, and I begged

him to do his best not to allow his Government to rush into provocative measures without reconsideration.

I then asked what exactly he meant us to do by way of mediation. He explained that the Turkish Government could not recede from their position as regards the expulsion of the Patriarch. They regarded this incident as closed, but he assured me that the Turkish Government were firmly resolved to abide by the undertaking given by Ismet Pasha that the institution of the patriarchate would be preserved. All that the Greeks had to do was to proceed to the election of a new Patriarch who fulfilled the requirements of Turkish law in being a Turkish subject, resident at Constantinople before 1918. What the Turkish Government desired was that we should put pressure on the Greek Government to accept the situation and promote the election of a new Patriarch under these conditions.

I said that I thought the word "mediation" was not perhaps very fortunately chosen for describing the rôle which the Turkish Government wished His Majesty's Government to play. The request really amounted to our becoming the advocate of Turkey in a case in which there was a *bonâ fide* difference of opinion between her and Greece; for whilst, I said, I did not question for a moment the good faith of the Turkish Government in putting forward the view which he had repeatedly expressed, I hoped the Turkish Government, on their part, would admit the good faith of the Greek Government, who took a different view. If the Turkish Government, as he assured me, were so anxious to avoid any cause of further trouble, and if they were as firmly convinced, as they expressed themselves, of the correctness of their attitude, why did they not agree to the proposal which I knew the Greek Government had made that the difference should be adjudicated upon by arbitration?

The Minister declared that they could not admit arbitration in a matter which concerned Turkey. I objected to this as unreasonable, because, whenever there was a dispute between Turkey and another Power, it was obvious that the matter concerned Turkey. But it could not be contended that this did not also affect Greece, whose interest in the Œcumenical Patriarchate could not be denied merely on the ground that it had been agreed that the Patriarch should not concern himself with political matters.

I asked the Minister whether, apart from asking for British "mediation," his Government were taking any other steps. In reply he became very eloquent on the subject of a desire of his Government above all to be on the most friendly footing with Great Britain, and he dwelt on the efforts which he personally was always engaged in making in order to promote British interests in Turkey, economic and others, and to interest British capital in Turkish enterprises, &c. I said that I could not refrain from observing that if these were the sentiments inspiring him and his Government, they did not seem to be very effectually translated into practice by the attitude adopted by the Turkish authorities towards existing British interests in Turkey. He begged me to specify exactly where we had any reason to be discontented, but I declined to enter further into this question now, beyond mentioning the difficulties which the representatives of British industrial and financial undertakings in Turkey persistently met with. I did not wish to pursue this matter here, which had nothing to do with the Patriarchate.

Reverting to this latter question, the Turkish Minister again pressed me to use our influence with the Greek Government to cease all opposition to the Turkish decision and to bring about the immediate election of a new Patriarch.

I said that if the request were put in this way I did not see how His Majesty's Government could possibly meet his wish. We had carefully refrained so far from taking sides definitely either for the Turkish or the Greek contention in the matter at issue; our efforts had been directed, and would be directed, towards promoting a peaceful spirit and a readiness for accommodation on either side. I still thought that Turkey would be wise, not to say generous, in accepting the offer of arbitration; but that His Majesty's Government should prejudice a possible reference to arbitration by definitely declaring themselves in favour of the Turkish thesis was not a thing which I could promise.

At this moment the Turkish Minister, with whom my conversation had proceeded quite peacefully, suddenly got up from his chair and declared in a very rude tone that he had nothing more to say, turned on his heels and walked out of the room.

E. A. C.

February 5, 1925.

No. 46.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 5, 1925.

MY telegram No. 24.

In commenting on Greek note in speech before Assembly yesterday Turkish Prime Minister emphasised internal character of issue. He admitted Lausanne engagement, but this had been embodied in proceedings and not in the treaty precisely because internal character of question was admitted. In no treaty had Turkey taken any responsibility towards a foreign Power over patriarchate, and could not therefore allow any intervention by such Powers.

Sub-commission of mixed commission had decided Constantine's exchangeability before Greeks elected him Patriarch. Turkish Government were only carrying out decision of mixed commission as to Constantine's exchangeability. Question would not have arisen but for election of exchangeable individual.

Fethy disclaimed any intention of attacking any Church or any religion, and he trusted that Greek Government, who seemed to be trying to menace Turkey by certain military measures, would remain reasonable. If not Turkey would know how to defend herself.

Tone of speech was firm but moderate.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 5.)

No. 47.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 5, 1925

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Only new point in Fethy's speech turned on question how far Greeks pushed election of exchangeable individual in spite of knowledge of risks. As far as I can gather from Turkish sources sub-commission did take view that Constantine was exchangeable and conveyed information to vilayet 16th December, namely, day before election of Patriarch, and Turkish delegate on sub-commission warned his Greek colleague on some date before election. Greek answer to this is that, for canonical reasons, election had gone too far to permit any such interference by time warning was given, and that Turks knew this. Turkish counter-reply is that they did not speak before only out of excessive desire to avoid accusation of illegitimate interference in ecclesiastical affairs.

You will notice that Fethy apparently does not regard any engagement in minority articles of treaty, such as article 42, as touching patriarchate.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 6.)

No. 48.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 5, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 22.

My French colleague received on 3rd February rather vague instructions in this sense. We discussed advisability of action, and as matters seemed menacing I told him that if he acted I would support him. In the course of the day he met a member of Turkish delegation and said something to him. Yesterday I called on Nusret and, speaking personally and unofficially, pointed out that Greek protest suggested settlement by discussion and was so far conciliatory; and that, if they now expelled any bishops, action, though less important than expulsion of Patriarch, would now have even more aggravating results. I asked him to suggest to Angora advisability of holding their hand.

I feel perfectly sure that Nusret has instructions to refuse to receive any representations resembling foreign interference, but he took my message and promised to transmit it. If matters were taken further at present I think we would receive a blunt answer.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 7.)

No. 49.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, February* 5, 1925.

YOUR telegram to Athens No. 16.

Turks would not be able to object to appointment of *locum tenens* in manner you suggest, especially in view of recent declarations (see, for instance, Prime Minister's speech—my telegram No. 25). They might even welcome it as constituting an admission that Patriarchs in future must be non-exchangeable. Nor could they even object to election of new Patriarch from amongst non-exchangeable prelates. But their object certainly is not to abolish patriarchate here, but to reduce its proportions till they are not more than commensurate with proportions of Orthodox community of Constantinople. I think, therefore, that even appointment of *locum tenens* would lead to instant expulsion of exchangeable bishops, though I must admit that this action is in any case not unlikely.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 8.)

No. 50.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 6.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February*, 5, 1925.

POLITICAL Director at Quai d'Orsay told Mr. Phipps that this morning the Turkish Ambassador had read to him a telegram from the Turkish Government stating that they had reason to fear that joint representations were to be made to them by the Powers with a view to the reinstatement of the expelled Patriarch. The Turkish Government added that any such representations would be considered by the Turkish Government as an unfriendly act. Turkey had no hostile intentions towards Greece nor any desire to acquire territory, but, if attacked by the latter, the Turkish army would unhesitatingly cross the frontier. M. Laroche informed Djevad Bey that the Powers, so far as he knew, had no intention of addressing any such representations to the Turkish Government. He added that, although it might be quite natural for Turkey to defend herself in case of unprovoked aggression, he thought it well to remind Djevad Bey that in case the Turkish forces crossed the frontier it was highly probable that Jugoslavia and Bulgaria would sink any differences they might have with Greece and unite against Turkey. It was therefore highly desirable that the latter should not take any rash action, which would, moreover, in the present circumstances be entirely uncalled for.

M. Laroche particularly assured Mr. Phipps that nothing whatever had been said by the French representative at Constantinople which might have caused the Turks to fear a *démarche* such as that alluded to in the telegram read out to him by Djevad Bey.

[C 1849/2/18] No. 51.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 488.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1925.

M. DE FLEURIAU came to see me this afternoon.

He spoke first of the dispute which has arisen in regard to the patriarchate. He left with me a note as to the action taken by the Greek and Turkish Governments at Belgrade, Sofia and Bucharest, and of the instructions which M. Herriot had

given in consequence. He also informed me that the Turkish Minister in Paris had repeated to the French Government the statement made to those Governments that, in the event of Turkey being forced in self-defence to invade Greece, Turkish troops would evacuate all occupied territory when the difficulty was settled. The representative of the French Foreign Office who had received the communication had informed the Turkish Minister that there appeared to be no intention on the part of the Greeks to attack Turkey, and that there was therefore no object in this announcement. M. Herriot had counselled moderation at Constantinople and in Athens and had suggested to the Greek Government that a way out of the difficulty might be found by the appointment of a *locum tenens*.

The Ambassador then turned to the communications which had been made by your Lordship to M. Herriot in regard to the question of Cologne. He read to me M. Herriot's account of the answer which he had made to your Lordship. I took the opportunity to speak most seriously to him on the subject. I told him that I had been gravely concerned by the evidence which the changed attitude of the French members of the mission in Berlin, coupled with the speech of M. Herriot in the Chamber, had seemed to offer of a change in the policy of the French Government and of an intention on their part to treat the question of Cologne not as one of treaty obligations on the one side or the other, but as a guarantee for French security irrespective of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. I reminded him that I had from the first realised the great anxiety of France about her security and that I had always been anxious to find a way by which this country might help to remove those fears; but I wished to make it quite clear that any attempt to use the occupation of Cologne to extort a guarantee from us would have the worst effect upon British public opinion everywhere, and would be fatal to such a policy.

I told M. de Fleuriau that I had seen the moment coming when General Wauchope might be unable to concur in the reports presented by his French colleagues and might have to submit a separate report of his own. I need not say how serious a position would result from such a divergence and, if it led further to a difference of opinion in regard to the continuation of the Cologne occupation it would be nothing short of a catastrophe for Anglo-French relations. If there were to be a new divergence between France and England of the kind which took place over the occupation of the Ruhr, we might, indeed, be forced to abandon all attempt at collaboration.

I then read to him the greater portion of my telegram No. 50 and sought earnestly to combat the view which it seems to me that M. Herriot has formed (possibly under German Socialist influence) that Dr. Luther's Government will be more hostile to the Allies than its predecessors. I believed the very contrary to be the case, and, provided that we did not needlessly humiliate them, but showed some regard for their susceptibilities in point of form, we should find that they had both more power and a greater will to meet our just requirements than the last Government.

In this connection I again pressed the view that, in the demands which we might make on Germany, we ought to concentrate upon serious defaults and not insist on trifling matters of no military consequence. If we were to act in the spirit of pettifogging attorneys, there would be no end to the litigation and we should never get satisfaction; but if we concentrated on the big questions and had some consideration for German feeling so as not unnecessarily to humiliate them, I hoped that we might be able really to obtain satisfaction. In the account which he had read of M. Herriot's conversation with your Lordship, M. Herriot had referred specifically to the question of the police. I said that I would beg M. Herriot not to close his mind to some further consideration of this point. Certainly, I had no desire to allow Germany to create a second army under the guise of a police force; but, having regard to past events in Berlin and in other great industrial centres in Germany, I was not quite certain that a local police force, locally recruited and living among the populace from whom it was drawn, would afford in those great industrial centres a trustworthy body of men for the maintenance of public order. I had myself come to no conclusion upon the subject, but I hoped that M. Herriot would be willing to consider whether anything further was required by the German Government for the prevention of revolution.

The Ambassador said that he hoped that the assurances given by M. Herriot to your Lordship and repeated by him to me had dispelled my anxieties, and if, in fact, the French members of the Control Commission revert to their earlier and more moderate attitude this will be the case; but I beg your Lordship to leave

M. Herriot under no misapprehension as to the certainty that in any other case there must be separate reports and as to the disastrous effect which such a divergence of views in the commission might have on our subsequent co-operation.

M. de Fleuriau expressed no decided view as to the attitude of the present German Government, but he thought there might be difficulty about summoning them to a conference instead of sending them a note of our requirements in the first instance. Before we met the Germans, we must be perfectly agreed among ourselves, and the proceedings with the Germans must be brief. A reference which he made to the suggested meeting between the President of the Council and the Prime Minister and myself caused me to say that I was afraid that, under present circumstances and in connection with this question, such a meeting was impossible unless we convoked our allies at the same time, for if French and English Ministers met alone, the meeting would certainly be a matter of suspicion and resentment to Belgium and Italy; but I pointed out that plenty of opportunities would arise for private conversations if any such gathering of Allied Ministers took place, and I repeated what I had said to him on a previous occasion that I thought it very probable, as he himself had suggested, that it would be better before any meeting took place that there should be some exchange of views between the two Governments through the medium of their Ambassadors.

Just as the conversation was coming to a close, he said that he was well aware that M. Herriot's speech had given rise to comment in other countries as well as here, but that some allowance must be made for the political position in France, where M. Herriot was as anxious to carry with him the opinion of France generally and not merely of his own party, as I on my side was to carry the general opinion of my countrymen. As he had mentioned the feeling in other countries, I told him that I knew my anxiety had been shared by Signor Mussolini, who had caused the Italian Ambassador to speak to me upon the subject. I had not disclosed to the Marquis della Torretta the full extent of my anxiety, but as long as the French Government were determined, as M. Herriot and he had declared to be the case, to act within the terms of the treaty and in the spirit of the treaty, I could hope that friendly co-operation might be maintained between us.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 52.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 7, 1925.*

MY telegrams No. 22 to Constantinople and No. 16 to Athens of 4th February: Œcumenical Patriarch.

Please communicate to Italian Government substance of my instructions to Mr. Lindsay and Sir M. Cheetham, and suggest to them that they should instruct Italian representatives at Constantinople and Athens to co-operate with their British and French colleagues.

(Addressed to Rome, No. 37. Repeated to Constantinople, No. 27; Athens, No. 19; and Paris, No. 55 (by bag).)

No. 53.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 7, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 5th February: Œcumenical Patriarch.
Your action approved.
(Repeated to Athens, No. 20.)

No. 54.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 7, 1925.*

ŒCUMENICAL Patriarch.

Turkish Minister informed Sir E. Crowe on 5th February that if Greece mobilised Turkey would make her own preparations, but that Turkish Government had informed Serbian and Bulgarian Governments that in no event would Turkey annex any territory. Turkish Government would, however, welcome mediation by His Majesty's Government.

He was told that Turkish fears appeared unfounded, urged to discourage provocative measures and asked what he meant by mediation.

He replied that Turkish Government wished His Majesty's Government to put pressure on Greek Government to accept situation and arrange for election of new Patriarch, conforming to Turkish conditions. Turks had no intention of breaking Lausanne pledge regarding institution.

Sir E. Crowe said that pressure would hardly be mediation. There was *bonâ fide* difference of opinion between Greece and Turkey as to interpretation of pledge. If Turks were so sure of correctness of their attitude they should accept arbitration proposed by Greece.

Zekiai Bey declared arbitration quite unacceptable, and endeavoured to side-track discussion by raising usual questions of Turkish friendship for Great Britain and desire for British capital, &c. He ended by repeating Turkish Government's hope that His Majesty's Government would force Greece to abandon all opposition to Turkish view.

Sir E. Crowe having explained impossibility of thus prejudging issue and repeated suggestion that Turkey would be wise to accept arbitration, Turkish Minister abruptly terminated interview.

(To Constantinople, Athens and Rome only.)

I learn that Turkish Ambassador in Paris recently informed Political Director at Quai d'Orsay that Turkish Government would regard any representations made by Powers for reinstatement of expelled Patriarch as an unfriendly act.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 29. Repeated to Athens, No. 21; Paris, No. 56 (by bag); and Rome, No. 38.)

[E 686/55/44] No. 55.

Memorandum on the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.

IT is necessary to distinguish between the religious and political aspects of this question.

(a.) *Religious.*

It is not accurate to say that the Patriarch is the head of the Orthodox Church; there are a number of Orthodox Churches, for the most part corresponding to national divisions, each of which has its own head, and each of which is independent of the others. The Œcumenical Patriarch's direct ecclesiastical authority before the war was limited to the Greek-speaking Orthodox population of Asia Minor, Constantinople and the provinces added to Greece since 1912. He was regarded with special respect by the heads of the various Orthodox Churches and by the Orthodox Patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria, but he possessed no kind of authority over them, and was never known as more than *primus inter pares*. Whether he can in any sense be regarded as forming a real ecclesiastical centre for the Orthodox religious world is questionable. If the patriarchate ceased to exist, there seems no reason to suppose that the independent Orthodox Churches would be seriously affected. There is, in fact, no parallel between his position and that of the Pope.

(b.) *Political.*

The Œcumenical Patriarch, since the foundation of his office in the 4th century, has practically always been under the control of the civil power established at

Constantinople. With the rupture with Rome in 1054, this dependence on the civil power became almost complete, and it was, therefore, comparatively easy for him to accept a position of dependence on the Ottoman Government after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The policy of the Turks at this time was not to interfere with the personal law and custom of the races they conquered, but to administer them through their national or religious heads, and the fact that to the Moslem mind there was little or no distinction between nationality and religion, and between civil and ecclesiastical law, and that law and nationality were personal rather than territorial, made it natural for the Turks to treat the Œcumenical Patriarch as the head of the "Greek nation" (Roum Millet) in the Empire, to make use of him for purposes of administration, and even to accord him in return privileges which had been denied him by the Christian Emperors.

Thus, the patriarchate, already under the control of the civil power, became under the Turks an integral part of the administrative machinery of the Ottoman Empire,* and the Turks were able to make regulations regarding the appointment and functions of the Patriarch which were justified by the circumstances and which the Patriarch himself was perfectly prepared to accept. Thus, under formal Turkish decrees, all candidates for the patriarchate must be Ottoman subjects,† and the list of candidates must be approved by the Ottoman Government; moreover, the Patriarch, when elected, was not entitled to exercise his functions until he had received the berat, or exequatur, of the Turkish Government.‡

With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the growth of Balkan nationalism and the development of Greek irredentism, both Hellenic and Ottoman Greeks tended to regard the Patriarch more and more as the symbol of Hellenic aspirations and the focus of the Byzantine idea.

Unfortunately, this point of view was adopted somewhat too openly after the armistice, when the ideal of the Greater Greece appeared to be on the point of realisation, and a Patriarch (Mgr. Meletios) was elected at the end of 1922 who was only too glad to lend himself to the political ambitions of his compatriots, whether in Greece or Turkey. His ill-advised championship of political Hellenism in Turkey in 1922 and 1923 has probably done more to make the position of the patriarchate in Turkey impossible than anything which had happened during the past few centuries. Mgr. Meletios was ultimately obliged to resign the patriarchate (which, from the Turkish point of view, he had never legally held) as a result of Turkish pressure, the Turkish contention being that his election was invalid, as he was not a Turkish subject when it took place. The Turkish argument in the present case is somewhat similar, since the Turks maintain that Mgr. Constantine, being an exchangeable Greek, became automatically a Hellenic subject, and was therefore ineligible for the patriarchate, his election to which has, in any case, not been accorded the exequatur of the Turkish Government.

Notwithstanding the unfortunate political activities of the patriarchate and its anomalous character as being both a Christian religious, and a Turkish administrative, institution, it was felt at Lausanne that a serious effort must be made to retain this last outpost of native Christianity in Turkey. The Greek Government naturally attached the utmost importance to its retention, since with its departure any hope of a Greek revival in Turkey seemed likely to be extinguished. They even maintained that they would not sign a treaty of peace unless the retention of the patriarchate were provided for. (It may be added that the Turks maintained a somewhat similar attitude in insisting on the exclusion from the operation of the Exchange of Populations Convention of the Turks from Western Thrace, their obvious object being to keep alive the possibility of a Turkish revival in the Eastern Balkans.) It was argued by the Greeks that the Patriarch, having become the natural head and leader of the Ottoman Greeks, if the institution were abolished the position of the 200,000 or 300,000 native Greeks who are to remain in Constantinople under the Lausanne settlement might become increasingly precarious.

In view of these considerations, Lord Curzon exercised all his influence to obtain from the Turkish delegation at Lausanne a promise that the patriarchate should not be interfered with. The Turks would only consider giving such an undertaking on the understanding that the patriarchate should be shorn of all its political and non-ecclesiastical attributes. M. Veniselos was prepared to agree to this, and a formula

* See Young's "Corps de Droit," Vol. II, pp 12 to 34.

† See annex.

‡ It is uncertain how far this will be affected by the agreement reached at Lausanne that the Patriarch should cease to exercise political or administrative authority, but as far as we know no steps have yet been taken to amend the existing regulations.

was actually drafted for the Turks to sign, but at the last moment they refused to sign any undertaking. However, just before the meeting of the First Commission on the 10th January, 1923, Ismet Pasha finally agreed to give a purely verbal and general undertaking that the institution of the patriarchate should be allowed to remain in Constantinople, provided it refrained from all political or administrative activities. This is the famous pledge out of which so much capital has been made. It is unfortunately of a very general nature, and our only record of it is in the official minutes of the meeting.*

The facts of the present dispute are briefly as follows: According to the Exchange of Populations Convention of 1923, all Ottoman Greeks, excepting those "established" in Constantinople before 1918, are to leave Turkey for Greece in exchange for the Moslems of Greece outside Western Thrace. When the last Patriarch died towards the end of last year, and the question arose of electing Mgr. Constantine to be his successor, the Turks caused the Synod to be warned that Mgr. Constantine, not having been established in Constantiople before 1918, was exchangeable, that he would consequently have to leave Turkey and become a Hellenic subject, and that, therefore, he was not eligible for the patriarchate. Notwithstanding this, the Synod proceeded to elect him Patriarch. The Turks immediately protested. The matter was referred to the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations, which decided that Mgr. Constantine was technically exchangeable as an individual, under the terms of the convention, but that it was outside its competence to decide whether this fact was overridden by Ismet's pledge regarding the retention of the patriarchate.

The Greek's contend that Ismet's pledge applies to the entire institution of the patriarchate as defined in Orthodox canon law, that is to say, the Patriarch and the Holy Synod of Resident Metropolitans, including all the ecclesiastics depending thereon. Clearly this interpretation of the pledge can be extended very far. On the other hand, if the Turkish view that the institution is distinct from the persons of its temporary incumbents were to be upheld, it might result that practically no members of the Synod would be able to remain in Turkey, and that the institution of the patriarchate would be so emasculated as to be practically put out of action.

Meanwhile, the Turks have brought matters to a head by expelling Mgr. Constantine from Turkey on the 30th January as an exchangeable Greek.

A minor technical point arises in connection with this expulsion, since the Greeks maintain that the Turks undertook, as a result of the discussions before the Council of the League of Nations on the question of what Greeks should be regarded as "established" in Constantinople within the meaning of the convention, not to expel any Ottoman Greeks from Turkey until they had been provided with passports by the Mixed Commission. Mgr. Constantine was provided with no such passport, but, as the Mixed Commission had decided that he was technically exchangeable and that the question of his ecclesiastical position was outside its competence, it is doubtful whether the point is of much practical importance.

The Greeks have invited the Turks to refer the question of the legality of the expulsion, that is to say, whether Ismet's Lausanne pledge should be so interpreted as exempting members of the Holy Synod, and any prelate elected to the patriarchate, from the operation of the Exchange Convention, to The Hague Court. It seems probable that the Turks will refuse this suggestion, if they have not in fact already done so, since they claim that the question is a purely domestic one, and that the Greeks of Constantinople have only to elect a new Patriarch from among the non-exchangeable members of the Synod. They have not declared their intentions as to the remaining exchangeable members of the Synod, but there is reason to suppose that they contemplate their early expulsion also, in fact, such expulsions would be merely the logical sequel of the expulsion which has already been carried out. Mr. Lindsay, however, in accordance with instructions sent him on the 4th February, has made personal and unofficial representations to the representative in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the hope of preventing such expulsions from taking place, pointing out that the Greek suggestion for settlement by discussion was of a conciliatory nature, and that nothing was to be gained by further aggravating the situation. The result of these representations is not yet known. At the same time, Sir M. Cheetham has been instructed to suggest unofficially to the Greek Government that a *locum tenens* should be appointed at the Phanar in order, if possible, to prevent the question of

* "Lausanne Conference Blue Book" (Cmd. 1814, pp. 317, 319, 323, and 327).

the personal exchangeability or otherwise of Mgr. Constantine from involving the major question of the fate of the patriarchate as an institution.

There appears to be some force in the Turkish argument as expounded in the Grand National Assembly by Fethi Bey, and in the foreign press by the Turkish representatives abroad, that the Turkish action constitutes no infringement of Ismet's pledge, and that the Turks are within their rights in refusing to accept as a Turkish functionary a man who has, from their point of view, been improperly elected, and in expelling him in his private capacity as an exchangeable Greek. The whole question is greatly complicated by the Patriarch's position as a Turkish civil servant. The Turks have developed this point in all their communications on this subject, and they even informed the French Government on the 5th February that any representations made to them by the Powers with a view to the reinstatement of the expelled Patriarch would be regarded by the Turkish Government as an unfriendly act.

It should perhaps be added that there appears to be a fairly strong party among the Ottoman Greeks themselves which is in favour of the transference of the patriarchate from Turkey, where it is perfectly obvious that, in the nature of things, it will never be able to lead a really independent existence. On the other hand, if the patriarchate were transferred to any one of the Balkan countries, it would no doubt come even more definitely under national influence than it has hitherto, and might easily lose such character as it still possesses of a general meeting point for all the Orthodox Churches.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
February 7, 1925.

Annex.

Œcumenical Patriarch: Nationality.

Article 3 of Chapter 2 of the regulations for the nomination of the Patriarch provides that—

> "Comme en dehors de sa qualité de chef spirituel de l'Eglise orientale le Patriarche est aussi chargé de la direction de toutes les affaires énumérées dans son 'berat' d'investiture en conformité avec les privilèges octroyés par le Sultan Mohamed, maintenus par d'autres souverains et confirmés par le Sultan régnant et qu'il doit en certaines circonstances être l'organe du Gouvernement dans l'exécution de ses décrets, il est nécessaire que ce dignitaire, à part les qualités susdites, jouisse de la pleine confiance du Gouvernement comme de celle de la 'Nation,' et qu'il soit sujet ottoman de naissance."

2. At the close of the year 1921 the patriarchate at Constantinople fell vacant and Mgr. Meletios Metaxakis was elected. This prelate had been born in Crete of Ottoman parents; he later resided in Jerusalem and proceeded to Cyprus in 1910, and was there in 1914 when the island was annexed by Great Britain. In 1918 he was elected Metropolitan of Athens, and a Royal decree was issued making him an Hellenic subject. At the time of his election he claimed to be an Ottoman, a British, and an Hellenic subject. The Turkish Government refused, however, to admit the validity of his election on the ground that they did not regard him as possessing the necessary Ottoman nationality.

No. 56.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 8.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February* 7, 1925.

TURKISH reply to Greek note arrived yesterday afternoon, but I have not yet been able to see it. Government press publishes résumé, of which following are main points:—

Note is very long, and mainly devoted to assertion that Turkish Government in expelling Patriarch has merely conformed to decision of Mixed Commission.

Exchange Convention contains no clause dealing with character ("qualité") of persons affected. Turkish decision is not arbitrary. Since Treaty of Lausanne and its annexes do not mention patriarchate, and since affairs of that institution are for Turkey a purely domestic matter, Turkish Government cannot tolerate intervention of foreign Powers.

Note further declares that article 44 of Treaty of Lausanne cannot be invoked because minority clauses are concerned not with exchangeable persons but those who remain as Turkish subjects. Turkish Government cannot therefore accept reference to The Hague.

Note ends on expression of regret that Greek Government has not appreciated Turkish desire for good relations and on hope that they will not attach undue importance to present issue.

No. 57.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 8.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 7, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 16.

After consultation with French Minister and with careful recollection of your instructions, I put before the Prime Minister yesterday suggestion that appointment of a *locum tenens* at Constantinople might help to save institution of patriarchate, if it were impossible for Mgr. Constantine to return there. Prime Minister replied at once that a *locum tenens* already existed who took charge of certain affairs automatically in absence of the Patriarch. Only death, resignation, or, possibly deposition of latter would, however, permit of his replacement in any real sense.

I understand that French Minister had contemplated similar suggestion himself, but has not proceeded with it.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 9.)

No. 58.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 8.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Athens, February* 7, 1925.

MY French colleague tells me confidentially that Turkish Ambassador in Paris, in discussing with French Government eventuality of hostilities between Greece and Turkey, had stated that Turkish troops would, in any case, not go farther than Thrace, and that Turkey had no territorial designs.

[**E 777/55/44**] No. 59.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February* 3, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 26 of the 13th ultimo, I had the honour to report that many Greeks here seemed to wish for the transference of the patriarchate to Mount Athos. Since the Patriarch's expulsion, I have made further enquiries, and I find that Greek laymen who are connected with and supporters of the patriarchate, while deploring the manner in which the Turkish Government's decision was carried out, are inclined to think that it may prove a boon to the patriarchate. They feel that being viewed by

the Turkish Government with incurable hostility it could not fulfil its functions here. It is imperative, they think, that it should be moved to a freer atmosphere, and one where it will not be thwarted in carrying out the many reforms which it has in view. They hope that the remaining metropolitans who are exchangeable according to the Turkish thesis (about ten out of twelve) may also be expelled, or that the Patriarch will lose no time in summoning them to join him in Salonica. With their departure there would be no risk of the election of yet another Patriarch here and of the subjection of the patriarchate to the ignominy of a further expulsion.

2. In considering where the patriarchate should find a home, which they hope would be only temporary, its supporters, to whom I refer, are further-sighted than might have been expected. They now think it would be a mistake for the patriarchate to move to Athens or even to a place still in its own jurisdiction, such as Salonica, Mount Athos, Crete or an island newly annexed to Greece, since it would then become too closely identified with the Hellenic national church. They do not wish the Patriarch to forfeit in other Orthodox countries his claim to the primacy of the whole Orthodox Church. For these reasons they would like to see him established for the time being in non-Greek territory, and although they have not approached me, I understand that they consider Cyprus to be an ideal place for this purpose. Only there, do they think, could the patriarchate assume a truly œcumenical character, free alike from the perpetual persecutions to which it has ever been subject in Turkey, and from the political pressure to which it would constantly be exposed in Greece or in any other Orthodox country. To Turks and Hellenes alike the institution appears predominantly as the centre of an alien propaganda in Constantinople; if it is in the future to subserve the spiritual needs of the Orthodox and to convey to them at last a living message, it can only do so from some neutral site where it will be freed from these purely secular distractions.

3. The Greek Government, however, appears to hold entirely different views. Unless my informants here are much mistaken, it is working for the maintenance of the patriarchate in Constantinople, hoping either that Constantine VI may be allowed to return or that he will resign, and that a new Patriarch will be elected in his place. The Greek Government holding the purse strings has, I am told, a strong influence on the situation. For the patriarchate now subsists mainly on the subsidy paid by the Greek Government, as interest on the capitalised value of the patriarchate properties in New Greece. But those Greeks here who favour the removal of the institution are confident that were the Greek Government [? not] to attempt to keep the patriarchate in Constantinople, there would be such an outcry in Greece as to overturn the Government. However that may be, the decision is for the Patriarch to make, and having even more of his metropolitans in Greece than here, he will, I understand, be able to convoke meetings of the Holy Synod for the purpose. The decision taken may greatly affect not merely the character of the patriarchate, but also the future development of Orthodox religion.

4. The Turkish Government, taking advantage of an unavoidable weakness in the arrangement attained with so much effort by the British representatives at Lausanne, anticipated an international question by disposing in a characteristic way of the subject thereof. Their object is to be rid once and for all of an institution which, not without some reason, they regard as a focus of Greek irredentism. I cannot but think that if the Greek Government is anxious for good relations with Turkey, it will find that the chief obstacle to their establishment has been removed. The action of the Turkish Government in violating the tradition of centuries and ousting the head of the Orthodox Church is an affront to Christendom. But, as I have reported elsewhere, I can think of no means by which that action can at present be reversed. It is to be remembered that the Greek community in Turkey now consists solely of those in Constantinople, who are possibly as many as 200,000, but will be reduced still further by exchange. A patriarchate existing in so small a community would be an anomaly and a weakness to itself. For the reasons indicated above I am not without hope that the Patriarch's expulsion may prove to be a benefit not only to Greece and Turkey, but also to the patriarchate itself.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 779/493/44] No. 60.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 3, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I communicated a copy of your despatch No. 44 of the 9th January, regarding the treatment of minorities in Turkey, to my French and Italian colleagues, as I was anxious that, in examining further the evidence to be placed before the Allied Governments and possibly the League of Nations, the Allied Juridical Commission should be well aware of the cogent criticisms made in that despatch regarding the commission's original memorandum and the kind of information which you now desired them to produce.

2. The commission have since carefully examined the available evidence and have drafted a memorandum which has been approved by my two colleagues and myself, and copies of which are forwarded herewith.

3. I fear that from the nature of the circumstances it is practically impossible to produce an overwhelming or even a telling case against the Turkish Government. The methods by which the Turkish Government has pursued its policy of intensive nationalisation, the natural reluctance of any person or company with vested interests in the country to appear as a witness for the prosecution and the lack of good information regarding events in the interior, all combine to prevent the preparation of any unanswerable indictment. But I am not sure that these difficulties are likely to grow less in the future, and it is a matter for the appreciation of the Allied Governments and the League of Nations whether, if any general enquiry into the treatment of minorities in Turkey is to be conducted by the League, it would not be wiser to act on the evidence available rather than to postpone such enquiry indefinitely. Of course, the best method of collecting unimpeachable evidence and probably of preventing further abuses, would be the visit of a League of Nations commission of enquiry to the country, but such is not provided for by the treaty, and a very strong case would have to be made out at Geneva and very strong pressure used by the Council of the League before Turkey would accept it.

4. The alternative seems to me to forgo any attempt at a general indictment, but to try in future to deal with individual and flagrant breaches of the minority provisions, as, perhaps, the Patriarch's recent expulsion, on their merits and as they arise. It may be that Turkey will be less insensitive to the effects of European public opinion once she has entered the League, and it must be remembered that as regards past history Turkey can always produce the technically valid argument that the treaty and the minority provisions only entered into force on the 6th August last, and that through no fault of her own.

5. With regard to the reference in the last paragraph of your despatch No. 44 of the 9th January, to the "considerable correspondence" between the Foreign Office and this mission relating to the treatment of Christians in South-East Anatolia, I cannot trace in our archives any reports from predecessors to the Foreign Office on this question. Almost all the information reaching this mission was contained in despatches addressed to the Foreign Office by His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, who forwarded copies to this mission. A précis of the information contained in Aleppo despatches to Foreign Office No. 64, July 7; No. 88, August 31; No. 102, October 6; No. 123, November 10; No. 138, December 14, 1923; and No. 14, January 29; No. 34, February 20; No. 38, March 6; No. 51, March 24; No. 86, June 2, 1924, was, however, prepared here, and given to the Allied Juridical Commission before their report was drafted, and a copy of the précis is enclosed herein. This mission, in the absence of consular officers in South-East Anatolia and in view of the conditions prevailing there for the last two years, has not been in a position either to supplement or to criticise the information furnished by His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, and I feel that the Foreign Office, with other sources of information available, *e.g.*, reports from Bagdad, will doubtless be in a better position than this mission to appraise at its true value such material as has been accumulated.

6. Copies of the enclosed report by the Allied Juridical Commission are being sent to Paris and Rome by my Allied colleagues.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

Exposé complémentaire des Infractions commises par la Turquie aux Clauses concernant la Protection des Minorités contenues dans le Traité de Lausanne.

LE mémoire que la Commission juridique interalliée a rédigé, à la date du 24 novembre 1924, concernant les infractions commises par la Turquie aux clauses relatives à la protection des minorités contenues dans le Traité de Lausanne (articles 37 à 44) a été examiné par les Gouvernements alliés. Pendant la réunion du Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui a eu lieu à Rome, au mois de décembre 1924, la délégation britannique et la délégation française se sont également entretenues avec le directeur de la Section des Minorités de la Société des divers griefs exposés dans ce mémoire à la charge du Gouvernement turc. Il n'a pas été jugé opportun de saisir alors de ces griefs le Conseil de la Société des Nations. On a estimé, en effet, qu'il était désirable, quand le conseil aurait, pour la première fois, à se prononcer sur une question intéressant la protection des minorités en Turquie, que le cas dont il serait saisi fût d'une évidence telle que le Gouvernement turc ne pût en contester la réalité. Or, il a paru que les conditions dans lesquelles se sont produits les faits articulés dans le mémoire susvisé, pourraient permettre au Gouvernement turc de se défendre par certains arguments spécieux et d'apparence plus ou moins plausible, de nier, par exemple, qu'il ait pris des mesures de rigueur spéciales contre les minorités chrétiennes, ces mesures qui, en fait, de notoriété publique, ont été appliquées à ces seules minorités, étant basées cependant sur des lois qui, en la forme, ont l'apparence de mesures d'ordre général. Il était à craindre que de tels arguments, "qui ne sauraient être convaincants et relativement aux faits connus en l'espèce, seraient en réalité déloyaux et erronés" pussent cependant faire impression sur une partie des membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations et qu'une intervention, dans ces conditions, eût pour résultat de diminuer l'autorité de la Société des Nations quand elle aurait plus tard à s'occuper de pareilles questions.

Le représentant du Gouvernement britannique à Constantinople a fait part aux représentants des Gouvernements français et italien des considérations qui précèdent en ajoutant que, le Conseil de la Société des Nations devant, dans sa prochaine réunion, en mars prochain, s'occuper, dans une certaine mesure, du traitement des minorités en Turquie et en Grèce, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique serait disposé à reprendre la question avec les Gouvernements français et italien, en vue d'une communication collective au Conseil de la Société, dans le cas où il serait possible de lui fournir, avant cette date, des informations complémentaires de nature plus convaincante. Les représentants alliés ont alors décidé de charger la Commission juridique interalliée de procéder à un nouvel examen de la question et de préparer un mémoire complémentaire qui serait soumis à la haute appréciation des Gouvernements alliés. Le présent exposé a été rédigé à cet effet par ladite commission.

Le Gouvernement britannique a signalé, à titre d'exemple, comme pouvant peut-être présenter un cas flagrant d'infraction aux garanties stipulées en faveur des minorités, les expulsions en Syrie et ailleurs de chrétiens ottomans du sud-est de l'Anatolie, expulsions qui, ajoute-t-il, ont fait l'objet précédemment d'une correspondance entre le Foreign Office et la Mission britannique à Constantinople.

Les faits ainsi rappelés, qui se sont déroulés pendant les derniers mois de l'année 1923 et au commencement de 1924, ont été, en effet, particulièrement graves et douloureux. Ils sont caractérisés par l'exode d'une population chrétienne considérable, qui, poussée par la crainte et les menaces, a abandonné ses foyers et s'est réfugiée sur les territoires détachés de la Turquie, principalement en Syrie. Ces populations chrétiennes venaient notamment d'Ourfa, de Mardine, de Kharpout, d'Aïntab, de Marach, de Malatia, de Biredjik et de Diarbékir. Arrivées au terme de leur refuge dans un état lamentable, elles ont déclaré que depuis plusieurs mois elles étaient soumises à un régime de violence et de terreur, dont l'objet était de les obliger à quitter la Turquie. Aucune sécurité n'existant plus pour elles dans ce pays, elles avaient préféré abandonner leurs foyers, leurs immeubles et la plus grande partie de leurs biens mobiliers, pour chercher un asile là où elles pouvaient seulement trouver la garantie de leurs vies et de leurs biens. Avant leur départ, elles avaient été encore rançonnées par les autorités turques, qui les avaient notamment obligées à échanger l'or qu'elles possédaient sur la base d'une livre-or pour une livre-papier. Les représentants alliés à Constantinople se borneront à cet exposé très succinct. Les Gouvernements alliés sont mieux placés qu'eux pour connaître, dans ses détails, la

vérité sur ces faits. Ils disposent, en effet, pour cela, des rapports de leurs agents en Syrie et dans les autres régions détachées de Turquie. Ces rapports doivent être concluants.

Ils sont naturellement basés sur les déclarations des intéressés, déclarations auxquelles le Gouvernement turc oppose et opposera toujours la plus complète dénégation. Mais, quand il s'agit d'un tel ensemble de faits précis et concordants, rapportés dès leur arrivée par des gens venus de localités différentes et appartenant à toutes les classes de la société, leur réalité peut-elle vraiment être mise en doute? La bonne foi des intéressés n'est-elle pas garantie, au surplus, par la gravité même du sacrifice auquel ils ont dû se résoudre? On dira peut-être qu'ils ont pu s'exagérer le danger qui les menaçait et céder à une crainte injustifiée. Cette objection est-elle admissible quand les mêmes faits se sont produits, en même temps, dans tant de localités diverses et sur une si grande étendue de territoires? Il n'est pas douteux qu'une contrainte très forte de la part des populations musulmanes avec la participation plus ou moins ouverte et, en tous cas, sous l'œil favorable des autorités turques, a seule pu déterminer un pareil exode des chrétiens de cette partie de l'Anatolie. Cette contrainte, on en cherchera vainement la preuve auprès des Turcs, qui sont trop intéressés à la nier et ont tout préparé dans cette prévision. Mais, les Gouvernements alliés ont les moyens de se renseigner sur les points qui leur sembleraient encore douteux. Une enquête de la Société des Nations, au besoin, établirait sans conteste la vérité.

On ne saurait douter que le Gouvernement turc n'ait vu avec faveur cette émigration. Elle répondait à ses désirs et à son intérêt. Il avait d'abord, ou il croyait avoir avantage au départ des chrétiens, en vue de la consolidation d'une majorité musulmane puissante et homogène. Cet avantage devait aussi se doubler d'un bénéfice matériel considérable et immédiat, résultant de l'application aux biens des nouveaux émigrés de la loi sur les biens abandonnés, application qui constitue pratiquement une complète spoliation.

Il y a enfin des faits difficilement contestables comme, par exemple, l'arrestation du vicaire syrien catholique de Mardine et la réquisition dans cette ville d'établissements religieux et d'écoles.

Il y a donc là un ensemble de faits particulièrement grave que les Gouvernements alliés jugeront sans doute de leur devoir de signaler au Conseil de la Société des Nations, en y joignant les griefs précédemment exposés dans le mémoire du 24 novembre 1924. Pour leur permettre de présenter de la façon la plus complète et la plus précise au Conseil de la Société des Nations l'exposé d'ensemble de la question, il paraît utile de revenir sur les faits exposés dans le précédent mémoire des représentants alliés, de les préciser et d'en démontrer plus explicitement le caractère.

Trois points sont à retenir dans le mémoire du 24 novembre : (1) les mesures de spoliation dont les chrétiens de Turquie ont été et continuent d'être l'objet par l'application rigoureuse de la loi sur les biens abandonnés, combinées avec les dispositions du Règlement sur la Circulation de juillet 1924; (2) l'obligation imposée à toutes les sociétés turques à capitaux étrangers de renvoyer leur personnel chrétien et de le remplacer par un personnel musulman; (3) la non-affectation aux minorités non musulmanes de la part, édictée par l'article 41 du Traité de Lausanne, au bénéfice des sommes qui pourraient être attribuées sur les fonds publics par le budget de l'État, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d'éducation, de religion ou de bienfaisance.

Le premier point paraît assez clairement exposé dans le précédent mémoire. Il est utile seulement de réfuter par avance les objections que les Turcs pourraient soulever à ce propos et qui sont indiquées dans la lettre du Foreign Office du 9 janvier. Cette lettre exprime l'avis que le Gouvernement turc soutiendrait, sans aucun doute, que la loi sur les biens abandonnés serait d'application générale et ne serait pas dirigée spécialement contre les minorités qui, en fait, ajoute-t-elle, ne sont pas mentionnées dans ce texte législatif. Cette constatation est exacte. Ni la loi du 17 Zilcadé 1333 (26 septembre 1915) promulguée en pleine guerre, ni celles qui l'ont par la suite étendue et aggravée et notamment la loi actuellement en vigueur n'ont expressément mentionné les minorités chrétiennes ou un élément de ces minorités. La pensée n'en est même pas venue aux législateurs. On en comprend suffisamment la raison. Mais, en fait, ce n'est qu'à ces minorités chrétiennes que les mesures stipulées par ces lois ont été appliquées, et c'est à elles seules qu'elles pouvaient l'être. Le Gouvernement turc serait dans l'impossibilité de prétendre le contraire. On ne voit même pas comment il pourrait l'essayer.

Le Foreign Office relève, d'autre part, en ce qui concerne le retour des Arméniens ottomans en Turquie, que la question a fait à Lausanne l'objet de longues discussions, lesquelles n'ont amené de la part des Turcs aucune mesure tendant à autoriser les personnes intéressées à rentrer en territoire turc. C'est encore exact. Ismet Pacha s'est borné, comme le mémoire du 24 novembre l'a indiqué, à déclarer que le Gouvernement turc examinerait, cas par cas, la situation des Arméniens qui ont quitté la Turquie et qu'il autoriserait le retour de ceux qui ne seraient pas compromis au point de vue politique. Mais quelle peut être la portée de cette déclaration?

Un arrangement venait d'être conclu entre la Grèce et la Turquie relativement aux populations de religion orthodoxe. Quelque sentiment qu'on pût avoir sur cette convention, le cas des populations turques de religion grecque était réglé. Les Hellènes, qui avaient quitté la Turquie, d'autre part, allaient pouvoir, aussitôt l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, y retourner librement et disposer des biens qu'ils y possédaient.

Un nombre considérable d'Arméniens avait quitté la Turquie pendant l'armistice avec des passeports alliés. La plupart l'avait fait après les événements de Smyrne au moment où s'annonçaient l'occupation de Constantinople par les troupes kémalistes et la fin de l'occupation militaire interalliée. La crainte seule, une crainte que les événements précédents rendait très explicable les avait poussés. Le plus grand nombre était absolument inoffensif. Quelques-uns enfin avaient quitté la Turquie simplement pour leurs affaires ou leur convenance, certains depuis de nombreuses années. A aucun, avant leur départ, avis n'avait été donné qu'il ne pourrait plus retourner dans le pays où beaucoup possédaient une grande fortune immobilière. Ce n'est que plus tard que pareille interdiction a été déclarée. Les délégués alliés dans une pensée d'apaisement et d'humanité se sont efforcés d'obtenir le retour pur et simple de cette catégorie très intéressante de ressortissants turcs. Ismet Pacha s'est constamment refusé à tout engagement d'ordre général. La seule promesse qu'il ait faite c'est, comme il est dit ci-dessus, que le Gouvernement turc examinerait les demandes de retour des Arméniens *cas par cas* et qu'il procéderait par décision individuelle en faveur de ceux qui ne seraient pas compromis au point de vue politique.

Il y a lieu de rappeler aussi qu'une amnistie générale a été proclamée en faveur de toute personne habitant ou *ayant habité* la Turquie en raison de sa conduite militaire ou politique ou en raison d'une assistance quelconque qu'elle aurait donnée à une Puissance étrangère signataire du Traité de Paix. Cent cinquante personnes seulement de nationalité turque ont été en fait exclues de cette mesure de clémence et privées du droit de demeurer ou de retourner en Turquie.

Dans le silence du traité et de ses annexes au sujet des Arméniens et en vertu de la déclaration d'amnistie, le bénéfice de cette mesure étant seulement refusé aux cent cinquante personnes visées dans le Protocole du 24 juillet, qui devaient être et ont en fait été nominalement désignées, il semble que, de plein droit, les Arméniens résidant à l'étranger devraient pouvoir rentrer en Turquie. Il est vrai qu'il y a la déclaration d'Ismet Pacha. Mais, cette déclaration si réservée et si calculée soit-elle, ne saurait avoir pour effet d'empirer leur situation. Cela ne serait guère soutenable. Or, même en prenant à la lettre cette réponse, qui écartait seulement un engagement d'ordre général, on doit constater que le Règlement sur la Circulation de juillet 1924, tel qu'il a été promulgué et qu'il est appliqué, rend précisément impossible la discrimination que le Gouvernement turc entendait se réserver relativement aux Arméniens. La différence de traitement que ce règlement institue entre les catégories différentes de ressortissants turcs, selon leur religion, est déjà difficilement compatible avec l'esprit des clauses concernant les minorités dont le but est précisément d'assurer une égalité théorique entre les divers éléments de la population de la Turquie. Mais, si on étudie avec soin ce règlement, on s'aperçoit que peuvent seuls rentrer en Turquie les Arméniens qui l'avaient quittée avec un passeport national. Or, en fait, quand par exception un passeport national a été accordé à un Arménien, ce qui n'est possible d'ailleurs que depuis l'occupation kémaliste de Constantinople il l'a été presque toujours sous la réserve de l'interdiction de retour. Depuis peu de temps seulement la mention " retour interdit " a cessé d'être apposée sur les passeports turcs pour l'étranger délivrés aux Arméniens. Le nombre des Arméniens ayant bénéficié d'un tel passeport est d'ailleurs en fait insignifiant. Presque tous les intéressés sont partis avec des passeports de l'ancien Gouvernement ottoman ou des Alliés et le règlement de juillet 1924 pour cette catégorie si nombreuse de personnes inoffensives exclut en fait l'examen d'une mesure gracieuse individuelle. Or, cette situation a pour conséquence d'entraîner, par

l'application de la loi sur les biens abandonnés, pour les victimes de ce déni de justice, la perte de tous les biens qu'elles possèdent en Turquie. Il y a lieu de rappeler, à ce propos, qu'aux termes du protocole du 24 juillet 1923, qui accompagne la déclaration du même jour relative à l'amnistie, " il a été entendu qu'au cas où le Gouvernement turc déciderait, ainsi qu'il en avait exprimé l'intention, que les cent cinquante personnes exclues de l'amnistie auraient à procéder à la liquidation de leurs propriétés et autres biens en Turquie, il leur serait laissé un délai de neuf mois à partir de la date de la proclamation susmentionnée, pour effectuer cette liquidation de leur propre gré et qu'en cas de liquidation par le Gouvernement turc à l'expiration de ce délai, le produit en serait versé intégralement entre les mains des dites personnes." Ces prescriptions sont régulièrement appliquées. Il faut remarquer que les cent cinquante personnes, dont il s'agit, sont celles auxquelles le Gouvernement turc actuel fait les plus graves reproches; qu'il accuse d'avoir trahi la cause nationale. Leur cas s'aggrave du fait qu'elles sont toutes non seulement de nationalité turque mais aussi de religion musulmane. Le Gouvernement turc doit donc les considérer comme doublement coupables. Il n'a, en fait, jamais varié dans sa détermination de les exclure de toute mesure de clémence.

Il n'y a aucune assimilation possible entre le cas de ces cent cinquante Turcs musulmans spécialement frappés en raison de leur conduite politique et celui des nombreux Arméniens que la crainte de violences possibles et pour certains des raisons d'affaires ou des convenances de famille ont déterminé à quitter momentanément la Turquie. Ceux-ci, cependant, auxquels aucun grief ne peut être reproché, sont frappés bien plus rigoureusement que les autres, car la seule interdiction de leur retour équivaut pour eux pratiquement à la ruine complète. La différence de ces deux situations et de ces deux traitements éclaire d'une manière frappante la scandaleuse injustice dont l'élément chrétien est l'objet. Peut-on croire que le Conseil de la Société des Nations hésiterait devant un pareil excès?

Les cas des personnes ainsi lésées sont des plus nombreux. Certains, concernant par exemple des dames des familles les plus honorables de Constantinople, qui ont toujours été étrangères à toute politique, mais qui possédaient des immeubles importants, sont à la connaissance des missions alliées. Il est inutile de les citer. Ce serait plutôt affaiblir une cause dont les intéressés sont tellement nombreux. Ce serait d'autre part risquer de compromettre inutilement les personnes citées. La situation de droit et de fait est assez claire. Si un doute quelconque pouvait encore subsister, une enquête de la Société des Nations le ferait disparaître facilement.

Les Gouvernements alliés sont exactement informés des conditions dans lesquelles les sociétés turques à capitaux étrangers ont été obligées de renvoyer leur personnel non musulman, quoiqu'il n'eût pas démérité et qu'elles fussent satisfaites de son service, pour le remplacer par un personnel musulman. Les représentants alliés ne croient pas que leurs Gouvernements puissent avoir un doute quelconque sur le caractère de cette mesure qui constitue une violation incontestable des garanties stipulées par le Traité de Lausanne en faveur des minorités chrétiennes en Turquie. Ils croient devoir seulement en vue de la future délibération du Conseil de la Société des Nations, compléter par quelques explications nouvelles les considérations concernant cette question déjà exposées dans leur mémoire du 24 novembre 1924, en les accompagnant de la copie de certains documents destinés à les éclairer. Il leur paraît utile notamment d'annexer au présent mémoire, à titre d'exemple et comme type général des contrats imposés aux sociétés fonctionnant en Turquie, copie des arrangements conclus entre le Commissariat des Travaux publics et quatre sociétés à capitaux étrangers, la Société du Chemin de Fer de Moudania à Brousse, la Société du Chemin de Fer d'Aïdin, la Société des Tramways de Constantinople et la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux. Ils croient devoir signaler qu'ils ont relevé le texte de ces quatre contrats dans le fascicule de "Législation turque" du 15 mars 1924 des éditions Rizzo & Sons publiées à Constantinople. Ils désirent, en effet, en cette matière éviter autant que possible de mettre en cause telle ou telle société alliée déterminée pour ne pas la compromettre vis-à-vis du Gouvernement turc. Les arrangements dont il s'agit (Annexe No. 14) ayant été publiés, il n'y a pas d'inconvénient à les citer. Les contrats des autres sociétés varient de forme. L'obligation qui leur est imposée au sujet du personnel est la même pour toutes. Les représentants alliés jugent utile également d'annexer à leur mémoire une copie de toutes les notes échangées par eux sur cette grave question avec le Gouvernement turc (Annexes Nos. 2 à 6). Les Gouvernements alliés décideront s'il y a lieu de communiquer au Conseil de la Société des Nations ces derniers documents. Ils concernent, il est vrai, aussi une question qui intéresse

seulement les Alliés, celle du renvoi des employés alliés des sociétés, mais cette question n'a jamais été séparée de la question générale du renvoi des employés non musulmans, à laquelle les missions alliées n'ont pas cessé de s'intéresser très vivement. Les diverses notes qu'elles ont adressées au Gouvernement turc témoigneraient des efforts qu'elles n'ont cessé de faire pour amener celui-ci à accorder un traitement plus équitable à une catégorie nombreuse de travailleurs particulièrement intéressants. Les réponses du Gouvernement turc, quoique peu nombreuses et très prudentes, doivent aussi être étudiées. L'une d'elles, celle du 30 juillet 1924 No. 5254 (Annexe No. 9), contient au dernier paragraphe sous une forme très voilée et en des termes soigneusement calculés, l'aveu assez clair cependant du but que le Gouvernement turc s'est proposé en imposant aux sociétés concessionnaires l'obligation de remplacer leur personnel non musulman par un personnel musulman. Quand il allègue que " la protection des minorités n'implique nullement la négligence du sort de la majorité ni ne devrait entraîner pour celle-ci un traitement inférieur," il reconnaît implicitement qu'il a voulu, par une mesure d'autorité, changer au profit des musulmans les termes d'une situation qui était jusque-là à l'avantage des non-musulmans, en raison, d'ailleurs, uniquement des aptitudes plus grandes de ces derniers et de leur plus grande activité.

La question dont il s'agit ne sera pas entièrement nouvelle pour le Conseil de la Société des Nations. M. Picard, délégué de la société, aux termes de l'article 107 du Traité de Lausanne, pour le contrôle du transit des tronçons des Chemins de Fer orientaux compris entre la frontière gréco-bulgare et la frontière gréco-turque a adressé, en effet, au mois de décembre 1923, au secrétariat général de la Société une note confidentielle sur l'obligation imposée à la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux, par le Gouvernement turc, de remplacer dans le plus bref délai son personnel chrétien par un personnel musulman. Les Gouvernements alliés trouveront, sous ce pli, copie de la note dont il s'agit et des lettres échangées alors entre M. Picard et le directeur de la compagnie. Ces documents, qui sont déjà connus, comme il vient d'être dit, du Conseil de la Société des Nations, ont un intérêt particulier en ce sens qu'ils contiennent un témoignage écrit du renvoi obligatoire des employés non musulmans et de leur remplacement par des musulmans. Le fait, en lui-même, est incontestable et de notoriété publique. Mais le Gouvernement turc a naturellement évité autant que possible de fournir la preuve écrite de ses exigences. Les arrangements conclus par lui avec les diverses sociétés, dont des types sont ci-annexés, stipulent seulement, comme les Gouvernements le remarqueront, que tous les employés devront être *turcs*, ce qui peut laisser croire qu'ils pourraient être de nationalité turque, mais de religion non musulmane. Il n'en est rien. Le Gouvernement turc a toujours entendu que le personnel chrétien, de nationalité turque comme de nationalité étrangère, fût congédié et remplacé par un personnel exclusivement musulman. Il s'est efforcé généralement de formuler ces exigences verbalement. Mais les déclarations de ses représentants auprès des diverses sociétés ont toujours été très explicites sur ce point. C'est à grand'peine que quelques sociétés ont pu obtenir de conserver de rares techniciens non musulmans qui leur étaient indispensables. Il ne paraît pas possible que le Gouvernement turc puisse démentir un pareil fait, dont les exemples sont si généraux et si concordants. Dans le cas où il tenterait d'égarer sur ce point la bonne foi du Conseil de la Société des Nations, le résultat d'une enquête ne serait pas douteux.

Il y a une objection, d'une nature plus délicate, que le Gouvernement turc ne manquera sans doute pas de soulever à propos du renvoi des employés chrétiens et qui, d'ailleurs, se présente également dans le cas des autres griefs exposés plus haut, qu'il s'agisse de l'expulsion des chrétiens du sud-est de l'Anatolie en 1923 et au commencement de 1924 ou des mesures établies par la loi sur les biens abandonnés. Ils feront probablement observer que le Traité de Lausanne n'était pas encore ratifié par les Puissances alliées, quand la loi sur les biens abandonnés a été promulguée et quand ils ont pris les diverses mesures qui leur sont reprochées. Cette objection serait tout à fait spécieuse et elle doit être complètement écartée. Les Gouvernements alliés jugeront sans doute à propos, le cas échéant, de présenter à cet effet au Conseil de la Société des Nations les considérations suivantes :

Il y a lieu, d'abord, de remarquer que, d'après une déclaration de la délégation turque à Lausanne, le Gouvernement turc avait annoncé formellement son intention de se conformer à l'esprit du traité sans attendre son entrée en vigueur. Non seulement il n'a pas contesté cet engagement, mais il l'a formellement reconnu dans une note, dont la copie est ci-annexée. Le Gouvernement italien avait eu l'occasion, pour

un cas particulier, de se référer à la déclaration dont il s'agit. Adnan Bey, dans sa réponse, déclara expressément que " la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères se plaisait à reconnaître l'engagement pris par son Gouvernement de conformer ses actes même avant la ratification à l'esprit du traité et de ses annexes et qu'elle pouvait assurer la représentation italienne que tel était toujours le désir de son Gouvernement " (Annexe No. 1).

Cette déclaration est précieuse; mais, même en l'absence de tout engagement pareil, le Gouvernement turc ne serait en aucune façon fondé à prétendre que les faits relevés contre lui étant antérieurs à l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne, ils seraient couverts d'une sorte de prescription et ne lui seraient pas opposables. Il faudrait, pour qu'il pût émettre une pareille prétention, qu'il eût changé d'attitude depuis l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne, non seulement qu'il eût dès lors conformé ses actes aux engagements assumés par lui, mais qu'il eût pris des mesures pour mettre ses lois, ses règlements et son action officielle d'accord avec les stipulations du traité, ainsi que l'article 37 lui en fait une obligation. S'il obéissait maintenant à cet engagement formel, il accorderait pour le présent et pour l'avenir, à ses ressortissants chrétiens, le bénéfice des droits qu'il leur a reconnus dans le Traité de Lausanne et il réparerait pour eux dans une assez large mesure les graves préjudices qu'ils ont subis dans le passé. La loi sur les biens abandonnés, qui a été, non pas excusable, mais explicable, comme mesure de guerre, pendant les hostilités, n'a plus aucune raison de subsister aujourd'hui. Si la lettre de cette loi ne viole pas expressément les dispositions du Traité de Lausanne, les chrétiens n'y étant pas spécialement désignés, il est incontestable que c'est contre eux seuls qu'elle a été faite; que c'est à eux seuls qu'elle a toujours été appliquée et qu'elle continue d'être appliquée. Or, non seulement le Gouvernement turc n'annonce aucunement l'intention de la supprimer, mais le règlement sur la circulation, qui, s'il n'est pas postérieur à l'entrée en vigueur du traité, est du moins postérieur à sa signature, a pour effet d'intensifier encore l'application de la loi sur les biens abandonnés en empêchant, on peut dire, complètement, la rentrée en Turquie des Arméniens. Les expropriations en vertu de cette loi sont de plus en plus nombreuses. Les biens des absents sont chaque jour liquidés dans les conditions les plus défavorables. Les Arméniens, en particulier, sont de plus en plus acculés à la ruine.

Le dernier point visé dans le mémoire du 24 novembre n'a pas le caractère particulièrement douloureux des autres points ci-dessus exposés. Il constitue cependant au même titre une violation des clauses des minorités. Là encore, il est difficile de produire des preuves expresses et particulières. Il faut, en effet, éviter de mettre en cause telle ou telle communauté, tel ou tel établissement religieux ou scolaire non musulman déterminés. Mais, les représentants alliés croient savoir suffisamment qu'en fait aucune part n'a encore été accordée sur les divers budgets aux communautés non musulmanes pour les crédits affectés à un but d'éducation, de religion ou de bienfaisance, conformément à l'article 41 du Traité de Lausanne. Pour plus de sûreté, il semble que, sur ce point spécial, il y aurait intérêt à poser simplement la question au Gouvernement turc en l'invitant à indiquer, avec preuves à l'appui, les établissements non musulmans vis-à-vis desquels il aurait rempli l'obligation de l'article 41.

Les représentants alliés ont l'honneur de soumettre ces nouvelles considérations à la haute appréciation de leurs Gouvernements, dans l'espoir qu'elles leur paraîtront suffisamment détaillées, précises et concluantes pour entraîner la conviction du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Il faut assurément s'attendre à une résistance très vive du Gouvernement turc. Celui-ci ne sera jamais à bout d'arguments. La diplomatie orientale a des ressources particulières, et il s'agit en l'espèce pour le Gouvernement turc de recueillir les derniers bénéfices d'une politique longuement mûrie, dont il a mesuré d'avance les difficultés et qu'il s'est préparé dès longtemps à défendre. Mais les Gouvernements alliés sauront faire triompher la vérité et la justice. Ils sauront déterminer le Conseil de la Société des Nations à prendre comme les représentants alliés l'ont indiqué dans leur précédent mémoire les mesures convenables pour amener la Turquie à mettre ses lois, ses règlements et son action officielle d'accord avec les stipulations des articles 38 à 44 du Traité de Lausanne qu'elle a reconnues, dans ce traité, comme lois fondamentales.

Annexes.

Bordereau des Pièces annexées au Mémoire des Représentants alliés du 3 Février 1925.

No. 1. Note d'Adnan Bey à l'Ambassade d'Italie du 24 janvier 1924.
No. 2. Note collective des Missions alliées à Adnan Bey du 16 août 1923.
No. 3. Note collective des Missions alliées à Adnan Bey du 13 septembre 1923.
No. 4. Note collective des Missions alliées à Adnan Bey du 16 février 1924.
No. 5. Note collective des Missions alliées à Adnan Bey du 1er mars 1924.
No. 6. Note collective des Missions alliées à Adnan Bey du 8 avril 1924.
No. 7. Note d'Adnan Bey aux représentants alliés du 17 mars 1924.
No. 8. Note d'Adnan Bey aux représentants alliés du 29 mars 1924.
No. 9. Note d'Adnan Bey aux représentants alliés du 30 juillet 1924.
No. 10. Note de M. Picard au secrétariat général de la Société des Nations.
No. 11. Lettre de M. Picard au directeur de la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux.
No. 12. Réponse de celui-ci à M. Picard.
No. 13. Lettre de M. Picard à la Société des Nations.
No. 14. Arrangements conclus par le Gouvernement turc avec les Sociétés du Chemin de Fer de Moudania à Brousse, du Chemin de Fer d'Aïdin, des Tramways de Constantinople et des Chemins de Fer orientaux.

Annex 1.

Adnan Bey to Italian Ambassador.

Adnan Bey a l'honneur d'accuser réception à la représentation diplomatique italienne de sa note verbale du 23 août 1923, relative aux employés italiens de la Société des Mines d'Héraclée.

La délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères se plaît à reconnaître l'engagement pris par son Gouvernement de conformer ses actes, même avant la ratification, à l'esprit du traité et de ses annexes, et peut assurer la représentation italienne que tel est toujours le désir de son Gouvernement. La délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a néanmoins l'honneur de répondre comme suit aux observations contenues dans la note verbale susmentionnée.

L'article 71 du Règlement minier du 26 mars 1322, exception faite pour l'ingénieur et le contremaître qui peuvent être étrangers, impose à l'exploitant, sous peine d'amende, l'obligation de n'embaucher que les sujets turcs domiciliés dans la circonscription de la mine.

Sans vouloir nullement contester la valeur de l'article 4 de la Convention d'Établissement signée à Lausanne, la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères croit devoir faire observer que, tout état créé en violation d'une loi, règle ou convention ne pouvant en aucune façon donner juridiquement naissance à un droit acquis, l'article 4 de la convention ne peut trouver son champ d'application en ce qui concerne le présent cas.

Constantinople, le 24 *janvier* 1924.

Annex 2.

Joint Allied Note to Adnan Bey.

Il est à la connaissance des Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie qu'une pression est exercée sur certaines sociétés à capitaux alliés pour les obliger à renvoyer une partie de leurs employés étrangers, de même que leurs employés turcs orthodoxes ou arméniens et à les remplacer par des musulmans.

Que les autorités du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie se préoccupent d'assurer des ressources à des fonctionnaires en disponibilité et de renforcer l'élément musulman dans le commerce et l'industrie du pays, c'est très naturel, les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ne songent pas à s'en étonner, et ils savent que les compagnies à capitaux alliés sont disposées à faire, pour faciliter, en ce qui les concerne, la réalisation de ces vues, tout ce qui sera réellement possible, sans désorganiser leurs services. Mais elles ont à tenir compte de deux éléments dont le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie n'a certainement pas l'intention de méconnaître l'importance : les nécessités de leur exploitation, d'une part, qui les obligent à se préoccuper avant tout d'avoir des employés capables et expérimentés, et, d'autre part, les droits acquis par un personnel, souvent très ancien, qui remplit bien son service et qu'il est impossible de congédier sans motif.

Les Hauts-Commissaires alliés sont convaincus que ces dispositions répondent aux vues réelles du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, qui désire ne porter aucun trouble dans le fonctionnement des sociétés opérant sur le territoire turc et qui certainement aussi ne voudrait pas, en privant de leur gagne-pain des étrangers ou des chrétiens, ses ressortissants, porter atteinte soit à l'article 4 de la convention relative à l'établissement et à la compétence judiciaire annexée au Traité de Lausanne, qui entrera en vigueur dès la ratification du traité par le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, c'est-à-dire incessamment, soit aux dispositions de la section 3 du traité concernant la protection des minorités et notamment à l'article 39 d'après lequel " la différence de religion, de croyance ou de confession ne devra nuire à aucun ressortissant turc en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils ou politiques, notamment pour l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs ou *l'exercice de différentes professions et industries.*"

Les démarches effectuées auprès de certaines sociétés à capitaux alliés, auxquelles il est fait allusion plus haut, sont donc le résultat d'instructions mal interprétées ou d'un excès de zèle de la part de quelques autorités turques. Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés sont convaincus que son Excellence Adnan Bey s'empressera de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que l'action de ces autorités tienne compte des intérêts légitimes des sociétés alliées et ne s'écarte pas des dispositions adoptées d'un commun accord, dans le Traité de Lausanne, par les Gouvernements alliés et le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

CURÉLY.
HENDERSON
MAISSA.

Constantinople, le 16 *août* 1923.

ANNEX 3.

Joint Allied Note to Adnan Bey.

Par leur note collective du 16 août dernier, restée à ce jour sans réponse, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie soussignés avaient appelé l'attention de son Excellence Adnan Bey sur le fait qu'une pression était exercée sur certaines sociétés à capitaux alliés pour les obliger à renvoyer une partie de leurs employés étrangers, de même que leurs employés turcs orthodoxes ou arméniens, et à les remplacer par des musulmans.

Les soussignés constatent qu'aucune suite n'a été donnée à leur note et que les sociétés dont il s'agit continuent à être invitées à licencier leur personnel étranger ou chrétien.

Ils croient devoir en conséquence renouveler de la manière la plus formelle les observations qu'ils ont présentées à ce sujet dans leur communication précitée :

En ce qui concerne les étrangers, ils font observer que, la convention relative à l'établissement étant applicable sans délai, aux termes du paragraphe VI du Protocole d'Évacuation, la question est réglée par l'article 4 de ladite convention, stipulant le maintien des situations acquises au 1er janvier 1923, relativement à l'admission en Turquie des ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes, aux divers genres de commerce, profession ou industrie.

Quant aux employés turcs non musulmans des compagnies concessionnaires, le Gouvernement turc ne saurait exiger leur renvoi si, comme l'ont déclaré les plénipotentiaires turcs à Lausanne et comme son Excellence Adnan Bey l'a répété maintes fois, ce Gouvernement se conformait dès maintenant à l'esprit du traité. Les articles 38 à 44 du Traité de Lausanne accordent en effet l'égalité absolue devant la loi aux musulmans et aux non-musulmans, et l'article 39 en particulier déclare que la différence de religion, de croyance ou de confession ne devra nuire à aucun ressortissant turc, notamment pour l'admission aux emplois publics *ou l'exercice des différentes professions ou industries.*

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés seraient heureux de voir le Gouvernement turc conformer ses actes sur ce point à ses déclarations générales, et prient en conséquence de nouveau son Excellence Adnan Bey de vouloir bien prendre les mesures nécessaires pour qu'aucune obligation contraire à l'esprit de l'article 39 du traité ne soit imposée aux sociétés à capitaux alliés.

CURÉLY.
HENDERSON.
MAISSA.

Constantinople, le 13 *septembre* 1923.

ANNEX 4.

Joint Allied Note to Adnan Bey.

D'après un télégramme d'Angora en date du 6 de ce mois publié par l'Agence d'Anatolie, le Ministre des Travaux publics, répondant à certaines questions qui lui avaient été adressées au sujet des sociétés étrangères, aurait déclaré que ces sociétés étaient obligées de remplacer leur personnel actuel dans un délai de six mois et que, dans ce délai, elles se seraient complètement conformées à cette obligation.

Les représentants des Gouvernements britannique, français et italien considérant que cette information, ainsi présentée, n'est pas conforme à la réalité, le Gouvernement turc ne saurait en effet imposer aux sociétés étrangères fonctionnant en Turquie des conditions qui seraient contraires aux engagements qu'il a pris lui-même vis-à-vis des Puissances alliées dans la Convention d'Établissement en ce qui concerne les droits des ressortissants alliés et dans les articles 37 et 39 du Traité de Lausanne relativement aux garanties reconnues aux minorités. Ils ont toutefois le regret de constater à ce propos qu'aucune réponse n'a été faite par le Gouvernement turc aux deux notes que les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie lui ont adressées sur cette grave question à la date du 16 août 1923, du 13 septembre de la même année.

Ils prient en conséquence son Excellence Adnan Bey de vouloir bien rappeler à l'attention du Gouvernement de la République turque les deux communications précitées, dont ils confirment expressément le contenu et qui ne sauraient rester plus longtemps sans réponse.

Constantinople, le 16 *février* 1924.

ANNEX 5.

Joint Allied Note to Adnan Bey.

Par une note en date du 16 du mois dernier rappelant et confirmant deux précédentes notes collectives concernant la même question en date du 16 août 1923 et du 13 septembre 1923 restées sans réponse, les représentants des Gouvernements britannique, français et italien ont protesté contre l'intention prêtée au Gouvernement turc par la presse turque d'obliger les sociétés alliées fonctionnant en Turquie à renvoyer leurs employés étrangers ou non musulmans et à les remplacer par un personnel turc et musulman. Ils ont signalé, une fois de plus à ce propos, que de pareilles dispositions seraient contraires aux engagements pris par le Gouvernement turc, tant dans le Traité de Lausanne, en ce qui concerne les minorités, que dans la Convention d'Établissement, en ce qui concerne les ressortissants alliés.

Or, il est à la connaissance des soussignés que plusieurs ressortissants alliés viennent d'être congédiés, sur l'ordre des autorités turques, des emplois qu'ils occupaient dans certaines sociétés à capitaux alliés et que la police turque les a même avertis que, s'ils s'avisaient de se rendre à ces sociétés à partir du 10 du mois courant, ils seraient empêchés par elle d'y pénétrer et d'y travailler.

Ce fait constitue une violation flagrante de l'article 4 de la Convention d'Établissement, dont le bénéfice est actuellement assuré aux ressortissants alliés, contre laquelle les représentants des Gouvernements britannique, français et italien ont l'honneur de protester hautement et qu'ils ont le devoir de signaler à leurs Gouvernements. Malgré le silence opposé à leurs précédentes communications sur cette grave question, ils veulent encore espérer que le Gouvernement turc reviendra à l'observation des engagements qu'il a pris vis-à-vis des Puissances alliées. Mais ils font, dès maintenant, toutes réserves pour le préjudice qui pourrait être causé à leurs ressortissants et dont la réparation incomberait entièrement au Gouvernement turc.

Constantinople, le 1er *mars* 1924.

ANNEX 6.

Joint Allied Note to Adnan Bey.

Les représentants des Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'accuser réception à son Excellence le Dr. Adnan Bey de ses notes en date des 17 et 29 mars dernier qu'il a bien voulu leur adresser concernant les mesures prises par le Gouvernement de la République turque en vue d'obliger certaines sociétés établies en Turquie à renvoyer leurs employés étrangers et non musulmans et à les remplacer par un personnel turc et musulman. Ils examineront successivement le cas de ces deux catégories d'employés.

2. En ce qui concerne les employés de la première catégorie, c'est-à-dire les ressortissants alliés, les représentants soussignés ont l'honneur de faire observer à son Excellence le Dr. Adnan Bey que les obligations de caractère international assumées par un État vis-à-vis d'autres États avec lesquels il a conclu des traités ou des conventions doivent primer n'importe quelle disposition de droit intérieur.

3. Tout État qui assume les obligations découlant d'un traité ou d'une convention assure en même temps l'obligation non seulement d'y conformer ses actions administratives, mais aussi de mettre sa législation, si elle ne l'est pas déjà, d'accord avec les dispositions de ce traité ou de cette convention, et de ne promulguer aucune nouvelle loi qui soit de nature à porter obstacle à l'application intégrale du traité ou de la convention.

4. En l'espèce, le Gouvernement de la République turque a assumé par l'article 6 du protocole relatif à l'évacuation l'obligation d'appliquer en faveur des ressortissants alliés les dispositions de la Convention d'Établissement, en attendant que cette convention soit ratifiée par les Puissances contractantes. Il en résulte que les dispositions en question priment déjà toutes les dispositions d'une loi turque qui leur seraient contraires. Les Gouvernements alliés ont donc non seulement le droit mais le devoir d'en demander l'exécution intégrale, quelles que puissent être les dispositions contraires des lois turques actuelles et futures.

5. L'article 4 de la convention précitée consacre le principe que, jusqu'à la conclusion de conventions spéciales dans les délais prévus par ledit article, le *statu quo* existant au 1er janvier 1923 sera conservé en ce qui concerne l'exercice de tout genre de commerce, de profession ou d'industrie de la part des étrangers. Le *statu quo*, c'est le fait indépendant du droit ; on peut contester son existence, mais, quand cette existence est contestée, on ne saurait discuter sa légalité. L'état de fait, quel qu'il soit, doit être respecté. Le Gouvernement de la République turque ne saurait se soustraire à l'obligation qu'il a assumée par l'article 4 de la Convention d'Établissement en invoquant, soit, par exemple, l'article 71 du Règlement minier, soit la loi sur l'encouragement des industries, la loi provisoire sur l'exercice des professions ou toutes autres lois ou règlements du même genre, de même que les contrats qu'il a pu passer avec certaines sociétés concessionnaires, après la stipulation de la convention. Le Gouvernement turc, quand il a conclu la Convention d'Établissement, connaissait parfaitement l'existence des lois plus haut indiquées ; par conséquent, s'il avait eu l'intention de s'en prévaloir, il l'aurait déclaré explicitement ; n'ayant formulé aucune réserve, il a pris purement et simplement l'engagement de maintenir tel quel le *statu quo* existant au 1er janvier 1923, et il est dans l'obligation la plus stricte d'observer cet engagement.

6. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement turc pourra, à l'avenir, mais à l'avenir seulement, se prévaloir des dispositions de l'article 71 du Règlement minier, de la loi sur l'encouragement des industries, de la loi sur l'exercice des professions, des contrats stipulés avec les sociétés concessionnaires, mais pour ce qui concerne le passé il est strictement tenu à maintenir le *statu quo* et à prendre les

mesures nécessaires, soit par la promulgation d'une loi, soit par des instructions appropriées données à ses fonctionnaires pour que les dispositions plus haut citées des lois turques et des contrats conclus avec les sociétés concessionnaires ne soient pas applicables aux employés, techniciens et ouvriers de nationalité alliée au service des sociétés concessionnaires, d'entreprises minières et industrielles ou autres, à la date du 1er janvier 1923, ou qui exerçaient tous genres de commerce, de profession ou d'industrie en Turquie à la même date. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement de la République turque ne remplirait pas ces obligations, il violerait les engagements découlant de la Convention d'Établissement et serait tenu à indemniser tous les ressortissants alliés qui, par son fait, ont eu surtout à subir un préjudice quelconque.

7. Ce premier point établi, il y a lieu de reprendre aux arguments présentés concernant la seconde question traitée dans la note du 17 courant, celle des minorités.

8. Il est à relever d'abord que si les représentants soussignés ont invoqué certaines clauses du Traité de Paix concernant la protection des minorités en Turquie, ils se croyaient fondés à le faire, étant donné l'intention exprimée à différentes reprises par le Gouvernement de la République de conformer ses actes aux dispositions du traité même avant son entrée en vigueur.

9. Or, par l'article 37 du Traité, la Turquie s'est engagée à ce que les stipulations contenues dans la section concernant la protection des minorités soient reconnues comme lois fondamentales et à ce qu'aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne soient en contradiction ou opposition avec ces stipulations ni ne prévalent contre elles.

10. L'article 39 dispose que les ressortissants turcs, appartenant aux minorités non musulmanes, jouiront des même droits civils et politiques que les musulmans. Il dispose également que la différence de religion, de croyance ou de confession ne devrait nuire à aucun ressortissant turc en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, notamment pour l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries.

11. Les soussignés seraient heureux de prendre l'alinéa 1 de la partie de la note de son Excellence Adnan Bey, qui traite la question des employés non musulmans, comme une preuve de respect du Gouvernement turc de ces dispositions si formelles du traité, si réellement les non-musulmans étaient admis à exercer toutes les activités qu'ils désireraient. Malheureusement, il résulte de l'alinéa 2 de la même partie de cette note que le Gouvernement turc entend toujours insister à ce que les dirigeants des entreprises alliées ou à capitaux alliés renvoyent des employés non musulmans faisant déjà partie de leur personnel pour les remplacer par des musulmans et soient privés dorénavant par conséquent du libre choix des employés dont ils pourront avoir besoin. Quand même certaines sociétés auraient été forcées de prendre de tels engagements, le fait de leur avoir imposé ces engagements n'en serait pas moins inconciliable avec les clauses précitées du traité.

12. Les représentants alliés doivent s'élever énergiquement contre l'accusation portée contre leurs ressortissants d'avoir voulu exclure systématiquement la majorité musulmane de toute coopération aux activités économiques. Les sociétés aux capitaux alliés ne demandent pas mieux que de voir l'élément qui constitue la majorité de la population prêter à l'avenir une collaboration plus étendue à leurs entreprises. Mais les soussignés ne sauraient admettre que cette collaboration soit assurée par des moyens coercitifs, qui non seulement lèsent les intérêts des entreprises alliées, mais sont manifestement contraires aux engagements pris à Lausanne au nom de la Turquie.

13. En concluant, les représentants soussignés ont l'honneur de prier le Gouvernement de la République turque de vouloir bien leur faire connaître, d'une façon claire et définitive, s'il entend se conformer aux stipulations de l'article 4 de la Convention d'Établissement et, en conséquence, promulguer une loi ou prendre telles dispositions qu'il jugera convenables afin que les ressortissants alliés, établis en Turquie au 1er janvier 1923, malgré toutes dispositions contraires du Règlement minier, de la loi sur l'encouragement de l'industrie de la loi sur l'exercice des professions ou de toute autre loi, règlement ou contrats analogues, puissent bénéficier du *statu quo*, c'est-à-dire conserver les emplois et postes qu'ils occupaient à la date susmentionnée ou y être réintégrés en cas de licenciement et continuer librement l'exercice de tout genre de commerce, de profession ou d'industrie. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement de la République turque croirait pouvoir donner une interprétation différente à celle attribuée par les Alliés à l'article 4 de la Convention d'Établissement, les représentants soussignés, vu que ladite convention est un acte bilatéral auquel leurs Gouvernements sont parties et qu'ils ont le plus grand intérêt à faire interpréter et exécuter conformément aux intentions qui ont présidé à sa stipulation, font toute réserve en ce qui concerne le droit des Gouvernements alliés d'exercer tous recours prévus par le droit international pour faire trancher le différend et, en cette hypothèse, ils se verront obligés de faire état de tous les dommages subis ou que pourront subir leurs ressortissants pour en demander une juste et équitable réparation.

14. Les représentants soussignés ont l'honneur de prier son Excellence le Dr. Adnan Bey de vouloir bien porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de la République turque le contenu de la présente note et de leur faire connaître sa réponse aussitôt que possible, afin qu'ils puissent la communiquer à leur tour aux Gouvernements alliés.

CURÉLY.
HENDERSON.
MAISSA.

Constantinople, le 8 avril 1924.

ANNEX 7.

Adnan Bey to Allied Representatives.

Leurs Excellences les représentants de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie formulent quelques objections, dans leur note collective du 16 février 1924, au sujet des mesures adoptées par le Gouvernement de la République en vue d'assurer la participation de l'élément turc aux travaux des entreprises fonctionnant en Turquie. Ils invoquent, à cet effet, la Convention de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923, ainsi que les articles 37 et 39 du traité de même date.

En ce qui touche l'admission des ressortissants britanniques aux divers genres de commerce, d'industrie et de profession, il est vrai que l'article 4 de la convention ci-dessus mentionnée prévoit soit le maintien du *statu quo* au 1er janvier 1923 durant les douze mois à compter de la mise en vigueur de cette convention, soit le respect des droits acquis au 1er janvier précité, dans le cas où des conventions particulières n'auraient pas été conclues dans le délai imparti.

Dans ces conditions, les objections formulées par les Puissances contractantes auraient toute leur valeur, si leurs ressortissants se trouvaient être interdits, après la signature des actes de Lausanne, d'exercer une profession qui n'était pas défendue le 1er janvier 1923 aux étrangers d'après les règles en vigueur en Turquie à cette date. Or, il y a à peine lieu de relever que tel n'est pas le cas en ce qui concerne les employés étrangers des sociétés. Vu le grand nombre de ces derniers travaillant actuellement dans bien des sociétés, on ne pourrait pas dire que les étrangers sont exclus du service des sociétés.

Il est à noter toutefois que le maintien du *statu quo* ci-dessus n'implique pas la continuation des situations incompatibles avec les lois existant en 1923, ni avec les dispositions des contrats librement passés. C'est ainsi qu'une société qui se serait obligée d'avoir un personnel recruté exclusivement parmi la population du pays, n'en serait pas moins tenue de respecter cet engagement sans que cela puisse constituer une violation de la Convention d'Établissement. Il en serait de même des industries, commerces ou professions qui étaient déjà, en vertu des règles établies, réservés aux seuls nationaux turcs le 1er janvier 1923 et auxquels auraient pu avoir accès quelques étrangers en dépit desdites règles.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, on pourrait encore citer la loi sur l'encouragement des industries; les établissements qui tiennent à profiter des faveurs prévues par cette loi sont tenus d'avoir un personnel composé, à l'exception des spécialistes, des ressortissants turcs; aussi l'obligation dans laquelle se trouve un tel établissement, pour bénéficier des avantages y afférents, de mettre fin au service de ses employés étrangers ne constituerait-elle pas non plus une transgression de l'article 4.

Pour ce qui est des éléments appartenant aux minorités ainsi que de l'argument tiré des articles 37 et 39 du Traité de Lausanne, son Excellence le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique voudrait bien convenir, après l'examen des considérations suivantes, qu'il n'y a rien dans les mesures en question qui soit contraire à ces articles, toute réserve faite d'ailleurs sur la validité de ces derniers avant la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix:

1. Le Gouvernement turc n'a réservé aux ressortissants turcs de religion musulmane aucune industrie, ni aucun commerce; les Turcs professant une autre religion sont admis à exercer comme leurs concitoyens musulmans toutes les activités qu'ils désireraient.
2. Les dispositions des articles 37 et 39 ne dérogent en rien au droit, ni diminuent le devoir du Gouvernement turc de veiller sérieusement à ce que les éléments appartenant à la majorité de la population ne soient pas privés de la possibilité de participer à un domaine important de travail dans le pays. Par conséquent, les mesures prises à cet égard devraient être envisagées non pas comme une tendance hostile à l'égard des minorités, mais bien comme des moyens légitimes et nécessaires adoptées dans le but de contrecarrer la pratique d'exclure systématiquement les majorités de toute coopération aux activités économiques.

Il découle des observations précédentes que les mesures qui font l'objet de la communication précitée du 16 février ne visent qu'à l'adaptation aux lois ou aux contrats existants des situations irrégulières ou bien répondent aux nécessités économiques du pays, sans qu'il y ait une incompatibilité quelconque avec les dispositions des traités.

(Seal.)

Constantinople, le 17 mars 1924.

ANNEX 8.

Adnan Bey to Allied Representatives.

En réponse à la note verbale que son Excellence le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 1er courant, la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de l'informer que le Gouvernement de la République, en se basant sur les considérations développées dans la note responsive de cette délégation en date du 17 mars 1924, déclare qu'il ne peut être l'objet d'aucune réclamation de ce genre.

Constantinople, le 29 mars 1924.

ANNEX 9.

Adnan Bey to Allied Representatives.

La délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir aux Missions diplomatiques de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie que leur note collective du 8 avril 1924 a fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi dont les conclusions leur sont communiquées ci-après.

Le Gouvernement de la République turque n'a pas contesté la valeur que doivent avoir les engagements internationaux dûment contractés, en présence des dispositions contraires du droit intérieur, ni l'obligation des États de conformer leurs législations aux engagements pris en vertu des traités. Cependant il y a lieu de relever tout de suite que cette considération ne pourrait avoir une influence quelconque dans la solution de la question en litige, aucun conflit n'étant établi entre les dispositions de la Convention d'Établissement et celles de la législation turque.

Il eût été peut-être superflu de revenir encore une fois sur l'historique de l'article 4 de ladite convention, les arguments contenus dans la note collective précitée ne l'eussent ils rendu nécessaire. Leurs Excellences les représentants diplomatiques n'ignorent sans doute pas que les délégations alliées à la Conférence de Lausanne avaient tout d'abord demandé l'assimilation complète de leurs ressortissants aux nationaux tures, pour ce qui concerne l'exercice de commerce, profession et industrie ; elles exceptaient toutefois les métiers qu'un long usage avait réservés aux sujets du pays. Le contre-projet turc n'avait accepté cette assimilation qu'en tant qu'il s'agit des commerces, industries et professions que la législation turque ne réserverait pas aux seuls nationaux. L'article 4 ayant, comme les autres dispositions de la première section de la Convention d'Établissement, un caractère réciproque et les législations des États contractants n'étant pas uniformes en cette matière, il ne fut pas possible d'énumérer les professions qui pourraient être réservées aux nationaux dans les rapports entre la Turquie d'une part et l'ensemble des autres États signataires d'autre part. C'est devant cette impossibilité qu'on a dû réserver cette question à des conventions particulières à intervenir entre la Turquie et chacune des Puissances contractantes. Toutefois cette manière de procéder se heurtait à une grande difficulté : la liberté complète d'action qu'elle conférait à chaque partie pourrait avoir comme conséquence une interdiction immédiate de l'exercice par les ressortissants de l'autre partie de toute espèce de commerce, industrie ou profession. On a voulu surmonter cette difficulté en consolidant l'état actuel des choses soit en Turquie, soit dans les territoires des autres Puissances contractantes, ce qui fut exprimé à l'article 4 par la conservation provisoire du statut existant au 1er janvier 1923. Il résulte clairement de cette stipulation qu'en Turquie de même que dans les territoires de chacun des États signataires les professions que les ressortissants respectifs avaient le droit d'exercer au 1er janvier 1923 ne pourront pas leur être interdites jusqu'à l'intervention des conventions projetées ou l'expiration, sans possibilité d'entente, du délai prévu et que dans ce dernier cas les personnes ayant légalement exercé à la date ci-dessus visée une profession qui serait, par la suite, devenue réservée aux nationaux, conserveront leurs droits acquis.

Dans ces conditions on ne saurait prétendre que l'article 4 ait pour but de consacrer les situations illégales au même titre que les droits légalement acquis les, premières ne pouvant donner naissance à aucun droit.

A cette occasion le Gouvernement ture désirerait savoir s'il serait permis, sur la base de l'article 4 en question, à un citoyen ture qui aurait, sans en avoir le droit, exercé en 1923 la médecine en France ou l'une quelconque des professions prohibées par le "Aliens Restriction Act" de 1919 en Grande-Bretagne de continuer ses occupations. On ne saurait établir aucune différence entre le cas d'un Turc qui, échappé à la vigilance des autorités locales, aurait exercé en territoires alliés une profession interdite et celui d'un ressortissant allié ayant exercé en Turquie une telle profession alors que par la force majeure résultant de l'occupation militaire l'action des autorités locales se trouvait être paralysée.

Il serait utile de rappeler en outre que les Puissances alliées ont reconnu à la Conférence de Lausanne l'abolition complète des Capitulations à tous les points de vue. Aussi, indépendamment de toute autre considération, ne saurait-on nier au Gouvernement de la République turque les droits qui n'avaient fait l'objet d'aucune contestation de la part des Puissances alliées du temps de l'Empire ottoman. Or, si l'on déduit du point de vue adopté en la matière par les missions diplomatiques toutes les conséquences qu'il comporte, force serait d'admettre que même les professions qu'un long usage avait réservées aux sujets du pays en plein régime capitulaire et qui au regard des Alliés pourraient continuer à être aussi réservées (voir l'article 4, projet allié) seraient accessibles aux ressortissants alliés malgré l'abolition complète des Capitulations par le seul fait que, profitant de la présence des forces d'occupation à Constantinople après l'armistice de Mudros, ils auraient pu s'y livrer contrairement aux règles existantes. La délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères ne pense pas qu'une pareille hypothèse puisse être approuvée par les missions diplomatiques, ni le *statu quo* d'une province occupée substitué au *statu quo* de tout le pays, qui est seul envisagé par l'article 4. Elle ne peut non plus s'empêcher d'espérer que l'exposé précédent ne laisse subsister aucun doute sur la portée de l'article 4 et notamment du terme *statu quo* qui représente les situations, tant de fait que de droit, ayant légalement existé au 1er janvier 1923.

Par conséquent, l'article 4 n'ayant visé aucunement le maintien des situations irrégulières, il n'y aurait pas de modifier, en Turquie, pas plus que dans les territoires des autres États contractants, les lois ni les contrats dûment passés, pour légitimer les quelques cas qui se seraient produits en violation des règles en vigueur.

En ce qui concerne les employés non musulmans des sociétés, la communication de cette délégation en date du 17 mars dernier contient les considérations détaillées justifiant les mesures prises par le Gouvernement en vue d'assurer la collaboration de la majorité des habitants aux travaux dans le pays. Les missions diplomatiques voudraient bien convenir que la protection des minorités n'implique nullement la négligence du sort de la majorité, ni devrait entraîner pour celle-ci un traitement inférieur.

Constantinople, le 30 *juillet* 1924. (Seal.)

ANNEX 10.

M. Picard to League of Nations.

La Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux, ayant reçu du Commissaire militaire du réseau l'ordre de licencier au 1er janvier prochain tous les employés chrétiens (grecs ou arméniens) encore actuellement en fonctions, m'a fait part *confidentiellement* de cet ordre. J'ai cru devoir, à la suite de cette communication, adresser à M. Bacle la lettre ci-jointe où, sans indiquer la source des renseignements qui me sont parvenus, je lui en demande confirmation officielle afin d'en rendre compte à la Société des Nations.

M. Bacle estime que cette démarche émanera peut-être des autorités subalternes qui ont donné l'ordre à le retirer ou tout au moins à en retarder l'exécution.

Je transmettrai au secrétariat général la réponse de M. Bacle, dès qu'elle me sera parvenue, avec mes observations.

PICARD.

ANNEX 11.

M. Picard to the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux.

M. le Directeur, *Constantinople, le* 28 *décembre* 1923.

D'apres certains renseignements parvenus à ma connaissance, vous auriez reçu des autorités turques l'ordre de licencier, au 1er janvier, tout le personnel grec et arménien restant encore en fonctions actuellement dans les services de la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux.

Bien que l'examen de cette question ne rentre pas dans le cadre des attributions qui m'ont été dévolues par l'article 107 du Traité de Lausanne, je ne puis oublier que j'appartiens à la Société des Nations qui, aux termes de l'article 44 du traité, est garante de l'exécution des stipulations de la Section III de la première partie de ce traité, concernant la protection des minorités. A ce titre, j'estime qu'il est de mon devoir de signaler à la Société des Nations les infractions à ces stipulations dont j'aurais connaissance. Or, la mesure dont j'ai entendu parler constituerait sans contredit une de ces infractions, et des plus flagrantes.

C'est pourquoi j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien me faire savoir si l'ordre vous a été réellement donné, contrairement à l'article 39 du traité, de faire une distinction entre vos employés sujets turcs selon qu'ils sont musulmans ou chrétiens, et de licencier les seconds. Je désirerais également savoir si cet ordre émane de l'autorité centrale ou d'un agent d'exécution.

Veuillez, &c.
PICARD.

ANNEX 12.

Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux to M. Picard.

M. le Commissaire, *Constantinople, le* 29 *décembre* 1923.

En réponse à votre lettre du 28 courant nous avons l'honneur de vous faire connaître que nous avons, en effet, reçu à diverses reprises de MM. les Commissaires de la République turque auprès de notre compagnie, et plus spécialement de M. le Commissaire militaire, l'ordre de congédier dans le plus bref délai des employés non musulmans en général ; suivant une récente communication de M. le Commissaire militaire, le dernier délai pour les Arméniens et les Grecs est le 1er janvier 1924.

Nous remettons copie de votre lettre à M. le Commissaire en chef de la République turque auprès de notre compagnie, en lui laissant le soin d'entrer en rapport avec vous sur la légitimité de ces mesures.

Veuillez, &c.
(Pour la Direction),
BACLE.

ANNEX 13.

M. Picard to League of Nations.

Constantinople, le 30 *décembre* 1923.

Je viens de recevoir la lettre ci-jointe de M. Bacle, que j'ai l'honneur de transmettre au secrétariat général de la Société des Nations comme suite à ma communication d'hier.

Je répondrai demain à M. Bacle que je n'ai pas à entrer en rapports avec le Commissaire en chef de la République turque auprès de la compagnie au sujet des faits qui font l'objet de la communication de M. Bacle ; mon rôle devant se borner à faire connaître la situation à la Société des Nations pour telle suite qu'elle jugera utile.

PICARD.

ANNEX 14.

Arrangement conclu avec la Société du Chemin de Fer Moudania–Brousse, à la date du 3 Juillet 1339/1923.

("Journal officiel," No. 57, du 14 février 1340/1924.)

5. Les employés de la société seront, tous, des Turcs.

Le présent arrangement a été approuvé par Kararnamé en date du 1er juillet 1339/1923, sanctionné par la Présidence de la grande Assemblée nationale, sous la condition de la liquidation des comptes et de l'estimation des valeurs, par les soins d'une commission mixte composée de membres du Commissariat des Finances et de celui des Travaux publics.

Fait en double et échangé à Angora le 3 juillet de l'année 1339/1923.

LAHERRÈRE,
Délégué autorisé de la Société du Chemin de Fer Moudania–Brousse.

FEIZI,
Commissaire aux Travaux publics.

Arrangement conclu avec la Société du Chemin de Fer d'Aïdin.

("Journal officiel," No. 57, du 14 février 1340/1924.)

A l'exception des spécialistes, le personnel de la société devra se composer de Turcs.

Le présent arrangement, qui a été discuté et adopté en conseil des commissaires, le 3 juillet 1339/1923, et dont le Kararnamé y relatif a été approuvé par la Présidence de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, a été signé en double exemplaire et échangé à Angora.

Le 3 juillet 1339.

ALWYN PARKER,
Délégué autorisé de la Société du Chemin de Fer d'Aïdin.

FEIZI,
Commissaire aux Travaux publics.

Arrangement conclu avec la Société des Tramways de Constantinople, à la date du 17 *Juin* 1923.

("Journal officiel," No. 57, du 14 février 1340/1924.)

8. Dans un délai de six mois, tous les employés devront être des Turcs.

Le présent arrangement, qui a été discuté et adopté en conseil des commissaires, le 14 juin 1339/1923, et dont le Kararnamé a été approuvé par la Présidence de la grande Assemblée nationale, a été signé en double exemplaire et échangé à Angora.

Le 17 *juin* 1339.

WEYL,
Délégué autorisé de la Société des Tramways de Constantinople.

FEIZI,
Commissaire aux Travaux publics.

Arrangement conclu avec la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux, à la date du 17 *Juin* 1923

("Journal officiel," No. 57, du 14 février 1340/1924.)

3. Les employés devront être, tous, Turcs. La société devra ouvrir une école, à l'effet de former un personnel turc.

4. Le présent arrangement, qui a été discuté et adopté en conseil des commissaires, le 10 juin 1339/1923, et dont le Kararnamé a été approuvé par la Présidence de la grande Assemblée nationale, a été signé en double exemplaire et échangé à Angora.

Le 17 *juin* 1339.

WEYL
Délégué autorisé de la Société d'Exploitation des Chemins de Fer orientaux.

FEIZI,
Commissaire aux Travaux publics.

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

Précis of Information supplied by His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo.

IN October 1923 His Majesty's consul at Aleppo reported that since the signing of the Lausanne Treaty the Turks in Southern Anatolia had become much more oppressive against the Armenians, with the object of thereby obliging them to leave the country. They had confiscated the crops and properties of the Armenians in the Harpoot villages. Greek soldiers who had escaped from Aintab stated that about 1,500 of their fellow soldiers were in captivity in that neighbourhood and were being forced to build a road between Marash and Aintab. They should have been released in accordance with the treaty.

In a report sent in November 1923, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo stated that recently arrived Armenian refugees from Malatia reported that the Turkish officials in that neighbourhood were making life intolerable for them by instigating systematically the ransacking of their houses, taking possession of the women and girls by force at night, and whipping and killing the men if they dared to oppose them. The Turkish authorities had posted up notices on Armenian houses that they would continue to inflict such outrages on them until they left Turkish territory, and that if they did not leave of their own free will they would be forcibly deported in the winter.

Refugees arriving in Aleppo in November 1923 stated that at Ourfa, Sourouj and Berejik Turkish officials searched most carefully all refugees and took away any gold or silver found on them. All Armenians were leaving Anatolia if they could find the means to do so. The Turkish Government, even in December 1923, refused to issue permits to Greek refugees in Anatolia to enable them to leave the country.

A report from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo at the end of January 1924 stated that at Berejik the shops of all Armenians had been closed by the Turks and the goods confiscated. An unconfirmed report stated that the Turks were murdering numbers of Circassians who, although Mahomedans, had taken the side of the Greeks in the Smyrna province.

In February, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo reported that there was but little doubt that the Turkish authorities were contemplating, if not actually carrying out, plans for deporting the remaining Christians in the districts of Ourfa, Mardin and Diarbekir. These reports were confirmed in March. Persons deported were not allowed to take anything with them in spite of the very severe climatic conditions.

In June 1924 His Majesty's consul at Aleppo reported that, while there was little doubt that the Turks were violating the Treaty of Lausanne by forcing all Christians to leave the country and by confiscating their property, their methods of so doing were by secret terrorism and victimisation rather than by published decrees. As a result of these measures there were hardly any Christians left in Eastern Anatolia. Any official enquiry would, however, elicit the reply that their departure was entirely of their own free will. Most of the Christian religious foundations had been seized. In the cases of the Chaldean Episcopal buildings at Diarbekir, Mardin and Ourfa only two rooms could be occupied by the Episcopal authorities. Elsewhere religious properties had been seized for use as barracks. In Ourfa there were hardly any Christians left. All persons leaving their homes and properties in Anatolia had to forfeit them to the Turkish Government. In only a very few cases had it been possible to dispose of them by sale, and even then the prohibition to export gold from Turkey rendered such transactions almost useless.

[**E 772/55/44**] No. 61.

Sir A. Young to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February* 5, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 14 and 15 of the 4th February respecting the effect in this country of the expulsion of the Greek Patriarch from Constantinople, I have the honour to state that the principal feeling called forth by this event and the reported excitement towards it in Greece was that it gave a good occasion for demonstrating to Greece the necessity of an alliance with this country. It may, I think, be foreseen that, whatever is written, said or done here, is

with the object of making Greece understand that her interests lie in giving a good price for Serbia's services as a permanent ally.

2. I enclose the translation of an inspired article in the "Vreme," which shows how the incident was at once seized on for the above-mentioned purpose, as well as, incidentally, for the electioneering advantage of blackening the Turkish party, whose leader, Ferad Draga Bey, as reported in another despatch, is temporarily confined in prison.

3. I do not think that the prospect of the removal of the Œcumenical Patriarchate from Constantinople would in itself be likely to cause particular concern in Serbian circles. It may be remembered from my despatch No 398, Confidential, of the 25th October, a proposal to that effect did not meet with, at any rate, immediate condemnation by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. I believe that the Patriarch of Ipek is to make a protest on behalf of the Serbian Church, but I have not yet heard whether this Government have come to a decision in regard to the request made by the Hellenic Government that they should join with the Roumanian Government in making a protest at Angora. The "Pravda" to-day states as follows:—

> "The Ministry for Foreign Affairs have to-day received the report that Great Britain, France and Italy will make a common protest at Angora and will resort if necessary to economic 'sanctions.' As regards our State, it will support any action tending to restore the Patriarch to his prerogatives, but it will not unduly expose itself because it is not a signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne."

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

Extract from the "Vreme" of February 3, 1925.

EXPULSION OF THE PATRIARCH.

SOME days ago it was stated at Athens that the Œcumenical Patriarch had been driven from his ancient seat at Constantinople by the Turkish authorities. The expulsion has been conducted in the most inconsiderate manner, without awaiting the decision of the League of Nations, which should have dealt with this question, and even without the ordinary decencies which every Government should observe towards ordinary citizens and still more towards the head of the oldest Christian Church in Europe.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the whole Christian world, with the Great Powers at its head, feeling itself insulted by this unheard-of action of the Turkish authorities, will find a dignified way of responding to the Turks; for, if such things should not be allowed to occur at all, they should still less be permitted to occur in Turkey after all the events of the war and least of all in Constantinople, which was only a year and half ago evacuated by the Allied troops of occupation.

And there is no doubt that the insult inflicted by the Turkish authorities on the Pravoslav Balkans is much greater than the general displeasure caused in the West by this action. All Pravoslav Churches who trace their origin to ancient Byzantium, even though the majority of them became completely independent long ago, feel close bonds of sympathy with the Byzantine Œcumenical Patriarchate, which was only strengthened by Turkish repression. The Russian Church, the great and free defender of Pravoslavism, especially protected the Constantinople Patriarchate, regarding everything in connection with it as a question affecting its own prestige. This Russia is now no more . . . .

But the Pravoslav Balkans still exist, and the greatest Pravoslav Power since the fall of Russia is our country, whose duty it is to stand up and resist this insult inflicted on Pravoslavism in general and on Serbia in particular.

For not only the religious feelings of the Serbs are in question: for long centuries Turkey was our national enemy, and there are sure signs that even to-day she has not changed this attitude towards us. Instead of open action, she makes use of her usual underhand methods, keeping up relations with the bad elements in our own country whose object is to hinder the development of our national and economical life in the south. For this reason it has not yet been possible, in spite

of the great love of peace of our country, and in spite of wish to be in good relations with every one, to restore regular diplomatic relations with Nationalist Turkey.

It is characteristic that many of those nations who were defeated in the Great War have changed their attitude for the worse and that, especially recently, they have been showing a warlike attitude which promises no good for the international relations of these countries with their neighbours, and which is especially significant in connection with interior conditions in certain States. For, if the telegram of the late Chancellor Wirth acknowledging "The meritorious work of Herr Kraft for the German Catholics" is intended to create the impression among the north-western allies of Radic that behind the handful of Germans in this country stand 80 millions of their warlike relatives in the north, any ruthless action on the part of the Angora Government, and especially such a one as strikes at both the religious and national feelings of the Serbs, will call forth among the supporters of Ferad Draga the conviction that behind every Katchak in South Serbia stands the whole might and assistance of Angora. "Moral" assistance, and perhaps material assistance, too, just as Radic and his allies desire.

As regards the immediate reasons which have enabled the Turks to take such misplaced action against the Œcumenical Patriarch, who is the head of the Greek Church and of the Greeks, one must see in recent events at Constantinople a hint to our southern neighbour and recent ally, Greece. For the Turks always attack those who are momentarily the weakest for one reason or the other. In this respect our southern neighbour, after her severe war with Turkey which so sapped her vitality, after her interior quarrels which weaken her military power, represents a very favourable object for Turkish attack, especially since her alliance was denounced with the S.H.S. Kingdom, which was Greece's best guarantee of security in case of war and which made it possible for her to take up a decided stand against insult from any quarter.

No. 62.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 9, 1925.

MY telegram No. 29.

I learn officially from Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that their reply to Turkish note will be a short one stating that it is the intention of the Greek Government to refer their case to League of Nations under article 11.

[E 846/194/44] No. 63.

Consul Hough to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)
Sir, *Aleppo, January* 28, 1925.

I AM indebted to the French Intelligence Department for the material of the following notes on Mustafa Kemal Pasha's recent visit to Cilicia.

2. Mustafa Kemal and his wife arrived at Konia on the 3rd January. The municipality of Adana telegraphed inviting them to be present at the ceremonies in honour of the deliverance of Cilicia on the 5th January. Mustafa Kemal declined, saying he could not arrive in time, but arrived in Adana on the 8th. The "Yeni Adana" reports that he had abandoned his intention of making a trip to Europe.

3. On the 15th he arrived at Deurtyol, on the 16th he was at Osmanieh. The object of his journey was said to be to maintain his popularity. He was accompanied by his wife, his secretary-general, Taufik Bey, his private secretary, Hassan Riza Bey, two aides-de-camp and Commandant Ismail Hakki. At Deurtyol he was received by an enthusiastic crowd, to whom he made a short speech of thanks for the warmth of their welcome. He spent the morning shooting, and in the afternoon received notables, including two ex-chete leaders, Kara Hassan and Moustek. A merchant of Alexandretta was introduced to Mustafa Kemal, who asked him whether Turks living in Syria were not oppressed, and showed some surprise on hearing that the population was satisfied with the mandatory Power.

4. On the 17th he is reported to have continued his journey from Osmanieh to Islahieh, but there is no detailed information about his movements for the next few days. Mr. Vice-Consul Catoni reports that on the 21st he was at Mersina, and that the town was decorated in his honour.

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

No. 64.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February* 10, 1925.

MY telegram No. 18.
1923 class has been released.
(Repeated to Constantinople. No. 10.)

No. 65.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February* 11, 1925.

MY telegram No. 35.
Greek Government now inform me that reference of their case to the League of Nations will be based on second paragraph of article 11. Object is to avoid mention of war.

[E 869/55/44] No. 66.

Memorandum respecting the possible Removal of Greek Œcumenical Patriarch from Constantinople.

THE Secretary of State has asked for the observations of the Department on the question whether His Majesty's Government should not now openly advise the Greek Government that, in their opinion, the best solution of the patriarchate question would be to transfer the patriarchate from Constantinople elsewhere, and whether they should not announce in Parliament that this is the policy they favour.

Hitherto we have aimed at securing the retention of the institution of the patriarchate at Constantinople, and we have accordingly endeavoured to separate the particular question of Mgr. Constantine's liability to exchange and eligibility for the office of Patriarch from the general question of the observance of Ismet's pledge. This perhaps involves a partial admission of the Turkish thesis, which is based upon the existence of such a distinction.

We have hitherto restricted our intervention to the minimum, in the form of unofficial advice to both sides. Thus we have suggested to the Greeks that arrangements should be made to ensure that the work of the patriarchate be carried on at Constantinople, so that it may not appear that the headquarters of the institution have been transferred with the departure from Turkey of Mgr. Constantine, and it is possible that we might even have been prepared, if necessary, to urge the Greeks to secure the resignation of Mgr. Constantine and the regular election of a candidate possessing the necessary legal qualifications, if by that means we could have ensured that Ismet's Lausanne pledge was not violated. We have not taken this line from any conviction that the retention of the patriarchate at Constantinople is desirable in itself, but merely on the general principle that, since Lord Curzon used all his influence at Lausanne to secure the pledge, and attached great importance to it, it behoved us to do what we could to secure its fulfilment.

We know, however, that there is now a strong party among the Constantinople (Ottoman) Greeks which desires the removal of the patriarchate, in order that it may be free from interference from the Turkish authorities, and there is little doubt that the position of the patriarchate, if it remains in Turkey, will always be anomalous and unsatisfactory. Moreover, the motives of the Greek Government in pressing for its

retention in Turkey are open to considerable criticism. They are almost avowedly political, and obviously based on the conception of the patriarchate as the focus and centre of Hellenism and Greek irredentism in Turkey rather than on any idea of its spiritual importance. It is more than doubtful whether it is desirable that we should support such a policy.

On the other hand, we could not urge the desirability of the removal of the patriarchate from Constantinople without first considering alternative arrangements and their consequences. The alternatives would appear to be the removal of the patriarchate to—

(*a.*) Greek territory other than Mount Athos;
(*b.*) Mount Athos; and
(*c.*) Some other, more or less neutral, territory, *i.e.*, territory not under the control of an Orthodox Power or forming part of the province of a national Orthodox Church.

(a.) *The Removal of the Patriarchate to Greek Territory other than Mount Athos.*

There would appear to be several objections to this. The Orthodox Church in practically the whole of Greece is autocephalous and technically independent of the patriarchate. The religious position of the Patriarch, even in New Greece, would, therefore, be extremely difficult. He would tend to become a mere appendage of the Greek National Church and consequently of the Greek Government, and the institution of the patriarchate might thus be used by that Government as a means of extending Greek influence among other Orthodox States, a policy which might easily lead to political complications, and would certainly not be in the best interests of the Orthodox religion.

(b.) *Removal of the Patriarchate to Mount Athos.*

There would be much to recommend this, as Mount Athos is a kind of religious enclave in the Balkans, and the Patriarch might thus retain a considerable amount of independence. At the same time his political importance would inevitably decrease, and there is reason to believe that the Greeks do not favour this policy. M. Caclamanos in fact told the Secretary of State some time ago that he considered that Mount Athos was altogether "too monastic."

(c) *Transfer of the Patriarchate to some "Neutral" Territory.*

Mr. Lindsay has reported that a number of Greeks at Constantinople favour the idea of the removal of the patriarchate to Cyprus or to British territory. There seem serious objections to this. It would almost certainly involve His Majesty's Government in a great deal of unpleasant intrigue, and might easily complicate our relations with Greece and the other Orthodox countries. Palestine seems equally unsuitable, since there has always been an independent Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, and in any case there are too many Patriarchs in Jerusalem already. The Dodecanese is, of course, out of the question, as the Italians have already made things extremely difficult for the Orthodox authorities in those islands. Egypt is a predominantly Moslem country, and, again, already possesses a Greek Orthodox Patriarch at Alexandria.

In these circumstances, of the three alternatives, the most favourable on the whole from the Orthodox religious point of view would appear to be removal to Mount Athos, but it is possible that removal to Greek territory other than Mount Athos—a solution on which the Greek Government would probably insist—might furnish the simplest solution for the time being.

The question that the Secretary of State has raised is whether it is desirable that we should intervene to the extent of making any recommendation as to the future seat of the patriarchate. Probably the answer to this is in the negative. The first consideration is that it is no affair of ours, except to the extent that we have assumed at Lausanne a moral obligation to support the retention of the institution at Constantinople. The Turks maintain that they desire its retention there, and, although we cannot put much faith in this declaration, we cannot, consistently with our Lausanne policy, oppose it. The last thing we want is to increase our responsibility, either towards the patriarchate itself or towards the Greek Government, or to intervene further than we need in either the political or the religious side of the question. For, as the Secretary of State has pointed out, the French attitude in the question is likely to be pro-Turk and the Italian attitude anti-Greek, and we cannot go crusading alone.

And it is doubtful if public opinion in this country feels strongly enough about the question to support a crusade.

It may be that the Secretary of State regarded the suggested advise to the Greeks as the best way to avoid becoming involved in a crusade. It might perhaps achieve this result by averting a fresh crisis, but we should have saved ourselves at the expense of (1) repudiation of our Lausanne obligation or, at any rate, inconsistency with our Lausanne policy, and (2) an undesirable responsibility for the future of the patriarchate.

Any decision should obviously take into consideration the results of the Greek appeal to the League, but these are very difficult to foresee. And it is quite possible that the matter may settle itself before it ever comes before the council. At any rate, the acute phase of the crisis is passed and passions are quieting down, and there does not appear to be any immediate necessity for action by His Majesty's Government or even for a decision as to the policy to be eventually adopted. It is therefore submitted that, at any rate in present circumstances, there is nothing to be gained by advising the Greeks to remove the patriarchate from Constantinople—advice which would involve superimposing on our moral obligation towards the religious institution of the patriarchate a political responsibility towards the Greek Government and people.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
February 12, 1925.

No. 67.

Sir R. Graham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February* 12, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 37: Œcumenical Patriarch.

Italian Government in lengthy note emphasise importance of preventing either party from taking precipitate action or from adopting an attitude of menacing character.

They suggest that Allied representatives in Athens and Constantinople should urge the two Governments to abstain from any decision until the nature of the problem has been made perfectly clear, and that Angora Government should be invited not to expel any further members of Holy Synod for fear of provoking a more violent reaction in Greece. Conversations with the two Governments thus initiated, Allied Powers, working in close contact, might be able to suggest a satisfactory solution to them.

The Italian representatives in Athens and Constantinople have received instructions to act in this sense with their Allied colleagues. Italian Government are, however, ready to discuss any other eventual provisions with other objects in view.

In later note to-night Italian Government state that Italian representative in Constantinople, after agreement with his Allied colleagues, had spoken in this sense to Nusret Bey, who informed him confidentially that conversations were taking place between a representative of Turkish Ministry of the Interior, who had come specially from Angora, and patriarchate, with a view to arriving at a formula for settlement of the question.

Texts by bag.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 68.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 13, 1925.

I HAVE received from Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs authoritative statement of Greek ecclesiastic view of patriarchate question. Statement, which is long, should reach you 18th February. It makes special point of danger that in case of anti-canonical removal of patriarchate advantage may be taken by the Vatican to

install Roman Catholic Patriarch at Constantinople; it is even more likely that Soviet Government would claim patriarchate and install Russian Patriarch, to which end they might very well put pressure on Turkey.

Metropolitan of Athens informed Legation chaplain that in his opinion person of Patriarch was not an important question. If Turks would not agree to extra-territorial patriarchate, Greeks would prefer temporary removal from Constantinople, preferably to Athos.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 11.)

No. 69.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February* 13, 1925.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I have reason to believe that Government view coincides with that of Metropolitan, but that they would be unwilling, save in the last resort, to agree to removal of patriarchate. In any case they would not be satisfied with bare assurances from Turkey, but would require guarantee of League of Nations or of Powers before concluding any agreement.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 12.)

[C 2200/298/3]

No. 70.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 570.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1925.

I HAVE recorded in another despatch that part of my conversation with the French Ambassador this afternoon which related to the questions of Cologne and security.

When we had finished this subject, the Ambassador said that he desired to mention the position in Austria. Very disquieting reports had reached him from several sources in the Balkans and in Switzerland that the financial arrangements established by the League were breaking down; that there might be, as one of his informants had said, a catastrophe; and that if that were to happen Austria would either make terms with some of the neighbouring countries or would tend to break up—one portion going to Hungary, the Vorarlberg to Switzerland and a third part going to Germany. He had heard from M. Mantoux that the Financial Committee of the League had had the position under consideration and had felt obliged to make very strong observations upon it. He himself thought there was occasion for some concern but not for any real anxiety at the moment.

I told his Excellency that I had seen the observations of the League committee, but that I had had no information of any such political movements as he mentioned. I was not without some anxiety as to the fiscal and economic stability of the country. I did not profess to have studied the question carefully, but I understood that the real peril, apart from the failure of Austria to carry out some of the requirements of the League control, was that the League's scheme might seem to have been conceived on too narrow a basis, and that the financial assistance procured by the League might be insufficient without an improvement in Austria's economic and commercial relations with her neighbours. I thought the most practical step that could be taken would be to use any influence that any of us might possess with countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania to secure more favourable commercial relations with Austria. This had been pressed upon me in Rome by Dr. Zimmermann, the League of Nations Commissioner-General for Austria in Vienna, and I had therefore taken the opportunity offered by an observation of Dr. Benes to express that view to him.

The Ambassador was then about to take his leave, but I asked him to spare me a few minutes more. I told him that I did not wish to make a complaint, but I must express a regret. I referred to my agreement with M. Herriot about the Embassy at Constantinople. I recalled that I had, while in Rome, secured Signor Mussolini's adherence to it, and I said that only a few days ago Signor Mussolini,

who was getting impatient at the delay, had agreed still further to defer the appointment of an Italian Ambassador on my recalling this agreement to him. M. Herriot had now decided that the moment had come to make the appointment. He had communicated, as promised, with both the Italians and ourselves, and the letter of our agreement was therefore perfectly kept; but I must add that I had assumed as a matter of course that this agreement as to Constantinople implied that we should act similarly in regard to the reception of Ambassadors in our own capitals. What then had been my surprise to learn yesterday that the Turkish Ambassador had already been received in Paris. I repeated that I made no complaint, but as friend to friend and using the frankness which M. Herriot and I had agreed we should always employ to each other if any difficulty arose, I could not but regret that this action had been taken without previous communication with me, and I regretted it the more because it might easily place me in a very embarrassing position with Signor Mussolini. M. de Fleuriau said that he would report what I had said to M. Herriot, and I again emphasised that he was not to express it as a complaint, though I should be glad that M. Herriot should know how I felt about it.

Your Lordship will agree with me that it would give undue importance to the subject if, in these circumstances, you took any further notice of it, unless the President of the Council mentions it to you.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[**E 912/821/44**] No. 71.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Denmark was signed at Angora on the 26th January by M. Wandel, the Danish Minister in Constantinople, and Tewfik Kiamil Bey, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

2. Although no text of the treaty has yet been published, M Wandel, on his return to Constantinople, remarked to newspaper correspondents that it followed the lines of similar treaties recently concluded with other States.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 915/915/44**] No. 72.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 94.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith the annual report for 1924 on the heads of missions in Turkey.

2. In most capitals the Corps diplomatique, chameleon-like, reflects the colour of its surroundings. So is it here. As a body I fear we are depressed, down at heels, and in a terrible state of confusion. Over all of us hangs the shadow of Angora, and though this affects us all differently according to our confidence or lack of confidence in our Government's firmness, and according to our own personal dispositions, the thought invests all we do with a certain depressing sense of the provisional. Like the inhabitants of Constantinople in their city, we in our establishments resemble small hermit crabs in enormous whelk-shells; and the tide of past glories has receded leaving us high and dry. With our curtains rather tattered we exchange occasional dinners and still more occasional dances, but our main diversion is the cheaper but more devastating *thé dansant*. So we entertain each other and any Turk who knows how to use a knife and fork, while those of us who have been here long enough, lick the chops of memory.

3. For years past our names have never been printed in any official list, nor could we now fairly ask anyone to attempt such a task; for I do not think any one of us knows the correct designation of all his colleagues, and I suspect that some of us hardly know our own. We are Ministers, Ambassadors, representatives, delegates,

visitors, Chargé d'Affaires, and High Commissioners, and we have completely set at defiance the last valid articles of the Vienna Congress Treaty. Some of us are nearly at peace and some nearly at war. Among those of us who have no relations with Turkey are included ex-enemy and ex-ally alike. Some of us have indeed completed all formalities for the establishment of normal relations, and the rest of us are in different stages towards that consummation, protected in the meanwhile only by miscellaneous ambiguities. These various conditions, combined with our various greatnesses and various pretensions make precedence among us an inextricable mystery; fortunately there is so much to be said for every possible point of view that quarrels are impossible. For my own part, compelled now to put my colleagues down in some sort of order, I will have recourse to the fortuitous dictates of the alphabet; venturing only to separate the sheep of Constantinople from the goats of Angora.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Report on Heads of Missions.

[The portions in brackets are taken from the 1923 report.]

(A.)—Constantinople.

Austria: M. Auguste Kral.

M. Kral reopened relations with Turkey in June, after the interruption dictated in the peace treaties. He is a member of the old Austro-Hungarian consular service, and during the war was Civil Commissioner in Albania. He has been all his life in the Balkans and speaks Turkish and Albanian. His manner is characterised by an effusive and rather elaborate courtesy, but he is intelligent, well informed, anxious to be on good terms with His Majesty's Mission, and perhaps even willing to be of service.

He is married.

Belgium: Baron de Villenfagne de Sorinnes.

M. Michotte de Welle retired on pension in the summer and was replaced by M. Villenfagne, who is unmarried. He comes from China, Japan and Siam. In person he is short, fat and round, and he likes dancing with the tallest ladies. His disposition is jovial and he can be amusing about Siam, but he is quite stupid.

Bulgaria: M. Simeon Radev.

[During the greater part of 1923 a General Markov resided off and on in Constantinople in a sort of unofficial capacity. Towards the end of the year, however, the Bulgarian Government appointed M. Simeon Radev to be its official representative here. He is a man with considerable diplomatic experience, having been Bulgarian Minister in Bucharest from 1913–16, and subsequently at The Hague, whence, I notice from one of Mr. Erskine's despatches, he is stated to have been removed owing to irregularities in his accounts. Though he is of somewhat sly and shifty appearance, this story sounds improbable in view of his subsequent appointment as second Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations. In spite of his appearance, I like the little that I have seen of him. He is a keen student of history, more particularly of the period about the Berlin Congress. He recently read to me extracts from a secret agreement signed by Andrassy and Sir Henry Elliott, which he has unearthed in the archives at Vienna, and which constituted a definite agreement between Great Britain and Austria as to the views which those two Powers would support at the Berlin Congress. He told me with great pride that the existence of this agreement had hitherto been unknown, and that he proposed to have it published in England.]

Many years ago, when Ferdinand of Bulgaria paid a visit to Constantinople, the Sultan asked him why no Bulgarian students came to the schools and colleges here. Orders were instantly sent for a dozen young Bulgars to be selected, and thus M. Simeon Radev's education was completed at Galata Serai. He hails from what is now part of Serbian Macedonia. Speaking Turkish fluently he is well informed on local affairs, and extremely intelligent. His mission is enveloped in an atmosphere

of obscure intrigue, inspissated by every sort of personal animosity and political complication, and only a very crafty man could keep afloat in such waters. I greatly enjoy supping with M. Radev, but I take care to have a very long spoon by me.

M. Radev married this summer a very charming young Bulgarian lady, who was brought up in Vienna.

Czechoslovakia: Dr. R. Svetlik.

[The Czechoslovak representative, M. Svetlik, is married to a Miss Armstrong, of Australian origin. I know him but little, but he gives one the impression of being heavy and uninteresting. Most people describe him as a deadly bore.]

M. Svetlik is a bore and he is ponderous, but he is sufficiently well-read and well-educated not to be uninteresting. He has been appointed consul-general to Australia, and is only awaiting the arrival of his successor (who will be a Minister Plenipotentiary, Czechoslovakia having signed a Treaty of Friendship with Turkey) to take his departure. Mme. Svetlik greatly regrets the transfer, and perhaps, too, the reversion to a consular career after a taste of the diplomatic, in spite of the fact that she is going to her land of origin. She is really Irish (as M. Svetlik explains at length), and an Armstrong of Gallen, somewhere near Killarney.

Denmark: M. Carl Ellis Wandel.

M. Wandel lives almost entirely at Therapia, only coming in to Pera occasionally for a night or so. He has money of his own and very little work, so that he spends most of his time yachting and fishing. When his Government expressed the intention of suppressing the Legation here, he offered to stay on as Minister without any pay. Nevertheless, he takes the rough with the smooth, and has just been to Angora to sign a Treaty of Friendship.

Mme. Wandel is a local lady of Jewish extraction. She is extremely handsome, well read, and quite agreeable.

France: M. Jessé Curély.

[Since April, M. Jessé Curély has been in charge of the French High Commission. M. Jessé Curély's last foreign post was Peking. He served during the war at the Quai d'Orsay, where he was Chef du Bureau du Personnel. He is a friendly, though very reserved, colleague, and is extraordinarily stolid and phlegmatic for a Frenchman. He professes no great devotion to M. Poincaré, and has never concealed his disgust at the attitude of France during the Chanak crisis. He has no love for the Turk, but spends most of his spare time in the bazaars.]

M. Jessé Curély has been in charge throughout 1924, General Pellé having died in the spring. I have found him reserved, indeed, but very loyal and trustworthy; but he is not courageous, and is obsessed with fears when he has something important to do. He strongly disapproves of the Franklin-Bouillon–Mougin methods of dealing with Turkey, and he quite understands that he will be removed from here as soon as an Ambassador is appointed; nor will he be sorry, as his position in regard to Mougin makes things very difficult for him

Mme. Jessé Curély is an agreeable person, plain in appearance, but always cheerful and pleasant. I shall be sorry when they leave Constantinople.

Germany: Herr Rudolf Nadolny.

Herr Nadolny arrived in June, his last post having been at Stockholm, and reopened with Turkey, as Minister Plenipotentiary, the relations which had been interrupted during the armistice period and pending the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Allies. He has the personal rank of Ambassador in the German service. The Embassy houses at Pera and Therapia have been reupholstered, repainted and redecorated, and a wooden transportable house of some twenty or twenty-five rooms has been erected at Angora. I have entered into relations with Herr Nadolny, and he has personally repeated to me the assurances, offered officially by Berlin to London, that Germany will not attempt to oppose in any way British policy in Turkey. I am unaware of any breach of these engagements, though, of course, in the commercial field the German merchant, doubtless with Herr Nadolny's help when required, makes great headway and leaves the British competitor far behind. To this no exception can be taken.

I do not think Herr Nadolny has any particularly good status with Turks, and there is a curious absence in the relations between the two countries of that comradeship which might have been expected to result from an alliance in war for four years. He has a good representative at Angora, and is well-informed on Turkish affairs, but I think that he is rather too sly to be regarded as really intelligent. Personally he is too obsequious to be entirely agreeable, but I understand he can be arrogant enough to his colleagues from minor States. He has given one large *musicale* to Constantinople society, but he explained to all and sundry that it cost him nothing, because he got the artistes' services free in exchange for board and lodging. The French Embassy long refused to have any relations with the German Mission, and induced the Belgian Minister (I think rather reluctantly) to follow suit, but at a party in this mission last night M. Jessé Curély allowed himself to be introduced to and to shake hands with Herr Nadolny.

Frau Nadolny is rather a forlorn figure, who never opens her mouth without saying "thank you."

Hungary: M. Ladislas Tahy de Tahvar et Tarkeo.

M. Tahy arrived in May 1924, and, like M. Kral, was formerly in the Austro-Hungarian consular service. He therefore speaks Turkish. In spite of his name, he is racially more a Slovak than a Magyar. During the war he was at Bagdad, and at one time, when there was no neutral consul there, he had to assume charge also of British interests. I have been in good relations with him, and he strikes me as being a very frank and straightforward man, perhaps with rather a hot temper. I do not believe he is anti-British any more than any of our ex-enemies might be expected to be so.

Mme. Tahy is an agreeable lady of pleasant appearance with a family of small children.

Italy: Signor Giulio Cesare Montagna.

Signor Montagna arrived in March and M. Maissa retired on pension. He came from Athens, and has served also in Washington and in Sweden and Tehran as Minister. He now has the personal rank of Ambassador in the Italian service. He is a highly-strung, energetic and ambitious man, interested in little outside his official work, poring over his dossiers all day long. His staff are kept perpetually in the chancery, but he does everything himself, and when last summer his counsellor rebelled against this ploughing of the sand, he was sent back to Rome at once. His position is a difficult one, as the Italian colony is numerous, emotional, and adapts itself with difficulty to the new conditions brought about by the abrogation of the Capitulations. Signor Montagna is therefore involved in multifarious petty controversies with the Turkish authorities, which he conducts personally and with acrimony, to the detriment both of his temper and of his personal prestige with the Turks. He came to Constantinople full of enthusiasm, and confident that he would achieve great successes. Disillusionment began with his visit to Angora in April last and has proceeded apace. He now realises that there are no laurels to be gathered in this barren soil, and he would be glad of a transfer elsewhere. I shall be sorry if he gets it, as he is a good colleague to me. His instructions are to work in with this mission, and, so far as I know, neither he nor his Government have during the past year attempted to cross the policy of His Majesty's Government. We exchange notes frequently, and I do not think he has more reticences towards me than I have towards him.

Mme. Montagna was Austrian before marriage, daughter of Count Logothetti, late Austrian Minister at Tehran, where she met and married her husband. As an Austrian, she was born in the precincts of the Palazzo di Venezia, where she now presides as Italian Ambassadress. She is a green oasis in the sandy waste of Constantinople society, but, like an oasis, is hard to find, for the Montagnas are given little public money for entertaining, and seldom open their doors. She is shut up in the house with her children and an uncongenial Italian mother-in-law, and I suspect that the domestic situation thus created may be rather serious.

Japan: Mr. Shiro Hanaoka.

Mr. Kasama has left for Roumania where he expects to be promoted to the rank of Minister.

Mr. Hanaoka has only just arrived here from Hamburg where he was consul-general. I have barely made his acquaintance.

Jugoslavia: M. Trajan Givkovitch.

M. Givkovitch has been in the Balkans all his life and speaks Turkish. In the virtual non-existence of any relations between Turkey and Jugoslavia, his post is mainly one of observation. He is well informed and quite intelligent.

Mme Givkovitch is a worthy plain woman from the Kozsovo region.

Netherlands: Baron W. B. R. de Welderen Rengers.

[Baron Rengers's last post was at Rome. Unlike the majority of one's diplomatic colleagues in Constantinople he bears the hall-mark of a diplomatist *de carrière*. He does not approve of Constantinople as a post. He is fond of wine, and after dinner can be very diverting. Owing to the Dutch Legation being in charge of Austrian interests he has a certain amount of work to do, otherwise most of his time is spent in frequenting places where he can get the opportunity of a drink or of seeing a pretty woman.]

A lascivious fellow: a light weight. Mme. Rengers talks too much about her domestic difficulties.

Persia: M. Sayyid Sedik Khan Tabatabai.

Sedik Khan arrived in September and succeeded safely in presenting letters of credence as Ambassador at Angora. He is of unpleasing appearance, but possesses a sense of humour, which would be still more appreciable if conversation did not have to be conducted through an interpreter. Unfortunately the Sayyid, though understanding French, is too diffident to speak it. He is, I think, anxious to be on friendly relations with this mission and I have seen him several times; but I have had no serious business with him.

Roumania: M. Georges Filality.

[M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister, was a colleague of mine at Nish during the war. He has been absent a good deal from his post and was employed in 1922 as Roumanian delegate in the negotiations with the Soviet at Warsaw. He is unmarried. He is short and round with a keen sense of his own humour. He conceals much shrewdness beneath a jovial exterior and his apparent bonhomie does not prevent him from being exceedingly caustic at the expense of others.]

But M. Filality has appeared this winter with a tiny little wife and a tiny, but fully grown, daughter.

Spain: M. Juan Servert y Vest.

[The Spanish Minister, M. Servert y Vest, is the doyen of the Ministers. He has spent most of his career in South America, and finds this climate somewhat trying. Owing to the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation in Constantinople itself, he lives rather an isolated life at Buyuk-Dere, where he spends the whole year. He is a quiet man of literary tastes.]

Sweden: M. G. O. Wallenberg.

[M. Wallenberg realised on his arrival that he was under suspicion of having been very pro-German during the war. The fact that he is in charge of German interests here made it more difficult for him to get rid of this suspicion, but he works hard to dispel the legend that he is Germanophile. After the conclusion of the Prisoners' Exchange Agreement with the Angora Government, some of the returned Turks did not hesitate to state in the Nationalist press that they had been badly treated at Malta and had suffered indignities there. M. Wallenberg procured a report, from the Swedish consul at Malta, on the treatment of the Turks. This report was very favourable to the British authorities and M. Wallenberg lost no time in communicating it to the Turkish Government.

M. Wallenberg goes in greatly for Turkish society, and Turks are always to be found at his evening parties. In fact, he rather forces Turks on the notice of his allied colleagues.

Mme. Wallenberg is a good-natured lady, who pours forth an unending stream of talk in a somewhat strident voice, which makes her a trying neighbour at dinner.]

United States of America: Rear-Admiral Mark L. Bristol.

[I think it a pity that the American Government have not long ago sent out a career diplomatist to take charge of the United States High Commission. I cannot bring myself altogether to trust Admiral Bristol.

Admiral Bristol and his wife entertain a great deal in a simple way. They are both devoted to dancing, and I am told are frequently to be seen at Maxim's and other similar places in this town.]

Admiral Bristol has been here now for five years expecting, most of the time, to be replaced by a diplomat at any moment. At one time his successor had actually been designated and was packing up to come out here, when the arrangements were countermanded at the last moment. He himself, while anxious to get back to the navy, would also like to stay here till the Turco-American Treaty is ratified; he was recently offered the command of the United States fleet in Far Eastern Waters.

In the little business I have had with Admiral Bristol he has proved friendly and helpful and I doubt his being anti-British. He affects to be very strongly pro-Turkish and pushes it to the point of never allowing himself to utter a remark derogatory to the Turks. This makes any reasonable discussion of current questions impossible, but as he is not well-informed, it does not much matter. His attitude may be due to the excessive discretion usually observed by amateur diplomatists, or to the necessity of maintaining somehow a good standing with the Turks in spite of the anomalous relations between Turkey and America, which compel him to continue calling himself High Commissioner. In this latter object he succeeds.

Admiral and Mrs. Bristol do a lot of entertaining. Till recently, at any rate, the Embassy was paid for from naval and not from State Department funds and was run like a ship. Filipino stewards do the waiting, a ship's steward buys the provisions and a ship's cook prepares them, all borne on the books of the U.S.S. "Scorpion." The result, though slightly strange at times, is nevertheless highly gratifying to Constantinople society in general, with whom Admiral and Mrs. Bristol are deservedly popular.

Vatican.

Mgr. Philippi left in the course of the summer and Mgr. Cesarano assumed charge. In September Mgr. Angelo Maria Dolci arrived here from Bucharest where he is Nuncio, but, owing to the non-existence of relations with Turkey, only in the capacity of visitor. He came partly to solve the question of the Congregational schools, partly to attempt the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. In the latter task probably owing to French opposition, he failed, and as he said to me, "the Church in Turkey suffers from too much protection." He returned to Bucharest at the end of the year, and Mgr. Cesarano is once more in charge.

Mgr. Dolci is a K.B.E., having received the distinction in recognition of his services to British prisoners of war. His personality is I understand well known to the Foreign Office.

(B.)—Angora.

Afghanistan: Sultan Ahmed Khan.

All I know is that Sultan Ahmed Khan is a brother-in-law of [?Mahmoud] Tarzi. His pay is much in arrears and he longs for the fleshpots of Kabul; but his Government will neither pay him nor allow him to come away until the arrival of his successor, who is not yet even designated.

France: General Mougin.

[Throughout the year Colonel Mougin has been maintained at Angora, theoretically as representative of the French High Commissioner for Syria, but practically as a representative of the French Government. The French High Commissioner here has a very low opinion of Colonel Mougin's capacity. General Pellé has described him as being entirely lacking in any critical faculty, and as a Frenchman who would like to see minarets on Notre-Dame. His reports are regarded as worthless, owing to their blind pro-Turk bias. He is now on leave, and will probably not return to Angora.]

General Mougin returned unexpectedly to Angora, as a general, last August. He describes himself on his card as "à la disposition du Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères," and M. Jessé Curély describes him in moments of impatience as "néfaste" or "ce fléau." He lives in the house of the director of the Ottoman Bank, whom he has evicted from all his best rooms, and is a familar figure in Angora, in his military uniform. Yet it is doubtful if he has much personal influence with the Turks, who regard him too much as their own man and commonly call him "Mougin Pasha."

Greece: M. Jean Politis.

M. Politis is still Chargé d'Affaires at Angora, full diplomatic relations not having yet been established, but he occasionally pays visits to Constantinople. He was at Lausanne for the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace and is well known to members of the British delegation. I have necessarily seen little of him, but he strikes me as being intelligent, with a keen sense of humour, and an objective manner of discussing questions which nevertheless hardly hides the Greek bias on most of his observations.

Mme. Politis is a Greek lady of Constantinople and courageously refuses to leave here husband alone at Angora. She is both agreeable, intelligent and good-looking.

Poland: M. Roman Knoll.

The Polish Legation is permanently at Angora and only a delegation of it resides in Constantinople. At Angora they have two houses, one in town for the winter and a country house for the summer. I have only seen M. Knoll once or twice: he is young, intelligent, sensible, good humoured, and determined to make the best of the life he has to lead at Angora. Yet I fear he is not above stooping to the arts of the sycophant to gain credit with the Turks.

Russia: M. Souritch.

I have never yet seen M. Souritch, who used to be Russian representative in Afghanistan, though he came this summer for a month or two to Buyukdere. At Angora the Russians are in course of erecting a new house which, it is said, is to be of enormous size and of the most fantastic new style of architecture. I hear that a vast pile of stones has been assembled in preparation.

I understand that Mme. Souritch declares that life at Kabul was far more agreeable than it is at Angora.

[E 932/55/44] No. 73.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, February 8, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 21, 22 and 24 of the 4th February, I have the honour to report that M. Papanastassiou, leader of the Opposition, asked the Prime Minister in the Chamber last night to communicate to the Deputies the contents of the Turkish note received on the 6th instant. M. Michalacopoulos answered that such communication was unusual, but that he would shortly give an account of the action which he had recently taken in connection with the affair of the Patriarch, and would submit the whole question to the Assembly.

2. The news of the expulsion of the Patriarch completely surprised the political world here, as was apparently also the case to some extent at Constantinople. The Prime Minister was at first influenced by fear of extremists in the Chamber, who were inclined to advocate immediate reprisals. He gradually developed more confidence, and in my telegram No. 16 I was able to report an improvement in the situation. Discussion in the Chamber had been avoided, and the policy of reference to The Hague of the dispute with Turkey was adopted by the Government. M. Michalacopoulos remained, nevertheless, much agitated by the apprehension of further expulsions and the effect which they would have on the refugee population and on political feeling in general. In spite of private assurances given him by General Kondylis, he was anxious lest the latter should overturn the Government and, with himself as Prime Minister, initiate a more spirited and adventurous policy. This danger has up to the moment been avoided. I discussed the matter thoroughly with M. de Chambrun, and he was able to approach the general, I believe with effect, through the French military attachés, who knew him well.

3. I have no reason to suspect the honesty of the Prime Minister's expressed desire for a judicial decision at The Hague or an appeal to the League of Nations. He must

be thoroughly aware of the weakness of Greece. When I spoke to him recently, in accordance with your instructions, to suggest the appointment of a *locum tenens* for the patriarchate, I said that Greece could not afford to miss any opportunity of a peaceful settlement, seeing that she was unable to count on any support from the Balkan Powers. M. Michalacopoulos made no attempt to controvert this view, and he is, moreover, nervous as to the attitude of Italy. His main preoccupation, however, appears to be the possibility, to which I have referred above, of the Turkish Government proceeding, if unchecked, to the expulsion of the Metropolitans, and subsequently of the entire Greek population from Constantinople. I was not able to discover whether the Prime Minister had any definite grounds for considering such drastic action on the part of the Turks to be a likely occurrence. He at any rate stated his belief that public opinion, which is already, from all reports, very tense in Salonica, would be difficult to control if further expulsions took place.

4. The Athens press is now behaving with moderation. "Eleutheron Bema" even went so far as to say, commenting on an article by their Constantinople correspondent, that the whole question was brought about by the "monkish pig-headedness" of the Patriarchal Council, who had persisted in electing the present Patriarch in spite of warnings that the Turks regarded him as exchangeable. The fact that the Patriarch is a "royalist" has not unnaturally tied the hands of the Government, who have been unable to put pressure upon the patriarchate without incurring a charge of allowing party feeling to influence them. The Government organ ("Messager d'Athènes"), in this morning's issue, takes the line that, Turkey having put herself in the wrong by refusing to go to arbitration, it is now for the League of Nations to redress the balance. The expulsion of the Patriarch, it argues, is really an attack on the Treaty of Lausanne. "That treaty, good or bad, is for the moment the Statute of the East. If the Great Powers who signed it continue to tolerate the licence of the Turks, they cannot expect the lesser signatories to remain impassive spectators."

5. This language seems menacing, but it may be only the expression of the eager desire of the Hellenic Foreign Office for some assurance of the European support to which it seems to be considered that Greece has a kind of moral right.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM

[C 2454/1435/90] No. 74.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 216.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 17, 1925.*

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me this afternoon about Albania. He asked that I should send instructions to Mr. Eyres to advise the Albanian Government to postpone the consideration of the Anglo-Persian Concession by the Assembly until there had been time for a further exchange of views between the Italian and British Governments and for a friendly solution to be reached. I told his Excellency that I had just received information that the concession had been passed by the Assembly yesterday, and that it gave the right to the Anglo-Persian to prospect for an area of 200,000 hectares, which had not, as I previously supposed, been already reduced to 100,000 hectares. It was therefore too late for me to take the step which he asked, but I was ready to continue the search for a solution satisfactory to both parties in the same spirit of friendship which had actuated me both in this question and in the question of the gendarmerie. But the next stage must be that the Italian Government should answer the question which I had addressed to Rome, and state precisely what was the area which they desired to see reserved for Italian exploration. It might be that the Italian State railways and the Anglo-Persian company contemplated quite different areas, and in that case no difficulty would arise.

The Ambassador said that he was unable to give me this information, but he professed to know that the areas coveted by the two parties did at any rate overlap. He stated that oil was local, and that though the Anglo-Persian Concession was not in terms a monopoly, yet in fact it constituted one, since the company had chosen the only land in which oil existed. I replied that I did not know precisely what land the Anglo-Persian had selected, except that they had not included the part which had been already exploited by the Italians. As to what he said of a practical

monopoly, I had heard that the experts of the Anglo-Persian were themselves divided in opinion as to which were the best lands, and that some at any rate among them thought that the richest area was outside the district which they contemplated taking.

The Ambassador continued to dwell on the susceptibility of Italian opinion and the difficulties created by it for the Italian Government. He assured me that Signor Mussolini desired to treat the matter as between friends and to prevent its affecting our friendship.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that he could not expect me to do anything to annul or invalidate the concession, and that both in the matter of the gendarmerie and in this matter of the oil concession I might be exposing myself to very considerable criticism when my action became known. I would, however, continue to seek a friendly solution, but I repeated that the first essential was that the Italian Government should state exactly what area they claimed.

Marquis Torretta then spoke to me of the reception of the Turkish Ambassador in Paris, recalling my intervention at Rome, in response to which Signor Mussolini had held his hand, only to find that France had now anticipated Italian action by receiving a Turkish Ambassador in Paris.

I told his Excellency frankly that I regretted the French action. I recognised that, in our conversation at Paris, M. Herriot and I had spoken only of Constantinople, but it had never entered my head that, whilst we agreed to move together in that capital, any one of us would take separate action at home. I had made no complaint to the French Ambassador, but I had expressed to him my regret at the French action, and had called his attention to the embarrassing position in which it might place me *vis-à-vis* of the Italian Government.

The Marquis said that he only mentioned the matter now as Signor Mussolini wished me to be informed that, in view of what had happened at Paris, he should at once receive the Turkish Ambassador, who had been waiting in Rome for three months, but had not been allowed to present his credentials owing to the agreement.

I thanked the Ambassador for his communication, and said I thought this a perfectly natural step.

I then took the opportunity to ask the Ambassador to urge upon Signor Mussolini patience and consideration for the difficulties of the Egyptian Government in regard to the frontier of Cyrenaica. As I understood, the Italian representative and the Egyptian Government were very nearly agreed upon a solution, but to take the immediate step now demanded by the Italians might gravely compromise the chances of the Egyptian Government in the present elections. This could not be in the interests of any country which had a colony of its citizens in Egypt. In making this request, I said that I was determined to carry out my promise to Signor Mussolini, that we would use our good offices with the Egyptian Government for the settlement of this question, and that Lord Allenby had been so instructed and was acting in that spirit.

The Ambassador undertook to report what I had said.

Finally, Marquis Torretta asked me how the discussions about Cologne were proceeding. I told him my programme as I have already described it to the French and Belgian Ambassadors, and he then raised the eternal question of security. If the meeting of Ministers took place, would that question or the protocol be discussed among them? To which I could only reply that if I met M. Herriot I thought it extremely improbable that he would allow the opportunity to pass without raising the question which lay nearest to his heart, but that His Majesty's Government could not consent to make the decision as to Cologne dependent upon the question of general security or of any other matter extraneous of the treaty rights and obligations of the two parties.

The Marquis then developed his views on the subject of pacts and the protocol at some length, but with considerable balancing of opposite opinions. His attitude may perhaps be summarised in his concluding observation, that he had been glad when the Cannes negotiations broke down, as it relieved him of the necessity of taking a decision.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 994/38/44] No. 75.

Memorandum on Turkish Railways.

[With Map.]

IN general, railways in Turkey are constructed of normal gauge and with a single track. They are operated through Turkish limited liability companies formed by foreign groups.

The first railways were constructed by British enterprise. The Mersina–Adana Railway, the Smyrna–Aidin Railway and the Smyrna–Kassaba Railway were built by British capital, and remained at first under British management, and part of what is now the Anatolian Railway was for a time leased to British subjects. This British interest in Turkish railways was most manifest between 1860 and 1890.

From 1860, and more particularly from 1890, Austrian and German influence became marked, and after 1890 the French entered the field.

To-day the Smyrna–Aidin Railway is the only British concern, but there is a possibility that the Anatolian Railway (now operated by Turks) and the Mersina–Adana Railway will come under British control.

The remaining railways in Turkey, namely, the Bagdad Railway, the Smyrna–Kassaba Railway, the Mudania-Brusa Railway and the Oriental Railway are under French control.

The present Turkish Government are anxious to develop railway communications, and have for a time been attempting to do this by their own efforts, but there are signs that they will be compelled to call in foreign help. They have shown a tendency to take advantage of the negotiations for the readaptation of existing railway concessions to compel the present railway concession holders to undertake the construction of new lines. Thus, the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company have been asked to extend their existing line in the directions of Afium Karahissar and of Adalia; the Anatolian Railway Company have been urged to undertake the construction of railways to Samsun and Sivas, while the French Régie générale des Chemins de Fer, which is entitled to the concession for the construction of the Samsun–Sivas and the Samsun–Angora Railways, is being pressed to construct railways in the Erzerum and Trebizond districts.

The foreign groups concerned, and, indeed, all foreign railway concession holders in Turkey, are reluctant to embark on fresh construction, their only desire being to obtain some partial satisfaction for their immense losses during the war by such a readaptation of their present concessions as will enable them to charge higher rates for the conveyance of goods and passengers. There are no signs that the Turks will accord any favours to foreign concession holders in readapting their concessions, and for this reason no issue has yet been reached in the readaptation of any railway concession in Turkey.

The following is a short description of the railways now existing:—

(a.) *In Turkey in Europe.*

The Oriental Railways.

A portion of these railways runs from Constantinople to Chatalja and the Græco-Turkish frontier near Kouleli Bourgas, thence through Greek territory, returning to Turkish territory near Adrianople, shortly after leaving which it again crosses the frontier into Greece.

The length of the line is about 325 kilom.

These railways, which were inaugurated in 1873, were in 1920 operated by an Austrian company called the Société d'Exploitation des Chemins de Fer orientaux, but were then acquired by a French group, consisting of the Banque française pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, Schneider Creusot, and the Société de Construction de Batignolles. The rather furtive acquisition of this line by a French group, at a time when all the railways in Turkey were being held as an Allied *gage*, was resented by us. The railway has two branch lines, one from Baba Eski (143 kilom. from Constantinople) to Kirkilisse. This line, which is 50 kilom. long, is of military importance. Another branch line was begun during the war, and was intended to run from Pavlokeui to Keshan, where coal-mines exist.

(b.) *In Turkey in Asia.*

The Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin.

The original concession dates from 1856, and the line, since its construction, has been under British management, and was in 1914 regarded as the best managed line in Turkey.

The line is 607 kilom. long, and runs from Smyrna along the Meander Valley to Dineir and Lake Egerdir, with branches to Eudemish, Sokia, Denizli and Chivril.

The original founders of the company undoubtedly hoped in time to extend eastward to Konia in order to tap the rich central districts of Asia Minor, but the construction of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, which carried with them the right to prevent other railways entering a wide zone on each side of their lines, prevented the realisation of this idea. Shortly before the war a further limitation on the possible expansion of the company's railway system was provided by the action of the Italians in obtaining for themselves the right to construct railways northward from Adalia. After the war the conclusion of the tripartite agreement would have enabled the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company to link up their line with the Anatolian Railway, and to join up with Italian railways constructed in the Adalia district. The falling through of the tripartite agreement, due to the victory of Kemalism, still leaves the company free to expand eastward or southward, and the Turkish Government have, indeed, proposed to the company to construct railways towards Adalia through Burdur and from Dineir to the Anatolian Railway line at Afium Karahissar. The company sustained great losses during the war, and is at present negotiating with the Turkish Government for a readaption of its concession, which will allow it to recoup to some extent its losses, but hitherto has not succeeded in reaching any agreement.

It would undoubtedly be in the interest of the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company that the Anatolian Railway should remain under British control, for the passing of the Anatolian Railway under German or French influence would prove an obstacle to the company's ultimate hope of expansion eastwards.

The Smyrna–Kassaba Railway.

The original concession for the construction of this railway was granted in 1863 to a British subject. The railway was in 1893 purchased by the Turkish Government, and a concession for the operation of it was granted to a French company. The total length of the system is 677 kilom. It runs from Smyrna to Panderma with a branch to Afium Karahissar, through which town the Anatolian Railway passes. Although this line and the Smyrna–Aidin Railway have been in existence for over fifty years they were only connected during the war at the instance of the Turkish War Office. Proposals have been made to the board of the line by the Turkish Government that they should construct new railways in the direction of Chanak.

Owing to its connection with the town of Afium Karahissar, the future of the line to some extent bound up with that of the Anatolian Railway, and it may be assumed that the French board will fight to prevent the Anatolian Railway passing under British or German control.

The Anatolian Railway.

A concession for the construction of this railway was granted in 1888 to the Deutsche Bank. It runs from Haidar Pasha to Konia, with a branch line to Angora. The total length of the system is 1,035 kilom. It passes through Afium Karahissar, in which town the Smyrna–Kassaba line has a station. At Konia it joins on to the Bagdad Railway, the construction of which was also financed by the Deutsche Bank. In 1923 a British group (Shroeder's, Lloyd's, Rothschild's, &c.) acquired an option on the Zurich Bank's majority shareholding in this railway, but has never succeeded in obtaining possession of the line or in signing with the Turkish Government a contract for the running of the line. The Anatolian Railway is the most important railway in Asia Minor, and its importance has been enhanced by the choice of Angora as the capital. The present Turkish Government counts on making Angora not only a political capital, but also the centre of a vast railway system which will embrace Constantinople, Smyrna and Adalia on the west, and Trebizond, Erzerum, Diarbekir and Mosul on the east.

At present the Anatolian Railway is being operated by the Turks with the assistance of Germans, and all the rolling-stock and material needed to replace depreciation caused by the war have been ordered from Germany. There seems little

likelihood of the British group obtaining possession of this line, for the Turkish Government is resolved to avail itself of the terms of the original concession, and to repurchase it. Funds for repurchase are lacking, but this fact does not prevent the Turkish Government from already utilising the line as its own property. A proposal has been made to the British group by the Turkish Government to the effect that the group would be put in possession of the railway if they consent to construct new railways from Angora to Sivas, and from Sivas to Samsun. While the construction of new railways may tempt the British group, it may be taken as certain that they can expect no profit from regaining possession of the Anatolian Railway. The Turks affect to fear that the handing over of the railway system to a British group will have a political significance, and will afford His Majesty's Government the opportunity of continually intervening in Turkish internal affairs. The fear is groundless, and the Turkish Government of course knows this.

The Bagdad Railway.

The concession for this railway was granted to the Deutsche Bank in 1903, and was intended to run from Konia to Bagdad, Basra and the Persian Gulf viâ Mosul. It is not yet complete. At present the line runs from Konia to Nisibin, with branches to Alexandretta, Aleppo and Mardin.

From the Persian Gulf the line runs viâ Basra and Bagdad to Samarra, and during the war was extended to Kala Sherghat, some 70 miles south of Mosul. Only the portion between Bagdad and Samarra belongs to the Bagdad Railway Company.

The majority of shares in this railway are now in allied hands, and under the terms of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement the operation of the greater part of the line has been handed over to the French. The French company, which operates the line, is actively pushing on the construction of it. His Majesty's consul at Aleppo has recently reported that a good deal of material has been ordered for this railway and that the French company hopes to construct as far as Mosul before the end of this year.

The Mersina–Adana Railway.

The concession for this railway was originally granted in 1885 and the line was for a time operated by a British company, but subsequently passed into German hands. The length of the line is 67 kilom. It links up with the Bagdad Railway at Adana, and may be considered a branch of that line. Although at present operated by the French and the Turks, it really should fall to the British group which has acquired an option over the Anatolian Railway. Their chances of obtaining possession of it are very small.

The Mudania–Brusa Railway.

This is the only pre-war railway in Turkey of which the Turkish Government undertook the construction. It was begun in 1873, but the construction was abandoned in 1875, as the Turkish Government had neither the financial credit nor the technical knowledge necessary to complete it. In 1898 a concession for the construction and operation of the railway was ceded to a French firm. It is a narrow-gauge railway, 41 kilom. long, and serves the ancient capital of Turkey.

(c.) *Railways Projected or under Construction.*

The Turkish Government had recourse to foreigners in the first days of railway construction, but even before the war they showed a tendency to impose on Turkish railways a national character and to eliminate as far as possible all foreign influence. The policy of the present Turkish Government is to construct railways without foreign help. Thus in 1924 there was begun a light railway between Samsun and Alacham to the west and Tereme to the east, in which only Turkish capital and Turkish labour were employed.

The Turkish budget for 1925 contains the following extraordinary credits :—

	£ T.
Construction of the railway Samsun–Sivas–Angora ...	8,000,000
Construction of the railway Diarbekir–Arghana ...	1,000,000
Construction of the railway Kutahia–Tavchanli ..	2,000,000
Railway repairs	2,000,000

There are signs that the Turkish Government are finding the construction of these new railways too onerous, and they have made offers to both French and British groups to undertake construction on their behalf. It will be remembered that the French Régie générale des Chemins de Fer obtained in 1914 a concession for the construction of railways in the Black Sea area, *i.e.*, from Angora to the Russian frontier. During the Lausanne Conference the Turks refused to recognise the French claim to be allowed to construct the Black Sea railway system, and even granted a concession to the American, Admiral Chester, for the construction of the system. Admiral Chester was unable to find the funds, and now the Turkish Government has approached both the Régie générale and the British group interested in the Anatolian railways with a view to obtain help to carry out this scheme. The scheme, if carried out, will result in the construction of railways from Angora to Sivas and from Samsun to Sivas, and thence to Diarbekir in the south and to Erzerum and Trebizond in the east. During the war a broad-gauge track for the Angora–Sivas Railway was laid. At present a Decauville railway has been laid on this track. Several bridges have been constructed and a good deal of material from Germany has arrived. It will be understood that the construction of the Black Sea railway system has an importance which is more strategic than commercial.

There is a project for the construction of a railway from Diarbekir to the Arghana copper-mines. These copper-mines are the richest in Turkey, and if the line is constructed, the cost of construction will very soon be repaid out of the freights obtained.

Conclusion.

It is certainly in the interests of British firms to tender for the supply of railway material necessitated by the scheme of new railway construction which dominates the minds of the Turkish Cabinet, but English engineers must understand that the days of railway concessions are over and that any contract now made with the Turks will result in very little profit. The tendency of the Turkish Government is to call in German help and to order German material in connection with their railway schemes, and, as German help and German material can be obtained on cheaper terms than British help and British material, the future outlook for British traders is decidedly bleak.

Foreign Office, February 18, 1925.

No. 76.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 20.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.)

Athens, February 19, 1925.

PATRIARCHATE.

Greek Government have formulated no definite policy as yet. Their idea would be a compromise on basis of resignation of Patriarch, election of successor from non-exchangeable Metropolitans, and undertaking by Turkey that exchangeable prelates shall not be expelled. Root distrust of Turkish Government, however, induces belief here that such an agreement, if feasible, would be ineffective unless negotiated with or guaranteed by a third Power or group of Powers. No direct proposals will therefore apparently be made to Constantinople. Meanwhile in official circles speculation is active as to what will be the attitude of Turkey at Geneva, where she must be represented for minorities question, and may find it difficult to avoid discussion of issue raised by Greece. Patriarchate has ceased for the present to affect Greek internal politics.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 13.)

MAP SHEWING APPROXIMATELY

RAILWAYS AND RAILWAY PROJECTS IN



G.S.G.S. N° 2713

Scale 1/4,000,000 or 63·13 Miles to 1 Inch

Kilometres 100 50 0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometres

English Miles 100 50 0 100 200 300 Engl. Miles

REFERENCE

	Projected
Turkish Railways under British management	
" " Turkish "	
" " French "	
Other Railways	

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :— F.O. 424 / 262

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EWING APPROXIMATELY

ILWAY PROJECTS IN TURKEY



War Office 1925

ale 4000.000 or 63.13 Miles to 1 Inch

100 200 300 400 500 Kilometres

100 200 300 English Miles

REFERENCE

Projected

[E 1090/194/44] No. 77.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 133.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 17, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 47 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, so far as internal politics are concerned, the past month has been fairly quiet and not marked by any striking developments. During the latter part of the period the crisis brought about by the expulsion of the Œcumenical Patriarch quite overshadowed all other political events, and the satisfactory issue of it has certainly strengthened the position of Fethi Bey's Cabinet, whose attitude in the matter has received the whole-hearted support of all Turks, whatever their political leanings may be. It also had the result of bringing the President back in a hurry to the capital, where he arrived on the 2nd instant. While in Cilicia he seems to have travelled about a good deal and to have made himself accessible to the public. He made many and lavish promises of roads, ports, railways and other material improvements, and the electioneering nature of the tour became more clearly evident.

2. Nothing more has been heard of the question of prefects and how they shall be appointed, which early in January nearly brought Fethi Bey's Cabinet to the ground, and the National Assembly has been mainly occupied with discussion of the budget, which has to be, and doubtless will be, voted by the 1st March. It has given rise to debates of some heat in regard to various Departments of the State, especially the Interior, against whom on the 14th instant some very sharp criticisms were levelled. An Erzinjan Deputy described the eastern provinces as in chaos and infested by brigands, while Zia-ed-Din Effendi, a reactionary from Erzerum, deplored the general decay of morals and increasing criminality throughout the country—facts which are patent to every inhabitant of Turkey—but nothing comes of this sort of debate.

3. While the political surface is thus fairly calm, it is just possible that developments may be taking place under the surface. The Progressive party is sufficiently in harmony with Fethi Bey's general policy not to feel bound to act as an organised opposition to the Government now in power, and no trials of strength take place in the voting lobbies, but it is unlikely that in this interval the old block of the Popular party is acquiring any additional strength or cohesion. By-elections steadily go against them; at Brussa, Nur-ed-Din Pasha, the reactionary, had it all his own way in the second election, which was ordered after the invalidation of the first (see my despatch No. 47, paragraph 3), and at Keskin, El Aziz and Kaisari elections have been won by men who may be Progressive, Reactionary or Independent, but are certainly not official supporters of the Popular party. It is said that only at Constantinople, where it had complete and unquestioned control of all administrative machinery, could the Government make sure of electing its official candidates—an eloquent comment on the spirit of constitutionalism in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal's prestige is still the dominant factor in politics, but in a country like this it provokes individual animosities caused by personal jealousies or grievances, to which point is added by the inability of any Government to achieve business-like reforms. For this the President gets his full share of blame, and, identified as he is with the one party, from it the dissidents are probably drawing strength.

4. One event has taken up more space in the papers than even the threat of a breach with Greece, namely, the shooting affray in the Assembly in which Halid Pasha lost his life. The Pasha was one of those hot-headed soldiers who know not fear and who in the course of Turkey's wars had distinguished himself by his bravery and had received literally dozens of wounds. For some time he had been highly nervous and irritable, and on the 9th February a quarrel took place between him and another Deputy, apparently over some very trifling affair, and Halid was heard by his friends uttering very menacing language against various persons. Among those who tried to calm him was one Ali Bey, and Halid, suddenly seeing red, pulled out of his pockets two revolvers and shot them off at Ali. A rough and tumble ensued on the floor in the course of which Ali Bey succeeded in getting out his pistol and firing it into Halid's body. When the affray was over Halid declared that he had really been shot by one Reouf Bey, a rough, unscrupulous Laz Deputy and a devoted henchman of the President's, but Reouf was able to show that neither of the two pistols he carried had been fired off at all. Of course, the air is thick with rumour, and it is freely said that what seems on the face of it to have been a mere brawl brought on by a homocidal

maniac was really the murder of an inconvenient personage by the President's henchmen, and advantage was taken of this atmosphere by certain parties to invest Halid's funeral with a dignity entirely out of keeping with the sordid circumstances in which he met with his death. The facts of the case, at any rate as they have consistently been reported in the press, are all against these fanciful tales; and what comes out most clearly is the fact that Deputies in the precincts of the Assembly are not merely armed, but that they prefer to have two revolvers in their pockets rather than one.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1092/55/44] No. 78.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 135.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 18, 1925.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 29 of the 7th instant regarding the expulsion of the Œcumenical Patriarch, I have the honour to report that the local newspapers have published almost in full the "Times" version of the speech made by Lord Curzon on this matter in the House of Lords on the 10th instant. The speech has been received with satisfaction and, I think I may say, relief. The Turks are pleased that Lord Curzon took the Turkish view of the case into account, and they are relieved that His Majesty's Government propose to endeavour to promote a direct agreement between Greece and Turkey. The "Tanin," for example, recognises that no one is better fitted to speak on this subject than Lord Curzon, welcomes his statement that His Majesty's Government, in accord with their Allies, are devoting themselves to bringing about a peaceful arrangement between the two parties, and disclaims the least desire to be dragged into hostilities. Such having been the reception given to the speech, I feel that any observations which His Majesty's Government may wish to make to the Turkish Government are more likely to be listened to than before Lord Curzon spoke.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1093/1093/44] No. 79.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 23.)

(No. 138.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report by Consul Knight on the political situation at Samsoun and Trebizond.

Constantinople, February 18, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Consul Knight to Mr. Lindsay.

British Mission, Constantinople, February 12, 1925.

Your Excellency,

IN accordance with your request, I have the honour to make the following observations on matters of a more or less political nature which came to my notice during my recent visit to Samsoun and Trebizond.

2. As Ottoman Bank managers are in a sense Turkish officials and so naturally come within the scope of a political despatch, I should like in the first instance to place on record the extreme courtesy and unfailing kindness shown me by M. Aluta at Samsoun and M. Roboly at Trebizond. Not only did both do everything to make my visit pleasant for me personally, but their practical help was quite invaluable.

Without it I should have felt almost completely at sea in provincial Turkey, which I was visiting for the first time under conditions totally different from those of which I had had some experience in Constantinople before the war.

3. Both these gentlemen, who are of Italian (originally Austrian) and French nationality respectively, speak Turkish fluently, and make a point of being on the best possible terms with the Turkish officials and the Turks generally. At Trebizond, M. Roboly, who is married to an hospitable English-speaking lady from Smyrna, even goes so far as to keep open house for the Turks on Fridays and Sundays, when there is always a crowd of them for bridge and poker, conversation and refreshments. His Samsoun colleague is unmarried, to his intense regret, but has just acquired an expensive English gramophone, with Turkish as well as European records, as the local taste has not been, and probably never will be, educated up to an appreciation of Western harmonies. The outcome of it all is that these two gentlemen, by virtue of their position and their methods (M. Roboly and his ten-year-old boy actually wear the Nationalist *kalpak*), are able to penetrate into the intimacy of the Turks in a way which would hardly be possible or fitting for His Majesty's consul. At the same time, they consider themselves members of an Anglo-French institution rather than as officials of the national bank of the country, and discuss the Turks with a frankness which is as startling as it is probably justified. In any case, no one in either place is better qualified to know the people with whom they are in business and social relations every day of their lives.

4. A few hours after my arrival in Samsoun I made enquiries as to when it would be agreeable to the Vali to receive my visit, but was informed that his Excellency had not appeared at his office that day. The day after it became known that his mother had died, and I accordingly went to his private house to present my condolences and attend the funeral. After the usual delay, beguiled by numberless coffees and cigarettes, the procession set out, headed by a whole regiment of chanting *hodjas*. When the mosque was reached, the Vali, to my surprise, left the *cortège* with his friends and retinue, followed hesitatingly by myself, and turned into a small, fiercely-heated room over a café, where more coffees and cigarettes were consumed, while the remains, the *hodjas* and the common herd tarried inside the mosque, to the Vali's obvious impatience. I was assured that this behaviour on his part was in deference to no local custom, so I concluded that it was to be attributed to his Excellency's desire to emphasise the fact that he was the representative of a "lay" State, and that even in the case of his own mother he had no use for such mummeries. At the cemetery later there was a scene of much confusion, for the grave was not nearly ready, and finally, to obviate further delay, someone called for a saw, and enough of the rough deal coffin was sawn off to allow the rest to be lowered into the earth. I thought I had deserved rather well of the Vali for having thus devoted nearly four hours of a bitterly cold day to his mother's memory, but I received no acknowledgment whatever either at the time or subsequently.

5. Fakhri Bey has, indeed, the reputation of being a hater of foreigners, though not, perhaps, to any very exceptional degree for Samsoun. He is a Cretan, which fact alone, in view of the recent history of the Moslems in Crete, would go far to explain his attitude. I had heard that he knew a little French, but he refused categorically even to understand it on the occasion of my official visit, which I paid as soon as a decent interval had elapsed after the bereavement. I was thus obliged to get along as best I could with what Turkish I could muster after nearly twelve years' complete desuetude. The Vali appeared to gnash his teeth at me frequently, but I had been prepared for this by the information that he suffered from a nervous malady which manifested itself in this way, and made him extremely self-conscious and irritable. I certainly found him anything but pleasant or helpful. I knew that he could almost certainly get me a house if he really wanted to, but, though he ended by saying that he would try (which he did not), his only practical suggestion was that His Majesty's Government should either build a consulate or send out one of the movable houses such as the Germans have put up at Angora.

6. On my return from Trebizond to Samsoun, I was amused to hear from the manager of the Ottoman Bank that the Vali had declared my visit had confirmed him in his opinion that Englishmen are personally the most charming of mortals, which made it all the more regrettable that British policy was so consistently hostile to Turkey.

7. Ata Bey, director of works of the Samsoun–Sivas Railway, was indisposed for the first week of my visit, and I called on him at his house while he was still keeping indoors. He consented to speak French of a sort, but under the circumstances I did not mention business on that occasion. Soon afterwards I wrote him a friendly letter asking for certain information about the railway. Days passed and still no answer came, while even on my return from Trebizond Ata Bey had neither replied, though he had received my letter, nor returned my visit. I was not surprised to hear that he, too, had the reputation of being anti-foreign, though not to the same extent as Rushdi Bey, the director of the Régie Tobacco Factory, and others. All the officials I met or heard of gave the same impression, and the general unfriendly atmosphere was in marked contrast to the positive geniality which I was to encounter in Trebizond. The difference may be attributed to the fact that in Samsoun the Greeks used to lord it insolently over the Turks. Trade was entirely in Greek hands, and the town was from every point of view predominantly Greek. The Turks have long since more than had their revenge, but the revengeful spirit still lingers, and for lack of Greeks everything European or Christian comes in for its share of hate. At Trebizond it was very different, for although there were important Greek and Armenian communities, the Turk was always top dog, and so could afford to be more magnanimous both then and now.

8. The Vali of Trebizond, Said Bey, not only knew a little French, but took pride in speaking it, and still more in implying that he was an enthusiastic student of the language and of European thought generally. He habitually borrows from the Ottoman Bank manager all his French papers, and on his return visit to me the conversation took the form of a discussion on the meaning of "objectivity" and "subjectivity," and the correct rendering of those terms into Turkish. Said Bey is certainly rather a fool, without force of character or any influence other than that conferred by his position, but he is harmless, good-natured and without any visible trace of xenophobia.

9. Niazi Bey, the Chief of Customs, for whom I had an introduction from the commercial secretary, fell on my neck when I reminded him that we had met several time before the war in the custom-house at Stamboul during Sir Richard Crawford's administration. Nothing could have exceeded the cordiality of his attitude, and he even gave a dinner-party in my honour at his house, where he and other high officials became more and more communicative as the evening advanced. Nothing connected with the present régime escaped criticism—the sham republic, the military despotism, the unprecedented corruption, the ultra-Nationalist spirit which was ruining the country, especially the insane pretence of being able to dispense with foreign brains and capital. Both Niazi Bey and his principal Turkish guest on this occasion, Osman Nouri Bey, Director of the Public Debt at Trebizond, are noted for their integrity, and the latter declared that after thirty-five years of service he was on the point of retiring, in consequence of his having been worried to death by the interference and stipidity of the Angora officials. He travelled with me back to Constantinople, and in the numerous conversations I had with him on board he impressed me as being a remarkably high type of Turkish official and gentleman.

10. *The* character of Trebizond is Hamid Bey, an ex-Vali of the Province of Erzeroum, of Diarbekir, and of Adana when the French handed back Cilicia to the Turks. A former supporter of Kemal, he is now living in retirement and one of his bitterest enemies. At the same time, he is one of the leading political spirits in the eastern provinces, and enjoys great influence on account of his disinterestedness, while his nickname of "Déli" or "Mad" is really a compliment. Although so often Vali, he has remained a poor man. He invariably refers to Kemal as "His Majesty," and believes he is deliberately modelling himself on Napoleon. Being something of a student of history, he finds much amusement in the comparison. Speaking as an unbeliever, he said the abolition of the Caliphate was a colossal *gaffe*, and was merely playing into the hands of "you English," while it deprived Turkey of the one factor that afforded her an international position and the interest and respect of countless millions throughout the Old World. He evidently attributed the *coup* to Kemal's own personal determination to get rid of so formidable a rival to his own absolutism, and not to any sincere though mistaken belief in the advantages for Turkey of "lay" principles. He ridiculed the pretence of popular government, and said that not one in ten thousand would have voted for such a subversive measure had the people been given any choice in the matter.

11. This I can easily believe at least of the eastern vilayets if, as appears to be certain, the interior is still more fanatically attached to Islam than the coast towns. Even in the latter the women are as closely veiled as ever, and social life as understood in the West is still completely unknown, nor would any approximation to European modes or manners be tolerated by public opinion. When Mustafa Kemal and his emancipated consort visited Samsoun last autumn he angrily remarked on the total absence of women from the reception ceremony, and accordingly, on a subsequent occasion, the harems of the leading officials yielded up their inmates to the number of twenty or thirty, but all have since retired into obscurity pending another forced inspection by the Dictator. One more indication of the strength of Anatolian religious feeling is afforded by the fact that at the inauguration ceremony of the Samsoun–Sivas Railway at the former town on the 29th December, the full religious ceremonial was observed with public prayers, *hodjas* in full force, the ritual slaughtering of sheep, &c. Moslem employees, even of the Ottoman Bank, are not infrequently to be found in an attitude of prayer during office hours, and naturally may not be disturbed until they choose to suspend their devotions. The mass of the people are indeed profoundly religious, and even the classes who pride themselves on being "enlightened" are politically "clerical," though they may believe in nothing themselves.

12. Public security is good, probably better than in normal times before the war, and better in the country districts than in the towns, where knifings and shootings are not uncommon. The turbulent Laz element is, as before, the main cause of disorder all along the Black Sea coast. As an instance of the present safety of the roads in the eastern vilayets, I was told by the manager of the Ottoman Bank at Trebizond that he is accustomed to despatch from 70,000 to 80,000 liras every week or ten days to each of the army corps at Erzeroum, Erzinjan and Sarikamish, and although the convoy consists of but a carriage with a gendarme for escort, every single consignment has hitherto got through without molestation.

13. Owing to the proximity of the Russian frontier, the Bolshevik danger looms very large at Trebizond, and the officials are clearly much preoccupied thereby. There is a Bolshevik consul-general, a crafty and ill-natured Jew named Trapoun, who occupies one of the finest houses in the town and flaunts the emblem of Red revolution every day of the year. That he exists solely for purposes of intrigue and propaganda is taken for granted by all. He appears, however, to have little success in getting his agents across the border, which is quite as strictly guarded on the Turkish side as on the Russian. Hamid Bey (see paragraph 10) told me with evident glee that when he was Vali of Erzeroum a few years ago he caught seventeen Turks whom the Russians had sent over for propaganda purposes, and marched them down to Trebizond with a message for his colleague to the effect that, if they survived the journey (it was midwinter) he expected they would display less power of resistance against the waves of the Black Sea. They were accordingly embarked on a sailing vessel, and had not got far on their way towards Batum when a motor-boat put out to meet it, and seventeen corpses were washed ashore in due course.

14. I fear that this despatch has already attained undue proportions, although I have reserved matters of mainly commercial, economic and social interest for a separate despatch to be addressed to the commercial secretary. I shall now conclude with a brief general comparison between the two towns visited.

15. Both, regarded commercially, are about on a par, although the advantage is rather with Trebizond owing to the very important transit trade to and from Persia. This interests the United Kingdom to a much greater extent than the tobacco export trade of Samsoun, which is almost entirely with the United States of America as regards the higher grades and Central Europe as regards the lower. The direct trade with England is quite negligible in either case. Politically, Trebizond is most interesting owing to the neighbourhood of Russia and Persia, the presence of Russian and Persian consuls-general (a French consul is due to arrive very shortly), and the keen interest which the educated classes, Turkish and European, take in political affairs. The city seems in a sense still conscious of its imperial tradition, and has been an important provincial capital for many centuries. It is well known to be the province most stubbornly opposed to the present régime, and the most fertile source of distinguished recruits to the Opposition. Samsoun, on the other hand, resembles an overgrown village, has no traditions, and takes no interest in current affairs. The marked difference in the attitude of the officials I have already commented upon. The Samsoun–Sivas Railway will not be finished for years, even *with* European capital, and will almost certainly never be finished without it, so that there would appear to be a good deal to be said for retaining

the consulate at Trebizond rather than transferring it to Samsoun at the present juncture. There is no question of there being any other consular establishment in the latter town, where even the Americans, with their large interests, closed down their consulate some months ago.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT.

No. 80.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 23, 1925.

ATHENS telegrams of 22nd February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs' speech said little that had not been said before, three main points being that no intervention by foreign Powers could be admitted, that last Greek note required no answer, and that Turkey cannot admit competence of League in this purely internal question. Tone of speech was indeed vigorous, and even uncompromising, and this may be due to declaration by Lord Curzon, which has had a very reassuring effect on public opinion here.

Turkish delegate informed me yesterday that negotiations are still in progress here on basis of electing a Patriarch from amongst non-exchangeable Metropolitans, though he could not give me any precise details.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 9.)

No. 81.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 23, 1925.

MY despatch No. 134: Kurdish unrest.

According to telegrams from Angora, movement is more serious than was at first represented.

After occupying village of Drakhen (unidentified), residence of Vali of Ghenj (20 miles west of Mush), Sheikh Said is reported to have sent out two columns, one in direction of Lijeh and the other towards Piran. These columns are stated to have been routed by Turkish forces and to have fled to Drakhen, where they are at present besieged. Turkish reinforcements sent against rebels are expected to arrive on the scene in a few days.

According to one report, Sheikh Said has proclaimed that he has a divine mission to establish Moslem religious law (the Sheri) in Turkey. According to other reports he is a tool of British, and Ghenj affair is merely a sequel of Hekkiari incident of last autumn.

Ismet Pasha, who proceeded rather unexpectedly to Angora on the 20th instant, is reported to have conferred on the situation with President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Grand National Assembly and the Minister of the Interior. In addition to inevitable crop of rumours as to a Cabinet crisis, there is talk of proclaiming martial law.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 12.)

No. 82.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 25.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 24, 1925.

MY telegram No. 37.

In accordance with article 86 of Organic Statute, martial law has been declared in all south-eastern vilayets, including Mardin, Hakkiari, Bitlis and Van, as well as in two kazas of Vilayet of Erzerum.

(Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 40. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 14.)

[E 779/498/44] No. 83.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 708.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February* 26, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 154 of the 12th January I transmit to you the accompanying copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's representative at Constantinople, regarding the possibility of a joint appeal to the Council of the League of Nations in the matter of the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey, under article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne. I shall be glad if your Lordship will take an early opportunity to discuss this matter with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and report his views on the whole question to me at an early date.

2. Pending an expression of the views of the French and Italian Governments in this matter, His Majesty's Government are reluctant to take any final decision as to the policy which should be adopted; but, on the whole, I am inclined, notwithstanding the arguments brought forward in Mr. Lindsay's despatch and in the enclosure therein, to question the desirability of bringing the matter before the council at its next meeting.

3. The four principal counts of the proposed indictment against the Turkish Government are (1) the forced exodus of non-Moslems, mainly Armenians, from South-Eastern Anatolia, in 1923–24; (2) the enforcement of the Abandoned Property Laws as regards the property of Christian refugees, and the exclusion from Turkey of non-Moslem Turkish subjects who have temporarily left that country; by a combination of these two measures, Armenians and other non-Moslem Turkish subjects are both permanently exiled from Turkey and deprived of all their property in that country; (3) the forced dismissal of non-Moslem employees of foreign and other companies in Turkey, *i.e.*, discrimination against certain classes of Turkish subjects on account of their religion; and (4) general discrimination against non-Moslem communities in educational, religious and charitable matters.

4. Against all these accusations the Turks can adduce a variety of more or less plausible defences and excuses. It is well nigh impossible to make an overwhelming case against them, and unless such a case could be brought it is difficult to see how the League would be able to right the undoubted wrongs of the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey. The fact appears to be that the Turks have now practically achieved their original object, that is, the elimination of all non-Turkish elements in Anatolia. The process of what may be called racial purification or simplification seems almost complete. Its ill-effects, however, are at length beginning to make themselves felt. In these circumstances a gradual reversal of the policy appears more likely than an intensification or even a continuance of it.

5. Should His Majesty's Government be right in anticipating such a gradual reversal of this policy, it appears that any publicity in the form of an appeal to the League, or any pressure on the Turks in connection with their policy, would probably have the effect of postponing any mitigation of the policy by arousing Turkish resentment and suspicion; while it is doubtful whether the League, even if it succeeded in obtaining permission for a commission to visit the territories concerned, could obtain any reparation for the injuries of the past.

6. It seems probable that, if matters are left alone, Armenians and Greeks will begin to filter back to Turkey, since the fact that they are essential to the economic life of that country is becoming apparent. As that fact is realised, their treatment may be expected to improve, and economic necessity may even induce the Turks to afford some compensation for past wrongs.

7. The Turkish policy of "racial purification" is largely a result of European interest in, and intervention on behalf of, the minorities, and it is open to question whether this interest and intervention has hitherto been anything but injurious rather than beneficial to the minorities concerned. Further intervention at the present moment, when the bulk of the damage has been done, seems unlikely to prove more effective than in the past, either in helping those who have suffered or in protecting the few remaining potential victims. On the other hand, it seems likely to reawaken all the suspicions of the Turks, and to confirm them in a policy which there is reason to hope they may be about to abandon.

8. Before, however, definitely abandoning all idea of an appeal to the League, His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn the considered views of the French and Italian Governments on the whole question.

9. A similar despatch (No. 252) has been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 84.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 25, 1925.

MY telegram No. 36.

Local authorities yesterday cancelled demand which they had addressed a few days ago to the Exchange Sub-Commission to prepare passports of three Metropolitans. I learn from sure source that in a meeting with all available members of Synod convoked yesterday by Vali, latter offered Synod bargain that Turkish Government would instruct their delegate on Exchange Commission to agree that no Metropolitan now in Turkey who is technically exchangeable shall be exchanged provided that Synod, on their side, would [? not] elect one of these Patriarch. Synod has been given two or three days to think matter over, but I understand that M. Exindaris's view is that Greeks should wait for meeting of League in the hope that even if above bargain be then accepted it will receive added strength of League's endorsement. Change in Turkish attitude is no doubt due to Kurdish rising.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 10.)

No. 85.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 25, 1925.

MY telegram No. 40.

Rebels are now reported to be in occupation of Kharput, Diarbekr and Dersim.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 15.)

No. 86.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 27, 1925.

MY telegram No. 42.

Kharput is now reported recaptured. Information in general is contradictory.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 16.)

No. 87.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 27, 1925.

I TOLD Nusret yesterday that I noticed that in the press and even in official statements the Kurdish rebellion was ascribed to British intrigues. I did not know whether those who made these statements really believed them, but I owed it to the honesty of His Majesty's Government to inform him that all advance to British authorities by malcontents had been received with absolute discouragement and refusal of any form of help. When Turkish authorities began to master the insurrection they would doubtless get confirmation of my statement from interrogations of prisoners.

Nusret thanked me for the statement, and said that he personally had not believed the reports of British instigation and did not think the Turkish Government credited them.

No. 88.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 1.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March* 1, 1925.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 41.

I have similar information from official source, though Greeks apparently know nothing about condition that election of Patriarch should be restricted to technically exchangeable persons. I learn, however, that Turkish authorities have now demanded that Greek Government should withdraw their appeal to the League of Nations, and that negotiations have consequently broken down. It is supposed that they were merely intended to gain time to estimate strength of Kurdish movement.

Disappointment here is marked, as Greeks hoped that Turkish declarations would be registered by commission and so receive international guarantee. It is also noticeable that competent Greek authorities were anxious to conclude bargain in spite of fact that it did not ensure permanence of patriarchal institution as opposed to immediate election. For that they would have been only too content to trust to the future.

No. 89.

Memorandum respecting Greek Minority in Constantinople and Turkish Minority in Western Thrace.

AT the 31st session of the Council of the League of Nations on the 31st October, 1924, when a dispute in regard to the interpretation of the Exchange of Populations Convention was being discussed, the Greek delegate made allegations regarding the maltreatment of the Greek Minority in Constantinople, which the Turkish delegate denied, complaining in his turn of the treatment of the Turkish population of Western Thrace. He also stated that his Government would welcome an enquiry by the League of Nations into the treatment of these two Minorities. The Resolution which was passed by the council at this meeting contained the following reference to the Greek Minority in Constantinople and the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace:—

> "As to the question of the treatment of Minorities proper, the council has taken note of the statement made that the two parties agree to an enquiry being undertaken, if necessary, by the Council of the League as to the position of the Minority of Greek race in Constantinople and the Minority of Turkish race in Western Thrace.
>
> "But the treatment of these Minorities has only been brought before the council this afternoon, and the council could hardly take a decision on a matter of such importance without full knowledge of the facts.
>
> "They would therefore ask the representatives of the two Governments to send to the Secretary-General full statements so that they may duly consider the subject at their meeting in Rome in December next."

The allegations made by the Greek delegate on this occasion were that the Turkish Government were preventing the return of Ottoman subjects of Greek extraction to Constantinople in contravention of the Minorities clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne, were confiscating their property and were persecuting those still in that city. The accusations brought by the Turkish delegate as regards the treatment of Moslems in Western Thrace were that land belonging to Moslems had been requisitioned for the benefit of non-Moslem refugees from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and that these Moslems had been subjected to grave maltreatment.

The treatment to be accorded by Greece to the Moslem Minority in Western Thrace is laid down in the following instruments :—

1. The Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (the 27th November, 1919), of which ARTICLE 46 reads as follows :—

> "Greece accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion."

2. The treaty to which reference was made in this article was signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920, and ratified with certain modifications, together with the Treaty of Lausanne, thus entering into force on the 6th August, 1924. Whilst too long to quote *in extenso*, it makes full provision that Greek nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic Minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Greek nationals The article of this treaty, which particularly affects land tenure in Western Thrace and the complaint of the Turkish Government, reads as follows :—

> "ARTICLE 11.
>
> "For a period of six months after the coming into force of the present treaty, Greece undertakes not to introduce any new regulations modifying the land system in the territories acquired by Greece under the treaties terminating the war of 1914–19."

In accordance with article 16 of this treaty—

> "Greece agrees that the stipulations of the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic Minorities, constitute obligations of international concern, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.
>
> "Greece agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.
>
> "Greece further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between the Greek Government and any one of the principal Allied or Associated Powers, or any other Power a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Greek Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final, and shall have the same force and effect as an award under article 13 of the covenant."

3. On the 24th July, 1923, at the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, a protocol was signed by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Greece, by which they agreed that the ratification of the above-mentioned treaty concluded at Sèvres should, if not previously deposited, be deposited at the same time as the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the instruments signed that day at Lausanne, and that the provision in the above-mentioned treaty by which Greece undertook to put into force an electoral system giving due consideration to the rights of racial Minorities in territories acquired by her since the 1st August, 1913, shou be abrogated.
4. Article 45 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, which reads as follows :—

> "The rights conferred by the provisions of the present section on the non-Moslem Minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem Minority in her territory."

The treatment to be accorded to *non-Moslem Minorities in Turkish territory* forms the subject of articles 37 to 44 inclusive of the Treaty of Lausanne. Article 44 contains the same provisions as article 16 of the Treaty of Sèvres with Greece, which is quoted above *in extenso*.

The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and the Turkish inhabitants of Western Thrace were excepted from compulsory exchange by the following article of the Exchange of Populations Convention :—

> "ARTICLE 2.
>
> "The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in article 1 :—
>
> "(*a.*) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.
> "(*b.*) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.
>
> "All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the prefecture of the city of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.
>
> "All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace."

On the 28th November, 1924, the Greek Government forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in which they stated that :—

1. Refugees were placed in Turkish houses in Western Thrace previous to the entry into force of the Exchange of Populations Convention and of the Treaty of Lausanne. This measure was necessitated owing to the fact that by the armistice concluded at Mudania in October 1922 the Greek forces were allowed fifteen days for the evacuation of Eastern Thrace, consequently the refugees from that province had to be accommodated at short notice, and, in view of the large number of refugees from Asia Minor who had to be sheltered in the other provinces of Greece, the Greek authorities were obliged to maintain nearly 100,000 refugees in Western Thrace. As it was dangerous to leave these refugees unemployed, it was necessary to requisition land in order to enable them to support themselves. Western Thrace must be treated on the same basis as the rest of Greece and the refugees now there must be enabled to settle permanently in that province, in view of the fact that throughout the whole of Greece 1,300,000 refugees have taken the place of the 350,000 Turks who come within the scope of the Exchange of Populations Convention.

   Immediately after the signature of the Exchange of Populations Convention the Greek Government considered the question of evacuating the houses and lands of Turks in Western Thrace, but, as the Mixed Commission set up under that convention decided to allow fifteen months for the 350,000 Turks to be exchanged to leave Greece, Turkish property in Western Thrace cannot be evacuated until some time after the departure of these Turks.
2. By article 11 of the Minorities Treaty concluded at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920, the Greek Government was obliged "for a period of six months after the coming into force of the treaty not to introduce any new regulations modifying the land system in Western Thrace." The Greek Government was therefore compelled to leave untouched the lands and houses belonging to small Turkish landholders and to settle refugees on the uncultivated lands of the large landowners, which must for this purpose be expropriated; this could not take place until the 6th February, 1925 (six months after entry into force of Lausanne Treaty).
3. A further difficulty encountered by the Greek Government was that the Exchange of Populations Convention came into force on the 25th August, 1923, whilst the other instruments completed at Lausanne only came into force on the 6th August, 1924, consequently the above-mentioned period of six months ran from the 6th August, 1924, whilst the Exchange of

Populations began almost a year before that date, with the result that the Greek Government could take no proper measures as regards land tenure in Western Thrace until nearly eighteen months after the entry into force of that convention.

However, they have endeavoured to solve the problem of the acquisition of large Turkish estates by means of direct negotiations with Turkey and offered to acquire these lands by purchase after valuation by mixed commissions, on which the Turkish Government would be represented, but the latter would not agree to the arrangements proposed.

The Greek Government argue that, whereas the Turkish Government are applying and propose to apply reprisals to the Greek Minority in Constantinople, they had to liquidate in Western Thrace a situation which arose before the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. Their memorandum ends with a statement that they have not remained inactive, but have (*a*) endeavoured to evacuate refugees to districts other than Western Thrace; (*b*) issued orders for the removal of more than 3,500 Armenians to other parts of Greece; (*c*) constructed houses in Western Thrace in order to free those owned by Turks, but employed for the accommodation of refugees.

On the 10th December the Secretary-General of the League of Nations received a report regarding the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter reiterated the accusations brought against the Greek Government by the Turkish delegate at the thirty-first session of the council and stated that a year had passed since the entry into force of the Exchange of Populations Convention, but the situation of the Turkish inhabitants of Western Thrace had deteriorated rather than improved, that requisitions and expulsions were increasing and that certain persons expelled had perished in the Maritza River. The Turkish Government also alleged that sporadic assassinations had taken place in the province (such as that at Cavin Tchoukour, where eighteen Turks were killed), and that the greater portion of the Moslem population, which is agricultural, having been deprived of its land, had been compelled to take refuge in the towns, where no work was available. It was stated, in particular, that the tobacco fields and premises for preparing tobacco leaves had been placed at the disposal of Greek immigrants, that the cattle and beasts of burden belonging to Turks had been given to the refugees and the former had been deprived of all means of living. The Greek Government are accused of reinforcing their frontier districts with a Greek population, where hitherto that population has been largely Turkish, and their authorities are alleged to have taken possession of territories owned by Turks and Moslem municipalities, even the gardens adjoining Turkish houses and the cemeteries, as building sites for domiciles for refugees. It is also stated that Turkish schools have been requisitioned as residences for refugees or for use as Greek schools. The Turkish Government maintain that the Turkish population of Western Thrace make every effort to cross the Maritza into Turkish territory, whilst the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople liable to exchange try to avoid leaving that city. The Turkish Government close their note by insisting that the position of the Turks in Western Thrace should be similar to that of the Greek Minority in Constantinople. A large number of communications to and from the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations is enclosed in that note with a view to bearing out the statements contained therein. These communications do not seem to be worthy of a detailed analysis.

In a letter dated the 10th December the Greek delegate forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations respecting the Greek Minority in Constantinople in which he complained that the Turkish Government had not observed the terms of the instruments signed by their representatives at Lausanne regarding the Greek Minority in Constantinople. The Greek Government state that those of that minority who have left the city cannot obtain permission to return, that their property has been seized as abandoned and the revenue obtained therefrom confiscated by the Turkish Government; that those who remain are subject to exorbitant levies, from which the Moslems are spared (in support of this fourteen cases are quoted in which persons of Greek extraction have been subjected to a levy on their capital in the most arbitrary and irregular fashion); that they pay a tax for schools, but that this money is distributed exclusively to Moslem establishments. The Greek Government allege that, in accordance with the Turkish regulations respecting travel in Turkey, those who desire to return to that country must apply within a year to the Turkish consulate at their place of residence and must make detailed statements in which they must specify their property at Constantinople, so that, if they have any possessions in

that city not previously confiscated, the Turkish authorities will be able to attend thereto. According to these regulations, only those who are born at Constantinople *and* are properly inscribed in the civic registers of that city as residing there before the 30th October, 1918, are permitted to return, all others born elsewhere, even if they have resided in Constantinople for many years, are not allowed to return to their homes, whilst travel is rendered almost impossible for Greeks in Constantinople owing to the difficulties they experience in obtaining passports, which, when granted, are frequently stamped "not valid for return."

In August 1923 a decree is stated to have been published by the Turkish Government ordering the sale within six weeks of abandoned property for the benefit of Turkish refugees from Greece. The Turkish Government are also alleged not to recognise powers of attorney made by persons of Greek extraction for the management of their property in Constantinople although such property cannot justly be considered as abandoned. Greek employees in Turkish Government offices and Greek lawyers are stated to have been deprived of their employment. As regards schools, the Turkish Government are alleged to be placing every possible obstacle in the path of the Greek establishments and to be compelling these to include Turkish professors in their staff. Respecting military service, the Greek Government maintain that the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople are subjected to the same maltreatment as formerly; that they are placed in labour battalions, from which few return, with the result that those of military age prefer to emigrate, and that the Turkish Government discriminate when allocating Moslem and non-Moslem recruits to the various units of the army. In this note the Greek Government enclose a memorandum comparing the Greek administration of Western Thrace with the Turkish administration of the Greek Minority in Constantinople, which does not seem worth a very careful analysis, as it mainly reiterates the statements contained in their note and purports to prove that they show the greatest solicitude for the Turkish inhabitants of Western Thrace.

At the 32nd session of the Council of the League of Nations on the 13th December 1924, Viscount Ishii suggested that, as it had not been possible to circulate the Turkish Government's memorandum regarding the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace and the Greek Government's last memorandum regarding the Greek Minority in Constantinople in time for consideration by the members of the council, "we cannot proceed further with this question at the present session, and I accordingly propose that the council should place it on the agenda of its next session, and request the Governments concerned to communicate to it as soon as possible any other documents which they think would be of value.

"As in my report of the 31st October, I would suggest that the two Governments should be requested, pending further action by the council, to refrain from doing anything which might be prejudicial to the personal and material interests of these populations.

"M. Carpanos (the Greek representative) said that he had no objections to make, and thought he could undertake on behalf of his Government that, in conformity with the wish expressed by the *rapporteur*, nothing would be done to prejudice the private and material interests of the populations concerned until the council had taken a new decision.

"Dr. Tewfik Rushdi Bey (the Turkish representative) made a statement to a similar effect."

This was approved.

V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.

March 1, 1925.

[**E 1226/109/44**] No. 90.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 148.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 24, 1925

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 33 of the 13th February relative to the diplomatic representation in Turkey of His Majesty's Government and their allies in the late war.

2. On the 19th instant, at an inter-Allied meeting with the French and Italian representatives, we compared the instructions we had each of us received and found them to be substantially identical. We decided that on the 1st March we would each of us

hand to Nusret Bey personally, but separately, a note conveying the intentions of our Governments. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note which I propose on Tuesday next to give to the Turkish delegate.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 90.

Mr. Lindsay to Nusret Bey.

M. le Délégué, *Constantinople, le 1er mars* 1925.

PAR ordre de Mr. Austen Chamberlain, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que Sa Majesté le Roi et son Gouvernement auraient l'intention de confier la représentation diplomatique de la Grande-Bretagne en Turquie à un Ambassadeur.

2. Celui-ci résidera à Constantinople. Toutefois, il se rendra à Angora aussi souvent qu'il pourrait être nécessaire.

3. L'Ambassadeur sera représenté en permanence à Angora par un fonctionnaire désigné à cet effet

4. J'ai l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement turc.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1243/544/44] No. 91.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 153.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 25, 1925.

YOU will doubtless have noticed in the despatches which the commercial secretary to this mission has addressed to the Department of Overseas Trade during the past year the numerous cases of Turkish official orders for goods and contracts which have been obtained by Germans.

2. There can, I think, be no doubt that since the Allied troops left Constantinople—and in the case of Anatolia from an earlier date—the economic penetration of this country by Germans, which had been pushed to great lengths before the war, has been taken up again. Every visitor to Angora and indeed to most towns of importance in Turkey has been struck by the amount of German heard (although this is admittedly not a fair criterion of the number of German nationals here) and—relatively to other foreigners—the numbers of Germans seen. Some of these are engineers, some doctors, some skilled artisans, the larger number are probably commercial travellers or representatives of German firms, both big and small, especially of machinery manufacturers. The Anatolian and Bagdad Railways and the new railways being constructed north and east of Angora are all being continually supplied with German material. (So far as the Anatolian and Bagdad lines are concerned, the German origin of the existing material and the natural tendency to go to the same market for replacement and spare parts must of course be remembered.) German agricultural machinery is being imported in large quantities. Germans, as I have already reported, have been given Government posts, *e.g.*, in the Post Office, and the Vali of Angora has enlisted their services in his schemes for the reconstruction of the capital. There was at one time talk of a large part of the new town-planning and building schemes there being farmed out to a German company. Incidentally, if this had been the case, it would, from the æsthetic point of view alone, have been unfortunate. Even here in Stamboul it is possible to see the effect of the German influence in new school and other buildings—an ill-assorted marriage between the outward symbols of oriental architecture and the crude neo German style.

3. No doubt the European war and post-war economic situation is chiefly responsible for this state of things. During the war Germany dominated Turkish economic life without competition. Since the war she has lost many of her former oversea markets; her energetic commercial travellers are still badly received, if not actually refused admittance, by many countries with which she traded before the war. To those markets which are still accessible to her she has much manufactured goods,

especially machinery, to export at prices, owing to smaller labour and other costs, which undercut her English, French or American competitors. Germans know this market well. They have learnt before and during the war how to accommodate themselves to its peculiarities. They take infinite pains to obtain a thorough knowledge of local conditions. The Turkish language is frequently used in their trade literature. In certain cases of Government contracts credit facilities are granted, and, although German manufacturers generally consign on a cash basis, German banks, such as the Deutsche Bank and the Deutsche Orient Bank, discount bills on easy terms. There are also, of course, political and social factors. Not much love is said to have been lost between the Turks and Germans as allies during the war, and German political tactlessness and the hypersensitive pride of the Young Turks, which were probably responsible for this, are features which exist to-day and will probably continue to ruffle Turco-German diplomatic relations. But Germany is one of the few big countries whom the Turks do not, at any rate for the moment, fear or suspect. They learnt to admire German organising capacity and industrial efficiency during the war. Before the war the Turkish officers were mostly German-trained, and the war only accentuated the German influence in the army. Turkish military text books are translated from the German, and the higher staff officers generally read the German originals. The German training is evident enough in the bearing of the average officer and the make and even colour of uniform. The Turkish officer class is drawn from probably the best stock in the country. Apart from the army, many Turks who could no longer during and since the war send their children to France sent their sons and, perhaps equally important, their daughters to German schools and universities to obtain either a general "Western" education or that technical training so much in demand in the Turkified Turkey of to-day. This has led to a great increase in the amount of German spoken, which now almost rivals French among educated Turks. On the whole, therefore, the war gave an impetus to the German pre-war penetration of Turkey, and the events of the armistice were not such as to cause the Turks to transfer their preference elsewhere.

4. It may well be asked how far this German movement is artificial in the sense of being encouraged and fostered by the German Government. As shown above, there are national causes sufficient to account for it. Perhaps, however, the German Government and German officials at home and abroad act as intermediaries in the relations between the Turkish Government and Turks on the one hand, or German individuals and firms on the other, more often than would be publicly or officially admitted. It is unlikely in any case that the process would be unwelcome to those German officials trained in the old school, who still hope unostentatiously to keep open those roads which the Allied victory temporarily closed, leading to German economic and political predominance in Asia. Be that as it may, I have seen here no sign of any attempt at German official interference in the affairs of Turkey, and my German colleague is certainly anxious, perhaps over-anxious, to prove it. An example of this anxiety was recently brought to my notice

5. A week or so ago a prominent local paper appearing in French, the "Gazette," devoted two columns on its front page to an interview, which must have been carefully prepared beforehand in the form of question and answer, between its correspondent and the German representative. Herr Nadolny was asked four questions relatingrespectively to the future of Turco-German economic relations generally, the assistance of German specialists in the Turkish administration, the participation of German industry in construction work and in railway and port development, such as the reconstruction of Angora and the Yumurtalik port, and, lastly, the transfer of foreign Embassies to Angora. He replied to the first question that he looked confidently to the future, since the two countries could each supply what the other wanted. The other reason for optimism was that their mutual commercial activity was unaccompanied by any political aims. The atmosphere was one of sincerity and frankness. He added that a prescient tariff policy on the part of both Governments could help much, and he alluded to the free trade tendency in Germany.

6. The second question, Herr Nadolny said, should be addressed to the Turkish Government, who obtained specialists directly without the intermediary of the German Government. He only knew about their presence in such concerns as the Anatolian Railway and the Posts and Telegraphs by what he read in the papers. Any enquiry regarding the results of the German specialists' work should also be made of the Turkish Government.

7. As German industry re-established its solid pre-war foundations and redeveloped its activity abroad, it would be able to help Turkey in its work of reconstruction and in

the development of its natural resources, interrupted by the war. But, as in the case of specialists, the Turkish Government, now free and independent, would, like any commercial concern, make its choice by open competition. If German industry had been able to obtain some important orders for railway or other constructions, it had done so because of the better conditions it could offer—price, quality, terms of delivery, &c. The municipality was known to be conducting itself the reconstruction of Angora. The introduction of a foreign element therefore only took the form of the employment of skilled and unskilled labour. Among them were many Germans. Herr Nadolny had not heard that any plans for port construction had yet taken solid shape.

8. Herr Nadolny replied to the fourth question that the journalist "paid him too great an honour in asking information about Embassies, that is to say, about the intentions of others." The Germans had recognised the *de facto* situation created by the transfer of the Government and capital to Angora by acts: their completed building at that town was there to prove it. It was not only an act of courtesy, but also the symbol of the German desire to approach Turkish statesmen at the opportune moment and to remove their present exceptional character from these edifices. For the rest, the existence of this centre at Angora, even during the absence of its chief, would enable a permanent staff to be housed. He hoped shortly to increase their number. He added that the ghazi had recently visited the building and expressed his satisfaction.

9. I do not of course wish to over-emphasise the extent of German influence here. While the Turkish navy is of relatively small importance compared to the army, there are a disproportionate number of officers to men, and in many walks of life, notably politics, there are many ex-naval officers. Among them the British naval training and traditions are still a predominant influence. The Germans have lost their hospital; their single school here is only just reopening; they have no newspaper, and it is perhaps significant that an attempt to revive a pre-war daily paper about eighteen months ago failed through lack of circulation. The foreign banking institutions of the country are still mainly in British, French, Italian and American hands. So are the existing foreign hospitals and schools. The most important existing public works and industrial undertakings are chiefly British, French, Italian, American and Belgian. If and when confidence is sufficiently restored in the stability of this country and its administration, it is difficult to see whence the capital necessary for any big new industrial construction or for the development of natural resources can be drawn except from Great Britain and America, and possibly France. It must also be remembered that Great Britain, Italy and America are still ahead of Germany as regards the values and volume of the import and export trade of Turkey. In 1913–14 Germany stood third in importance as regards imports to Turkey, whereas she stood fifth in 1923 according to official statistics. It is rather from the point of view of the smaller trader and concession hunter and from the point of view of closer personal contact in trade all over the country that German influence seems now relatively strong and may increase because of the peculiar character of this country and its people, and because of the patient tenacity with which the German pushes his wares here in spite of difficulties.

10. Nor do I wish to imply that the extension of German economic influence is necessarily bad from the point of view of the stability of this country and therefore of its influence generally in the comity of nations. German thoroughness and technical skill can do much to help Turkey to organise herself and her resources, and this will doubtless favour an increase in foreign trade generally. It is rather from the side of the possible political and psychological results of this economic penetration that disadvantages may be foreseen. The political inexperience of the bulk of the ruling class in Turkey, the tendency to arrogance and tactlessness, are faults for the improvement of which one would rather see other counsels and examples followed than those of Germany. In the background—and likely to remain there as long as the Turkish Government goes on its present courses—is the possibility that one day a weaker Turkish Government, more susceptible to foreign influences and more conscious of the necessity of foreign assistance, may again fall under the sway of German advisers and once more become a pawn in a revived German attempt to extend its domination eastwards and southwards.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1229/1091/44] No. 92.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March 2.*)

(No. 154.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 24, 1925.*

CONSTANTINOPLE was surprised to learn on Thursday last from the papers that Ismet Pasha had been summoned to Angora from his retirement at Halki; and that he was to start the next day. Everyone lost himself in conjectures as to the reason of the journey and the prevalent opinion was that some sort of Cabinet crisis had broken out. The Pasha reached the capital on Saturday the 21st and was met at the station with unusual demonstrations of affection by the President of the Republic, who took him straight off to Chankaya to a conference. Some significance was attached to the fact that Fethi Bey, the Prime Minister, and some of his Cabinet colleagues were not present to meet Ismet Pasha at the station.

2. The true reason of the sudden journey was that the President wished to consult his ex-Prime Minister about the insurrection of Genj, in regard to which the Government had observed great reticence, only giving out sufficient news to arouse interest and excite the suspicion that affairs might be more serious than was admitted. Even now official news regarding the movement is in general of a reassuring nature and it is always stated that the military dispositions taken are such that the suppression of the revolt within a few days is certain. Be that as it may, martial law for one month has been declared in the south-eastern vilayets of Turkey (Genj, Mush, Arghana, Dersim, Diarbekr, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Seghert, Bitlis, Van and the Kighi and Khinis Cazas of Erzerum and Hakkiari). The Assembly's ratification of this action is certain.

3. The movement has taken place in a remote region in the very centre of Asia Minor, and in default of any reliable official information as to what has really happened, I attach a note summarising the various reports printed in the Turkish press. It is clear from these that Sheikh Said's movement has assumed considerable dimensions and that it is quite beyond the powers of the local forces to master it—indeed, some of the gendarmerie have joined the rebels. As to its causes, the papers freely state that foreign intrigue (meaning British) has been at work, but it is also clear from their reports that the mainspring of action is religion and Kurdish nationalism. I hear a story of Sheikh Said having said that Islam has been the sole bond of union between Turk and Kurd, and that the Turks having broken it, the Kurds must now ensure their own future.

4. This is the first open movement by other than mere individuals against the "laic" tendencies of the present Turkish régime, and as such it has made a deep impression on opinion in general. There is, however, no indication as yet that the revolt will have any far-reaching political consequences. It has been said that Ismet Pasha wished martial law to be extended to Constantinople and to Trebizond and that Fethi Bey was opposed to this, but the report that a Cabinet crisis was impending is denied. In such a matter as this the difference between the two would only be as to how far things should be pushed on the one path of repression. With the exception of the handful of reactionaries in the Assembly the politicians of modern Turkey are too little touched by any personal feelings of religion to feel any sympathy with Sheikh Said's insurrection. It is said that the leaders of the Progressive party have been in conversation with the Government and it is likely that their support of the Government's measures has been secured in some way. It is noticeable also that the "Tevhid-i-Evkiar," the Conservative and Islamic newspaper, though it sympathises always with the cause of religion, has deplored the effort to re-establish it by way of revolt. Sheikh Said's movement is probably already a source of embarrassment to the Government, but however widespread the sympathy with his ideas may be among individuals, the general direction of Turkish internal politics cannot be expected to change unless the revolt assumes an even wider extension than now appears probable, and unless serious disaffection shows itself in the army.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 92.

Press Summary, February 24, 1925.

All Press (A.A.).—Cabinet decision to proclaim martial law in eastern provinces. (French papers.)

"Tanin" and "Tevhid" telegrams state that People's party extremists will propose proclamation of martial law at Trebizond and Constantinople, as religious propaganda is involved in Genj revolt. According to "Vakt" and "Vatan" telegrams, martial law area will be further extended. Cabinet meeting, attended by Mustafa Kemal and president of General Staff, discussed Genj incident. This morning People's party will discuss the measures taken by the Government, and in the afternoon the Assembly will discuss the Prime Minister's letter regarding the proclamation of martial law, though papers take it for granted that martial law in eastern vilayets is an accomplished fact. Minister of Interior stated to the press . . . . that the conspirators had prepared a general revolt, which was to have begun at the end of March, and that the outbreak had been due to various factors, such as Sultanate, Caliphate, Sheriat and reactionary propaganda by a son of Abdul Hamid. Most papers state that Sheikh Said has about 7,000 men. "Tanin" and "Tevhid" telegrams state that Sheikh Said distributed proclamations by means of British aeroplanes, stating that the Turkish Government leads women to prostitution, encourages atheism, expelled the Caliph, that Sheikh Said is acting on behalf of religion and morals, that an independent Kurdistan will be formed, and that the ex-Caliph will be restored. Stated that Sheik Said's forces have occupied Palu. "Vakt" telegram states that spread of the revolt has been prevented. Large units are approaching the disaffected area and the Silvan and Hazro tribes are acting against Sheikh Said. It is established that the Genj revolt was the result of foreign propaganda. Sheikh Said's men, who are fighting the Turkish advance guards, are groups of 300–350 men. "Vakt" goes on to say that the Genj incident is very important, and that it is on a larger scale than was realised. Sheik Said is a Zaza Kurd and a Nakshibendi sheikh, and numerous villages have joined him.

Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, Reouf and Adnan Beys visited Fethi Bey in connection with the Genj revolt. Following the explanation, the Progressive party met and discussed the situation ("Vatan"). "Vatan" states that the situation is not serious, and that the question will be settled shortly. A few months ago Sheikh Said was in Constantinople. He is a native of Palu, very rich and influential, but ignorant. He revolted against the Government project to establish a stable administration in those regions.

"Jumhuriet" states that there is not the slightest doubt that the revolt is the result of foreign instigation. It will, however, be crushed shortly, as Government forces are arriving.

Angora Telegrams.—Latest information states that the rebels are besieged. Stated that a mission of Deputies will leave for the disaffected areas. At the beginning the revolt was of a reactionary nature. Some of the local gendarmes joined the rebels, stating that they refused to fire against their comrades. At first the Government thought that the revolt could be crushed by local forces, but within the last few days the rebels have increased in number as a result of propaganda. The ignorant people have been deceived by Said, teacher Fakiri and Nevress.

"*Vatan.*"—Angora telegram describes influence of sheikh in Kurdistan. The revolt is partly due to the bad provincial administration. When sanjaks became vilayets, incapable people became Valis and could not direct the affairs. Sheikh Abdullah, of Genj, and Halid Bey, chief of the Chiran tribe, have joined Said.

"*Techid*" (leading).—Fethi Bey has been most unlucky. At a time when there were all sorts of differences among the Turks, it was a defiance of fate for Fethi to promise stability. The whole country is suffering from nervousness. No stability can be established if the latest startling events continue. The economic crisis will continue. If present excess of excitements continues, some day the whole country will fly into a panic when the slightest incident takes place. The Administration must do its best, it does not matter how, to establish stability and peace of mind.

"*Vakt*" (leading article).—Anxiety growing. Fear similar to that when Independence Tribunal was sent here. Only last year country was at peace, but now there is revolt at Genj. Situation will be clearer to-morrow. The aims of the Government are to crush the revolt and to prevent another outbreak.

"*Vatan*" (leading article).—Fethi Bey has been very unfortunate in having to face many internal and external difficulties. Genj incident is the result of the faulty system of administration in the eastern vilayets. Inspectorsg eneral, with wide powers, must be sent there. They must be able to make the same impressions as did the old pompous Valis or there will be other incidents like that at Genj. If extraordinary measures are adopted all over Turkey, this will be bad for the country. Genj incident is not serious.

Enclosure 2 in No. 92

Press Summary, February 25, 1925.

All Press.—Much comment on Genj revolt. Government's explanations to People's party yesterday. Measures taken by Government approved (French papers.) Martial law extended to Malatia. Special meeting of Cabinet was held last night, Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi, Ismet and Shefik Pashas being also present. Progressive party stated to be supporting Government's policy.

According to "Tanin," rebels are in possession of Genj, Piran, Lijeh, Palu and Kharput areas. Jinianli Halid and Haji Mussa said to be co-operating with Said.

"*Tevhid.*"—Leading article states that trouble is much worse than was thought. Revolt is entirely due to bad administration. Why did the officials not discover the plot in time? Foreign intrigue must be looked for. Both Britain and France want a buffer State between them and Turkey. "Our Khurdish countrymen make trouble for us when the Greeks are threatening us in the west and the merciless British in the south-east." The Government must take energetic repressive measures, but justice and far-sightedness must not be forgotten. Action against Government is treason, even though it is due to bad government. Revolt should not be called reaction. The Turks must be united.

Cabinet yesterday received full authority to proclaim martial law anywhere.

Mission of Deputies will not go to disaffected area till after rebellion has been crushed.

"*Vakt.*"—Leading article states that revolt is general in Bitlis Vilayet. Religious propaganda is behind the revolt, and has been very successful among the ignorant people. Now is not the time to blame Turkish officials. The Government must act with energy. The slightest hesitation would result in terrible calamities.

Angora telegram states that situation is grave, Kharput having been occupied by the rebels at 3 P.M. yesterday. Rebels being bombed by aeroplanes.

Northern Khurdistan has been misled by foreign propaganda. A Van notable is probably directing movement, but its centre is Bitlis.

Moush, Saird and Siverek tribal chiefs said to be cursing Sheikh Said.

At People's party meeting, Ismet Pasha stated that, whatever was the case at the beginning, foreign influence was probably now behind the revolt.

"*Vatan.*"—Leading article states that there is no definite proof of British intrigue in the revolt, though it is a coincidence that revolt should have taken place when Irak Commission was at work.

Genj revolt has been boiling up for some months. The rebels know the country well, and it is doubtful whether revolt can be crushed before April.

"*Jumhuriet.*"—Leading article reminds Turks that they have many external and internal enemies. Past negligence should be a warning to prevent other incidents like that of Genj.

Angora telegram states that local gendarmes and troops were chiefly responsible for spread of revolt. Turkish regular troops have not yet arrived in rebel area. Reaction is spreading in a treacherous manner. Reported that Diarbekr, Kharput and Dersim have been taken by the rebels.

People's party discussed question of proclamation of martial law at Constantinople, Brusa and elsewhere, but no decision was taken.

Angora telegram states that, starting from Angora, reaction will be crushed.

Cabinet had constituted itself a War Council.

Signs of reaction at Urfa.

[E 1231/1231/44] No. 93.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 157.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 25, 1925.

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 623 of the 19th August regarding the interruption of the Turco-Bulgarian negotiations, I have the honour to inform you that M. Radev returned to Angora yesterday to resume the discussion with a view to conclude a Treaty of Friendship.

2. M. Radev stated last August that the real stumbling-block was the question of the Bulgarian exarchate and of the Bulgarian schools in Eastern Thrace, and, from a statement which he recently gave to the correspondent of the "Times" here for publication, it appears that the question of minorities in general is the real point at issue between the two Governments.

3. The Turkish Government, while insisting upon the maintenance in the clauses of the Treaty of Constantinople of 1913 concerning the Moslems in Bulgaria, has asked the Bulgarian Government to renounce the guarantees laid down for the Bulgarian population in Turkey, on the grounds that the general clauses on minorities accepted by the Turks in the Treaty of Lausanne are a sufficient guarantee. The Bulgarian Government, however, maintain that by the Treaty of Neuilly they themselves have assumed obligations towards minorities, and that consequently the Turkish Government ought also to be satisfied with such undertakings on their part.

4. The two Governments have apparently agreed upon a method of liquidating the goods belonging to refugees in each other's country, and the necessary measures have been taken with regard to the nationality of persons whose country of residence has been changed by the alteration of the frontiers.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sofia.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 94.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 85.) [By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 1, 1925.

PRESS has this morning published a communiqué reporting that M. Franklin-Bouillon has refused the offer of the "Angora Embassy" [*sic*] owing to the political situation, "especially as regards the questions of security and inter-Allied debts," which necessitate his remaining at his post in Parliament as president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. M. Franklin-Bouillon is stated to have telegraphed to Mustafa Kemal expressing his regret, but it is added that he will visit Angora for a short time, leaving Paris about a week hence, when he will engage in "private conversations with his friends of the Angora Government" in order to smooth away some of the difficulties in the way of a settlement of such outstanding questions as the Turco-Syrian frontier, the Turco-Syrian Customs Convention and the payment of the Ottoman Debt coupons.

It is worth remarking that in the communiqué which is published announcing these facts the post is described as that of Ambassador at Angora, and not Constantinople.

No. 95.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 89. Confidential.) [By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 2, 1925.

MY telegram No. 85.

The President of the Council told me to-day that on Friday next he would submit to the Council of Ministers the name of M. Albert Sarraut for this post, and he hoped it would be generally regarded as a good appointment.

M. Albert Sarraut was Governor-General of Indo-China from 1911 to 1914; Minister for the Colonies under M. Briand in 1921, and again under M. Poincaré from 1922 to 1924. He is a Socialist-Radical.

M. Herriot had been so much occupied in the Chamber lately that he had not even been able to lay this proposal before the President of the Republic. He had found that he and M. Franklin-Bouillon were not in accord regarding future policy in the East; the latter had high-flown ideas of a *politique lyrique, à la Bonaparte*, which seemed to M. Herriot impossible to pursue in these days. M. Franklin-Bouillon was a very capable man, of many good qualities, but for several reasons he was glad that this appointment would not be made.

M. Herriot made no allusion to the fact that the French Ambassador was not appointed on the 1st March, the date which he had himself suggested, and I did not think it necessary to comment on this.

No. 96.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 2, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 45.

I informed Nusret yesterday of intention of His Majesty's Government to appoint Ambassador to Constantinople. I also told him that I had just received my credentials. He suggested that I should at once ask to be received by the President for their presentation. I replied that I could not do so without first consulting my colleagues, with whom, as he knew, I had always acted in concert.

Yesterday evening my Italian colleague informed me that he had asked formally for an audience to present his letters of credence, having received instructions to do so that very morning. I was not surprised at his communication, as I had suspected he would do so even before I saw Turkish delegate.

I to-day explained situation to my French colleague and invited his observations. He did not think I could now well do otherwise than ask for an audience at Angora, but said he would like to telegraph to Paris. I told him that I should probably take no step for two or three days.

No. 97.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 3, 1925.

ATHENS telegram to Foreign Office, repeated to Constantinople, No. 16.

Restriction referred to in my telegram No. 41 should have been "technically non-exchangeable."

Apparently M. Exindaris does not yet regard negotiations as definitely broken off, but Greeks have so far failed to get anything in writing from Tewfik Rushdi or Vali, and there seems no doubt that original proposal for bargain was wrung from Turks by uncertainty as to scope of Kurdish crisis and by desire to prevent Patriarch question from coming before League of Nations.

Turks are now more inclined to temporise.

Tewfik Rushdi is going to Geneva, and M. Exindaris seems to think he may be prepared to discuss Patriarch question—at any rate, privately—with members of the council.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 11.)

No. 98.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 3, 1925.

PRIME Minister resigned yesterday after prolonged party meeting, at which President of the Republic was present and took an active part. Issue was the

extension to other parts of Turkey of repressive measures applied in area of rebellion It is understood that Ismet now becomes Premier.

No. 99.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, March 5, 1925.*

FOLLOWING for Ministry of Air from B.L.O. :—

"French have authorised transit of Turkish troops through Syria for suppression of Kurdish revolt. Fifth Army Corps mobilising. French promised to give all details. French General Staff suspicious that revolt is imaginary or exaggerated."

(Sent to Bagdad for Air Chief of Staff I.)

[**E 1388/498/44**] No. 100.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 170.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 3, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of the 3rd February regarding the treatment of minorities in Turkey, I have the honour to inform you that the Vali of Constantinople has issued an order forbidding Greeks living in the suburbs of the town outside of the actual area of the prefecture from visiting Constantinople without obtaining previous permission for each journey. The order in its original form appeared to apply to all non-Mahometans; this has, however, now been modified, and only affects Greeks.

2. The measure is undoubtedly a particular harsh one, as it means that many Greeks who live permanently, or at any rate for the summer, along the coast of the Marmora and are in the habit of coming into Constantinople daily for their work will in practice be unable to continue to do so on account of the formalities required even for a single journey.

3. The terms of the order received by the vali have not been made public, but I enclose a copy of a statement which appeared in the "Gazette" of the 26th ultimo. An announcement to the same effect appeared in all the Constantinople newspapers of that day.

4. I would also refer to my despatch No. 109 of the 11th ultimo, transmitting despatch No. 1 of the 5th ultimo from His Majesty's consul at Adrianople. In the fourth paragraph Mr. Dawkins reports that the local Jewish minority appears to be subjected to unduly heavy taxation. Any definite evidence which Mr. Dawkins may obtain I shall of course report. His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reported much the same state of things prevailing in the Jewish community there (see end in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 676 of the 11th September, 1924). Here, again, the evidence is indefinite, and would need to be used with great discretion if good, rather than harm, is to be done to the minority. If I mention these cases now, it is merely in order that they may be on record.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Extract from the "Gazette" of February 26, 1925.

LES DÉPLACEMENTS DES NON-MUSULMANS DANS LA BANLIEU DE CONSTANTINOPLE.

LE Ministère de l'Intérieur a fait parvenir hier, sa réponse au vilayet, qui lui avait demandé des instructions en ce qui concerne le déplacement des Arméniens habitant aux environs de Constantinople. Les non-musulmans—les Grecs exceptés—pourront désormais voyager sur la ligne au Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie jusqu'à Guebzé, et en

Turquie d'Europe jusqu'à Tchataldja sans avoir à solliciter d'autorisation préalable du Ministère de l'Intérieur. Dans la zone du Bosphore, ils pourront aller jusqu'aux Cavaks.

Quant aux Grecs, ils pourront se déplacer seulement dans les limites de la préfecture.

[**E 1392/55/44**] No. 101.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 174.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 4, 1925.*

IN my telegram No. 41 of the 25th ultimo I had the honour to report briefly the change of policy adopted by the Turkish Government in their treatment of the question of the Œcumenical Patriarchate. It may perhaps be well that I should now record that development at greater length, though in doing so I am largely dependent on such information, sometimes of a contradictory nature, as has appeared in the local newspapers.

2. As late as the 20th ultimo, everything tended to show that the Turkish Government would persist in their intention to expel those "exchangeable" metropolitans who are members of the Holy Synod, and the announcement of such expulsion was daily expected. Whether the spread of the Kurdish revolt was the direct cause of the Government's change of attitude cannot be definitely stated, but the fact remains that on the 24th instant, at the very moment when the situation in the eastern vilayets had taken a more serious turn, the Governor of the Stamboul vilayet was visited, apparently at his request, by the members of the Synod, to whom he proposed that a new Patriarch should be elected from among the non-exchangeable metropolitans who were not objects of the Government's suspicion. At the same time, he gave a definite undertaking that, in the event of the Synod accepting the Government's proposal, the "exchangeable" metropolitans would, as a special favour, be allowed to remain. The Vali's offer apparently surprised the Synod, who requested a few days' delay to permit of its consideration, a request which was duly granted.

3. In publishing the foregoing account of the interview at the vilayet the local newspapers hastened to announce that the patriarchate question had been finally settled. This happy interpretation was, however, quickly discounted by the Vali, who made statements explaining the true position and making it clear that the next move was with the patriarchate authorities. That move has not, however, been made, though it is true that two metropolitans failed in an endeavour to see the Vali for the second time owing to the illness of the latter. In the meantime the press has published almost daily reports to the effect that the expelled Patriarch refuses to resign, and that the Synod, far from receiving the Government's graceful offer in the manner in which it was made, is merely considering the question of the appointment of a *locum tenens*. In these circumstances, and on the receipt of more favourable news from the eastern vilayets, certain organs of the press have not been slow in calling for the withdrawal of the Government's offer and the instant expulsion of the metropolitans. Angora is for the moment, however, concerned with more urgent business, and the present position may be given in the words of the Vali to the press on the 1st March, when he stated that, owing to illness, he had been unable to study the latest phase of the question, that the Government, as a special mark of its favour, had exempted the metropolitans from exchange, and that, in his opinion, it would be well for the Greek community to choose a religious chief as soon as possible.

4. I understand from a good source that M. Exindaris and his friends have been urging the Synod to obtain something in writing from the Vali as to his offer, and Tewfik Rushdi has been similarly approached on the Mixed Commission. It is felt, not without justice, that unless the Mixed Commission will endorse in some way the non-exchangeable status of the exchangeable metropolitans, their fate will always remain at the mercy of any change of Government, or even of Vali. So far, Greek efforts in this direction have been quite unavailing, but as they themselves have apparently shown no desire to fulfil their side of the bargain—it may, of course, be canonically impracticable in present circumstances—it is perhaps to be expected that the Turks should not commit themselves more definitely in the meanwhile.

5. Meanwhile, Tewfik Rushdi is leaving for Geneva this week to represent the Turkish Government, when the question of the situation of Moslems in Western Thrace and Greeks in Constantinople comes before the council. While the official attitude of

the Turkish Government apparently remains as reported in my telegram No. 36 of the 23rd February, namely, a refusal to admit the interference of any foreign Government on the League of Nations in this question, it is thought locally that Tewfik Rushdi may have received instructions on his recent visit to Angora to listen to any proposals which may be made to him privately by members of the council and possibly to discuss the matter in this kind of informal way. Much obviously turns on the present state of feeling at Angora with regard to the dangers of the Kurdish revolt. Probably, but not certainly, the Government feels itself rather more secure than when they instructed the Vali to make the original offer of a bargain. If so, it may well be that the psychological moment for a settlement—at any rate, more favourable to the Greeks than the existing situation—has been allowed to slip. On the other hand, the military dispositions for the suppression of the Kurdish rising (the move of the Ismid division) point to the expectation that there will be no trouble with Greece. I can only hope that the meeting at Geneva will serve to throw some light on this obscure situation and that it may there be found that the Turkish Government remains in a more tractable frame of mind.

6. I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1393/109/44] No. 102.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 177.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 4, 1925.

I HAVE had the honour to receive, in your despatch No. 181 of the 23rd February, the letter of His Majesty the King accrediting me as his Ambassador to Turkey, and I beg to express my appreciation of the confidence so reposed in me. I have ventured to assume that I am authorised to take steps for presenting the letter at Angora as may seem most suitable.

2. On Saturday, the 28th February, my Italian colleague called on me to show me the note he was to hand the next day to Nusret Bey notifying the Allies' intention of appointing Ambassadors to Turkey. I informed him that I had that morning received my credentials, but the information evoked no interest in him and I was not surprised, as I have always understood that he brought his credentials out with him a year ago. I then told him rather vaguely about the communications that had passed between yourself and the Italian Embassy in London about arrangements subsequent to the 1st March (your telegram No. 45 of the 26th February) As this, too, did not interest him and he asked me no questions, I assumed that he knew all about it, and I suspected that he was furnished with instructions to ask for an audience at once at Angora for the presentation of his letters.

3. On the 1st March I visited Nusret Bey and handed to him the note of which I sent you a copy in my despatch No. 148 of the 24th February, informing him that His Majesty's Goverament intended to appoint an Ambassador to Turkey. My French and Italian colleagues had preceded me. I asked Nusret Bey if I ought to ask for an *agrément* by the Turkish Government. He replied that he thought I ought to, and I acquiesced, saying that I would write to you and ask that it be done properly through Zekiai Bey in London. I then told Nusret that I had just received my credentials, upon which he turned completely round, said that no *agrément* was necessary, and that I had better ask at once for an audience with the President for the presentation of my letters. I said that, as he knew, the three Allied Powers in this matter had always proceeded together; in loyalty to my colleagues, I could not fall in with his suggestion till I had consulted with them; I would do so, and communicate with him in two or three days.

4. Clearly Signor Montagna had already asked for an audience at Angora, and Nusret's sudden change of opinion about the *agrément* was due to his discovery that he was, all innocently, handicapping me in the race to Angora. Sure enough, Signor Montagna called on me that very evening. A quarter of an hour before he went down to see Nusret, he said, he had received a telegram from Rome instructing him to ask for an audience at once for the purpose of presenting his credentials. He had not had time to warn me of what he was doing. I hastened to inform him precisely of what had passed between myself and Nusret Bey.

5. On the 2nd March I called on M. Jessé Curély and told him all that had happened as detailed above, and asked for his appreciation of what I should do, adding that I was inclined to ask for my audience within the next day or two. He agreed with me; he had no official news of M. Franklin-Bouillon's intentions, but the papers were reporting that that statesman had definitely declined the ambassadorship and was only coming here on a visit of a few days; he fancied the report was true, and as the appointment of a French Ambassador must therefore be still far off, he did not see how I could be asked to wait; he would, however, like to telegraph to Paris. I said I was quite willing to wait two or three days, but that I could hardly delay longer without being discourteous to the Turkish Government.

6. I propose to ask Nusret Bey to-morrow to arrange for me an audience at Angora with the President.

7. I apologise for reporting at such length an affair of small political importance, but matters of this kind sometimes cause heart-burnings, and it may be well that you should have the details at hand. I have taken no step without informing my Allied colleagues of it beforehand. In trying to avoid participation in an undignified scramble, I have, almost deliberately, allowed my Italian colleague to get through the door first; but I do not think this a matter of any practical importance.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1394/1091/44] No. 103.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 178. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 3, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 154 of the 24th February I had the honour to report the development of the Kurdish rebellion which, breaking out at Ghenj, had suddenly assumed important proportions. It is extremely difficult to state exactly what is happening. All news comes from Angora, and as there are no correspondents in the eastern provinces, it all originates from official sources, and can hardly command confidence, and of course there are countless rumours afloat, the value of which it is still more difficult to assess. It is clear that the centre of the rebellion lies along the valley of the Murad Su and throughout the mountainous region to the south (Dijeh, Haini, Piran, Arghana). North of the valley, Khinis and Ghenj are in revolt, and there is fighting at Chimishghezek further west. The important Kurdish sheikhs of Dersim are said to have sent loyal assurances, but the report, or the sincerity of the protestations may be doubted. Kharput, in the western bend of the Murad Su, was certainly entered by the rebels; apparently the authorities fled, but the tribesmen began to loot, and the townsmen, headed by a man who is bitterly opposed to the present régime, expelled the invaders. Turning further east, there is very little news from Mush, and none whatever from Bitlis and Van; one can only suppose that communication of any sort with these regions is impossible. Further north, on the Black Sea coast, it is known (see Mr. Knight's report enclosed in my despatch No. 138 of the 18th February) that the Government has no friends in the Trebizond region; an outbreak there would be a very serious matter; but though there is no news of anything having happened, there has been pressure on the Government to proclaim martial law in the district as a precautionary measure. At the moment of writing this has not been decided on definitely, though the change of Cabinet makes it more likely.

2. Every day almost the papers report the activities of aeroplanes against the insurgents, and a considerable movement of troops is in progress against them. Five divisions are to attack the rebellion from the south, and from the north the Sivas and Erzinjan corps are to move as soon as the weather allows. I beg to enclose herewith a report by Major Harenc, military attaché to this mission, giving full details both of the rebellion and of the military measures taken with a view to its suppression.

3. As regards the causes and nature of the rising, there is at present no reason to modify the suggestion put forward in my despatch No. 154. The movement is religious, national and anti-republican, though it cannot be said how much each of these contributes to the general result. It is widely said here, and generally believed at Angora, that Selim Effendi, a son of Sultan Abdul Hamid and now in

exile at Beirut, it put forward by the Kurds as the head of the movement, or even as a prospective King of Kurdistan. Another cause of the insurrection mentioned frequently is the deterioration in the general standard of administration brought about by the change of system which the Nationalist Government has introduced. The large vilayets of olden days have been broken up and each sanjak has become a separate province, the vali of which receives his orders direct from Angora. The extra centralisation thus produced causes added delay, and the new type of vali is said to be more tyrannical, inefficient and incapable of controlling the population than the old Governors-General.

4. In the political field the first action of the Government, simultaneously with the proclamation of martial law, was to introduce into the Assembly new draft articles to the law of treason, and they have duly been enacted. They make any person liable to penalties varying from death to two years' imprisonment, who shall exploit religious sentiment for political purposes. Administrative measures have also been taken to curb the possible excesses of language of preachers in the mosques. the preaching licences of the hojas in Constantinople (and probably elsewhere too) have been called in and reviewed, and some well-known imams here have been forbidden to preach any more. As regards the press, there are threats from Angora that any paper publishing false news designed to encourage the rebelliously minded will be dealt with drastically. No new legislation on this subject has been passed, the existing law which dates from Hamidian days being strong enough to enable the Government to control the press by " temporarily " suspending any journal whose publications are displeasing. Under the shadow of this threat, the papers will be in no hurry to publish disagreeable items of news.

5. It is clear that on the 23rd and 24th February Angora was in a panic over the rebellion. The best proof of it is to be found in the almost desperate efforts that were made to reach an immediate settlement with the Greeks over the patriarchate question. Since then the authorities have somewhat recovered their equanimity, and their constant theme has been that the rebels are being repulsed everywhere, that many Kurdish districts are entirely loyal, and that as soon as the troops reach their stations the suppression of the whole affair will be rapid. Nevertheless, the last three or four days have brought about interesting political developments at Angora.

6. The Progressive party, which constitutes the Opposition, has behaved with exemplary loyalty during the crisis of the last week; their leaders have uncompromisingly denounced the rebellion, and, however much they may disapprove of the violent and headstrong courses favoured by the majority of the People's party, there is no reason to believe that they sympathise in any way with the strongly reactionary tendencies of Kurdistan. Fethi Bey has received their general support during the past three months on account of the generally conciliatory attitude he adopts. He was, as in known, put into office partly to allow Ismet Pasha to recover his health, partly to take the wind out of the sails of the Opposition, and to stop the disintegration of the Popular party, but his position has been difficult, for he was always dependent on the People's party to support him, of which the head is Ismet, his predecessor, and the secretary-general for the last two months has been Rejeb, who formed a cave against him in the beginning of January. I rather expect that latterly Ismet Pasha, who is reported to have attended Cabinet meetings, has been *de facto* in control of affairs, with Mustafa Kemal at his elbow.

7. Fethi Bey has been subjected to strong pressure by the wild men of the People's party, both to take more drastic action against rebellion by proclaiming martial law at once in Trebizond and Constantinople—perhaps even over the whole extent of the country—and to seize the opportunity of taking strong action against the Progressive party, with a view to its suppression. To the latter form of pressure he seems to have yielded so far as to request the progressive leaders to close down their provincial branches, but he met with a refusal, and does not seem to have been inclined to persist.

8. The crisis came yesterday, the 2nd March, when a meeting of the People's party was called and continued for ten hours. The attack on the Government was led by Rejeb, and the moderate policy was defended by Fethi, who was supported by the majority only of his own Cabinet (6 against 4). The proceedings were only very summarily reported in the press, but they were extremely stormy. The President of the Republic was present in person, and at the request of Kilid Ali, one of his favourite henchmen, consented to answer the questions of Deputies and to make them a speech. Finally a motion was passed by 90 votes to 60, the terms of which have not transpired, but which Fethi regarded as a vote of censure on himself. He

accordingly handed in his resignation. This evening it is reported that Ismet Pasha has resumed the Premiership, and it is supposed that he is prepared to carry the policy of repression all round just as far as the Ghazi can wish.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 103.

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 4, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information—

(1.) A summary of the news given in the local press regarding the insurrection against the present Government, which has broken out in the eastern vilayets.

(2.) A record of a short conversation I had on the 3rd instant with General Shukri Naili Pasha, commanding the Third Corps in Constantinople.

(3.) Miscellaneous information regarding troop movements.

2. Up to the 25th February, I was inclined to think that the Turkish Cabinet, which, for some time, had been experiencing a good deal of opposition, not only from the Progressive party, but also from malcontents amongst the Popular party, was, in order to rally this opposition to its side, allowing the press to exaggerate the original raid on Arghana by some 150 Kurds, led by Sheikh Saad, into an insurrection against the republic.

3. Judging, however, by the line taken by the Government with regard to the patriarchate, it was evident that it was genuinely alarmed, and confronted with this new danger, was endeavouring at all costs to solve its differences with the Greeks. From information received during the last two days, there is no doubt that the movement at one time threatened to be a serious one.

4. Up to the 26th February, the rebels seem to have had matters pretty much their own way. They have been joined by a certain number of disaffected officers and men, and to have overrun the greater part of the Diabekir, Dersim, Malatia, Mush and Bitlis districts. The troops in those areas do not appear to have been able to hold their own, for Kharput was in the hands of the rebels for some time, in spite of the presence there of the headquarters of the 17th Infantry Division and 62nd Regiment. (These were reported at the end of December last year as having returned after taking part in the operation against the Nestorians.)

5. After the 26th, the rebels appear to have been losing ground. They were expelled from Kharput by the population of the town organised by one Mehmed Bey, an opponent of the present Government. Reports come in every day to the effect that other towns have followed the example of Kharput; in this connection it is interesting to note that the conflict has become one of town versus country So far, apparently, the army has taken no part in expelling the rebels.

6. From the 26th also, the Government appears to have taken heart. Its tone on the Patriarch question has hardened, troops are being concentrated to deal with the insurrection as soon as movement is possible in the affected regions.

7. The five divisions reported to be concentrating at Adana would appear to be—

23rd from Ismid.
8th from Angora.
7th at Adana.

The other two would be 57th from Smyrna, 41st from Nigde, or the 17th from the Menemen area.

8. The divisions available for the movement from the north are—

5th from Sivas.
9th from Sarikamish.
12th from Kars.

I exclude the 15th from Samsun and 3rd from Trebizond, as they would be occupied in keeping their respective areas quiet in the event of trouble breaking out in the Black Sea littoral.

I have, &c.
R. E. HARENC, *Major.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 103.

News Summary of the Local Press respecting the Genj Revolt.

February 23.

General tone of the papers was that the revolt, which was at first thought to be a raid by a brigand band, now turns out to be something much more serious. It has been proved that foreign influence is at work.

Several papers make out that Ismet Pasha's hurried return to Angora is occasioned by the seriousness of the situation.

February 24.

Papers which had hitherto referred to "the incident at Genj," now refer to the "insurrection," which has spread to the Vilayets of Mush, Arghana, Dersim, Diarbekir, Mardin, Urga, Suwerek, Sairt, Bitlis, Van, and Hakkiari; and state that martial law had been proclaimed throughout these regions.

It is stated that Sheikh Saad has proclaimed himself appointed by God to restore the Caliphate and the Sheria Law. That it is by this means that he has gained so many adherents amongst the uneducated masses.

February 25.

A Cabinet meeting was called in the morning, and the situation was discussed; after which the Minister of the Interior made a statement to the effect that the conspirators had prepared a general revolt which was to have begun at the end of March, that it is of a reactionary nature and is fomented by a son of Sultan Abdul Mamid. The fomentors of the rebellion have persuaded the ignorant sections of the people to join them, saying that the Turkish Government has encouraged atheism, expelled the Caliph and has encouraged the prostitution of women; that Sheikh Saad pretends that he is acting with divine authority on behalf of religion and morals; that he proposes to restore the Caliphate and the Sheria, and also to establish an independent Kurdistan.

The forces at the disposal of Sheikh Saad are now stated to be 7,000 men, all armed with mauser rifles, but that number cannot be increased unless the rebels seize the centres in which arms are to be found, and arm the rest of the population.

Almost all the papers insist that the whole affair is due to foreign influences; the "Tanin" and "Tevhid" go so far as to state that Sheikh Saad's manifestos have been distributed by British aeroplanes.

"Vatan" puts it down to faulty administration and lack of capable Governors; says there is no proof of British connivance, but agrees that it is a curious coincidence that it should have occurred while the Mosul Commission was at work.

February 26.

All press announce rumour that Diabekir, Kharput, Dersim, Malatia and Arghana are in the hands of the rebels.

That the Government forces sent against the rebels have started, but that, owing to the severity of the winter and the lack of communications, they have not yet been able to get into touch with them. Aeroplanes have, however, been used with good effect.

February 27.

General tone of the papers more hopeful; that the situation is not so bad as was thought at first.

Anatolian agency telegram reports that it is not true that Kharput was occupied by the rebels, nor that Malatia, Arghana and Diabekir had fallen into their hands.

"Jumhuriet" states that the Government forces will get into touch with the rebels at the beginning of March, and that in a fortnight the movement will be suppressed.

The Assembly sent its thanks to Bey Zadé Mehmed Bey, who, after the flight of the Vali, organised the population of Kharput and drove out the rebels. This man offered himself as candidate at the last election as an Independent, was not supported by the organisation of the Popular party; the papers say that he

will be supported if he stands again. A good deal of notice given to this in all the papers to point the moral that Turkey is really united when it comes to facing danger from outside.

February 28

The telegrams from Angora were reassuring, and general satisfaction was expressed by all the papers, also it was officially denied that there was any intention of ordering a general mobilisation, or of taking any extraordinary measures in Constantinople.

The "Tanin," on the authority of an Adana correspondent, stated that the 1894–1902 classes had been called to the colours, and that nearly all civil transport had been commandeered for the use of the army.

Most papers expressed relief that the revolt was not spreading. They continue to attribute it to foreign interference, and express the hope that means will be found to punish the real instigators.

March 1.

Optimistic tone of the papers continued. Reports of differences of opinion amongst tribal leaders, and also that some sheikhs are sending assurances of their loyalty to Government.

A law making treasonable to incite people against the Government was passed.

£T. 265,000 was also voted to meet expenses of partial mobilisation.

"Vakt" reports that French have agreed to the transport of troops on their section of the Bagdad line. "Jumhuriet" reports that the rebels seized the ammunition depot at Kharput.

March 2.

Papers report that situation continues to improve. Fighting between local civilian population and rebels continues; rebels are being defeated on all sides.

March 3.

Reports of continued fighting between civil population and rebels. Some papers say that Vasto, Chemisghezek, Palu and Silvain areas have been cleared, others that the rebels are still in occupation.

According to the "Jumhuriet," the Turkish main forces will reach the rebel area on the 4th or 5th.

Enclosure 3 in No. 103.

Record of a Conversation with General Shurki Naili Pasha on March 3, 1925.

I CALLED on the corps commander to inform him that Air Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton Brancker was on his way to England, that he proposed arriving at Konia on the 5th or 6th, whence he was coming to Constantinople.

As he appeared ready to talk, I referred to the situation in the eastern vilayets, and suggested that "it was all over except the shouting"; he became rather grave, and said that it was not by any means all over, and far from being a question of 150 discontented Kurds out for loot (my suggestion), it was a case of more than 5,000 well-armed men who were out to upset the Government.

I suggested that they had sufficient troops in the vicinity capable of dealing with 5,000 brigands; to which he replied that they were not brigands, but were well armed fighting men, and amongst them were a proportion of regular army officers and soldiers; and far from having lots of troops to deal with them, there were not many troops in that area, and those that were there were "otherwise engaged." He continued, "we shall have five divisions at Adana soon, which we can quickly move across to that region, and as soon as the snow clears we can get another three divisions down from the north."

He said that he personally knew neither the country or the people; but his chief of staff did, and said they were very dangerous, they liked fighting, and it was difficult to deal with them on account of the lack of communications and the nature of the terrain. He thought that if the present rebellion could be confined to its present area, it would soon die out; but that if regular operations were undertaken

against the Kurds generally, it was quite possible that it would start a rising of all the Kurds.

Lieutenant-Colonel Veissel Bey, chief of the staff, came in at this period; I tried to get him to give me his ideas, but as usual when there are two of them together, there was no information forthcoming.

Comments.

The information, such as it is, confirms that obtained from a French source. The conversation was interesting, firstly, in that it is the first time that the general has given me any military information; secondly, as showing that there is something to say for the view taken by the President of the Council of Minister that the measures taken so far are all that is necessary to deal with the situation.

I take it that his "otherwise engaged" means either that they are held in readiness for action against Irak; or that since a proportion of them are Kurds, they are engaged in looking after each other.

Enclosure 4 in No. 103.

Information regarding Troop Movements towards the Eastern Vilayets.

ACCORDING to information obtained from a French source, the Turkish General Staff will concentrate five divisions at Adana. These will be sent by train eastwards [? Jerablus or Ras-ul-Ain] and will then march north and north-east, clearing up the country of rebels as far as Diabekir.

Apparently it is not intended to commence operations in the difficult country north-west of Diabekir until the country is clear of snow.

A paragraph appeared in one of the local papers to the effect that the French authorities had been asked for permission to move troops over that section of the Bagdad railway which is under French control.

An acquaintance who left Adana on the 27th February informed me that—

1. Four days previously, when at Deurt Yol, there were practically no troops in the town.
2. At Adana, no cabs were obtainable in the town on the 25th. A jobmaster with whom he had business previously told him that the army had requisitioned all serviceable horses.
3. For the two days previous to his departure, all Turks coming into the town were met by gendarmes, collected, and marched off under guard. The day he left, the station was packed with men being entrained; there were about 500 in the station. Ten trucks, say 300 men, were attached to the Constantinople train, these were cut off at Yenije (junction for Mersina) where an engine was waiting, and sent down the Mersina line.

   As far as he knew there had been no movement of troop trains eastwards from Adana.
4. On the way to Constantinople, he saw one train at Eskishehr, and two between that station and Ismid. Each train had about fifty covered waggons half full of men in uniform with equipment; they did not look like new recruits. As far as he could see, only half the men were carrying rifles. There were no guns on the trains, nor did he see any machine guns.

Comments.

Allowing twenty men per waggon for a long journey, this would give 1,000 men per train. I take these troops to be part of the 8th Division for Angora and the 23rd Division from Ismid. The estimated strength of a division is 1,500 men.

I cannot account for the movement to Mersina, unless for internal security purposes. I have no information regarding unrest in that area.

[**E 1378/498/44**] No. 104.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 589.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Herriot respecting non-Moslem minorities in Turkey.

Paris, March 8, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Note communicated by M. Herriot.

LE Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'accuser réception du mémorandum de l'Ambassade britannique du 2 février [*sic*], par lequel le Gouvernement britannique a bien voulu demander l'avis du Gouvernement français sur l'opportunité de signaler au Conseil de la Société des Nations, lors de sa prochaine session, par une démarche conjointe des Gouvernements britannique, français et italien, les infractions qui auraient été commises par le Gouvernement turc aux clauses du Traité de Lausanne relatives aux minorités. Cette procédure avait été suggérée par le Comité juridique interallié de Constantinople.

Les rapports de ce comité, qui ont été examinés avec beaucoup d'attention par le Gouvernement français, énumèrent, en effet, un certain nombre d'infractions. Le rapport du 24 novembre, dont les représentants de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France avaient eu connaissance à Rome lors de la session de décembre du conseil, ne leur avait pas alors semblé suffisant pour motiver une intervention. Le nouveau rapport du 3 février 1925 n'apporte pas, dans la plupart des cas, ainsi, d'ailleurs, que le constate le Gouvernement britannique dans son mémorandum du 2 février, de preuves absolument convaincantes.

Dans ces conditions, tout en reconnaissant qu'un recours à la Société des Nations est possible en vertu de l'article 44 du Traité de Lausanne, le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique pour penser qu'il n'est pas désirable de porter cette question devant le prochain conseil.

HERRIOT.

Paris, le 6 mars 1925.

[**E 1426/544/44**] No 105.

Lord D'Abernon to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 166.)

Sir, *Berlin, March* 6, 1925.

I HAVE read with interest Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 153 of the 25th February describing the present condition of relations between Germany and Turkey.

So far as the matter can be judged from Berlin, I have little to add to Mr. Lindsay's statement, and should not wish to modify his report by a comma. I see the matter in exactly the same light as he does.

It may be of interest to report that the Turkish representative here—General Kemal-ed-din Sami Pasha—was suddenly recalled to Turkey three days ago, and left in all haste for the purpose, it is alleged, of taking command of the Turkish troops against the Kurdish revolt.

Sami Pasha is quite an interesting study. He came here with a bad reputation for being violently anti-English, and he made, during the early days of his mission here, a speech so violent that the German Government had to remind him that Germany was on friendly terms with England and could not tolerate any abuse of diplomatic privilege.

I began, therefore, with a strong prejudice against Sami Pasha, but I must confess that personally he is quite an agreeable character. He is extremely popular in Berlin. He is characteristically a frank soldier who—by his own statement—has

been wounded innumerable times and has shown conspicuous bravery on many occasions. He is pro-German, mainly because Germany is the only great European country of which Turkey is not afraid. England and France are much too political, and their industrial representatives are merely instruments of policy. With German industrials there is no political danger in the background. Sami Pasha spends a great deal of his time in going round industrial institutions and visiting factories. What his particular purpose in this very un-Turkish form of recreation may be I cannot say, but it is reported that he has given considerable orders for war material from Germany. This, however, is surmise rather than ascertained fact.

Sami Pasha views the future of Asia Minor, now that it has been cleared of Greeks and Armenians, with unbounded optimism, and appears to underrate the grave disadvantage from the commercial point of view which the absence of these trading elements will create. He is convinced that Turkey will enjoy at one and the same time the immunities of a Central Asiatic State and the solid advantages of a prosperous industrial community. In his judgment there is no limit to the possibilities of development now the country has been freed from the deleterious influence of subject Christian populations.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
D'ABERNON.

No. 106.

Sir R. Graham to Consul, Genera.—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received March* 10.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March* 10, 1925.

FOLLOWING for Mr. Chamberlain:—

"Your despatch No. 259.

"Italian Government concur in British view that it is undesirable to bring question of minorities in Turkey before Council of League of Nations—at all events, during present session."

No. 107.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 12, 1925.

I LEAVE for Angora 14th March.
I shall probably be there about a week.

[E 1674/194/44] No. 108.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 18.)

(No. 181.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 6, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 52 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list of the members of Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet, together with such details of their careers as are in my possession.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Notes on Members of Ismet Pasha's Third Cabinet, formed on March 4, 1925.

President of Council	Ismet Pasha.
Interior	Jemil Bey.
Foreign Affairs	Tevfik Rushdi Bey.
National Defence	Rejeb Bey.
Justice	Mahmud Essad Bey.
Public Works	Suleiman Sirri Bey.
Finance	Hassan Bey.
Commerce	Ali Jenani Bey.
Health	Dr. Refik Bey.
Marine	Ihsan Bey.
Public Instruction	Hamdullah Subhi Bey.
Agriculture	Sabri Bey.

Jemil Bey (Interior).

Unchanged. Staff lieutenant-colonel. During armistice was in command of defence forces against the Greeks at Chatalja. Elected Deputy for Rodosto in 1923; he was appointed general secretary of the People's party in May 1924. He succeeded Rejeb Bey as Minister of Interior in January 1925, his appointment being criticised because of his youth and inexperience.

Tevfik Rushdi Bey (Foreign Affairs).

Elected Deputy for Smyrna in 1923. Was secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission which considered the Lausanne Treaty. In the autumn of the same year was appointed chief Turkish delegate on the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations, a post which, in spite of repeated resignation, he has held ever since. His activities in this connection are well known. Is stated to be unscrupulous and ambitious.

Rejeb Bey (National Defence).

One of the leading extremists in the People's party, and closely in touch with Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas. Elected Deputy for Kutahia in 1923, he immediately became general secretary of the People s party. Became Minister of Interior in May 1924, and continued to hold this post till January 1925, when he resigned from the Fethi Bey Cabinet. Has for some time been regarded as a possible alternative to Ismet Pasha as Prime Minister.

Mahmud Essad Bey (Justice).

Unchanged. Native of Smyrna, and about 40 years of age. Is one of the leading Turkish specialists on constitutional law. Established himself in Smyrna as a lawyer in 1912, and remained there till the Greek occupation in 1919. Became Deputy for Smyrna in 1920 and published the "Geni Gyun" at Angora in May 1922. In June 1922 became Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and in July Minister of Economy. Was a failure in this post, and resigned a few months later. Held the same post August–September 1923, when he resigned owing to severe criticism. Retired to Smyrna, and was believed to have become an Oppositionist, though Mustafa Kemal made a point of seeing him when he visited Smyrna in December 1923. Became Minister of Justice in November 1924.

Suleiman Sirri Bey (Public Works).

An engineer and an ex-official of the Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople. In 1923 was elected Deputy for Constantinople. In January 1924 he became Minister of Public Works, a post he held till the fall of Ismet Pasha in November, when he was succeeded by Feizi Bey.

Hassan Bey (Finance).

About 40 years of age. Native of Trebizond, and is of Laz origin. Studied in Constantinople and Paris. Was Director of the Economic Section of the Food Ministry during the war. Elected Deputy for Trebizond in 1919. Joined the Nationalist movement early in 1920. Became Minister of Finance in May 1921, and held the post till

April 1922. Was accused of being very pro-Bolshevik. Minister of Economy and Public Works, May–July 1922; Turkish financial expert at Lausanne Conference, 1922–23; again Minister of Economy, September 1923–March 1924; and Minister of Commerce, March–November 1924. Speaks French fairly well, is a man of private means, and is well-versed in financial matters.

Ali Jenani Bey (Commerce).

Unchanged. Was a Malta deportee, being accused of having taken a prominent part in the Armenian massacres. Is one of the leading business men of the Aintab area. In business is considered honest and go-ahead. Has represented Aintab since 1920. Became Minister of Commerce on the formation of Fethi Bey's second Cabinet in November 1924.

Refik Bey, Dr. (Health).

Elected Deputy for Constantinople in the summer of 1923, he was Minister of Health in Ismet Pasha's first and second Cabinets from October 1923 till November 1924.

Ihsan Bey (Marine).

Unchanged. One of the extremists of the People's party, and one of the most devoted of Mustafa Kemal's personal henchmen. Was elected Deputy for Jebeli Berket in 1923, and has always been noted for his violent utterances in the Assembly. Was president of the Independence Tribunal sent to Constantinople in December 1923 for the trial of the three newspaper proprietors. Became first Minister of Marine in December 1924.

Hamdullah Subhi Bey (Public Instruction).

Turkish man of letters. Has for some time been one of the leading lights of Mustafa Kemal's entourage. Since 1910 has been one of the chief propagandists of the pan-Turanian movement, and has of recent years particularly identified himself with the organisation of the *foyers turcs*. Was believed during the armistice to have Italian sympathies. Joined the Nationalist movement early in 1920, and was specially identified with secret service work. Became Deputy for Adalia in January 1921, and Minister of Public Instruction two months later. Resigned in December 1921, and in March 1922 was sent on a mission to Bokhara, but was turned back by the Bolsheviks. Was elected Deputy for Constantinople in 1923, and in the Assembly itself has been noted for his violent speeches. Was one of the chief critics of the Treaty of Lausanne when it was submitted to the Assembly for approval. Is 44 years of age.

Sabri Bey (Agriculture).

Another of the extremists of the People's party, and Deputy for Sarukhan. In August 1923 was elected one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Is noted for his violent speeches, and attracted attention in November 1923 when an incident arose in the Assembly between him and Hussein Reouf Bey.

[E 1608/53/44] No. 109.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 191.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 10, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 48 of the 28th February, regarding the seizure of the Galata Bridge tolls, I have the honour to inform you that the manager of the National Bank informs me that his bank received from the prefecture on the 3rd instant the sum of £T. 132,000. According to a statement by the prefect to the press, referred to below, the sum was £.T 127,000.

2. As the manager of the bank has pointed out to me, the payment of the half-yearly coupons alone requires the sum of £32,500 or (at £T. 9 to the £1) £T. 292,500. It is therefore evident that the payment is intended by the municipality, roughly, to meet this year's payment of interest and sinking fund on some calculation of the present value of the French franc in relation to the Turkish lira.

3. This is borne out by Emin Bey in a statement in the press of to-day. Questioned by a journalist with reference to the question in the House of Commons referred to in

your telegram No. 44 of the 25th February, the prefect said that the municipality was under no obligation to pay into the bank all the receipts from the bridge tolls—

> "We are only obliged to make the payments provided for in the loan contract. This service is carried out regularly. At the beginning of this financial year we have sent the bank a cheque for £T. 127,000 for this year's interest and sinking fund. This advance payment is no negligible advantage. Certain banks are ready to give a discount when they receive payments before they fall due. We execute our engagements faithfully. The bank has only the right to make objections on one point. We settle interest and sinking fund payments in French francs, while the bank claims payment in English currency. However illogical, this claim can be regarded simply as a point of view. The solution of the conflict will depend on the arrangement to be made between the Turkish Government and the Allied Powers as to the currency in which the debt coupons are to be paid."

4. In view of the last sentence, I do not personally think that any representations are likely to move the municipality from their present attitude. In conversation with me about a fortnight ago, Emin Bey made exactly the same point, putting all the blame for the municipality's default on the Central Government, and making out, with what sincerity I cannot say, that, if left to itself, the municipality would fully meet its obligations.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1550/498/44] No. 110.

Sir R. Graham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 193.)

Sir, *Rome, March* 11, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 259 of the 26th ultimo and my telegram No. 68 of the 10th instant regarding the question of an appeal to the Council of the League of Nations in connection with the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey, I have the honour to report that, as I was still unable to see the President of the Council personally owing to his indisposition, I drew up an *aide-mémoire* based on your despatch and its enclosures and transmitted it to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with a private letter asking him to submit it urgently to Signor Mussolini.

Yesterday I received from Senator Contarini a memorandum, of which I now enclose a translation, giving the views of the Italian Government in reply. It will be seen that they concur in the opinion of His Majesty's Government that it would be inadvisable for the question to be raised at the Council of the League, at all events during the present session.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Memorandum communicated by Signor Contarini.

(Translation.)

THE Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has also examined the possibility of an appeal to the Council of the League of Nations regarding the question of non-Mussulman minorities in Turkey in relation to article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

The Royal Government, which did not regard as sufficiently exhaustive the memorandum prepared last autumn by the Inter-Allied Juridical Commission in Constantinople, also gave instructions to their representative in Turkey that the question should be re-examined in agreement with the Allied representatives, bearing in mind the necessity of collecting indisputable proofs of infractions committed by Turkey, such as could be sustained against the reasons which might be deduced by the Turkish Government in their own justification.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has now also received a fresh memorandum prepared by the Inter-Allied Juridical Commission and approved by the three Allied representatives.

After examining this document it appears, however, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that, although the above-mentioned commission has fulfilled its task in the best manner possible, and has drawn up a notable number of documents exposing the acts committed by Turkey in contravention of the guarantees for non-Mussulman minorities residing in her territory, it would none the less be possible for the Turkish Government to adduce reasons in their defence based above all on the conception which the Turks have repeatedly expressed at Lausanne as elsewhere, namely, that it was in the interest of Eastern pacification to deprive the non-Mussulman minorities residing in Turkish territory of the possibility of creating fresh disturbances and fresh political difficulty which necessarily would lead to grave conflicts, and therefore might have harmful repercussions on the relations between Turkey and the European Powers.

This is the principal justification of a political character produced by Turkey in defence of her work of "racial purification," a work which, as His Britannic Majesty's Embassy justly observes, may now be regarded as almost complete.

In view of this state of affairs, the Royal Government are also inclined to the view of His Britannic Majesty's Government—

1. That the remedies for the situation can only practically arise from the situation itself, from spontaneous realisation which may conceivably be originated at a certain moment by the bad results which this policy adopted by Turkey will bring about in the general economy of the country and for the interests of the autochthonous Turkish population, which will most probably be unable to provide by itself for the economic and political development of the country. In such circumstances it appears more probable that sooner or later there may be a gradual change in the line of policy adopted by Turkey rather than an intensification thereof.
2. That the League of Nations would have great difficulty in finding practical means of repairing the damage incurred by the non-Mussulman minorities in Turkey.

The pressure which might be exercised by the League of Nations or also by the Allied Governments to induce the Turkish Government to change their policy would probably have the effect of confirming them still further in the conviction that the line of policy hitherto pursued is the only one which can save them fresh perils for the security and territorial integrity of Turkey.

It would therefore most probably result in the intensification of the present policy, which, on the other hand, time, and above all economic necessity, might lead Turkey to abandon.

Once normal diplomatic relations have been established with the Turkish Government it might perhaps be possible for the Allied representatives in Turkey to initiate a prudent and wise, if perhaps slow, policy on behalf of the non-Mussulman minorities by endeavouring to favour the verification in Turkey of fresh conditions which may spontaneously bring about afresh the pacific coexistence of foreign with Turkish elements in Turkey.

In this line of thought it appears to the Italian Government that it would be the best course to delay, at all events for the present, an intervention by the League of Nations in the question, and that it would be opportune to avoid its being raised at the present session.

The Royal Government would therefore favour waiting some time longer for the results of the policy which it may be possible to develop in Turkey by means of the Allied diplomatic representatives after the presentation of their credentials, and after having initiated direct and more effective relations with the Turkish Government.

Rome, March 9, 1925.

[**E 1610/58/44**] No. 111.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 193.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 5th January last, relative to the budget estimates for the financial year 1925-26, prepared by the Ministry of Finance, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Budget Law in the form in which

it was drawn up by this Ministry, together with the law in its modified form after revision by the Budget Commission.*

2. This commission effected certain modifications in the original estimates of the Minister of Finance and embodied its views in regard to the revised estimates in a lengthy report, of which the attached survey, prepared by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, is of interest.

3. It will be observed, in the first place, that the Budget Commission estimates the total of Government expenditure at £ T. 158,980,222 as compared to the Finance Minister's estimate of £ T. 162,288,942, whilst revenues are assessed by the commission at £ T. 149,496,854 as against the previous estimate of £ T. 145,306,978.

4. The budget deficit of £ T. 16,961,964, forecasted by the Minister of Finance, has therefore been reduced in the revised estimates to £ T. 8,483,368.

5. In regard to expenditure, it will be observed by reference to the table attached to Annex 2 that there has been a general cut in departmental votes, due no doubt to the excision of article 17 of the Budget Law, which provided for a general increase in the salaries of minor officials.

6. The decrease, amounting to about £ T. 1,500,000, in the vote of the Ministry of Finance, is due in part to the fact that the salaries of foreign experts and employees have been transferred from the vote of this Ministry to that of the Department to which they are attached.

7. The vote of the Ministry of National Defence has been reduced by practically £ T. 1,500,000, and in its survey of previous votes to this Ministry the Imperial Ottoman Bank points out that, in the financial year 1921–22, the National Defence vote represented 61 per cent. of total Government expenditure; in 1922–23, 56·8 per cent.; in 1923–24, 36·77 per cent.; in 1924–25, 20·41 per cent.; and in 1925–26, 20·70 per cent.

This laudable desire to reduce military expenditure will, however, probably be temporarily checked by the recent rebellion in the eastern vilayets.

8. The vote allocated by the Ministry of Finance to the Ottoman Public Debt, viz., £ T. 9,095,283, has been increased by the Budget Commission to £ T. 14,433,322.

In the table of expenditure at the end of Annex 2 it will be observed that a supplementary credit of £ T. 6,450,705 was voted to the debt by the Assembly during the course of the past financial year, bringing the nominal vote of this Administration up to a total of £ T. 14,011,242. I am informed, however, that the supplementary vote was merely a paper transaction, and that no additional payment was made to the debt.

The increased vote recommended by the Budget Commission represents an augmentation of the sum allotted to the service of interior loans and an increase in the sum of £ T. 2,190,316, which figures in the Minister of Finance's estimates as set aside for the service of the external debt. In the absence of a detailed statement of the revised distribution of the debt's vote, I am unable to state what part of the total sum of £ T. 14,433,322 now allotted is intended for external loans, but it is estimated by the Imperial Ottoman Bank at £ T. 6,000,000–7,000,000.

9. Except that the already considerable vote of the Ministry of Public Works has been increased by about £ T. 1,000,000, the remaining departmental votes call for no further comment.

10. In regard to revenues, numerous minor modifications have been effected by the Budget Commission, but these modifications have been dealt with in detail in the survey of the Imperial Ottoman Bank (Annex 2), and do not require any further amplification.

This survey provides valuable information relative to the past history and present position of the revenues of the country, and should be useful for future reference.

11. Whilst the attached estimates are one stage nearer their final form than those transmitted with my despatch of the 5th January, the ratification of the Grand National Assembly has still to be obtained. The budget debates are still in progress, but when they are completed I will transmit as soon as available a copy of the budget in the form in which it is finally approved.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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* Not printed.

[**E 1613/1613/44**] No. 112.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 19 .)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Turkish authorities have now taken over the administration of the Régie des Tabacs, the monopoly of which was conceded to the Régie in 1300 for a period of thirty years, and extended by special convention at a later date for a further period of fifteen years.

2. The cancellation prior to the expiration of the renewed term of the rights acquired by the Régie des Tabacs is due primarily to the fact that this prolongation had never been ratified by the Assembly and, secondly, to an agreement concluded between the parties concerned whereby the Government was authorised to proceed with the abolition of the administration of the Régie des Tabacs at three months' notice.

3. In conformity with this agreement the Turkish Government notified the Régie in August last that the concession would expire on the 1st of March, 1925, and that thereafter the control and sale of tobacco would be administered by the Turkish Government direct. In accordance with this decision a draft law was submitted to the Grand National Assembly.

As this law is still under consideration owing to certain differences of opinion as to the form which the monopoly is to take, the Assembly promulgated a provisional law authorising the Government to administer the Régie des Tabacs in its existing form. It is by virtue of this law (the translation of which is herewith attached*) that the Turkish authorities have now taken over the administration.

4. It will be observed that in accordance with the terms of this law, a State monopoly for the sale of cigarette papers has also been instituted.

5. In the estimates of the Budget Commission a revenue of £T. 9,000,000 is anticipated as the result of the application of this law, but I fear that the receipts to be derived from the control and sale of tobacco, cigarettes and cigarette papers will fall short of this sum, especially as regards the receipts derived from the sale of tobacco and cigarettes, for I have no doubt that as the result of the transfer of the Régie des Tabacs to Turkish administration many changes will be effected in the present organised and experienced staff.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 1615/1091/44**] No. 113.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 199.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 10, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 178 of the 3rd instant relating to the fall of Fethi Bey's Cabinet, I have the honour to report that the terms of the actual motion in the People's party meeting, over which the voting went against him, have not been made public. It is, however, generally believed that the decisive factor which turned the scales against him was the intervention in the debate of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. This throws a curious light on Turkish politics. The voting within the party was 90 against 60; add to the latter figure some 30 or 40 avowed members of the Opposition, make some allowance for the influence exerted by the President, and it becomes clear that the Government of Ismet Pasha must really be supported only by a minority of convinced politicians in the Assembly. I may add that nobody for one moment imagines that it has any material support in the real sentiments of the country at large.

2. These considerations make no difference to its procedure, and as members of the Popular party, whatever their individual convictions, have to vote according to the dictates of the party caucus, the present Cabinet, backed as it is by the President, gives more impression of stability than its predecessor. Mustafa Kemal himself has

* Not printed.

apparently been impelled by the crisis to abandon the attitude of qualified reserve which he has observed during the last few months and may be expected to figure more openly as the real ruler of the country. Not only has he personally ejected Fethi, his Prime Minister, but, as will be seen below (paragraph 4), he has to give his official approval to all measures taken under the new extraordinary law for the reinforcement of order and will thus for two years to come bear the responsibility for the administration of a Turkish D.O.R.A.

3. On the 4th March the party held its meeting in the morning, when the new Government's programme was announced and approved. In the afternoon of the same day it was revealed to the Assembly. Ismet stated the usual intentions of all Governments: to cultivate friendly relations abroad and usual reforms at home. For the special needs of the moment two measures were announced—the first, a law for the "stabilisation of tranquillity"; the second, the establishment of two tribunals of independence. Both measures were stoutly opposed by the Progressive party, but quite in vain, and both became law the same day. The Opposition pointed out that only a week before Fethi Bey had been given a unanimous vote of confidence, and asked what could have happened since to justify its reversal. Ismet Pasha's answer was reserved, and amounted to little more than that more energetic treatment yet of the crisis was necessary.

4. The independence tribunals are two in number, one at Angora and the other with no fixed seat, but intended to work in the area of the rebellion. Sentences of death pronounced by the latter are to be executed immediately, while those of the Angora court are to be subject to the approval of the Assembly. The law for re-enforcing order is to be valid for two years. Under it the Government, subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, may, by administrative procedure, prohibit any organisation, or any incitement to reaction or revolt of a nature to disturb social order, public tranquillity or general security. Those guilty of such offences can be sent before an independence tribunal.

5. The law was, of course, opposed in the Assembly on grounds of its vagueness, and, indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the net of repression could have been thrown out more widely, for it virtually gives the Government a free hand to do what it will for two years. The debate was marked by a violent outburst by Rejeb Bey against the press of Constantinople, to whom, he said, the conception of the law was due. The press was a nest of serpents, who must be destroyed, silenced, cleared out, and until this was done the country would know no peace. Indeed, the most marked effect of the law so far has been on the press; the Government has said that there is no censorship, but under the most rigorous censorship papers could hardly say less than they now dare, under the menace of such elastic legislation backed by the prospect of trial, with elastic procedure before an independence tribunal sitting in the prejudiced atmosphere of Angora. On the 6th March, the day after the law was passed, three Constantinople papers were suppressed, viz., the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," the Conservative Islamic organ, probably with the biggest circulation in the country, and two smaller evening papers, the "Son Telegraph" and the "Istiklal." Two papers in Trebizond have also gone under—one in Eskishehr, one in Adana, and three or four periodicals and reviews. The journals still printed refrain from all serious comment, and hardly dared for the first two or three days publish any news at all from the eastern vilayets. Hussein Jahid, of the "Tanin"—the only real journalist of Turkey—has announced that he will attempt no more political articles at all, and his leading column is filled with reminiscences of his deportation to Malta, which, be it said in passing, are not, so far, at all anti-British.

6. In other respects no marked change is visible so far as a result of the new régime, but it is difficult to believe that the town and country organisation of the Progressive party will be left to work in peace, even if it has not already been wrecked. The tribunals of independence have been established and the judges named. All are well-known extremist supporters of Mustafa Kemal, but the president, Kilidj Ali, is the only one whose name has been mentioned in previous despatches. At the moment of writing no cases have come before the new courts.

7. Of the actual rebellion there is plenty of rumour with so little authority behind it that it cannot well be reproduced. For two or three days the papers had literally nothing to say except that the forces of repression would soon be at work. To-day they have taken heart of grace, and with one accord all report an attack on Diarbekir, in which 5,000 rebels participated and were repulsed. Either the news and the figure have been given out by the Government, or, I presume, all the papers of Constantinople will vanish to-morrow. In the hope of getting some news I have

sent Mr. Knight to take up his duties at Trebizond immediately. What is available now is summarised in the report from Major Harenc, military attaché to this Embassy, which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith.*

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1616/55/44] No. 114.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 200.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1925.

SINCE I had the honour to report upon the question of the patriarchate last week (in my despatch No. 174 of the 4th instant) the Turkish papers have supplied encouraging assurances that the offer made by the Turkish Government was about to be accepted, viz., that Constantine VI would resign, that a prelate admitted by the Turks as non-exchangeable would be elected in his place and that the other metropolitans would be allowed to remain here. The Greek Government, too, so far as I learn, would be glad enough to settle the question in this fashion, provided that it could obtain certain minor political or other concessions, of which I am unaware, as part of the bargain.

2. In a previous despatch I have suggested that there is a profound difference of view between the Greek Government and the Greek element here, which is most devoted to the patriarchate. According to these latter, the Greek Government, no less than the Turkish, is seeking to use the patriarchate as a political pawn, in disregard of the true interests of the Orthodox Church. They consider that a change has latterly come over the attitude of the Turks. Angora no longer wants to uproot the patriarchate altogether. It has realised that its continuance here may provide Turkish policy with certain levers which would be lost if the institution were completely suppressed. The present intention of Angora, therefore, is to keep the patriarchate here, but in such a reduced state that it will be both a mockery of its former self and a ready tool in Turkish hands. This object has almost been achieved, but for the continuance in office of the Patriarch himself. The bishops remaining here are, I believe, hardly of the standing to be able to form a worthy Synod, even if a passable Patriarch could be found among them. The Turkish authorities have, I understand, already been approaching some of them and suggesting that, whether Constantine VI resigns or not, their own personal interests might best be served by the election of one of themselves and by the sharing among the remainder of such spoils as there are. The archives of the patriarchate are in the hands of the police, who have been searching them for evidence of treason. Documents of canonical importance, such as the decree recognising the Serbian patriarchate, are passed round with the rest from one police station to another, and may not improbably be lost. The patriarchate has, in fact, been debased already.

3. Those Greeks whose views I have quoted complain that, in being prepared to sacrifice the Œcumenical Patriarchate by keeping it here at the mercy of the Turks, the Greek Government only stands to gain small advantages of various kinds, and that the Turks will annul even these as soon as a favourable moment arrives. But I think the real object of the Greek Government must be the traditional one of keeping a foothold in Constantinople against the day when they still hope it may be embodied in the Greek State. It may safely be assumed that the Turks, on their part, if they allow the patriarchate to remain, will do their utmost, by continuing to reduce the Greek community here, to weaken this foothold.

4. I beg to enclose a translation of a report and covering memorandum, both in Russian, which purport to emanate from the Russian consulate-general here.* Although these documents reached me through a Greek, and therefore interested, channel, I am inclined to think that they are genuine, or, at any rate, represent views genuinely held by Russian officials. The suggestion that the Soviet Government is interesting itself, for its own purposes, in the preservation of the patriarchate here has already been made in the enclosure in Sir M. Cheetham's despatch No. 68 of the 13th ultimo. I find Greeks here inclined to attribute Ismet Pasha's final concession at Lausanne rather to an interview in which M. Chicherin upheld the patriarchate than to the efforts of the British delegation. However that may be, it seems probable that Russia, as much as Greece, has political motives for the maintenance of the Orthodox patriarchate here.

* Not printed.

5. If the views which I have outlined above are roughly correct, the position is curious. Russia, Greece and Turkey, for varying reasons, each want the patriarchate kept at Constantinople. Greece and Russia each hope one day to step thereby into Constantinople and, meanwhile, to keep the other out. Turkey hopes thereby to play Russia and Greece off against one another. Not even Greece has the real interests of the Orthodox Church at heart. But, from what I am told here, these interests are very honestly sought by the Patriarch himself, who is said to have the character to follow a line of his own. His inclination, it is stated, is to keep his office and to convoke the Holy Synod in Greece. But it is difficult for him to take this step without the assent of the Greek Government. In any case, it is possible that he will refuse to resign and that by some expedient another Patriarch will be elected here, who will canonically be a "false" Patriarch. As this would only increase the degradation of the patriarchate, its devotees here hope Constantine VI may be supported by all who are concerned for the welfare of the Orthodox Church.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 115.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 102.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 14, 1925.

MY telegram No. 85.

It is reported in press of 14th March that M. Franklin-Bouillon will leave for Angora to-day, accompanied by Colonel Sarron.

M. Franklin-Bouillon's visit is stated to be of an unofficial character.

No. 116.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Angora, March* 16, 1925.

RECEIVED in audience to-day and presented letters.

No. 117.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 19.)

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, March* 18, 1925.

A CURIOUS and rather serious situation has arisen as to transfer of Embassy to Angora. My Italian colleague, on arrival here on 11th March, was subjected to very strong pressure to agree to transfer, which he stoutly resisted. When I arrived we found that a despatch was said to have been delivered to us at Constantinople of which we obtained by bag an unofficial copy. Following is substance of this document:—

> It is the principle of international law and custom that Embassies are established at the capital. As regards Turkey, there is no reason or possibility of departing from this rule. Turkish Government is ready to accord all facilities for effecting transfer in the best conditions and will give sites, but cannot define duration of facilities now accorded to foreign missions in Constantinople or take any engagement towards them. In view of the importance of direct contact, Turkish Government hopes that missions will be transferred as soon as possible.

Apparently it was not intended to send this note to French representative, perhaps because notification of 1st March was made verbally by him and in writing by myself and Italian Ambassador. French Government may therefore know nothing about this development.

Both my Italian colleague and I have spoken very strongly to the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against this pressure with threats. I have pointed out that, if abstract logical Turkish position is to admit that our position is that our Ambassadors abroad must be surrounded with circumstances of decency and dignity more or less corresponding to what obtains in London, the conclusion to be drawn from these two arguments combined is that embassies here must be reduced to legations.

Effect of our action is that note has almost certainly not been presented at Constantinople; but last night copy of it, undated, unsigned and unauthenticated, was handed to us rather formally by official of Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We think it very likely that no action will be taken immediately, but that Turkish Government will wait till Franklin-Bouillon arrives on 22nd or 23rd and see how they can act on him. My Italian colleague has good ground for thinking that language used by Mougin may have encouraged Turks to carry out present offensive. We therefore think it desirable that French Government be informed urgently of what has been passing here and begged to instruct Franklin-Bouillon to resist pressure as we have done.

[E 1727/175/44] No. 118.

Zekiai Bey to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 20.)

Légation de la République turque, Londres, le 19 *mars* 1925.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre ci-inclus à votre Excellence un projet d'arrangement préparé par mon Gouvernement en s'inspirant des idées échangées dans notre entrevue du 24 janvier dernier, relative aux questions intéressant les deux pays.

En remettant ce document à votre Excellence, je réponds au désir qu'elle avait bien voulu m'exprimer, d'être fixée sur le consentement effectif de mon Gouvernement à ce projet.

Je me tiens, par conséquent, à la disposition de votre Excellence, pour lui remettre, quand elle voudra, les pleins pouvoirs m'autorisant à négocier et signer *ad referendum* un accord permettant de résoudre d'une façon amicale et directement entre nous la question de Mossoul. Je suis prêt à fournir à votre Excellence, des explications sur les divers points de ce projet, et à examiner et discuter ces points avec elle ou avec les représentants qui seraient désignés à cet effet par le Gouvernement royal.

Je serai donc heureux de rencontrer votre Excellence, le jour qu'elle voudra bien m'indiquer, et de connaître ses dispositions à cet égard.

Je saisis, &c.

ZEKIAI.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Projet d'un Arrangement entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne.

I.—*Partie politique.*

ARTICLE 1er.

La frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak est fixée comme suit:

La ligne-frontière commencera par un point à déterminer à 50 kiloms. au sud de Djezirei-ibni-Omer et à 25 kiloms. à l'est du Tigre. Elle passera à 20 kiloms. à l'ouest de Tel-Afr, rejoindra le Tigre à 10 kiloms. au sud de Gayara, et continuera en suivant le cours du fleuve jusqu'au point de jonction de la rivière de Kutchuk-Zab avec le Tigre. La ligne-frontière rejoindra la Dyala en laissant le mont de Krachouk et les villages de: Mella, Taza-Kormato, Djemile, Ribat, Kouran-Kale dans le territoire turc. Elle suivra ensuite le cours de la Dyala jusqu'à la frontière de la Perse. Cette ligne, tracée dans la carte ci-jointe, sera communiquée par les deux parties contractantes à la commission d'enquête désignée par la Société des Nations, dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date de la signature du présent accord.

ARTICLE 2.

Le Gouvernement turc tout en s'engageant à reconnaître l'intégrité territoriale de l'Irak, déclare n'avoir aucune visée sur la partie des territoires devant rester au sud de la ligne-frontière qui sera tracée conformément au présent accord.

II.—*Partie économique.*

ARTICLE 3.

La concession de l'exploitation des mines de pétrole se trouvant dans la partie du vilayet de Mossoul restant à l'intérieur de la frontière turque conformément au tracé de frontière mentionné dans l'article 1er, sera accordée par la Turquie à un groupe anglais qui sera approuvé par le Gouvernement britannique. Les taxes revenant à la Turquie de l'exploitation de ces pétroles ainsi que toutes formalités et obligations ayant trait à la concession, et toutes questions d'ordre financier ou économique, non prévues dans le présent accord et découlant de cette concession, seront régies par les lois turques en vigueur. Il est, en outre, bien entendu, que la quote-part du Gouvernement turc sur les produits bruts de l'exploitation, dite "taxe proportionnelle," ne sera pas inférieure à 12·50 pour cent. La Turquie aura un droit de participation jusqu'à concurrence de 25 pour cent dans le capital de l'exploitation de ces mines.

ARTICLE 4.

Les "pipe-lines" passeront par le territoire turc, pour aboutir à un port turc de la Méditerranée. La concession de l'exploitation, ainsi qui celle de la construction de ce port sera également concédée au groupe précité. Le groupe formera ensuite une société anonyme turque à laquelle il aura à transférer cette concession.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement turc consent à donner à un groupe anglais la concession pour la construction et l'exploitation d'un réseau de lignes-ferrées d'au moins 3,000 kiloms. de longueur, lignes devant relier les provinces orientales turques à la mer Noire d'une part, et à la Méditerranée d'autre part. Les travaux d'exécution devront être commencés six mois après la date de la mise en vigueur du présent accord. La création et la mise en trafic des diverses lignes de ce réseau, devront être effectuées dans les délais et conditions à déterminer entre le Ministère des Travaux publics turcs et le groupe en question, immédiatement après la signature du présent accord.

Les lignes à créer seront exploitées par une société anonyme turque, à fonder par ce groupe anglais qui transférera la concession à la susdite société. Cette société sera en même temps munie de permis de prospection pour les mines se trouvant dans un espace de 20 kiloms. des deux côtés du tracé de chaque section de la voie ferrée. Ces permis de prospection seront valables depuis le commencement des travaux de construction de ces sections jusqu'à leur mise en trafic. Exception est faite toutefois des concessions accordées antérieurement.

ARTICLE 6.

Les concessions de construction et d'exploitation des ports de Youmourtalik, Héraclée, Inéboli, Samsoun et Trébizonde seront accordées à des groupes anglais, dans des conditions à déterminer entre le Ministère des Travaux publics turc et les groupes en question, immédiatement après la signature du présent accord. Ces concessions seront transférées à des sociétés anonymes turques qui seront créées par les groupes précités. Les travaux d'exécution devront être commencés dans les six mois à partir de la date de chaque contrat de concession relatif à ces ports.

ARTICLE 7.

Les groupes anglais qui se chargeront des travaux mentionnés dans les articles 5 et 6, perdront leur droit d'option indiqué dans les susdits articles, dans le cas où ces groupes n'auraient pas, dans un délai de six mois à dater de la signature du présent accord, accompli les conditions et formalités désignées dans ces deux articles.

ARTICLE 8.

Le Gouvernement turc ou le capital turc auront un droit de participation de 25 pour cent au capital du groupe qui créera et exploitera les lignes ferrées, et un droit de participation de 50 pour cent au capital des groupes qui construiront et exploiteront les ports.

ARTICLE 9.

Le Gouvernement britannique déclare consentir à ce que le différend concernant la monnaie de paiement de la quote-part de la Turquie dans la dette ottomane soit réglé sur la base du franc français.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement turc, dans le but de contribuer au développement économique du pays, en collaboration avec le capital anglais, fera, en cas de besoin, un emprunt de près de 15 millions de livres sur la place de Londres.

ARTICLE 11.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à consentir, pendant la durée d'un an, à un arbitrage ou à un règlement à l'amiable, avant de recourir à des mesures militaires, en ce qui concerne tous les différends qui peuvent surgir entre eux.

ARTICLE 12.

Il sera procédé sans retard aux négociations pour la conclusion d'une convention de commerce répondant aux intérêts des deux parties contractantes.

Légation de la République turque,
Londres.

No. 119.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1925.

MR. LINDSAY'S telegram of 18th March.

Please inform M. Herriot at once of substance of Turkish communication to Mr. Lindsay, and add that I hope he will at once join us in resisting Turkish pressure.

It is most important that French representative should make it quite clear to Turkish Government that French Government are at one with British and Italian Governments in their determination in no circumstances to transfer Embassies to Angora.

His Majesty's Government for their part—and subject to concurrence of French and Italian Governments—are prepared, if Turks persist, to let them understand that British representation will be reduced to a Legation.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 59, and Rome, No. 84 (in (D).)

[E 1773/109/44] No. 120.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 212.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting residence at Angora.

Constantinople, March 18, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 120.

Nousret Bey to Mr. Lindsay.

Excellence, *Constantinople, le* 17 *mars* 1925.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser, en date du 1er courant, relativement à l'intention de Sa Majesté britannique et de son Gouvernement de confier leur représentation diplomatique en Turquie à un Ambassadeur qui résidera à Constantinople.

Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à qui je me suis empressé de communiquer le contenu de cette pièce, tout en me chargeant de transmettre à votre Excellence les remerciements du Gouvernement de la République pour cette communication, observe ce qui suit :

Conformément aux principes du droit des gens et à la coutume internationale, ce n'est qu'à Angora, qui est la capitale de la Turquie, que les Ambassadeurs peuvent avoir leur résidence afin de pouvoir directement représenter leurs Souverains et leurs Gouvernements auprès de la République turque.

Il n'y a aucune raison ni possibilité de modifier cette règle générale, en ce qui concerne la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement de la République, pour être agréable aux missions étrangères, leur a accordé et est prêt à leur accorder toutes les facilités en son pouvoir pour que leur transfert à Angora ait lieu dans les meilleures conditions possibles. Une loi autorisant le Gouvernement à donner aux Puissances ayant des relations diplomatiques avec la Turquie des terrains pour y bâtir leurs Ambassades ou Légations à même été soumise à l'approbation de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et sera, nous l'espérons, votée prochainement.

D'autre part, le Gouvernement de la République ne peut naturellement déterminer la durée des facilités, qui sont actuellement accordées aux missions étrangères résidant à Constantinople, ni prendre un engagement quelconque à ce sujet.

En base de ce qui précède et vu l'intérêt primordial qui existe tant pour les Gouvernements étrangers que pour le Gouvernement turc à ce que les missions étrangères soient directement et constamment en contact avec le Gouvernement de la République, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères espère que ces missions seront transférées à Angora dans le plus bref délai possible.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
NOUSRET.

[E 1774/109/44] No. 121.

Mr Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 213.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the speeches made on the occasion of the presentation of my credentials to the President of the Turkish Republic at Angora on the 16th March, 1925.

Constantinople, March 18, 1925.

Enclosure 1 in No. 121.

Speech by Mr. Lindsay.

M. le Président,

J'AI l'honneur de remettre entre les mains de votre Excellence la lettre par laquelle Sa Majesté le Roi m'a accrédité comme son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès de la République turque.

J'estime hautement le privilège et l'honneur de pouvoir aujourd'hui renouer, pleinement et formellement, les relations diplomatiques entre la Turquie et l'Empire britannique, interrompues depuis tant d'années. Je m'adresserai avec énergie et avec plaisir à la tâche de cultiver les meilleures relations entre les deux pays et entre les deux Gouvernements, et il est le désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté que ces

relations puissent rapidement revêtir un caractère de cordialité et de confiance. Dans la tâche qui m'incombe j'espère rencontrer les bonnes dispositions et l'appui favorable de votre Excellence et du Gouvernement de la République, et dans cet espoir, les yeux tournés vers l'avenir, j'envisagerai avec calme le développement futur de ma mission.

Enclosure 2 in No. 121.

Speech by Turkish President.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

JE reçois avec plaisir les lettres de créances par lesquelles Sa Majesté britannique accrédite votre Excellence auprès de moi en qualité d'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire.

Je considère avec satisfaction la désignation de votre Excellence en vue de rétablir pleinement et formellement les relations diplomatiques interrompues depuis tant d'années entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne.

J'envisage avec plaisir le désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de voir ces relations revêtir rapidement un caractère de cordialité et de confiance. Le Gouvernement turc désire également que les relations susmentionnées deviennent plus cordiales et plus confiantes.

Il n'y a pas de doute que vous aurez à ce sujet mon appui et l'aide entière du Gouvernement de la République.

Je souhaite que vous réussissiez dans vos efforts en vue de développer favorablement les relations des deux pays.

[E 1821/109/44] No. 122.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 25.)

(No. 721.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of notes exchanged with the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Allied representation at Constantinople.

Paris, March 24, 1925.

Enclosure 1 in No. 122.

Memorandum communicated to French Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 21, 1925.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople proceeded recently to Angora to present his letters of credence to the Turkish President.

Mr. Lindsay reports that both he and his Italian colleague have been subjected to strong pressure on the part of the Turkish Government to agree to the transfer of the Embassies from Constantinople to Angora. The arguments by which the Turkish Government urged this transfer had, it appears, been embodied in a despatch which was to have been addressed to the Ambassadors at Constantinople. The Turkish Government pointed out that it was in accordance with custom and international law that Embassies should be established at the capital of the country in question. The Turkish Government offered facilities for the transfer, and indicated that the present facilities accorded to foreign missions at Constantinople could not be continued for an unlimited space of time.

His Majesty's Ambassador and the Italian Ambassador strongly contested the Turkish attitude, and it appears that owing to their representations the despatch in question has not been sent to Constantinople by the Turkish Government.

His Majesty's Government hope that the French Government will at once join with them in resisting this pressure from the Turkish Government. They consider it most important that the French representative at Constantinople should make it quite clear to the Turkish Government that the French Government are in complete agreement with the British and Italian Governments in their determination in no circumstances to transfer the Embassies to Angora. For their part, His Majesty's Government are

prepared, if the Turkish Government persist in their present attitude and subject to the concurrence of the French and Italian Governments, to let it be understood that if the Turkish Government continue to press for the transfer British representation will be reduced to a Legation.

Paris, March 21, 1925.

Enclosure 2 in No. 122.

M. Herriot to the Marquess of Crewe.

Paris, le 24 *mars* 1925.

PAR un aide-mémoire en date du 21 mars, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté a bien voulu faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Constantinople avait remis récemment à Angora ses lettres de créance. Mr. Lindsay a porté à la connaissance de son Gouvernement que son collègue italien et lui-même avaient été l'objet d'une violente pression de la part du Gouvernement turc, en vue de leur faire accepter le transfert de leur Ambassade de Constantinople à Angora. Les arguments que le Gouvernement turc mettait en avant pour justifier ce transfert devaient être consignés dans une dépêche qu'il se proposait d'adresser aux Ambassadeurs à Constantinople. Le Gouvernement turc faisait ressortir qu'en conformité avec la coutume et le droit international, les Ambassades devaient être installées dans la capitale.

Le Gouvernement turc ajoutait qu'il était disposé à offrir des facilités pour ce transfert, et indiquait que les facilités actuelles accordées aux missions étrangères à Constantinople ne seraient pas continuées indéfiniment.

Les Ambassadeurs de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont combattu vigoureusement la thèse turque, et il semble qu'en raison de leurs représentations, la dépêche dont il s'agit n'a pas été envoyée à Constantinople par le Gouvernement turc.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté espère que le Gouvernement français voudra bien sans tarder joindre ses efforts aux siens pour résister à la pression du Gouvernement turc. Il attache la plus grande importance à ce que le représentant français à Constantinople marque clairement au Gouvernement turc que le Gouvernement français est en complet accord avec les Gouvernements anglais et italien dans leur commune décision de ne pas procéder au transfert de leur Ambassade à Angora.

Quant à lui, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est décidé si le Gouvernement turc persiste dans son attitude présente, et sous réserve de l'adhésion des Gouvernements français et italien à cette manière de voir, à laisser entendre au Gouvernement turc que, s'il continue de réclamer ce transfert, la représentation britannique sera réduite en Turquie au rang de Légation.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade britannique que son aide-mémoire du 21 mars a retenu toute son attention. Le Gouvernement français entend rester fidèle à l'attitude qu'il a prise d'accord avec les Gouvernements britannique et italien, en ce qui concerne sa représentation en Turquie, et qui s'est traduite par la démarche du 1er mars.

Il joindra ses efforts à ceux de ces deux Gouvernements pour faire accepter ce point de vue par le Gouvernement turc. Il s'efforcera de lui faire comprendre qu'étant donné le développement que comportent les services d'une grande Ambassade, il est impossible d'affecter actuellement la résidence permanente de l'Ambassadeur de France à Angora, en raison des difficultés matérielles qu'elle rencontrerait, et que, d'autre part, comme l'Ambassadeur se rendra aussi souvent que la tractation des affaires l'exigera à Angora, où il aura d'ailleurs une représentation permanente, le Gouvernement turc ne serait pas fondé à voir dans les décisions prises par le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec ses alliés, autre chose que le désir d'assurer à sa représentation par un Ambassadeur son plein rendement.

Le Gouvernement français estime qu'il n'y a pas lieu pour le moment de faire savoir à Angora que la représentation des Gouvernements alliés pourrait être réduite en Turquie au rang de Légation, une telle démarche, étant donnée la susceptibilité du Gouvernement turc, ne pouvant que risquer de l'indisposer sans bénéfice pour la solution de cette affaire.

HERRIOT.

No. 123.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 25.)

(No. 110.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 24, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 91.

I handed *aide-mémoire* to M. Herriot accordingly on 21st March.

Reply was handed to Mr. Phipps this morning to the effect that French Government intend to adhere to attitude taken up in agreement with His Majesty's Government and Italian Government, which brought about the *démarche* of 1st March at Constantinople. They will unite with His Majesty's Government and Italian Government to secure acceptance of this view by Turkey and to make Turkey understand that Angora is at present unsuitable for the residence of a French Ambassador by reason of the size of staff, &c., necessitated and that the Turkish Government have no reason to see in the present decision anything but a desire to give an Ambassador his due scope, especially as the Ambassador will go to Angora whenever necessary and will be permanently represented there.

French Government do not consider that it is at present necessary to hint at reduction to Legations owing to Turkish susceptibility.

Copy of note by bag in my despatch No. 721.

No. 124.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 25.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 24, 1925.

MY telegram No. 2 from Angora.

Note summarised therein was actually delivered at all three Embassies in Constantinople on 18th March, but immediately afterwards withdrawn by Nusret Bey. On the 19th another note of almost precisely the same purport, but with one slight change in substance, was delivered to Italian Ambassador and myself at Angora. It is also better drafted and less peremptory in tone. Copies by bag with comments. Italian Ambassador and I agreed that we could do nothing further usefully, and that we must refer the matter to our Governments.

Same note was delivered yesterday to French Chargé d'Affaires here.

[C 4458/3066/62] No. 125.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Athens, March* 18, 1925.

THE officially inspired "Messager d'Athènes" published yesterday a telegram from Belgrade stating that M. Gabrilovic, who is now in the capital, had declared his belief that Greece was disposed at an early date to ask for admission to the Little *Entente*. A Belgrade paper is further quoted in the telegram as saying that the question at issue is whether Roumania, Greece and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will form a distinct group or whether, on the other hand, the Little *Entente* will, after the Bucharest Conference, be extended to Greece.

2. In my despatch No. 752 of the 24th December last I had the honour to report the strong views of M. Roussos on the necessity for Greece of a Balkan understanding, in which Roumania would be included, as well as his conviction that M. Pasic would desire to give a wider character to any renewal of the Serbian alliance with Greece.

3. I took the opportunity of a diplomatic dinner, given by the Prime Minister, to ask him what, if any, importance he attached to the language attributed to M. Gabrilovic, as to the admission of Greece into the Little *Entente*—a question which, so far as I am aware, has been little discussed of late in responsible circles here, though, from time to time, articles have appeared in the Royalist press which aimed at making capital out of the difficulty which the Greek Government find in their alleged efforts to arrange for the entry of Greece into the Little *Entente*. M. Michalaopoulos replied that there were two courses open to Greece: to seek to join the *entente*, or to work for a general Balkan alliance, to which Roumania would adhere. The Greek Government would have to consider maturely any opportunity

which might be offered to them at a later date, and they could form no opinion at present; but they were certainly not in a position to undertake distant responsibilities. The odium incurred by M. Veniselos on account of the participation of Greece in the Ukranian campaign and the betrayal of Serbia in 1915 by the Government of the late King Constantine are precedents which no future Greek Government can ignore.

4. The French Minister, M. de Chambrun, referred to this matter in general conversation with me this morning. He gave his view that a Balkan combination would be the best policy for Greece, and he was inclined to think that Turkey should be included so far as Eastern Thrace was concerned—an original proposition so far as my knowledge goes. M. de Chambrun went on to suggest that, as soon as the question of the patriarchate could be settled, our respective Governments should endeavour to promote better relations between Greece and Turkey, which he thought might, after a time, well be secured. He hoped that we might be able to work together with this object in view.

5. I agree that it would be very desirable if some method could be found of putting the two countries on more friendly terms. The Greeks are afraid of a Turkish attack on Western Thrace, and apprehensive at the same time lest Turkey should build a navy more powerful than their own. This is, I believe, their main incentive in the prevailing desire for an increase of naval power. The Turks, on their part, are probably being egged on by the armament firms to make preparations to meet the Greeks.

6. I should be grateful for any instructions which you may think proper to give me in respect of M. de Chambrun's suggestions, and particularly as to whether they may have any significance of which I am ignorant.

7. There are two further points in connection with the idea of a Græco-Turkish rapprochement which are perhaps worthy of note. One is the frequently expressed desire of M. Michalaopoulos to arrange a naval holiday with Turkey. (See my telegram No. 34 of the 9th February.) No steps have certainly been taken in this direction as yet, but the Greek Government might view the matter more seriously if the Turkish ships were refitted.

8. Secondly, I learn that in the late summer of last year, when I was away from Athens, Tewfik Rushdi had a series of conversations with his colleague on the Exchange of Populations Commission on the subject of a possible *détente*. Nothing came of these discussions, but M. Roussos, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, was strongly in favour of an arrangement with Turkey. I understand that Ismet Pasha allowed the unofficial pourparlers to continue without in any way committing himself. If the facts are correctly stated it would be of interest to know whether the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has now any recollection of these discussions, and if, at the proper moment, he would be ready to renew them.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

[E 1932/109/44] No. 126.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 217.)
Sir, *Angora, March* 20, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived here on the 15th instant and was received on the following day by the President of the Republic for the presentation of the King's letter accrediting me as Ambassador to the Turkish Republic. I had a short interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the evening of my arrival, at which his Excellency explained to me the ceremonial to be observed. The President, he said, would make his speech in Turkish, which would be interpreted to me in French, and as it was an Ambassador who was being received, he himself the Minister would act as interpreter. I myself, he said, could speak in English or in French, as I liked. I had looked up precedents and found that for the last thirty years at least British Ambassadors' speeches on these occasions had been made in French, and for this reason I had prepared my speech in that language and forwarded it officially to the Turkish Government beforehand. I thought it would be difficult now to change round at the last moment and speak in English, and I therefore told Tewfik Rushdi that I would address the President precisely in the terms which I had already communicated to him.

2. On the morning of the 16th Tewfik Rushdi Bey sent round to me copies in French and in Turkish of the speech which Mustafa Kemal Pasha would deliver to me that afternoon. The text of these speeches were enclosed in my despatch No. 213 of the 18th March, 1925.

3. That afternoon we were taken in motor cars provided by the Turkish authorities to Tchankaya for the ceremony. I was accompanied in the first car by Kiamil Bey, "conseiller politique" of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who apparently also acts as a sort of "chef du protocole." The staff accompanying me were Major R E. Harenc, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Edmonds, Colonel H. Woods and Mr. Helm.

4. On arrival at Tchankaya we found the Guards' band and a company of infantry drawn up; "God save the King" was played as we alighted, and the troops saluted as we entered the house. We were received by the President's household, civil and military, headed by Colonel Tewfik Bey, his "chef de cabinet," and after a minute or two of conversation I was taken alone across the entrance hall into the small room where the President received me. Only Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and one member of the household, were present. The President said to me "Soyez le bienvenu, M. l'Ambassadeur," we shook hands, and exchanged speeches, the Minister interpreting each, according to schedule. When I had handed over my credentials I asked leave to introduce my staff. The President addressed us in Turkish, saying that he was glad to welcome the members of the British Embassy to Angora and that he hoped that the personal contact so established would be continued. He then shook hands with them once again and they withdrew. Left alone once more, the President immediately asked me, in French, what I thought of Angora, and I replied with my regular *cliché* by saying that I admired the courage of any people who chose to transfer the site of their capital. He then expressed the hope that I would speedily establish myself definitely here, to which I replied that the first thing for me to do was to find a site, about which I had already spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This evoked a brief and abrupt question in Turkish to Tewfik Rushdi, who replied hurriedly in the same language We then exchanged a few sentences about situations for a house and about what I proposed to do and to see during my present visit to the capital, and the audience ended. Throughout the President's demeanour was dignified and courteous, but also friendly and smiling.

5 Once more the band played "God save the King" and the troops saluted, and we returned to our railway cars in Angora station after an absence from them of just fifty minutes, of which thirty-five to forty must have been taken up by the drive to Tchankaya and back. Nevertheless, I do not wish to create the impression that the ceremony was in any way to be criticised on the ground of being unduly hurried. It was indeed very simple, but it was efficiently arranged and nothing was slipshod. The President's house is rather like a small suburban villa, pleasantly situated 5 miles south of the town near the summit of a long sloping hill and enjoying a fine view of the wide plain in the centre of which Angora rises abruptly on its rock. The rooms are, of course, small, and the furniture is rather too rich and "presidential"; but on the whole the ceremony was invested with an air of simple dignity which was not unpleasing.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 1931/1231/44**] No. 127.

Mr. Erskine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Sofia, March* 23, 1925.

I ENQUIRED to-day of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether any progress had been made in the negotiations between the Turkish and Bulgarian Governments during the recent visit of M. Radev to Constantinople.

2. M. Kalfov replied that no progress whatever had been made, and that not a single outstanding question had been settled since the beginning of the conversations a year ago. A fresh difficulty had, in fact, now arisen, as the Turks were expelling into Greek territory certain Bulgarians who, on the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, had maintained their allegiance to the Patriarchate on the pretext that they were therefore not Bulgarians, but Greeks. The Greek authorities, of course, refused to accept them, and forced them to emigrate into Bulgaria. I observed that from what M. Radev had said to Mr. Henderson some time ago, I had gathered that at least on the question of the liquidation of Bulgarian properties in Thrace a satisfactory

arrangement had been come to. His Excellency replied that in this matter, as in others, the Turks had gone back on their promises.

3. M. Kalfov added that on the occasion of his last visit to Angora M. Radev's reception had certainly been more cordial than before, but that the Turkish authorities appeared to be so preoccupied with the Kurdish outbreak which occurred soon after his arrival as to be unable to attend to anything else. He had therefore allowed him to come to Sofia to discuss the situation.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

[**E 1927/1786/44**] No. 128.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 219.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1925.

DURING the six days I have spent at Angora I have had three conversations on general or special subjects with Ismet Pasha and at least three with Tewfik Rushdi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. With the personality of the former the Foreign Office is so familiar already that further description is unnecessary. Tewfik Rushdi, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not make a favourable impression on me. Outwardly he is amiable enough—indeed, he abounds in the most odious forms of fulsome flattery—but he is shifty and inspires no confidence. There is an incessant flow of talk without any substance or even meaning, while protestations and affirmations, obviously insincere, follow hot on each other. Though I may report some of his statements, I cannot remember any that I entirely trust. Fortunately, it is generally agreed that he does not count for much, and that Ismet Pasha will really direct foreign policy.

2. In the following paragraphs I will report according to subjects the gist of what passed between myself and the two Ministers, with any necessary comments. I reserve two or three subjects for separate despatches.

3. *Kurdistan Insurrection.*—In reply to my various questions, Ismet Pasha told me that he felt no anxiety about the situation. The revolt had already reached its climax in the attack recently made on Diarbekir, and had already failed. The necessary concentrations of troops were now very nearly completed, and the actual suppression of the revolt would only take a very short time. He had no fear of unrest spreading to Bitlis and Van—the inhabitants were loyal there, and, moreover, "he had drawn a cordon." Nor did he apprehend difficulties in the non-Kurdish parts of Turkey; there must be order and quiet everywhere in the country, and the special powers which the Government had taken enabled him to ensure it. I remarked that, according to the papers, there had been as many as 5,000 rebels out in the Diarbekir region alone; there must be deep-seated causes to bring about so considerable a movement; doubtless the Government could soon suppress the actual rebellion, but how did they propose to deal with the root of the evil—conservatism, nationalism, religious prejudice, or whatever it might be—so as to prevent the unrest from becoming chronic. I asked because it was not in our interest that Turkey should be diverted by internal disorder from the task of peaceful reconstruction

4. Ismet answered that in the first place he did not intend to deviate in any way at all from the policy of progress which had always been the essence of his programme. On the other hand, by persisting in this policy he would effect the object I had referred to. The tithe in Kurdish districts had always been farmed out to the tribal chiefs, and they had used it to establish authority over the peasants and to perpetuate the clan system. With its abolition—which was now an accomplished fact—the authority of the chiefs, from whom all the trouble came, would be shattered, while the peasant, when he next reaped a harvest, would find that he was no longer exposed to the extortions and vexations of the past. Economic reform would provide the needed remedy, and no political change would be required.

5. Though Ismet did not say so to me, there is every chance of a parallel policy of "thoroughness" being pursued also. The chief of the staff said to the Italian military attaché that there are now 500,000 Kurds in Turkey; the number would soon be greatly reduced, and the remainder would be very useful as labourers on public works. While shortly there would not be a sheikh or an agha left in all Kurdistan.

6. I may say that Ismet's optimism over the actual suppression of the revolt is shared by every Turk I spoke to, and that the European diplomats in Angora regard it as justified.

7. *League of Nations.*—I said I hoped Turkey would join the League. Putting the matter on its lowest plane, I said that the League was a forum before which the representatives of fifty odd nations could stand up and say anything they liked, while the others had to listen; it was absurd that a Greek or Bulgar should be free to stand up and talk, and that there should be no one to put forward Turkey's point of view. But, apart from this, it was desirable that Turkey should join the League and by so doing enter into the confraternity of nations from which at present she seemed to prefer to stand aloof in almost complete isolation. By doing so she would help the League, and acquire more self-confidence in her own international relations with other States. Ismet said that he was still in principle anxious for Turkey to join the League, but he asked the question that Zekiai put to you, could she not come in with a seat on the council; to which I answered, as you did, that every country wanted that, and that it was a matter for the League to settle for itself. He then expressed some nervousness lest, if Turkey asked, admission should be refused. I said that here, too, no absolute assurance could be given honestly, because it was for the Assembly of the League to decide, but I also said that it seemed to me quite inconceivable that admission should be refused, and that hesitation by Turkey on that ground was entirely unnecessary.

8. Tewfik Rushdi, to whom I repeated this conversation, after mentioning how favourably impressed he had personally been at the methods and organisation of the League, asked me whether His Majesty's Government would support Turkey's request for a seat on the council; to which I said that I believed His Majesty's Government often received this request, and that they generally preferred not to pledge themselves in advance. Turkey had better enter the League and then earn her seat on the council by virtue of the valuable contributions she would bring to the League's beneficent work.

9. I think the Turkish Government will enter the League, but I also think it will take no final action till the Mosul decision has been rendered. Not that I expect it will make the entry into the League dependent on the nature of the verdict, for I still look on acceptance of the verdict as practically assured. But the Turks like to delay making up their minds or committing themselves definitely to anything till the last moment, and the imminence of the League's decision gives them a pretext, satisfactory to themselves if to no one else, for postponement of an engagement.

10. *Economic Relations with Great Britain.*—I said both to Ismet and to Tewfik Rushdi that I hoped Turkey would soon begin to think seriously of re-establishing her credit with Europe. Referring only to Great Britain, and without wishing to rake up the past, I reminded them that Turkey had succeeded in mortally offending the Council of Foreign Bondholders, the Anatolian Railway group, all the insurance companies and the Eastern Telegraph. In the directorates of these groups would be found almost every one of the most prominent financiers of the city, and at present if the word Turkey was mentioned to any one of them it merely evoked bitter memories.

11. Ismet wailed that he had made a very definite proposal about the debt at Lausanne, which had been rejected, and that Turkey was poor and could not pay her debts. I said that he was putting the cart before the horse. Turkey must first recognise the principle of the sanctity of obligations, and then only could the question of reduction of the burden be approached. Turkey might find it difficult to do this, but she would have to come to it if she wished to re-establish herself as a strong and prosperous Power. Meanwhile, I was aware that both the Eastern Telegraph and the Anatolian Railway questions were coming to the fore very shortly; I hoped the Turkisk Government would attend to both carefully, and so open the door to the confidence of the City of London.

12. Tewfik Rushdi said that obviously Turkey "had had bad luck with the city," and that he had come to the conclusion that only in London was any considerable amount of capital to be had. Meanwhile, the Turkish Government was seriously thinking of its credit, and had already practically come to terms with the Ottoman Bank about the renewal of its concession.

13. *German Experts for Turkish Customs.*—I said to Tewfik Rushdi that since coming to Angora I had heard that he and Ismet Pasha were displeased at the *démarche* I had made to Nusret Bey (see my telegram No. 54 of the 6th March) and especially at my use of the word protest; I should be glad to hear what he had to say on the

subject. Tewfik Rushdi burst into a long disquisition on how things that might have been possible under the régime of Capitulations were now impossible, and that under the present Turkish régime differentiation of treatment by experts was out of the question. I answered that German penetration of Turkey was as active or even more active now than before the war; that the appointment of Germans would be regarded by British traders as the last bar on the door to British commerce, and that it would also unfavourably affect financial circles just at the moment when with the opening of political relations we might hope for a restoration of mutual confidence. His Excellency's answer showed me that he had missed the point of my remarks to Nusret Bey. I felt that I had been right in making the Turkish Government aware of a point of view that might have escaped their attention. I repeated this conversation later to Ismet Pasha. From his manner I inferred that he had in fact been displeased at my communication, but his answer was merely a disquisition on the disappointing difficulties in engaging foreign experts.

I think it would now be dangerous to do more in this matter. The decision of the Turkish Government is on the knees of the gods, and we must just await it.

Relations with other Powers.

14. (a.) *With Great Britain.*—I said to Ismet Pasha that I looked forward to the League of Nations verdict on the Mosul question. I expected that the verdict would prove a disappointment to both parties, but once rendered I hoped we would turn over a new page, and that mutual confidence would be increased. I did not anticipate that Anglo-Turkish relations could become really close for some time yet—there was too much and too recent past history for that—but with the lapse of time relations would improve, and in the meanwhile the best thing to do was to follow a rather negative policy, and seek always to prevent difficulties from arising between our two Governments. This conversation took place at my farewell interview with the Pasha. He listened carefully, interrupting me only to have a phrase or two repeated, but he made no answer of note, and we passed to other topics.

15. (b.) *With the three Allied Powers.*—I said to Ismet that I had noticed how nervous Turkey became whenever the Allies appeared to be conferring together; she always fancied they were plotting together against her, and this had been particularly the case on the occasion of your own visit last December to Paris and Rome. As a matter of fact, I said, the only discussion about Turkey at that time had resulted in a decision complimentary to her. Turkey, in general, was low down on the horizon of the Allies, who were thinking of other things more important to themselves, notably the question of security. This set Ismet off asking me about the Geneva Protocol, and I told him what I could about it on general lines.

16. (c.) *With Greece and the Balkan States.*—Ismet told me that when he was in power before he had always striven for good relations with Greece; since then certain incidents had occurred, and his manner rather conveyed a hint that he did not quite approve of them; but now he hoped to reach a satisfactory settlement. The instability of Greek Cabinets was, he said, a principal difficulty.

17. Tewfik Rushdi told me that he knew all about the Greek questions, and that he was looking forward to a negotiation of them in which there would be ample scope for give and take and good hope of successful conclusion. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires told me that with the change of Government an improvement had indeed taken place; whereas the Turks had in Fethi's time refused even to talk of the Patriarchate, Tewfik Rushdi had said, talking as Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he was prepared to discuss the question; but the good effect of this had been nullified four days later when the Vali of Constantinople had again asked the Exchange Commission to issue passports to all the exchangeable metropolitans. I think, nevertheless, that relations between Greece and Turkey have improved, and that the strain put on the Turkish Government's energies by the Kurdish rebellion in the east has had its natural and inevitable result on the frontier of Thrace.

18. (d.) *With Balkan States.*—Ismet asked me with interest and some persistence whether I thought there was likely to be any trouble among the Balkan States. I said I thought they were far too much exhausted to make any real trouble. It seemed to me that he had in mind some story or other about a Balkan combine against Turkey, but I could get nothing definite out of him, and the matter dropped.

19. In addition to my own political conversation, my staff had busy discussions with subordinate members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the various cases. They were treated with the utmost courtesy, no effort was made to evade questions, and every facility was given to them for seeing the competent officials in other

Ministries, where also every attention was given to their representations. To our present knowledge, only one case has been decided, and for the rest we have only protestations to go on; we are not likely to know for a fortnight or three weeks how much success we have had with these minor questions.

20. Literally speaking, we have returned to Constantinople with a bagful of promises, a rather disagreeable note, and nothing more, but I hardly expected any tangible and immediate results. In all our dealings with officials and others at Angora we observed the utmost courtesy compatible with abstention from mere flattery, and the compliment was returned. In my own conversations I tried always to be scrupulously fair, to discuss with them on a footing of equality, and to avoid talking down to them: for Turks are yellow dogs; they are subconsciously aware of the fact, and they want toning up to give them a little more true self-pride. I think our mission to Angora was taken as a compliment and appreciated as such by the Turks, and, though we must expect many disappointments and further quite unconscionable behaviour from the Government, I do believe that the past week has not merely established direct contact between His Majesty's Ambassador and Angora, but has also marked a distinct stage on the road to the re-establishment of confidence between the two Governments.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1908/109/44]

No. 129.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 224.) *Constantinople, March* 24, 1925.

Sir,

ON arriving at Angora on the 15th instant I found Signor Montagna, my Italian colleague, in high excitement about a note said to have been delivered by Nusret Bey to our Embassies in Constantinople the very day I left, in which we were asked to transfer our residences directly to Angora, and for the next four days we were in constant consultation as to what to do, and in as constant mystification as to what the Turks intended. Signor Montagna had been pressed hard to accede to this request by everyone in turn from the President and Latife Hanum downwards, and had resisted all such suggestions with ever-increasing acerbity.

2. Next day, the 16th, he obtained unofficially from the Turkish Foreign Office a copy of this alleged note (see my despatch No. 212 of the 18th March), and showed it to me. It appeared not to have been addressed to the French Embassy, but we gathered it had already been delivered on ours. I saw Ismet Pasha that evening, and expressed my great regret at this action. He stated the theory of the question, that where the capital and seat of Government is, there the foreign missions should reside. Our note of the 1st March ran directly counter to this simple principle, and the Turkish Government simply could not pass the matter over in silence. Moreover, reason was with them, for it was closer contact with foreign Governments that Turkey desired, and how could that be secured except by the presence of the foreign representatives at the capital; and how could those representatives understand the modern Turkey when they were surrounded by the alien atmosphere of Constantinople? No threats were intended by the note, but a condition of affairs set forth and a request formulated that simply could not be left unuttered.

3. Thinking that the note had been delivered, I said I greatly regretted the action taken, and thought a serious mistake was being made. I could say nothing definite and my Government must answer. If the Turks had left the matter alone, I believed that as Angora improved in amenity and the advantages of direct contact with the Government became more clear, the foreign diplomats would spend more and more of their time in the capital and less and less in Constantinople, and the Turkish Government's desires would be brought about silently and without trouble. If the question must be raised in this acute form, then I feared my Government might answer that in London they exert themselves to provide every circumstance of dignity for foreign Embassies: reserve a high place for them at the King's Court; and surround them with all possible consideration. They would expect that their own Ambassadors abroad should be treated likewise, and, if suitable conditions of existence could not be provided, then Legations must take the place of Embassies. The Turkish note would be pregnant with difficulties, and only estrangement between Turkey and the Western Powers could ensue.

4. Next day, the 17th, we heard vaguely that the note had not been presented yet at Constantinople. I saw Tewfik Rushdi Bey that day and repeated to him the arguments I had used to Ismet. Tewfik Rushdi tried to persuade me that the note need create no difficulties if it were accompanied by verbal explanations, but I refused to acquiesce in this theory; he assured me that no menace was intended by it, and that it was far from the intention of the Turkish Government to stipulate what the movements of an Ambassador must be or how much time he must spend in this or that place; but the principle laid down in the note must be stated, and the foreign Governments ought not to take offence where no offence was intended. In reply to my questions, he said he did not know whether the note had been presented at Constantinople or not; he would telegraph at once to find out. I urged him strongly to withdraw the note altogether, or at the least to alter it completely, and I came away with the impression that it would be withdrawn. That very evening, however, copies of the note were handed to Signor Montagna and myself by a junior official of the Turkish Foreign Office, and we were more mystified than ever as to what was up. We came to the conclusion that the principal point was to get the French Government to stand firm against any pressure exerted on them similar to that applied to ourselves, though with M. Franklin-Bouillon already on the horizon we feared there was not much hope of success. General Mougin had aired his views of the Angora question to the Italian military attaché, and they were that a political counsellor should reside at Angora with a staff and all the technical attachés, and that the Ambassadors should stay as a sort of *fainéant* Mikado at Constantinople.

5. I accordingly addressed to you at this stage my telegram No. 2 of the 18th instant, and Signor Montagna telegraphed in the same sense to his Government. As a matter of fact, the note was that very day, the 18th, handed to Mr. Broadmead at Pera, and within a few hours again withdrawn from him by Nusret Bey.

6. On the 19th we were asked by the Turkish Foreign Office to hand back the copies of the note which had been given us on the 17th, and we learned by telegram of what happened at Constantinople. We scarcely had time to feel pleased before the second and revised note, signed by Tewfik Rushdi Bey himself, was delivered to us in our railway carriages. As you will see from the copy enclosed, it is very nearly the same in substance as the first note, though improved drafting gives it a softer and more courteous tone. Signor Montagna and I then felt that it was no more use kicking against the pricks, and that we must leave it to our Governments to decide now what action to take on the Turkish communication. I have, however, expressed my feelings once more to Ismet Pasha, Tewfik Rushdi having been upset in a motor-car and confined to his house.

7. I will first consider the motives of the note. It is impossible to overstate the extent to which the Ghazi personally directs all the policies and activities of the Turkish Government, and the fraction of the party through whom he is now governing the country, more absolutely than ever under the new temporary laws, are, in accordance with his wishes, ready to support any measure and to spend large sums to make Angora the real capital in every way of Turkey. The next point is that the Ghazi's personal pride is involved. As head of the State he feels that he should be closely surrounded by the foreign diplomatists, and that their absence is a slight on himself. Thirdly, as the Government wishes Angora to be the capital, so the Opposition, or at any rate considerable sections of it, would prefer a return to Constantinople; and the hesitation of foreign Governments to send their representatives to Angora appears to the supporters of the Government, and perhaps, too, to its opponents, as an incitement to the Opposition and as a manœuvre directed against the permanence of the present régime.

8. The obvious and simple thing for the Powers to do is to persist and reply that they have nothing to add to their communication of the 1st March, or something to that effect. I imagine, from correspondence of last year, that His Majesty's Government may be inclined to take this line. Now the minor Powers, and Germany too, have no desire to send their diplomatists to Angora, and if the three Great Powers stand firm in resistance, I think the others are unlikely to break away. Will they do so? The French attitude will presumably be known in a few days, but it is unfortunate that at this moment French representation should be confided, even for a few days only, to M. Franklin-Bouillon. Signor Montagna tells me that Mussolini, having pressed to have Ambassadors named to Turkey, will be furious at the pressure and menaces now applied, and will be inclined to stand out—but only if everyone else does so too. Unity of front is therefore the first essential.

9. The next question is what success will attend combined resistance, if it is

secured. Signor Montagna thinks it would achieve its object, and that the Turkish Government would allow things to go on as the three Allies had contemplated. The Hungarian Minister, who is now in Angora, shares this view. The element of doubt, of course, is that this country is just now an absolutist State, and that the personal pride of its absolutist ruler is involved. If the Turks refused to succumb to combined resistance, they would not only abolish the delegation in Constantinople, but also refuse facilities to liaison officers in Angora—for instance, by ruling that they may only discuss questions with officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of equal rank to themselves. Of course, a liaison officer would be of little use unless he could get access to Ministers, and the resulting situation would be one of almost completely interrupted intercourse. I do not know how long under such circumstances the Allied resistance would continue to be combined.

10. The best alternative course of action I can devise is to reply to the communication of the 19th March by taking special note of the offer of land at Angora for the construction of houses, and, while expressing acknowledgments, stating that the Powers cannot admit that there is any condition, express or implied, placing limitations on the Ambassador's movements, or any obligation on him to reside any longer at one of his houses than another, but that it will always be his duty to be in residence in that spot where the interests of his Governmnent and of relations with Turkey require—or some formula of that kind. It is possible that this line of action might end the present controversy for the moment. Tewfik Rushdi's words to me, that it was not desired to interfere in any way with the Ambassador's movements, point in that direction, and one of the changes from the first note introduced into the second (paragraph 3, insertion of the word "officielle" after "résidence") rather makes one think that the Turks would be satisfied for the moment if the construction at Angora was called the "British Embassy," just as the house at Therapia was before it was burned down.

11. The disadvantages of acting thus is that no real settlement is effected. I have little doubt that, in some form or other, and sooner rather than later, a further attack would be launched—perhaps on the position and rights of the liaison officers —and all the bickerings would begin again. Anyhow, time would have been gained, and you never can tell how long a one-man régime, such as we now have, will last.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 129.

Dr. Rushdi to Mr. Lindsay.

Excellence, *Angora, le* 19 *mars* 1925.

EN réponse à la note de votre Excellence adressée à Nousret Bey en date du 1er courant, relativement à l'intention de Sa Majesté britannique et de son Gouvernement de confier leur représentation diplomatique en Turquie à un Ambassadeur, qui résidera à Constantinople, j'ai l'honneur de porter à sa haute connaissance les considérations suivantes :

Je tiens d'abord à remercier le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de sa décision de se faire représenter en Turquie par une Ambassade.

Conformément aux principes du droit des gens et à la coutume internationale, ce n'est qu'à Angora, qui est la capitale de la Turquie, que les Ambassadeurs peuvent avoir leur résidence officielle, afin de pouvoir directement représenter leurs Souverains et leurs Gouvernements auprès du Président de la République turque.

Il est, au demeurant, désirable pour nous et de l'intérêt des deux pays que les chefs des missions étrangères puissent traiter directement les affaires concernant les Gouvernements respectifs avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Il n'y a aucune raison ni possibilité de modifier cette règle générale, en ce qui concerne la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement de la République, pour être agréable aux missions étrangères, leur a accordé et est prêt à leur accorder toutes les facilités en son pouvoir pour que leur transfert à Angora ait lieu dans les meilleures conditions possibles. Une loi autorisant le Gouvernement à donner aux Puissances ayant des relations diplomatiques avec la Turquie des terrains pour y bâtir leurs Ambassades ou Légations a même été soumise à l'approbation de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et sera, nous l'espérons, votée prochainement.

Dans ces conditions, j'espère que votre Excellence voudra bien considérer que les facilités provisoires qui sont actuellement accordées aux missions étrangères résidant à Constantinople sont faites dans le but de faciliter leur transfert et de permettre que jusque-là l'expédition des affaires courantes ne soit pas entravée.

En base de ce qui précède et vu l'intérêt primordial qui existe, tant pour les Gouvernements étrangers que pour le Gouvernement turc, à ce que les missions étrangères soient directement et constamment en contact avec le Gouvernement de la République, j'espère que ces missions seront transférées à Angora aussitôt que possible.

Veuillez, &c.
DR. ROUSHDI.

[**E 1909/109/44**] No. 130.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 225.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that Fethi Bey, late Prime Minister, has been appointed Turkish Ambassador at Paris, and that Jevad Bey, who has occupied that post for some weeks, is to be transferred to some other mission, probably Vienna, which is a Legation only.

2. When Jevad presented his letters at Paris he made a long and rather foolish speech, full of gush and flowery phrases, to which the President replied in a discourse containing, indeed, the usual courtesies but ending with a paragraph which bluntly impressed on the Turks the necessity of observing their engagements. The two speeches were printed in the local papers, which, after two or three days of silent horror, burst into a storm of attack on Jevad Bey for his indiscreet utterances. It was clear that Jevad's term at Paris would be a short one, and that he would receive the punishment that M. Doumergue's words had earned for him as soon as it was convenient to nominate his successor. It is certainly now convenient for the Administration to have Fethi somewhere outside Turkey.

3. Fethi, who used to be regarded as very advanced in politics, is now called in Angora "the man of obsolete ideas." He was put into office only to serve the turn of the moment according to the President's ideas, and I think he has hardly had a fair chance from the first. His views are so much more moderate than those of Ismet Pasha and the President that he almost belongs to a different school of politics, yet he had to depend in Parliament on the People's party, of whom Ismet Pasha remained the active chairman. Then, as the moderate element was still strong in the Cabinet, a new Ministry (that of Marine) was created, and a hot extremist, Ihsan Bey, put into it. Later again Rejeb, his Minister of the Interior, organised a cave against him, and when it failed of its purpose and he had to resign he was made secretary-general of the People's party. Now Fethi himself is ejected as the result of an adverse vote in the People's party, to bring about which the Ghazi himself had to intervene actively in the debate. Yet now, whether from a dog-like fidelity to Mustafa Kemal's person or from lack of political perception, Fethi shows no resentment whatever at his treatment, and is as happy as a sand-boy at the prospect of Paris. His glee at getting out of a hot place is the only sign of pessimism which I observed among Turks during my visit to Angora. Were he now to remain as a Deputy in Turkey he would have an ideal opportunity (judging purely from the parliamentary point of view) of forming what Turkey most wants, a strong Centre party, supported by the Progressives and by the moderate members of the People's party, and leaving on the Right the small band of religiously-minded reactionaries and on the Left the more numerous and very active extremist supporters of Mustafa Kemal. The latter must assuredly be glad to see this danger removed; as for Fethi, I am uncertain whether he is now blindly throwing away a heaven-sent opportunity or prudently reserving himself for a later and less dangerous occasion.

4. Fethi Bey is thus a moderate, sensible, fairly straightforward man, with the Turkish sense of humour, some interest in outside things and a lot of loyalty, but he is not intelligent. He was one of the Malta deportees, but he has said in the Assembly that in the discharge of official duties he regards it as necessary to put aside any feelings of personal resentment he may feel on that score. Mme. Fethi Bey (Ghalibe Hanum, as she is called here) is young, pretty and very pleasant to

meet. She was brought up in France, her father having been Turkish consul-general at Marseilles, and she speaks English and French. She is looking forward to leaving Angora and to buying herself pretty new frocks in Paris.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1910/109/44] No. 131.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 226.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1925.

PERHAPS I should offer some general observations on our recent experiences in Angora.

2. We spent six days in the town, from the afternoon of the 15th to noon of the 21st, lodging in two railway cars at the station. They were moderately clean—but only moderately—and we were fairly comfortable. In summer, of course, they would be intolerably hot. Nature was unusually kind to us; the weather was cool and dry, there was neither dust nor mud and no mosquitoes, and we had our full share of sunshine. We were thus privileged to see Angora at its very best.

3. Apart from its citadel and monuments of undoubted archæological interest, the town itself is just as poor a place as all accounts lead one to believe. There is but one road which, judging by Constantinople standards only, can be regarded as decent; it runs from the station some 400 yards across the famous marsh, and about the same distance beyond into the heart of the city; the other streets of the place are execrable and there is nothing like them here. The general style of building is miserable, and there is nothing in Western Europe to which the town can be compared. If in politics Angora is about as much ahead of Turkey as Kurdistan is behind, so in "ædility" (if I may coin the word) it is about as much behind the dilapidated Constantinople of to-day as Constantinople is behind, say, Marseilles. I understand that progress has been made in the last four years, and there is a certain amount of Government building of offices going on which represents quite an effort for an impoverished State like Turkey, but progress is very slow. It is particularly noteworthy that there is absolutely no private building going on, though the overcrowding is such that rents are preposterously high. Private persons do not feel secure enough to invest capital in new dwelling-houses, and this is the most telling testimony of all against the permanent use of the city as the capital. In the way of diversion Angora is endowed with a restaurant, said to be "nearly as good as Tokathan's" (but it is not), and one cinema. The latter is unventilated and always thick with smoke. Both owe their existence in some way to Government help.

4. In spite of these depressing surroundings the predominant tone of the people we encountered was one of incredible and unbounded optimism, not merely as regards the town itself, but also as regards the politics of the future. I heard it solemnly stated that, the credit having been granted, the marsh would be drained and turned into a forest, and that there would be no mosquitoes this summer—and this from an intelligent, well-educated young Deputy, who I feel sure was sincere and was only deceiving himself. If these people were capable of being undeceived they would be truly pathetic. Those who are in the swim of politics, with whom mostly we came in contact, live in a fool's paradise, and the only one heard by any of us to say what Angora really is was Rejeb Bey, the Minister of Defence; but then I have the impression that Rejeb is a remarkable man. Among the small fry, living two and three in one rotten room, separated from their wives and families and paying high prices for food imported from Constantinople, there is none of the jubilant spirit of the governing class.

5. From Constantinople we had gathered the impression that the State and the Ghazi Pasha are one and the same thing, but it has been greatly deepened by our visit, and it is difficult to overstate the extent to which his personality seems to dominate the whole direction of affairs. It is he who has planted the capital where it is, and his will-power has brought people to persuade themselves that it is an ideal site, and his magnetism that has filled them with such optimism that they reject the evidence

[E 1727/175/44] No. 132A.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I CIRCULATE a note received from the Turkish Minister.*

2. On various occasions during and since the protracted negotiations over the question of Mosul the Turks have proposed that His Majesty's Government should hand the vilayet over to them in return for economic and commercial advantages. They have throughout believed or thought it politic to affect a belief that the real interest of His Majesty's Government in the vilayet was the oil that might be obtained from it, and to us and to others they have continually suggested that our policy was dictated by the oil interests, and that if they were safeguarded the fate of the vilayet was indifferent to us.

3. It will suffice briefly to enumerate their more notable attempts to reach a solution on these lines. The first occasion was at Lausanne, when an offer was made to Lord Curzon at a private interview to settle various outstanding matters, such as the Thracian frontier, in accordance with the British point of view, in return for the cession of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey. Next, after the Constantinople Conference in May and June 1924 had disclosed a wide and irreconcilable divergence between the claims put forward on behalf of Turkey and Irak respectively, and after the issue had, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, been referred for decision to the League of Nations, the Turkish Government continued to express a preference for a direct settlement without, however, submitting any concrete proposals. In the course of last autumn the present Turkish Minister in London approached the late Prime Minister with suggestions for a solution favourable to Turkish demands, in return for commercial advantages. Meanwhile offers of concessions had been made to various British financial groups on the understanding that they should influence His Majesty's Government in favour of a direct settlement in satisfaction of the Turkish claim. Lastly, I was approached by the Turkish Minister in January of this year. A record of the interview was circulated to the Cabinet at the time, and a copy is attached to this note for convenience of reference.† At this interview I stated clearly to Zekiai Bey that His Majesty's Government could not consent to bargain away the rights of Irak, of which we were the trustees, in exchange for economic advantages to British subjects, and that it would be useless for the Turkish Government to submit any proposals based on such a suggestion. Nevertheless, in spite of this explicit warning, it will be seen that the Turkish Government have now made formal proposals for an agreement on just this basis.

4. It will be further noted that His Majesty's Government are asked to bind themselves to a quite inequitable betrayal of the legitimate interests of the bondholders of the Ottoman Debt, both British and foreign, by endorsing Turkey's repudiation of her financial obligations. (It may be remarked in passing that this would constitute the most unpropitious preliminary to the very considerable investment of British capital and the flotation of a loan on the London market, which are contemplated under the proposed agreement.) In return for the abandonment of the rights of the people of Irak and of the bondholders, the Turks offer a great variety of concessions for the exploitation of oil, the construction of ports and railways, and the dubious privilege of advancing Turkey £15 million. An arbitration treaty and a commercial convention are thrown in as further make-weights.

5. It is not the first time that we have heard of these wholesale offers of concessions. Some of them figure in the Franklin-Bouillon treaty with the French of 1921 and in the famous Chester concession. Some of them, with or without authority, have been hawked about the City of London. When they are offered by the Turkish Government, it is with the purpose of attaining some immediate political end, after which they can, if desired, be withdrawn for similar use elsewhere on a subsequent occasion. When they are offered to financial groups the object has been, first, to bring pressure to bear on His Majesty's Government over the question of Mosul, and secondly, to attract foreign capital to Anatolia. Yet, while Admiral Chester is trying to raise capital on them in New York and someone else in London, both equally unsuccessfully, the Turkish Government are found peddling them in a third quarter. It is now suggested that His Majesty's Government should indicate to the Turkish Government the British groups who are prepared

* No. 118. † No. 13.

to undertake these very considerable investments in Anatolia, but it is very doubtful if the City would be found willing to risk a tenth part of the capital required. For, in effect, the Turkish offer amounts to a call for an enormous investment of capital without any adequate security. Turkish limited liability companies are to be formed to exploit the railways and ports in question, and they would, of course, be subject to Turkish law and Turkish control. The fate of past investments in Turkey does not encourage whole-hearted confidence in the security offered, and it is questionable whether, when it came to specifying the conditions of the contracts, agreement would be attainable between the demands of the Turkish Government and the guarantees required by the British investors. It is even more improbable, in present conditions, that Turkey would be able to place a loan of £15 million on the London market, and it is, I conceive, undesirable in the interest of the general financial policy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that she should be encouraged to do so.

6. It is clearly incumbent on me to submit these proposals to my colleagues, but I trust that they will support me in the line which I took with the Turkish Minister on the 21st January. There can, I submit, be no question at this stage of withdrawing the question from the cognisance of the League—still less of bargaining away rights and interests of which we are trustees on behalf of the people of Irak in exchange for economic concessions to British financial groups. A surrender on this point would involve (1) a complete reversal of policy on our part, (2) a disregard of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, (3) a cynical renunciation of the claim that we have solemnly and consistently urged on behalf of Irak on racial, economic, geographical and strategic grounds, (4) a highly discreditable desertion, both of the people of Irak and the Christian inhabitants of the north of the Mosul Vilayet, (5) a substantial risk of getting the worst of a discreditable bargain, and (6) marked discourtesy to the League of Nations, whose Commission of Enquiry have just completed an exhaustive local investigation lasting two months, and are about to frame their recommendations.

7. In the circumstances, therefore, I propose to return a firm but polite refusal to the offer communicated by the Turkish Minister.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

April 2, 1925.

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of their senses. So long as he maintains his position, there is no possibility of Angora being deserted. If he vanished to-morrow I think the thing would crumble at once; but if he remains with us some years it is quite a question whether, with his force of character, he will not have been able to give his institution some degree of semi-permanence.

6. We visited the Assembly two or three times, and, if you were to take off the Deputies' kalpaks and fezzes and leave out some of the hodjas, you might think yourself in any Central European Parliament. The proceedings were interesting and perfectly decorous, though outside, in the entrance by the front door, we could see the marks of the bullets that killed Halid Pasha six weeks ago. People work industriously in their offices in Angora, though, judging by the standards of, say, a small provincial town in Italy, they are squalid and untidy; but the fat old pashas are things of the past, and Ministers are young and can be found in their offices early or late. They tell you rather pathetically that they have nothing else to do.

7. On the whole, I think I may say that we found out little in Angora, about it or about its general atmosphere, that we had not already realised from Constantinople, except that on some points our impressions have perhaps been deepened; and I really think that the political situation in Turkey can be adequately, if not perfectly, observed from the old capital. It is to keep in contact with Ministers and to conduct ordinary business that visits to Angora are necessary. Verbal communication is the very essence of diplomacy, and it is difficult to understand without actual experience how it feels to conduct conversations with the capital through the uncertain medium of a Nusret Bey. It is like fighting with one hand tied to your back. I still think, though with regret, that His Majesty's representative in Turkey, whatever his future rank may be, will have to go to Angora frequently, and to be able to go there at a moment's notice. I find that it is just a year ago that I first expressed this view to your predecessor.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 1976/1976/44**] No. 132.

Sir E. Howard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 1.)

(No. 432.)

Sir, *Washington, March* 18, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1012 of the 13th June, 1924, regarding the American Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey, I have the honour to report that on the 13th instant the Senate, as the result of a suggestion made by Senator Borah, referred this treaty back to the Foreign Relations Committee. It is reported that President Coolidge had previously intimated to Senator Borah that he would like this treaty to be ratified before the adjournment of the current special session, as he believed that suspension of action for several months till the next Congress meets would be embarrassing to Americans residing in, or trading with, Turkey. It appears, however, that Mr. Borah, after examining the prospects of favourable action by the Senate, came to the conclusion that the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification could not be obtained, nearly all the Democrats being against the treaty.

On the 17th instant Senator King, of Utah, made a long speech in the Senate attacking the treaty, in the course of which he also condemned the attitude of the State Department in refusing to make representations to the Allied Powers regarding the disposition of the Turkish gold deposited in Berlin during the war. Copies of an extract from the Congressional Record containing the debate and the text of Senator King's resolutions on this question are enclosed herein.*

No action on the treaty can now be expected till Congress meets again at the end of the year.

I have, &c.
ESME HOWARD.

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* Not printed.

No. 133.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1925.

MY telegrams Nos. 62 to Constantinople and 100 to Paris of 3rd April: Diplomatic representation in Turkey.

Please make similar representation to Italian Government.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 101 (by bag).)

No. 134.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 100.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1925.

YOUR despatch No. 721 of 24th March: Diplomatic representation in Turkey.

Please express to French Government my thanks for their note. I presume that their representative in Constantinople has received note demanding transfer of Embassy to Angora similar to that referred to in my telegram No. 62 to Constantinople.

Reply which is suggested by Mr. Lindsay, and which I am authorising him to return to Turkish Government, subject to receipt of similar instructions by his French and Italian colleagues, is to following effect:—

> "His Majesty's Government take note, and desire to express their appreciation of the impending offer of land at Angora for construction of an official residence. They cannot, however, admit the existence of any condition imposing limitations on the movements of foreign representatives or on their freedom to reside any longer at one rather than another of their official residences. It will always be the duty of foreign representatives to reside in that place which the interests of their Governments and of relations with Turkey require."

Please urge French Government to send similar instructions to their representative at Constantinople, and inform them at the same time of further authorisation contained in second paragraph of my telegram to Mr. Lindsay.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 99, in D.)

No. 135.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1925.

YOUR despatch No. 224 of 24th March: Diplomatic representation in Turkey.

You should reply to Turkish note in concert with your Italian and, if possible, French colleagues, to whose Governments we are suggesting this answer, in the sense of paragraph 10 of your despatch, substituting, however, the words "foreign representatives" for "Ambassadors."

You might also express your personal conviction, on any occasion that may present itself, that while a British Ambassador would, when necessary, proceed to Angora as you have just done, yet if the Turkish Government were to persist in their demand that the Ambassador should reside permanently at Angora, it is probable that the whole question of British representation in Turkey would be reconsidered.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 102 (by bag), and Rome, No. 101.)

[E 2027/1786/44] No. 136.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received April 4.)

(Private.)
Dear Oliphant, *Constantinople, March* 25, 1925.

LATIFE HANUM (wife of Mustafa Kemal) is far too great to put in the mere corner of an official despatch, so I place her in the forefront of a private letter. She is small, not pretty, black hair, which was uncovered—this is considered rather advanced in Constantinople—intelligent, and speaking first-rate English. She was a year at a school at Chiselhurst and has spent besides six months in England since the war. We talked about women's rights. I was, of course, asked if I liked Angora. I said the Turkish Government intended to give us a site. "I should jolly well think they would," said she. Demeanour *posé* and dignified, withal agreeable. Dress rich, but not gaudy; curtains drawn and lights lighted; we burst into French now and then for the benefit of Colonel Tewfik Bey, the massive head of the household, who was present. It was no ceremony, for Tchankaya* has learned things since the Hungarian Minister went up last spring to present his letters and was later received by the lady with presidential ceremony—uniforms, evening dress, band and troops. It is a simple affair now. I told her my very best comic story, stayed twenty minutes agreeably enough, bowed, smirked, and took my leave.

Still to my Italian colleague "elle a montré le bout de l'oreille." For when he started talking about knowing her family in Constantinople she drily answered that she was far too busy to think of her family. But then he had put her back up over the question of women's rights. Women, he said, can be mothers, and that is enough for them.

I have never before seen Montagna at work on Turks and it was rather a surprise to me. He is extraordinarily tactless and makes the mistake, fatal with Orientals, of being sarcastic. It made me quite uncomfortable at a dinner to hear him gibing at Tewfik Rushdi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. From Angora he telegraphed *en clair* to his wife "Angora horrible comme toujours," and all Constantinople is ringing with it. Result is that he is making a bad impression up there. He is a nervous fellow, straining for results, with an eye always on the effect he is producing on Mussolini at Rome. His staff take their cue from him and make it worse. Mussolini has a fatal influence on his diplomats abroad. They are all expecting the sack at any moment, and they cannot be natural.

Montagna is staying behind till to-morrow at Angora, nominally to chase some wretched cases through the dirty offices of the place, really to see what Franklin-Bouillon is up to. Perhaps I shall hear something when he comes back, for I have not a notion what the fellow really is out for. Coupons, frontier, concessions, anything is possible, but something anti-British is probable. He has with him Mougin, of course, and Sarrou, a man of the same kidney, who nearly got taken on by the Turks in about 1921 to reorganise their forces and gendarmerie or something of that sort. From a good source, I am told that he (Sarrou) said on his way through here "nous ne pouvons pas rester inactifs pendant que la suprématie anglaise s'établit partout ici." I wonder if he did; and if it is. Balancing budgets do make a difference, and those who can afford to wait doggedly in the East may reap a late but rich harvest; but I have seen no signs of its coming yet.

I should like to think that our visit to Angora has done some serious good, but it is very difficult to know. Certainly we, who behaved with ordinary amiability, gained in comparison with the Italians, and we received many fulsome compliments which, of course, only roused one's suspicions. The Turks are now risking any rapprochement that has been effected by their silly note about the transfer to Angora. I did my very best to get them to answer nothing at all, but I am afraid we have touched up the Ghazi himself and we failed to get any real improvement. There is one little sentence in the middle of the Turkish note that stands out like Angora in its plain. It is just as if the Ghazi had spatchcocked it in with blue chalk. Observe that the French of the rest of the note is quite good, and that of the one little sentence is really bad grammar. The affair is very tiresome and dangerous, for decisions on it will be pregnant with consequences; and if we take a wrong turning we shall get further and further away from the right path and may find it difficult to get straight again.

One thing we did at Angora was to find quite a nice site for a house, as per description in official despatch; and yet I wonder if we shall get it, for it lies just

* The "Bell Rock" or isolated spot where Mustafa Kemal lives.

outside the boundary of the Ghazi's private estate, and I have an uncanny feeling that we may be snatching a Naboth's vineyard from a covetous Ahab. However, in asking for the land, we have only done what they suggested we should do, and if we do not get the land we shall at any rate have a grievance, and on public grounds a little delay in the affair of the house does not much matter if it is caused by the Turks. The whole controversy is about a comparatively remote issue, for how can any of us remove our Embassies within measurable time to the mountain top? On private grounds delay means a lot to me, for it makes me shudder to think how I am going to exist a few days at Angora at other seasons than the middle of March. How about tents? Would the Office of Works lend me a few decent ones? I could establish a bit of a camp on some dry waste ground perhaps. I should have thought the War Office would have dozens to spare. Somehow or other I shall have to go up to Angora at intervals; but even Tewfik Rushdi puts the completion of the new hotel only at the end of the summer, and that means the Kalends of Greece. Even then they are likely to commandeer it for a Government office. I am rather tickled at the idea of posing as a monument of protest in a tent.

He is a loathsome fellow is Tewfik Rushdi; and I counted him drink six glasses of raki at one dinner. Lord only knows how many he swallowed that I did not count. On the way home he upset in his car and pitched on his head. We passed the same way half an hour later and saw the overturned car, but in this country when you see an overturned car you merely pass by on the other side, "comme si rien n'était."

By the way, one of the prospective horrors of Angora will be the society. Seventeen men and two women; the pleasures of the table immoderately prolonged, and nobody can go home till midnight without being rude. Tehran as we knew it twenty years ago, but infinitely worse. Tehran, anyhow, is a far better place than Angora. Its European quarter was well laid out by someone, and nature is far kinder. Of course, as the man on the spot, I am necessarily biassed in favour of following lines of least resistance here, and letting Turks keep their Embassies somehow, but honestly I cannot say that the dignity of Angora deserves the honour. Whether or not other considerations, *e.g.*, the importance of the post or the importance of keeping on terms with the Turks, outweigh the indignity of the situation, you can judge in the Foreign Office better than I can here.

Yours ever,
RONALD LINDSAY.

E 2075/2075/44 No. 137.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 257.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 1, 1925.

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 562 of the 20th July, 1924, regarding the concession of the Ottoman Bank, I have the honour to inform you that, for some months past negotiations have been taking place at Angora for the conclusion of an agreement supplementary to that already signed by the bank and the Turkish Minister of Finance last year, but not passed by the Grand National Assembly.

2. This supplementary agreement was really designed to meet a number of criticisms which had been raised against the bank's concession in the Assembly and in order to enable the Minister of Finance to secure the passage of the new concession. On the 20th March, M. Steeg and Mr. Reid went up to Angora and signed this supplementary agreement with Hassan Bey, the Finance Minister. Mr. Reid has furnished me with a copy (see enclosure in this despatch).

3. Mr. Reid stated that, so far as the bank's concession is concerned, they found the atmosphere at Angora and in the Assembly even more "national" this year than last. There was undoubtedly a strong feeling afoot that the State bank ought not any longer to be, to the extent which it is, in the hands of the capitalists of two of Turkey's late enemies—(the kind of feeling, Mr. Reid added, against which Mr Parker will have to fight, in order to secure for British interests the running of the Anatolian railway or any other new lines to Turkey's capital)—this feeling was voiced in the Assembly by absurd allegations, *e.g.*, that the fall in the lira is due to the bank's speculations and that the bank is taking Turkey's money and investing it abroad—that it is, in fact, interested only in the dividends of its French and British shareholders and not in the financial welfare of Turkey.

4. All this criticism is reflected in the articles of the supplementary agreement. For instance, article 1 hints that other note-issuing banks may appear; article 3 is, in effect, a window-dressing declaration by the bank that they will put fresh money into the country, and other articles are aimed at safeguarding the progressively Turkish character of the institution.

5. Mr. Reid said that he was not sure even now if the bank will get their concession through. People at home had suggested that a little money paid in the right quarter would ensure this, but in biggish matters this sort of thing was no longer possible in Turkey. Even if the Minister of Finance was venal (in this case he is apparently not—on the contrary, he is an ex-professor of political economy of Stamboul University, with strong theories of his own on banking and commerce), it was not possible to bribe away opposition in the two Commissions of Finance and Commerce, composed of separate individuals, often fanatically national or wedded to theories. After the commissions came the People's party, and, finally, the Assembly. Only the last stage was a formality. So far the supplementary agreement is only signed by the Minister of Finance. The rest of the gauntlet has to be run.

6. If, of course, the Ghazi himself could be interested and be induced to give the necessary word of command, these obstacles could be quickly surmounted, and, as a matter of fact, the bank have done what they can in this direction by agreeing in a letter to the Minister of Finance, which is to be sent when the agreement is through, to advance to the new Ichbankesi (Bank of Affairs) at Angora the sum of £600,000. This bank is the bank in which all the Ghazi's money is invested, and is, in fact, the future rival of the Ottoman Bank, which Turkey's present rulers hope eventually to make the State bank. Mr. Reid said in confidence that the hardest part of their recent negotiation at Angora was a verbal discussion with Ismet Pasha, in which the latter, on behalf of his master, endeavoured to induce M. Steeg and Mr. Reid to raise the advance to £1,000,000. Apparently the Minister of Finance had previously accepted £500,000. Eventually, after a long and, at times, very heated discussion, Ismet Pasha accepted £600,000, the bank's representatives undertaking to recommend an increase of another £120,000 to their principals in London and Paris.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 137.

Appendice a la Convention en date du 10 *mars* 1340/1924.

Article 1er. Si pendant la durée de la concession mentionnée à l'article 1er de la convention du 10 mars 1340/1924 il est fondé par le Gouvernement une banque gouvernementale turque, autorisée à émettre des bank-notes, la Banque ottomane n'aura le droit de faire aucune objection à cet égard. Toutefois, le Gouvernement avisera quatre mois à l'avance la Banque ottomane, à titre d'information, de la fondation de ladite banque.

Cependant, en cas de création de la banque gouvernementale, les autres dispositions de la convention du 10 mars 1340/1924, des conventions antérieures et de l'acte de concession seront maintenues. En conséquence, tous les droits que la Banque ottomane possède en vertu des conventions et actes de concession susmentionnés et notamment la faculté qu'elle a d'émettre des bank-notes en conformité de l'article 3 de la convention du 10 mars 1340/1924 resteront en vigueur comme par le passé.

Art. 2. La Banque ottomane s'engage à ne pas convertir en son nom et pour son compte en devises étrangères les dépôts en monnaie turque qui lui seront effectués, avec ou sans intérêts, par le Gouvernement, les sociétés et les particuliers.

Art. 3. La Banque ottomane s'engage à affecter sur son capital la somme de 500,000 livres sterling à ses opérations en Turquie et à en faire l'emploi et le roulement en livres sterling.

Art. 4. La Banque ottomane s'étant engagée par l'article 2 de la convention du 10 mars 1340/1924 à ouvrir au Gouvernement un compte courant de 5,000,000 de livres turques, il est convenu qu'un montant équivalent à la moitié de cette somme sera avancé par elle en livres sterling qui seront décomptées au cours du jour de l'avance. Le Gouvernement restituera à la banque ledit montant effectivement en livres sterling.

Art. 5. La banque s'engage à porter au moins à 60 pour cent à la fin d'une période de cinq ans, à compter de l'échange de la convention, le nombre des employés turcs musulmans mentionnés à l'article 11 de la convention du 10 mars 1340/1924, et à porter le total des appointements de ces employés à 40 pour cent de la totalité des appointements, non compris ceux du directeur général et de son adjoint.

Art. 6. La banque tiendra en turc, au plus tard dans le délai d'une année, les registres et documents relatifs à ses opérations et comptes afférents au Gouvernement et aux particuliers résidant en Turquie. Si elle le désire, elle peut les tenir séparément en français aussi.

La présente convention additionnelle, faite en double, a été signée et échangée à Angora.

Le Directeur général adjoint
de la Banque ottomane,
A. H. REID.
Le Directeur général de la
Banque ottomane,
L. STEEG.
Le Commissaire aux Finances,
HASSAN HUSNI.

Le 22 *mars* 1341/1925.

[**E 2076/194/44**] No. 138.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 258.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 31, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 199 of the 10th March, I have the honour to report that the political situation in Turkey during the past three weeks has remained in a state of subdued inertia. The Grand Assembly at Angora continues debating, principally the budget; the Opposition as such shows practically no signs of life either in the Chamber or in the country, and if it has not been absolutely crushed, it certainly has been reduced to silence. The movement discernible last winter towards the development of a real parliamentary régime has received an abrupt check, and, with the predominance in the State of one individual less disguised than ever, it is not easy to see how it could now resume its progress without a recourse to violence, itself the very antithesis of constitutionalism. However sceptically one may have regarded the strivings towards political development in the past, it is impossible to withhold sympathy at contemplating the hopeless blind alley into which Turkish politics have now entered.

2. The Angora Independence Tribunal has set to work and has had offenders brought before it from various regions in Turkey, but so far chiefly from Cilicia. Two newspaper men from Adana have been sentenced to seven and to three years' imprisonment for reactionary language and for disloyal propaganda among mobilised soldiers, while the Vali, for remissness in producing witnesses, was fined £ T. 250. The tribunal for action in the eastern vilayets has not yet been started on its journeys, but, lest time be lost, one possibly dubious point was settled this week at a meeting of the People's party, viz., that sentences of death pronounced by courts-martial in the area of the rebellion may be executed on approval by the army corps and divisional commanders.

3. In this stifling atmosphere serious comment on public affairs in the press has wilted away. Hussein Jahid, in the "Tanin," keeps silence even from good words, and fills his columns with reminiscences of his internment at Malta, which, I am sorry to say, consist mainly of rather bitter complaints against the restrictions imposed in the island on himself and his fellow-prisoners. Other papers write about aviation, the Turkish theatre, Ramazan fasting, anything but internal politics. Even the Prefect of Constantinople enjoys an unaccustomed respite from attack.

4. As to the actual revolt in Kurdistan, I enclose herewith two reports* from Major Harenc summarising such information as to the course of events as is now available. There are certain indications that things are not proceeding quite as well as official communiqués would have us believe. There has been fighting at Varto, in the north-east, and at Sivan, north-east of Diarbekr; there seems to have been a considerable killing of loyalists by rebels. Melasgird was reported one day in the

* Not printed.

papers to be in the hands of the Kurds and the telegraph between Mush and Bitlis to have been cut. My Italian colleague yesterday received a telegram from his consular agent at Tiflis reproducing local rumours to the effect that the revolt has spread to Erzerum and Van, and that Russian troops were being moved to the frontier to help the Turks. The agent expressed the view that Bolshevik Armenians were not unconcerned in the Kurdish revolt "in order to show the necessity of rectifying the Turco-Russian frontier." These are but rumours of uncertain credibility; more serious is an article in the "Hakimiet-i-Millé," the semi-official organ printed at Angora. The article regrets that pacification cannot yet be spoken of. The rebels are active between Diarbekr and Siverek; there is strong propaganda round Mush and Varto; Dersim is worked on by religious chiefs; and the situation remains uncertain. The republic has taken all necessary measures to suppress rebellion and will succeed, but it must not neglect the further duty of cutting at the root of the ill by introducing wise measures of administrative and social reform on the heels of the armies of repression, and doubtless it has already laid its plans to that effect. This article could not have been written without approval by the Government, and has a certain importance. In contradistinction to the daily communiqués, which always imply that, the necessary concentrations having been effected, the revolt will now be suppressed, a pessimistic note is struck and the public is prepared for reform—even, perhaps, concessions to local sentiment, the nature of which is not hinted at in the "Hakimiet-i-Millé" or in any other paper.

5. There can be little doubt that the revolt is serious and that it is constituting already a serious strain on the Turkish State. A credit of £ T. 10,000,000 has been voted for its suppression, which brings the deficit in the budget for 1925 up to the acknowledged figure of £ T. 30,000,000, and I hear that many urgent public works, such as railway construction, are already being curtailed. If the revolt cannot be mastered quickly the sum allotted must surely be exceeded; if it is mastered and reforms are introduced, as suggested in the "Hakimiet-i-Millé," further expenditure yet will become necessary. These financial difficulties, with the considerable military effort put forth, must surely have a weakening effect, and it becomes almost impossible to believe that the revolt can have been engineered or precipitated by the Government to serve its own purposes. As to instigation from outside, I think it is hardly necessary to seek for it; suspicion could fall on the Russians on the argument of *cui bono?* but the only confirmation I have received is the rather flimsy one of the Italian telegram from Tiflis quoted above.

6. Now that the revolt has broken out the Turks have exploited it promptly to crush the opposition that was growing throughout the country against the radical and secular tendencies of the present régime and to strengthen the *de facto* autocracy of Mustafa Kemal; this is the incidental advantage arising out of an otherwise bad situation. Would they exploit it still further to the point of turning their troops round, once the revolt is crushed, and menacing the northern frontier of Irak, or even, as Major Harenc suggests in the closing paragraph of his despatch No. 5, enclosed herewith,* to the point of attempting a military *coup* against Mosul? To make either of these threats it will be necessary for Turkey first to crush completely the revolt in Kurdistan pretty quickly, and our information at present is so scanty and so uncertain, both as to the extent of the revolt and as to the efficacy of the measures taken against it, that I hesitate to pronounce a decided judgment. Granted the complete suppression of the revolt by the time the League renders a Mosul verdict thoroughly adverse to Turkey, and granted that the necessary concentrations had then been effected, I imagine that a *coup* against Mosul would, from the military point of view, be possible, and therefore may require consideration beforehand. All political aspects of the question are against any such likelihood, for it would be necessary for Turkey to set the League of Nations at defiance and to undertake hostilities against Great Britain single-handed at a moment when, as she knows, she would meet with sympathy from Russia only, and that of a character highly distasteful to her. Though individual Turks may find some satisfaction from talking big on such lines, I cannot now persuade myself that the governors of the country will seriously contemplate incurring such formidable risks.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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* Not printed.

[E 2077/55/44] No. 139.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 259.)
Constantinople, April 1, 1925.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 200 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to report that on the 28th ultimo it was announced in the press here that with the authority of the Soviet Government, the Russian Synod had invited the Œcumenical Patriarch to take up his residence in Russia. From enquiries which I have made I understand that the Patriarch has, in fact, received such an invitation, but that he has no intention of accepting it.

2. M. Exindaris, the Greek delegate on the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations, has just returned here. I am told that he has every hope of reaching a compromise on the lines mentioned in the first paragraph of my despatch under reference. The Patriarch's intention, according to my information, is still to convoke the Œcumenical Synod in Greece, and I believe he still has the support of the large majority of his Metropolitans in his determination not to resign.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2056/471/89] No. 140.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 805.)
Paris, April 2, 1925.

Sir,

IN my telegram No. 102 of the 14th March I had the honour to report the departure of M. Franklin-Bouillon for Angora. Since that date there has been a plentiful crop of rumours as to the nature of M. Franklin-Bouillon's activities in Turkey. Yesterday a report appeared in the "Sans Fil" to the effect that an arrangement had been reached for the retrocession to Turkey of Alexandretta, Antioch and Aleppo.

It was probably in consequence of this report that the French Government issued a *démenti* to the effect that English newspapers had announced that M. Franklin-Bouillon had been entrusted with negotiations in the name of the French Government regarding the cession of certain Syrian territories to Turkey. These reports were without any foundation. It should be observed, moreover, that M. Franklin-Bouillon had gone to Angora in a purely private capacity, and that in no way whatever had he received a mandate to carry on negotiations on behalf of the French Government.

This *démenti* is commented on in one or two of this morning's newspapers. The "Petit Parisien," for instance, after quoting the *démenti*, states that it must be observed on the other hand that the various questions outstanding between the two Governments are in a fair way of settlement. With regard to the reported cession of Antioch and Alexandretta, the "Petit Parisien" writes that there was never any question of their return to Turkey. There had, however, been a question of setting up an autonomous Administration in conformity with the Angora Agreement. That Administration had now been set up to the complete satisfaction of the Ottoman Government. With regard to the schools, out of forty scholastic establishments, twenty-two had adopted Turkish as their principal language, including the *lycée* at Antioch.

The "Petit Parisien" continues that the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Syrian frontier is equally on the point of settlement. Differences of opinion had only occurred in connection with a very small part of that frontier on the north-eastern extremity of Syria, where a mixed commission had examined the frontier. There was no difference of opinion with regard to that portion of the frontier which lay along the Bagdad Railway. As regards the Ottoman debt, there were hopes of an early agreement regarding the payment of coupons. Negotiations with regard to these various matters were, nevertheless, within the competence of M. Sarraut, the newly appointed French Ambassador.

The "Sans Fil," in publishing the *démenti*, also refers to various information which it has received, tending to show that M. Franklin-Bouillon's conversations

have, in fact, touched upon the special régime to be given to the Vilayets of Antioch, Alexandretta and Aleppo, and states that the Turks are very anxious to see the terms of the Angora Agreement put into force in this connection.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

[C 4458/3066/62] No. 141.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir M. Cheetham (*Athens*).

(No. 200.)
Foreign Office, April 7, 1925.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 101 of the 18th March, on the subject of the possible admission of Greece to the Little *Entente*, and of the relations of Greece with her Balkan neighbours, and more especially with Turkey.

2. In the fourth paragraph of your despatch you report that the French Minister suggested to you the possibility of the British and French Governments joining in an effort to promote better relations between Greece and Turkey, and you ask for instructions for your guidance.

3. I am desirous that in all spheres the representatives of this country and of France should co-operate as closely as possible, and I am glad that M. de Chambrun should have consulted you, but I find it difficult to believe that he had any authority or encouragement from his Government for the suggestion which he made. My own experience leads me to think that M. Herriot would desire to act with the greatest circumspection in all that concerns questions in dispute between Greece and Turkey, and that he would be very unlikely to volunteer any interference unless he had previous reason to suppose that his action would be welcome to both parties.

4. This is also the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I see little advantage and much risk in volunteering advice. It is extremely doubtful whether any advice that we might offer would be agreeable to both parties, or would, in fact, be followed by either. If one party accepted the advice and the other refused, we might find our responsibility inconveniently engaged, and, very probably, our influence and authority seriously prejudiced.

5. I recommend you, therefore, to abstain from volunteering any advice. If such a policy is to succeed it must proceed from the spontaneous determination of the Greeks themselves, meeting a like desire for a rapprochement on the side of the Turks. I need not say that such a movement would be in full accord with the desires of His Majesty's Government, who wish nothing better than the appeasement of old feuds and the reconciliation of former enemies. If your opinion is sought you can so express yourself, but you will avoid becoming committed in any way to particular proposals or engaging to act as intermediary, and you will, for the reasons which I have explained, take no initiative and volunteer no expression of opinion.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2139/109/44] No. 142.

Sir C. Eliot to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 8.)

(No. 90.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Tokyo presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from the Japanese Government, dated the 27th February, respecting the appointment of an Ambassador to Turkey.

Tokyo, March 5, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 142.

Baron Shidehara to Sir C. Eliot.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of the 17th February, in which, under instructions from His Britannic Majesty's Government, you inform me that His Britannic Majesty's Government, after previous

arrangement with the French Government, have sent instructions to the British representative in Constantinople to announce to the representatives of the Turkish Government the appointment of a British Ambassador to Turkey, that the French Government also have sent similar instructions to the French representative in Constantinople, and that the Italian Government are being invited to send instructions in the same sense to their representative there; that this notification of the appointment of Ambassadors will be made alike by the representatives of the three countries, Great Britain, France and Italy, on the 1st March, provided that they have received similar instructions by that date, that the notification will not be by joint action, but that the representatives of the three Allied countries will, on the 1st March, simply make a similar notification reporting the decisions of their respective Governments. Your Excellency further informs me that the French Government have instructed the French representative to add that the French Ambassador will reside ordinarily at Constantinople and will proceed to Angora when necessary at any time, and that a permanent official will be appointed to act for him at Angora.

I have the honour to notify your Excellency that the Imperial Government also, as a result of consideration of the various circumstances, are now engaged in arranging the formalities necessary under the laws of this country, with a view to the appointment of an Ambassador resident in Turkey. Until such appointment is made, they have decided to appoint the representative of the Imperial Government now resident in Turkey to be Chargé d'Affaires, and have instructed him to notify the representatives of the Turkish Government to that effect on the 1st March.

I avail, &c.
KIJURO SHIDEHARA,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[**E 1727/175/44**] No. 143.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Zekiai Bey.

Foreign Office, April 9, 1925.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 19th March communicating proposals for the direct settlement of the question of the Turco-Irak frontier and thereafter for economic collaboration between Turkey and Great Britain.

2. In forwarding these proposals you refer to our conversation of the 21st January regarding the relations between our two countries. On that occasion you spoke of the advantages of economic collaboration between our countries and enquired whether it was not possible to remove the sole political obstacle to such collaboration by a direct settlement of the outstanding issue of the Turco-Irak frontier. To this I replied that His Majesty's Government cordially reciprocated the desire for friendly political relations and would be glad to see our commercial and economic relations developed. But I felt bound to add that, much as I regretted the failure to obtain a settlement of the frontier question by direct negotiations at an earlier time and the necessity for referring it to the decision of a third party, His Majesty's Government could not now withdraw the question from the cognisance of the League of Nations, to whom the two Governments had remitted it; and I expressly informed you that His Majesty's Government would be obliged to refuse any proposals based upon the surrender of the rights of Irak in Mosul.

3. I had hoped that I had thus made clear the position of His Majesty's Government, but it appears, from the contents of your present communication, that you failed to appreciate my declaration or to convey it to your Government. For, on examination of the present Turkish proposals, I find that they are, in fact, based upon the handing over to Turkey of a considerable portion of the Mosul Vilayet.

4. I must therefore repeat that His Majesty's Government cannot consider any arrangement by which the rights of Irak would be surrendered in exchange for the grant of economic advantages to British subjects. After the fruitless discussions at Lausanne in 1923, and at Constantinople in 1924, the issue was referred to the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Commission appointed by the League has now completed its enquiries on the spot and is engaged in preparing its report to the League. Both the

British and Turkish Governments are pledged to accept the League's decision. In these circumstances, not only is the British Government precluded by its duties as mandatory from bartering away the rights and interests of the people of Irak, but it would appear to us a marked discourtesy to the League of Nations itself to withdraw from the council at this stage the decision which we have invited and for which the council has made all the preliminary enquiries.

5. His Majesty's Government must, therefore, decline to proceed with the proposed agreement, but I shall be glad if you will inform your Government of our hope that, when the frontier question has been settled in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations and the stipulations of the Treaty of Lausanne, our common interests may find their full and natural expression in cordial political relations and renewed financial and commercial intercourse.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[**E 2179/1091/44**] No. 144.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 268.)

Constantinople, April 3, 1925.

Sir,

HERR NADOLNY, the German Ambassador, is one of those who repeated to me the rumour referred to in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 258 of the 31st ultimo, that the troops concentrated for the suppression of the Kurdish revolt might be turned round and used as a menace to Irak. He returned a couple of days ago from Angora, where he had presented his credentials as Ambassador, and I asked him if he had gathered any further impressions as to these reports. He told me that he had questioned two persons about the possibility of Turkey's attempting a raid into Irak; the first, the Russian Ambassador, M. Suritz, who said to him with just a touch of regret in his tone that there was no indication of the Turks having any such intention and that he did not believe the rumours. The second person Herr Nadolny had questioned was Kemal-ed-Din Sami Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, with whom Herr Nadolny was on good terms. Kemal-ed-Din had simply scouted the idea of any attempt in the direction of Irak and had said that the Turkish Government would never be so imprudent as to fall foul of Great Britain in such a manner.

2. Kemal-ed-Din Sami, who is rated as one of the best generals in the Turkish army, was summoned by telegraph from Berlin to Angora to take command against the Kurdish rebels, and left in such haste that he could only take hand baggage with him. By the time, however, that he reached his destination the Turkish authorities had recovered confidence and began to think it unnecessary to pay the rebels the compliment of pitting Kemal-ed-Din against them. The pasha was therefore sent to Eski Shehr to settle some questions of accounts with the army corps he used to command there, and is now rather expecting to be sent back to his post at Berlin.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 2180/109/44**] No. 145.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 269. Very Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 3, 1925.

Sir,

M. JESSE CURELY, the French Chargé d'Affaires, called on me to-day to relate to me the circumstances in which he had made his recent journey to Paris.

2. He represents, as you may know, everything that is opposed to the Franklin-Bouillon-Mougin school of policy and line of procedure in Turkey, and, having voiced his feelings frankly in his reports, never knew quite how he stood at the Quai d'Orsay. About the middle of March he was surprised to receive a telegram from M. Herriot about his forthcoming transfer from here, but full of amiability, promises and compliments; he replied with one or two questions, and was told to come to Paris at once.

3. M. Sarraut he found reserved but friendly. He had said that he greatly disliked the idea of M. Franklin-Bouillon coming out to Turkey at all; that he had insisted that he should not be allowed to compromise the future in any way; but that all efforts to persuade him to give up the journey altogether had completely failed.

4. At the Quai d'Orsay everyone had been most friendly to M. Jessé Curély, including M. Herriot himself, who had spoken unreservedly and violently about M. Franklin-Bouillon, and had made it quite clear that a wide breach had opened between himself and that politician. M. Jessé Curély had gathered the impression that the offer of the mission to Turkey made to M. Franklin-Bouillon had actually been withdrawn by the French Government, and that this alone accounted for the appointment of M. Albert Sarraut. He feels like a man who, after expecting for months past to be recalled at any moment in disgrace, suddenly finds himself floated into smooth waters on the wave of a quarrel between politicians with which he himself has had nothing to do.

5. As to M. Franklin-Bouillon, his feelings are just the opposite. He returned from Angora to-day, and, learning at Haidar Pasha that M. Jessé Curély was on the quay at Tophane waiting to welcome him back, promply ordered the launch to land him at the quay of Dolma Bagtche.

6. The inference, however, to be drawn from the above is that M. Franklin-Bouillon has had no official authority to make any engagements whatever with the Turkish Government during his visit to Angora.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 2192/109/44**] No. 146.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 285.) *Constantinople, April* 7, 1925.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 269 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report that M. Franklin-Bouillon on the 4th instant received the journalists of Constantinople and gave them an interview. His declarations were lengthy and consisted largely of what is usually called "flapdoodle." He declared that he had no mission to fulfil at Angora, and the object of his journey was to explain and to excuse himself for his refusal to accept the Embassy to Turkey. This, he said, was due to the situation of politics in France, where the question of security so much overshadowed every other that he could not remain away from Paris. For this, however, he could offer his Turkish friends two consolations: the first, that he himself would be able to do in Paris ten times as much for a Franco-Turkish *rapprochement* as he could do in Turkey; and the second, that he would be replaced here by M. Sarraut, whose name he himself had put forward for the post, and who had been one of the first in France to rise in opposition to the Treaty of Sèvres. To such hands M. Franklin-Bouillon felt he could confidently entrust the safeguarding of Franco-Turkish relations; and he also congratulated himself on leaving behind him two friends, General Mougin and Colonel Sarrou.

2. That same evening M. Franklin-Bouillon left for Paris direct; he had intended to proceed viâ Bucharest, but gave out that M. Briand had summoned him to France by telegram in connection with the political crisis.

3. I learn on good authority that while at Angora M. Franklin-Bouillon's activities were seriously curtailed by illness; he was considerably troubled by an attack of angina. He saw the Ghazi Pasha on arrival and on departure only; he had several talks with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, but with Ismet Pasha only one. I have heard a tale that at Mudania M. Franklin-Bouillon obtained some concession from Ismet on giving a formal pledge that he himself would represent France at the Peace Conference and would there give the strongest support to Turkish pretensions, and that Ismet has never forgiven him for failing to redeem his pledge. This tale is perhaps confirmed by something Franklin-Bouillon himself said here, to the effect that the two men of the future in Turkey are Fethi and Reouf Beys.

4. It remains to be seen whether General Mougin and Colonel Sarrou will form part of M. Sarraut's staff. From the pretensions of the former it is to be doubted whether he will consent to sacrifice his present position of independence and subordinate himself entirely to his Ambassador in Constantinople; and it is equally

hard to believe that M. Sarraut, an ex-Minister, coming out as Ambassador, can allow the present state of affairs to continue. If Mougin leaves, French policy in Turkey may be loyal or disloyal to His Majesty's Government; but, at any rate, it will lose some of its present ambiguity.

5. As to Colonel Sarrou, I understand that he is being put forward for the post of military attaché, which General Mougin declines on the ground that he already practically has the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Colonel Sarrou, I believe, is of a somewhat unsavoury reputation in connection with concession-hunting schemes, and he does not possess the high technical qualifications which the French Ministry of War usually requires from the officers it nominates for military attachéships abroad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 2196/109/44**] No. 147.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 866.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of correspondence with M. Herriot respecting the place of residence of the Allied representatives in Turkey.

Paris, April 9, 1925.

Enclosure 1 in No. 147.

Memorandum communicated to M. Herriot.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador forwarded to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a copy of M. Herriot's note of the 24th March, regarding the Turkish proposal for the transfer to Angora of the Embassies of the three Allied Powers at Constantinople. His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to express to the Government of the Republic the thanks of His Majesty's Government for the assurances conveyed in that note.

His Majesty's Government presume that the French representative at Constantinople has received from the Turkish Government a note on this subject similar to that which has reached Mr. Lindsay. Mr. Lindsay has suggested a reply which might be given to the Turkish note, and His Majesty's Government are authorising him to reply in the terms suggested by him subject to the receipt of similar instructions by his French and Italian colleagues. The proposed reply is to the following effect:—

> "His Majesty's Government take note, and desire to express their appreciation, of the impending offer of land at Angora for construction of an official residence. They cannot, however, admit the existence of any condition imposing limitations on the movements of foreign representatives or on their freedom to reside any longer at one rather than another of their official residences. It will always be the duty of foreign representatives to reside in that place where the interests of their Governments and of relations with Turkey require."

His Majesty's Ambassador is requested to urge that the Government of the Republic may instruct their representative at Constantinople to return a reply in similar terms.

In addition to the above reply, it is being suggested to Mr. Lindsay that he should express his personal conviction, on any occasion that may present itself, that while a British Ambassador would when necessary proceed to Angora as he has just done, yet if the Turkish Government were to persist in their demand that the Ambassador should reside permanently at Angora, it is probable that the whole question of British representation in Turkey would be reconsidered.

A similar representation is being made to the Italian Government.

British Embassy, Paris, April 4, 1925.

Enclosure 2 in No. 147.

M. Herriot to the Marquess of Crewe.

A LA date du 4 de ce mois, l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu transmettre au Ministère des Affaires étrangères les remerciements du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour les assurances données par la note du Département des Affaires étrangères en date du 24 mars, relative à la proposition turque de transférer les Ambassades des trois Puissances alliées de Constantinople à Angora.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté présumant que le représentant français à Constantinople a reçu du Gouvernement turc une note similaire à celle adressée à Mr. Lindsay, a bien voulu charger son Ambassadeur à Paris de communiquer au Ministère des Affaires étrangères la réponse que Mr. Lindsay a été autorisé à faire à la note turque pour le cas où des instructions identiques seraient adressées aux représentants français et italien.

L'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté a donc reçu l'instruction d'insister auprès du Gouvernement de la République pour qu'il soit prescrit au représentant français à Constantinople de répondre à la note turque dans les termes similaires à ceux suggérés par Mr. Lindsay. Il a ajouté enfin qu'il avait été suggéré à Mr Lindsay d'exprimer personnellement l'opinion, en toute occasion qui se présenterait, que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre se rendrait à Angora aussi souvent qu'il serait nécessaire, mais que si le Gouvernement turc persistait à demander le transfert des Ambassades à Angora, tout le problème de la représentation britannique en Turquie pourrait être remis en question.

Le Président du Conseil a l'honneur de prier l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté de remercier le Gouvernement britannique d'avoir bien voulu communiquer au Gouvernement français la réponse que Mr. Lindsay a été autorisé à faire à la note turque. Le Gouvernement français entend demeurer attaché au point de vue sur lequel se sont mis d'accord les Gouvernements alliés en ce qui concerne leur représentation en Turquie et il se propose de prescrire à M. Jessé-Curely de faire parvenir à Nusret Bey la réponse ci-jointe, qui n'est pas différente dans ses lignes générales de celle que doit faire tenir Mr. Lindsay au représentant de la Turquie à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement français serait heureux de connaître le plus tôt possible le sentiment du Gouvernement britannique à ce sujet.

E. HERRIOT.

Paris, le 9 avril 1925.

Enclosure 3 in No. 147.

Proposed Reply to Nusret Bey.

LE Gouvernement de la République me prie de faire connaitre à votre Excellence, en réponse à sa note du 23 mars qu'il est très sensible à l'offre que le Gouvernement turc lui a fait de mettre à sa disposition un terrain à Angora pour la construction de la résidence de l'Ambassadeur de France.

Le Gouvernement français croit devoir toutefois réserver entièrement la liberté de résidence et de mouvement qui, contrairement à ce que semble croire le Gouvernement turc, est entièrement reconnue par le droit des gens aux représentants étrangers, comme il y en a du reste bien des exemples, tels que la résidence du Corps diplomatique à Paris, tandis que le siège du Gouvernement français était à Versailles, ou à Pétropolis au lieu de Rio de Janeiro; ou encore le cas nombreux où un État entretient un même agent diplomatique accrédité dans plusieurs pays ou ne résidant que dans un seul.

Le Gouvernement français, qui est très désireux de donner le plus grand developpement à ses relations avec la Turquie, entend bien que son représentant soit en relations étroites et aussi suivies que possible avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora. Mais c'est précisément le désir de donner à l'installation de son représentant toutes les commodités compatibles avec le fonctionnement des services d'une Ambassade importante qui a amené le Gouvernement de la République à assigner comme résidence habituelle à son Ambassadeur la ville de Constantinople, où il rencontrera toutes les facilités voulues à cet égard. Le Gouvernement français est convaincu que le Gouvernement turc se rendra d'autant mieux compte des nécessités qui ont imposé cette décision, que, par ailleurs,

l'Ambassadeur de la République française se rendra à Angora aussi souvent et y demeurera aussi longtemps que sa présence y sera nécessaire; il y sera représenté, du reste, d'une manière permanente, par un agent ayant toute sa confiance et toute qualité pour parler en son nom.

Le Gouvernement d'Angora peut être assuré que le Gouvernement français, en agissant ainsi, n'a en vue que de rendre la mission de son représentant en Turquie aussi fructueuse que possible pour le plus grand bien des deux pays.

(HERRIOT.)

[**E 2356/2356/44**] No. 148.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 20.)

(No. 301.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 15, 1925.

WITH reference to your predecessor's despatch No. 832 of the 28th July last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note which I have addressed to Nusret Bey regarding the appointment by the Turkish Government of sanitary counsellors in accordance with the declaration made by the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference on the 24th July, 1923.

2. My Italian colleague, on his return from Angora, recently informed the French Chargé d'Affaires and myself that he had learnt up there that the Turks were hoping to defer the appointment of these counsellors till the Sanitary Liquidation Commission had finished its work and then to take advantage of the fact that the interested Powers had no longer any hold over them in sanitary matters to avoid making the appointments altogether. In these circumstances we decided to address identic notes on the subject to Nusret Bey. The enclosed note shows the form agreed upon.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 148.

Note communicated to Nusret Bey.

AUX termes de la déclaration relative aux questions sanitaires signée a Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923, les délégués turcs, agissant en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs, ont déclaré que "le Gouvernement turc nommera, pour une durée de cinq années, trois médecins, spécialistes européens, comme conseillers de l'Administration sanitaire des Frontières. Ces médecins seront fonctionnaires turcs et dépendront du Ministère de la Santé. Ils seront choisis sur une liste de six noms, établie de concert par le Comité d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations et par l'Office international d'Hygiène publique. Leur traitement ainsi que les autres conditions d'engagement seront fixés d'un commun accord entre ledit Gouvernement et les deux organes internationaux susmentionnés."

L'Ambassade d'Angleterre a l'honneur de signaler à la haute attention du Gouvernement de la République turque l'intérêt qui s'attache à la prompte désignation desdits conseillers, afin qu'ils puissent, le plus tôt possible, prêter leur concours à l'Administration sanitaire turque pour l'établissement du règlement déterminant l'organisation du service sanitaire des côtes et frontières de la Turquie, dont l'élaboration a été prévue également par la déclaration précitée.

Mr. Lindsay serait reconnaissant à son Excellence Nusret Bey de vouloir bien le mettre en mesure de faire connaître au Gouvernement britannique les dispositions adoptées par le Gouvernement turc pour l'accomplissement de l'engagement qui a été ainsi pris par lui.

Ambassade d'Angleterre, Constantinople,
le 7 avril 1925.

[E 2368/1231/44] No. 149.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 302.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 14, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 145 of the 24th February last, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegate in this city informs me that the question of establishing formal relations between Turkey and Serbia is in a good way to be solved. On the Serbian side, Belgrade consents to give an independent diplomatic status to the Turkish representative there, who hitherto has worked only as a functionary in the Polish Legation, and will receive from the Turkish Government, though without prejudice, a note reserving Turkish rights in regard to the partition of the debt On the other hand, the Turkish Government consents to negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship of a simple character similar to those which have been concluded with other States. This reserves for other treaties the conclusion of commercial, establishment, consular, and other conventions, as and when they may become necessary, and in view of the small direct relations between Serbia and Turkey, M. Givkovitch does not anticipate the necessity of haste in these negotiations. Furthermore, Turkey has agreed that the negotiation of the Treaty of Friendship may take place either at Angora or at Constantinople—a very considerable concession for the Turkish Government to make. Finally, one further point has also been settled: hitherto, when a Serb subject established in Turkey has left the country for abroad, he has not been allowed to return to Turkey for more than a month, a procedure which, of course, caused acute inconvenience to its victims. The Turkish authorities have now admitted that this regulation was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law.

2. This settlement, if achieved, will constitute for Serbia a victory all along the line, though in a small field. M. Givkovitch ascribes the yielding attitude of Turkey to the revolt in Kurdistan and to the consequent desire of Angora to be in normal and correct relations with Belgrade during a conjunction of events in which the Greeks might choose to make themselves disagreeable.

3. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2358/194/44] No. 150.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 20.)

(No. 304.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 15, 1925.

I REPORTED in my despatch No. 258, paragraph 2, that the People's party had approved a resolution to the effect that death sentences passed by courts-martial in the area of the rebellion could be executed on approval by corps or divisional commanders. On the very day I wrote, the 31st March, this proposal came before the Assembly in the form of a Bill, and was opposed by the members of the Progressive party. The debate was quite stormy, and Rejeb Bey, the Minister of Defence, made a violent speech against the Opposition. The latter, with some courage, questioned the constitutionalism of the draft law, and pointed out that under the present exceptional legislation the Government would have it in its power by extending martial law to other areas than those of Kurdistan, to put a large part of the population at the mercy of courts-martial without proper guarantee that the power of capital punishment would not be abused. The law was voted by 120 odd votes to 21.

2. Since then the papers have reported several executions, especially at Diarbekir. To-day it is stated that at Bitlis the executions have taken place of Yussuf Zia, ex-Deputy of Bitlis, of Colonel Halid Jiranli, of his brother-in-law, Faik Mollah, and of one Abdul Rahman. There is no news of the Tribunal of Independence for the eastern vilayets having yet begun operations; that at Angora continues its activities, but they seem to be on rather a small scale, and none of its cases appear to be of great importance. It doubtless has a deterrent effect on the wayward.

3. At the beginning of the week the police of Constantinople raided the offices of the Progressive party and seized a number of papers. Reouf Bey, one of the most prominent members of the party, declared in the press that the Government was acting within its rights, and was quite at liberty to see anything; that the party had nothing to conceal from anyone. This is doubtless true; and the Government must know well that even if the Progressives ever had had any compromising documents in their premises, they would long ago have made away with them. The Government's object is partly to suggest that, even though the rebellion may be nearly crushed, political repression is not going to cease; their action will also have the effect of frightening people from joining the Opposition party, for there is nothing an Oriental dislikes so much as that the police should find his name included in a political list.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2359/362/65] No. 151.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 20.)

(No. 305.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 15, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a further report from Major Harenc, military attaché to this Embassy, on the progress of the operations against the rebels in Kurdistan.

2. It is always worth while remembering that all the definite and consecutive news received from the area of the rebellion comes from Government offices at Angora, and may therefore be open to suspicion. For more than a fortnight now it has recorded a series of successes, and place after place has been reoccupied by the Government troops. I imagine there is no reason to doubt these facts, for the rebel Kurds are without transport or commissariat services and cannot maintain concentrations long enough to oppose organised forces, who must therefore be able to proceed substantially to whatever towns or villages the higher command may order them to take. The interesting question now is whether the rebels will maintain the energy and determination to carry on a guerilla warfare, and if they do, how much they will thereby embarrass the Government. On this point I have no precise information. The newspapers have made one or two mentions of guerilla warfare, and Ismet Pasha in his declaration to the Assembly only a week ago (my despatch No. 289 of the 8th April) said that operations are not yet over, and foreshadowed the transfer of the warfare to the mountains.

3. The point is of interest to His Majesty's Government, as on it turns the question whether the Turks will be able to turn their troops round and use them as a menace to Irak, a question which I discussed in my despatch No. 258 of the 31st March (paragraph 6). It has always been known that many irresponsible Turks have had such a movement in mind, and it seems to be a current topic of conversation among officers. In the last fortnight the tendencies in this direction have been more marked and perhaps more authoritative. There has for some days been quite a little anti-British campaign in the press mainly about Mosul. Perhaps it is due to the return from Irak of Jevad Pasha, assessor on the League's commission, who has given pressmen material for talk; possibly too the papers, unable to discuss internal politics, are glad to let themselves go in diatribes against our imperialism. The campaign has not been very violent, but it has been fed by a stream of telegrams from Angora of an irredentist nature, describing repressive measures against pro-Turks in Mosul Vilayet. It is also stated that various agents are being recruited from among the discontented and exiled Turks in the Levant and sent to the area of the rebellion through Irak, and that Nestorians from Irak are being allowed to make attacks in the neighbourhood of Chal.

4. Rejeb Bey's language to Commandant Neyrone (see Major Harenc's despatch, enclosed herewith, paragraph 5*) is interesting. Rejeb is in the inner circle of Government and what he says is not irresponsible or unauthoritative. At the same time he would be well aware of the probability that his words would be repeated to the British Embassy, and from the fact of his having spoken as he did one can only

* Not printed.

infer that the Turkish authorities are not unwilling that His Majesty's Government should know that they are thinking of a threat to Irak.

5. In this connection it is worth while remembering the offer made by Zekiai Bey for a direct settlement of the Irak frontier question. It can hardly be supposed that the offer has been made seriously, for it is precisely of the nature which you yourself, only a month before, had told Zekiai would be inadmissible. The Turkish Government may have argued to themselves that it could do no material harm to their cause to put the offer forward; and that it would be useful for them with public opinion in Turkey to publish the facts of their offer if later on they did wish to carry out an aggressive policy in regard to Mosul. The news of the offer having been made has appeared here in telegrams from London as having been published in the "Daily Mail." I presume it was given out by the Turkish Embassy in London.

6. Finally, Turks will remember that last autumn they successfully jumped a claim north of Amadia and in Chal, and that they kept the greater part of their loot in the face of the League of Nations and of something like an ultimatum from His Majesty's Government. This recollection cannot fail to encourage those who are so inclined to meditate on a policy of adventure once more.

7. These possibilities are worthy of grave consideration. Still, even if serious Turks are thinking of them, even laying plans of a non-committal sort with a view to them, it would not necessarily follow that they have yet made up their minds to attack or even seriously to menace Irak. I do think they are toying with the idea; but the country is not in a condition to justify a policy of perilous adventure, and I doubt if, as a policy of desperation, an aggression against Irak would quiet discontent and rally the disaffected to the support of the Government.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2370/175/44] No. 152.

Zekiai Bey to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 21.)

Légation de la République turque,
Londres, le 20 *avril* 1925.

Excellence.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence et sur les instructions de mon Gouvernement, mis au courant des correspondances qui avaient été échangées avec le Gouvernement britannique au sujet de la question de Mossoul, les considérations suivantes :

Mon Gouvernement a pris connaissance des correspondances à la suite desquelles l'ancien Cabinet turc, en s'inspirant des suggestions qui m'avaient été faites dans mon entrevue avec leurs Excellences Mr. MacDonald et Mr. Thomas, lors de leur présence au pouvoir, et de l'avis et recommandations faites par certaines personnalités anglaises, avait envisagé l'opportunité d'arriver à un arrangement direct entre les deux Gouvernements, en vue de faciliter les travaux de la Société des Nations.

Le Gouvernement de la République, en se basant même sur les conversations que j'ai eues avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté britannique et sur l'intervention de certaines personnalités anglaises, est convaincu de l'impossibilité de résoudre directement entre les deux parties une question déjà soumise à la Société des Nations.

Le Gouvernement de la République, considérant notamment qu'il était au-dessus de son pouvoir de consentir aucun sacrifice touchant les droits que la Turquie possède de par les traités et pour d'autres diverses et puissantes considérations, a jugé nécessaire de préciser derechef ce point, afin de ne donner lieu à aucun malentendu. Il me charge d'en faire part à votre Excellence.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai par conséquent l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que ma note du 19 mars 1925 ainsi que le projet y annexé sont considérés comme nuls et non avenus, et que les droits revenant à la Turquie par les traités seront poursuivis dans le cadre de leurs stipulations.

Je saisis, &c.
ZEKIAI.

[E 2506/301/44] No. 153.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 133.)

Sir, *Athens, April* 17, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the appointment of M. Pericles Argyropoulos as Greek Minister at Angora has been officially announced in the press and confirmed by enquiry at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, though I do not believe that the *agrément* of the Turkish Government has yet been secured. M. Argyropoulos has held the post of secretary-general at the Foreign Office for several months. Though a Greek subject, he is partly French in blood, and as a result of long residence in Paris is said to talk Greek somewhat imperfectly. I have never heard, however, that his sympathies are particularly French. He has ability, and will, I think, be regretted in the diplomatic world at Athens.

2. The appointment of M. Argyropoulos to Angora has been made with the object of developing the slightly more cordial relations with Turkey which have recently been established. Conversations were initiated, M Argyropoulos told me, on the principle that to be in negotiation with an enemy is always better than to remain openly on bad terms. It was not expected that all questions pending between the two Governments could be settled, but I understand that Tewfik Ruchdi Bey and M. Exindaris have gone over a good deal of the ground and that the results have up to date been satisfactory.

3. More substantial accounts of these pourparlers may perhaps have reached His Majesty's Government from Constantinople. I gather that the main points under discussion have been the question of the Patriarchate and the indemnification of Mussulman owners of properties in Thrace which have been handed over to Greek refugees. A meeting of the principal officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was held some days ago under the presidency of the Prime Minister for the purpose of examining the information provided by M. Exindaris, but nothing has transpired to show that a real improvement in Greek relations with Turkey has taken place. Meanwhile, it is commonly stated that the Patriarch is showing great reluctance to resign. The situation, however, is not clear, and I am not for the moment in a position to forward an accurate report.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

[E 2492/313/44] No. 154.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 316.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 21, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Paul Boyer, administrator of the Paris School of Oriental Languages, arrived here on the 12th instant, accompanied by his wife, to study on the spot the organisation of the French Institute, to which I had last occasion to refer in my despatch No. 38 of the 14th January last. He and Mme. Boyer were introduced to Nusret Bey, delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, by M. Jessé Curély, the French Chargé d'Affaires, the following day, when they also had interviews with Ismail Hakki Bey, rector, and various professors of the University of Constantinople. Members of the teaching profession gave a dinner in their honour at the Union française on the 15th instant, at which M. Jessé Curély presided. They left Constantinople for Paris on the 18th instant.

2. In an interview which he gave to the local French newspaper "Stamboul," M. Boyer stated that the French Government would defray the expenses necessary to make the building obtained from the Turkish Government suitable for its new purpose, as well as the expenses of staff and material. The institute would be essentially a home for French science and for French savants, who would devote themselves to acquiring knowledge of the Turks and of things Turkish. It would differ from the French schools at Athens and Rome in not confining itself to matters of historic and archæological interest alone. It would welcome French men of learning of every kind, provided that their studies related to Turkey. He mentioned that Turkish art—architectural art, for example—had not been studied as it deserved, although it was quite original and distinct from Arab or Persian art. There were also numerous Turkish funerary inscriptions, the collation of which was incomplete and would be impossible unless prompt action was taken.

3. With regard to the arrangement of the building, M. Boyer stated that, in addition to four or five flats for persons who came to work in the institute, they would require a library and a lecture room. He pointed out that the French Government had in mind Franco-Turkish collaboration through an interchange of professors, as was becoming a general practice nowadays. Intellectual relations were bound to be formed between the members of the institute and their colleagues of the University of Constantinople. A place would be kept for the Turkish professors in the works which the institute would publish periodically, and it depended on them how large that place would be. He stated in conclusion that the institute would not fail to make a valuable contribution to knowledge of the East in general and of Turkey in particular, and would consequently bring together all those connected with it, because " if politics sometimes divide, science always unites."

4. I learn that at the last moment difficulties arose in connection with the handing over of the barracks (" Sari Kishla ") assigned by the Turkish Government for the use of the institute, and that Nusret Bey was obliged to write to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Instruction asking that steps might be taken for the transfer to be effected.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 2493/109/44] No. 155.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 317.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 22, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Baron de Villenfagne de Sorinnes, the Belgian Minister to Turkey, was received in audience by the President of the Republic on the 15th instant and presented to him his letters of credence.

2. I have the honour to enclose herein a translation from the Turkish of the speeches exchanged on this occasion. As you will observe, particular stress was laid on the commercial relations between the two countries. The Belgian Minister hints in no uncertain fashion at the desirability of concluding a commercial convention the President, in his reply, while saying that wheat and cotton abound in Turkey—a statement which is entirely untrue—adopts a very reserved tone towards the substance of M. de Villenfagne's suggestions.

3. Not the Belgians only are anxious to have a commercial treaty with the Turks. My German, Netherlands, Hungarian, Swedish and other colleagues have endeavoured to persuade the Turkish Government to negotiate, but quite in vain. The Turks have always informed them that they are quite willing to accord to their subjects the treatment stipulated in the Commercial Convention attached to the Lausanne Treaty in favour of Allied subjects, but Angora, though it has signed treaties with Austria and Poland, has recently refused to bind itself further by signatures even to this much, stating that a " gentleman's agreement " must suffice, and forgetting that for such an agreement two gentlemen are requisite. The Turkish Ministers state quite openly that the Commercial Convention of Lausanne was wrung out of them as the price of peace; that they intend to denounce it at the earliest permissible moment, and thereafter have all foreign Governments on the same footing.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 155.

Extract from the " Hakimiet-i-Millieh " of April 15, 1925.

(Translation.)

HIS Excellency the President of the Republic received the Belgian Minister, M. Villenfagne, at Chan-Kaya to-day with the customary ceremonial. The Minister presented his letter of credence and made the following speech :—

" Mr. President,

" I feel highly honoured in presenting the letter of credence, by which the King, my august Sovereign, accredits me to your Excellency (literally ' the Asylum of the Presidency '). You are the head of a nation which we esteem greatly for its sincerity, valour, clemency and magnanimity. Under your enlightened administration, the Turkish nation is adding to these virtues an *éclat* of progress which astonishes Belgium.

" I beg your permission to mention the following matter : We Belgians are a peace-loving nation. Our ambition is to develop our industries. Our geographical situation compels us to increase our industrial output in order that we may be able to procure the necessary wheat for our food, the necessary cotton for our clothes, and so forth. Our country, which has a dense population, is far from assuring this population's material requirements. We shall be glad if the Turks will discuss the means of effecting commercial exchanges profitable to both parties. Such commercial relations can only be discussed in an atmosphere of mutual goodwill. As representative to your Excellency of a nation which loves Turkey greatly, I shall direct all my endeavours to making Turkey love us as we love her.

" I trust I shall enjoy your goodwill to facilitate this task."

His Excellency the President of the Republic made the following speech in reply :—

" I receive with pleasure the letter of credence by which His Majesty the King of Belgium [*sic*] accredits you to me. I particularly thank you for the sentiments of esteem which you bear towards the Turkish nation, and for the amiable expressions which you have used in this connection. The Turkish nation greatly appreciates the qualities of magnanimity, valour, patriotism and application displayed by the Belgians. I am especially touched and pleased that your clear statements give proof of sincerity and truth. In effect, the wheat and cotton desired by Belgium exist in our country in abundance.

" The Turks, who, like the Belgians, have adopted peace and economic development as their greatest objectives, desire that the commercial and economic relations, which have existed between the two countries for long years and which are in harmony with the interests of both countries, should be developed in mutual good relationship and affection. There is no doubt that your endeavours in this direction will have the full support both of me and of the Government of the Republic."

On the arrival and departure of his Excellency the Minister the customary ceremonial was observed.

[E 2497/1091/44] No. 156.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 322.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 22, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 304 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that Sheikh Said, the leader of the Kurdistan revolt, was captured with some other sheikhs and a score of followers on the 15th March and was taken to Varto. It is stated that he is to be put before the court-martial at Khinis, his native town; also that he is to be tried before the independence tribunal at Diarbekir; that he will be executed in due course is open to no doubt. His capture is regarded by the Government as marking the end of the critical period of the revolt, and it is announced that no more official bulletins about the operations will be given out. The only item of news on this point given in the papers of the last week relates to the breaking up of some bands of rebels in the neighbourhood of Silvan. Executions by courts-martial are reported frequently, and the independence tribunal at Diarbekir is ready to begin work. I enclose herewith a report by Major Harenc, military attaché to this Embassy, giving details of the week's occurrences.

2. Telegrams from Angora freely state that British instigation of the Kurdistan revolt is now proved by documents found on, and by statements of, witnesses, but the accusations, when they have any precision, seem to relate to the period of 1919 and 1920, when ideas of Kurdish autonomy were very much to the fore. No details are forthcoming at present as to the immediate origin of the recent outbreak. On the other hand, there are reports that Nestorians and Armenians are

now being encouraged by the British authorities to penetrate into Kurdistan from the south.

3. I have already foreshadowed that a policy of repression throughout Turkey is likely to be maintained. On the 16th March Constantinople was surprised to learn that the Turkish edition of the "Tanin," Hussein Jahid's paper, had been suspended *sine die*, and three of its staff packed off to Angora. When they were examined by the independence tribunal they stated that they were mere subordinates who took orders from Hussein Jahid, whereupon the latter was arrested in Constantinople and sent up at once to Angora, where he is now awaiting his trial in prison. I understand that his friends feel some nervousness as to his fate. No convincing reasons for the suppression of the "Tanin" have yet been forthcoming, as for weeks past the journal has even ostentatiously abstained from any form of political comment, a kind of journalistic strike that may well be irritating to the authorities. Really he is being prosecuted for his well-known anti-Government opinions, but doubtless when the trial opens some kind of pretext will be found on which an indictment can be based.

4. On the 20th April, after the usual preliminary canter in the party caucus, the Assembly proceeded to deal with the question of the future régime in the eastern vilayets. Broadly speaking, the policy is one of repression, accompanied, doubtless, by the undoubted fiscal relief to be afforded by the abolition of the tithe—much as Ismet Pasha indicated to me in conversation at Angora. Martial law is to be continued for seven months from the 24th April; the independence tribunals are to remain in existence for six months longer than was originally decided; and death sentences rendered by the Angora tribunal are to be executory without reference to the Assembly—which is expected to adjourn to-day. The two latter decisions met with opposition in the Assembly from the Progressives, who mustered twelve and eighteen votes on divisions. The Government has also been authorised generally by the Assembly to modify the administration in the eastern vilayets. At present there is nothing definite to show how they propose to use this vast latitude, beyond a statement by Djemil Bey, the Minister of the Interior, foreshadowing the amalgamation of some small vilayets into larger units, and the appointment of one or more Governors-General with wider powers than are possessed by the present-day valis.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 156.

Major Harenc to Mr. Lindsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 21, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your information, extracts from the daily press of news regarding the insurrection in the eastern vilayets.* I regret that I have been unable to collect any other information on this subject, owing to my absence in Smyrna during the week.

2. The last official communiqué was dated the 15th, and announced that Sheikh Said, together with other leaders of the rebellion, who were endeavouring to escape eastwards, had been captured south of Varto, and that important documents and large quantity of gold had been found in Sheikh Said's saddle-bags; that Genj, the centre of the rebellion, had been occupied by our troops; that the authority of the republic had been re-established throughout the disaffected area; and that the insurgents, left without leaders, were submitting to the authorities; and that, since all organised resistance was at an end, and military operations had ceased, no further communiqués would be issued.

3. Since that date the news has been scanty. There are a few scattered bands still holding out in the more inaccessible regions; but the papers maintain that they will soon be dealt with, and confine themselves to recounting the activities of the "independence" tribunals and the various courts-martial; and recount the names of persons on trial and executed.

The responsible authorities are discussing the administrative reforms to be carried out in that area, and have sent commissions to examine and report on the conditions. There will be no undue haste in deciding on these reforms; and the Assembly has agreed to the independence tribunals functioning for six months longer than was originally intended.

* Not printed.

4. Apparently the documents captured during the operations show that the revolt was approved, if not actually assisted, by the British authorities in Irak. The examination of these is not yet completed, but the extracts published so far do not incriminate anyone except the Kurds themselves.

There is also a good deal of indignation expressed at the action of the Irak authorities in establishing Nestorians along the Turkish frontier.

5. It may be taken that all organised insurrection is at an end for the present. This does not necessarily mean that the aspirations of the Kurdish leaders towards an independent Kurdish State is at an end, or has been stifled. It remains to be seen whether the Turks will be able to carry out reforms that will satisfy the Kurds.

I have, &c.
R. E. HARENC.

[E 2370/175/44] No. 157.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Moukbil Bey.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 28, 1925.

IN reply to the note which Zekiai Bey addressed to me on the 20th April, I have the honour to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is unable to regard as null and void an official note from a foreign representative to which a formal reply has already been returned.

2. The views of His Majesty's Government regarding the question of the Turco-Irak frontier remain as stated in the note which I had the honour to address to Zekiai Bey on the 9th April.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 158.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April* 28, 1925.

ITALIAN Ambassador tells me that he hears from a reliable source at Angora that Government circles now feel very satisfied with position of affairs in eastern provinces. They have a very large concentration of troops there (he says 60,000), which, besides ensuring internal order, constitutes a strong moral pressure, not only on His Majesty's Government, but also on League, who, it is hoped, will thus be influenced to incline its decision in favour of Turkey.

I have not confirmed Italian Ambassador's figures quoted above.

He has it from an unimpeachable source that Prime Minister, while willing to allow this form of pressure to continue, is absolutely opposed to any action that will lead to serious difficulties with His Majesty's Government.

Deciding factor is President's attitude, as to which neither I nor Italian Ambassador have definite information. I think it will probably coincide with that of Prime Minister.

No. 159.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May* 1, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 64 of 21st April: Representations at Angora.

Apart from current local subjects, of which your Excellency can alone judge, only subject meriting mention at Angora is recent attitude of Turkish Government regarding Mosul.

Turkish Minister sent official note on 19th March making definite proposals for settlement of Irak frontier between two countries without reference to League of Nations. I replied on 9th April stating that, matter having been referred to League, His Majesty's Government must decline to proceed with proposed agreement, but expressing hope that when frontier question should have been settled in accordance

with decision of League and stipulations of Treaty of Lausanne, our common interests may find their full and natural expression in cordial political relations and renewed financial and commercial intercourse.

Turkish Minister in official note of 20th April expressed conviction of Turkish Government of impossibility of direct settlement of Mosul question, and added that, in order to remove any misunderstanding, his note of 19th March as well as proposals contained therein are considered as null and void.

I have replied that His Majesty's Government are unable to regard as null and void an official note from a foreign representative to which a formal reply has already been returned.

Such attitude on the part of the Turks is so contrary to customary procedure and international courtesy that it has created a deplorable effect.

His Majesty's Government desire to live in good relations with Turkey, and, as time and opportunity permit, to return to old terms of friendship which formerly existed between our two countries. I am, however, entirely mystified by this recent proceeding. I am unaware whether Zekiai Bey correctly reported his conversation with me in which the first suggestion of negotiations was made by him, and I replied that I could not entertain any proposals based upon the surrender of Mosul. If so, I do not understand what Turkish Government meant by putting forward proposals on just those very lines which I had then begged should not be adopted because we had no alternative but to refuse them. Turks' action may be summarised as follows:—

1. They put forward proposals which they had been warned were unacceptable.
2. Turkish Minister here informed press that no such proposals had been made.
3. After our reply had been sent he made preposterous proposal that they should be treated as *nul et non avenu*.

In view of this you may let it be known in highest Government quarters at Angora that I am wholly at a loss to understand the motives of such procedure, which it is difficult to reconcile with any sincere wish on the part of the Turkish Government for that improvement in relations which His Majesty's Government desire to see attained.

[E 2634/194/44] No. 160.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 4.)

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 28, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 322 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that the Assembly adjourned on the 23rd instant till the end of October. Apparently the budget was passed in due time, but no detailed account has yet appeared in the papers as to its final form. The Minister of Finance, however, has been reported in the press as giving an interview, from which I quote the following extract:—

> "Il n'est pas du tout juste de tant parler du déficit budgétaire. Les anciennes théories et les opinions classiques, au sujet du budget, n'ont plus leurs raisons d'être. Budget veut dire déficit."
>
> * * * * * *
>
> "A combien monte le déficit de notre budget?
> "Je ne saurais vous citer aucun chiffre à ce sujet."

An endeavour will be made to obtain and to report to you details on this subject, but, judging from the Minister's statement and from the silence of the press, it is possible that they may be inaccessible.

2. As to the rebellion in Kurdistan, there is little to report except that things seem to be following their natural course. The bands round Silvan have been broken up, and on all sides the inhabitants, both sheikhs and peasants, are said to be hastening in with submission and assurances of loyalty. Normal life is returning, and one paper reports that in a short time a part of the troops of repression will be withdrawn. On this latter point some doubt may be permitted. It is unlikely that

the Turkish authorities will either forgo yet awhile such advantage as they think they may draw from maintaining pressure on the Irak frontier by means of their present concentrations, nor will they willingly lose the present opportunity of smashing Kurdish nationality. We are unlikely to have any very reliable accounts of what has been going on in the last few weeks in the area of the rebellion, or of the punitive measures now in the course of execution; but the latter are certain to be very drastic, and will almost certainly necessitate the use of numerous forces.

3. That this policy of repression is to be followed, proof is to be found in a speech made yesterday by Ismet Pasha to the Congress of Turk Ojaghi (clubs for the propagation of Turkish culture). The pasha is reported as saying:—

> "We are frankly Nationalist . . . . and Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. Before the Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. At any price, we must turkify the inhabitants of our land, and we will annihilate those who oppose Turks or 'le turquisme.' What we seek in those who would serve the country is that, above all, they be Turks and 'turquisites.' They say we lack solicitude for religious currents; we will crush all who rise before us to use religion as an instrument."

This speech constitutes a very striking pæan of victory at the present moment.

4. Hussein Jahid, whose arrest by the Angora Independence Tribunal I reported last week (my despatch No. 322, paragraph 3), came to trial yesterday, but the case was adjourned. From what is published to-day of his interrogatory, it looks as if one, at any rate, of the charges against him is that his journal, in reporting police action against the Constantinople office of the Progressive party a few weeks ago, called it in its headlines a "raid" ("descente") instead of a "perquisition." I had heard this story before, but refrained from reporting it, because it seemed too flimsy, but, combined with Jahid's complete abstention from all political criticism or comment, it now seems that it had sufficed to justify a prosecution.

5. I hear an interesting report to the effect that Jahid Bey's arrest was ordered as a result of suggestion direct to the Ghazi Pasha by the president of the Angora Tribunal, and that, till it was an accomplished fact, nothing of it was known by Ismet Pasha, who was furious. This certainly illustrates the general disorder in the working of Government machinery and the immense power of the President; it might also mean that Ismet was losing personal influence, but on that point I prefer to suspend judgment for the present.

6. It seems almost certain now that the Ghazi Pasha will come to Constantinople next month and stay here for some weeks—probably at Beylerbey Palace, on the Asiatic side, which is easily guarded. Reports to this effect have often appeared before, but to-day they have a new tone of consistency and authenticity. I may mention also, in confirmation, that, when I was in Angora last month, Latifé Hanem told me that she and the pasha hoped to visit Constantinople this summer. It was at first said that the President would also go to France from here, but this story been discredited in the last few days.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2636/109/44] No. 161.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 4.)

(No. 353.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 28, 1925.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, ending with your despatch No. 389 of the 20th instant, on the subject of the residence of the foreign representatives at Constantinople or at Angora, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the notes which I and my French and Italian colleagues have addressed to Nusret Bey.

2. The French Chargé d'Affaires was, as you know, tied by his instructions to a text, and had to telegraph to Paris for authorisation to effect the only small change that has been introduced—viz., to eliminate the reference to Constantinople as the habitual residence of the Ambassador, which appeared likely to have a challenging effect at Angora. My own note and that of Signor Montagna call for no comment.

I trust you will find that all three are sufficiently identical in substance to demonstrate the solidarity of the three Allied Governments.

3. How these notes will strike the Turkish Government I cannot foretell, but I shall doubtless learn when I reach Angora in twelve days' time

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 161.

Mr. Lindsay to Nusret Bey.

Ambassade d'Angleterre,
M. le Délégué, *Constantinople, le* 26 *avril* 1925.

J'AI l'honneur de me référer à la note de son Excellence Tewfik Ruchdi Bey en date du 19 mars relative à la représentation diplomatique du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en Turquie. Agissant selon les ordres reçus de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir transmettre à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères la réponse suivante :

Sans vouloir s'arrêter sur les considérations de droit international invoquées dans la note turque, dont l'application universelle peut bien être mise en question, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique prend acte de l'intention du Gouvernement de la République de lui offrir un terrain à Angora destiné à la construction d'une résidence officielle. Il désire exprimer son appréciation de cette offre, mais en meme temps il ne saurait admettre que cette offre ou son acceptation puisse donner naissance à des conditions de nature à imposer des limitations quelconques sur les mouvements de son représentant en Turquie. Celui-ci aura toujours le devoir de se trouver là où les besoins de son Gouvernement ou des relations internationales du moment pourront l'appeler, mais il ne pourra être tenu comme règle générale d'habiter l'une quelconque de ses maisons officielles plus longtemps qu'une autre.

Veuillez, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 161.

Note from French Representative, Constantinople, to Nusret Bey.

LE Gouvernement de la République me prie de faire connaître à votre Excellence, en réponse à sa note du 23 mars, qu'il est très sensible à l'offre que le Gouvernement turc lui a faite de mettre à sa disposition un terrain à Angora pour la construction de la résidence de l'Ambassadeur de France.

Le Gouvernement français croit devoir, toutefois, réserver entièrement la liberté de résidence et de mouvement qui, contrairement à ce que semble croire le Gouvernement turc, est entièrement reconnue par le droit des gens aux représentants étrangers, comme il y en a, du reste, bien des exemples, tels que la résidence du Corps diplomatique à Paris, tandis que le siège du Gouvernement français était à Versailles, ou à Pétropolis au lieu de Rio de Janeiro; ou encore les cas nombreux où un Etat entretient un même agent diplomatique accrédité dans plusieurs pays ou ne résidant que dans un seul.

Le Gouvernement français, qui est très désireux de donner le plus grand développement à ses relations avec la Turquie, entend bien que son représentant soit en relations étroites et aussi suivies que possible avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora. Mais c'est précisément le désir de donner à l'installation de son représentant toutes le commodités compatibles avec le fonctionnement des services d'une Ambassade importante qui a amené le Gouvernement de la République à assigner une des résidences officielles de son Ambassadeur la ville de Constantinople, où il rencontrera toutes les facilités voulues à cet égard. Le Gouvernement français est convaincu que le Gouvernement turc se rendra d'autant mieux compte des nécessités qui ont imposé cette décision, que, par ailleurs, l'Ambassadeur de la République française se rendra à Angora aussi souvent et y demeurera aussi longtemps que sa présence y sera nécessaire; il y sera représenté, du reste, d'une manière permanente, par un agent ayant toute sa confiance et toute qualité pour parler en son nom.

Le Gouvernement d'Angora peut être assuré que le Gouvernement français, en agissant ainsi, n'a en vue que de rendre la mission de son représentant en Turquie aussi fructueuse que possible pour le plus grand bien des deux pays.

Enclosure 3 in No. 161.

Signor Montagna to Nusret Bey.

M. le Délégué, *Constantinople, le* 30 *avril* 1925.

AU cours de mon dernier séjour à Angora, son Excellence Tewfik Ruchdi Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République turque, a bien voulu m'adresser une note, en date du 19 mars écoulé, concernant la représentation diplomatique italienne en Turquie.

J'ai recours à l'obligeante entremise de votre Excellence pour la prier de vouloir bien transmettre au Gouvernement de la République turque la réponse suivante :

Le Gouvernement royal est très sensible à l'aimable offre qui lui a été faite par le Gouvernement turc d'un terrain à Angora pour y bâtir une résidence destinée à sa représentation diplomatique et il me charge de lui présenter ses remerciements.

Le Gouvernement royal, tout en acceptant l'offre en question, ne saurait de ce chef prendre aucun engagement quant au séjour plus ou moins prolongé que son Ambassadeur aura à faire dans l'une ou l'autre de ses résidences, d'autant plus qu'un des fonctionnaires de son Ambassade, jouissant de son entière confiance, se tiendra en permanence à Angora pour assurer le plus étroit contact entre la représentation diplomatique italienne et le Gouvernement de la République turque.

Le Gouvernement royal considère que sa manière de voir plus haut exposée ne porte aucune atteinte aux principes de droit international invoqués par le Gouvernement de la République turque, dont, d'ailleurs, l'application générale peut être mise en question.

Le Gouvernement royal, soucieux d'assurer que ses relations avec le Gouvernement de la République turque acquièrent tout le développement nécessaire et soient empreintes des sentiments de sincère amitié rattachant les deux pays, ne manquera pas de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour que son Ambassadeur se trouve en contact direct avec le Gouvernement de la République turque toutes les fois que cela sera nécessaire et pour que le bon fonctionnement des services de son Ambassade, dans l'ordre d'idées plus haut exposé, soit réalisé.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Ambassadeur d'Italie.

[**E 2678/2/65**] No. 162.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 6.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May* 5, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 194 of 1924.

Note from delegation of Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that Nestorians who left Hakkiari [group undecypherable] last year and those coming from the south are assembling in Rowanduz district with help of Seyyid Taha and preparing to cross frontier near Tiari Tkhub and Selmas.

Note adds that Turkish Government expects authorities to take measures to stop any incursion into Turkish territory.

Nusret Bey has no further details.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 22.)

No. 163.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (*Constantinople*).

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May* 18, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 72 of 14th May: Ferid Bey as Turkish Ambassador in London.

Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has been informed of the King's *agrément*.

No. 164.

Mr. Keeling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 24.)

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, May* 23, 1925.

SIR M. CHEETHAM'S despatch No. 91.

Press reports that Patriarch resigned yesterday. Greek Government cannot yet confirm.

[E 3004/175/44] No. 165.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 362. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 15, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that the day before I reached Angora I received your telegram No. 74 of the 1st instant relating to the Turkish offer to settle the Irak frontier question out of court, and lost no time in mentioning the matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in an interview I had with him on the 9th May. I recapitulated to his Excellency the sequence of events in this negotiation, and in doing so I ascertained from him that Zekiai had, indeed, reported to Angora the substance of your conversation with him of the 21st January with such accuracy that there was no misapprehension here as to its true purport. I said that His Majesty's Government were completely mystified by the procedure of the Turkish Government in now proposing that their note should be regarded as annulled. Such a suggestion was entirely contrary to usage; it was discourteous to His Majesty's Government, whom, it appeared, the Turkish Government were treating with frivolity ("à la légère"); it had created a deplorable impression on your mind and was of a nature to prejudice the task of improving relations between the two Governments. I should be glad to know what explanations I might convey to His Majesty's Government.

2. The Minister's reply was substantially to throw the blame of what had happened on his predecessors in office and to repudiate their action. When he came to power, he said, he found out that a proposal was being made by Zekiai Bey in London. He had not in Angora even a copy of what the proposal was. He had telegraphed to London to prevent any action from being taken by the Turkish Minister, but by then Zekiai Bey's note had been addressed to you formally and there was nothing to be done but to await the answer. The policy thus launched by his predecessor was completely opposed to that always favoured by Ismet Pasha and adopted whole-heartedly by himself. He and Ismet Pasha were convinced of the necessity of leaving the question to the sole arbitration of the League, and he could not understand what Fethy Bey and Chukri Kaya Bey were thinking of in putting forward proposals foredoomed to failure. He characterised their action as "une aberration," and he had taken the first opportunity to reverse it by instructing Zekiai Bey to declare it annulled, so that the Turkish Government now regarded the incident as closed.

3. Incidentally, I should mention, he also suggested that the action of the late Government in proposing a direct settlement was to some extent improper as being, if not contrary to, yet outside the terms of, the treaty to which the Turkish Government gave the closest and most scrupulous adherence. This view I contested. The League, I said, existed for the purpose of helping in the solution of international differences and could not object because such differences were solved without its help. Two parties to a suit could always come to terms out of court, on condition, of course, of submitting their solution to the judge.

4. To the main part of Tewfik Rushdi's reply I said that the situation was this: That a proposal had been officially made by the Turkish and officially declined by His Majesty's Government. This fact could not be contested or denied or annulled, whatever the Turkish Government might think about the incident being closed. In this view Tewfik Rushdi Bey acquiesced.

5. Ismet Pasha's Cabinet came to power on the 3rd March, and Zekiai Bey's note to yourself was dated the 19th March; nevertheless, with administration as bad as it is in Turkey, it is not impossible that the new Government required all these sixteen days to find out that some action was being taken at London under orders sent by

their predecessors, or that Zekiai should be in possession of instructions of which Angora had retained no copy. I do not mean to suggest that Tewfik Rushdi Bey's explanation of what happened is necessarily the true one, for he is a loose and voluble talker, and thinks that in conversation with diplomatists any sort of nonsense will do that is not susceptible of immediate and complete refutation; but it may be so. It is also possible that the Turkish Government—the present or the late one—may merely have done a foolish thing and only now realise its foolishness, and certainly the telegrams in the Constantinople press from Angora are all in the sense that no proposal by Turkey has been made at all. I reproached the Minister with the falsity of this stream of news, and especially with a statement by Zekiai Bey to this effect published only a day or two before; but he replied that no news on this subject had been given out to the newspapers by the Turkish Government; and as for the words attributed to Zekiai, it was notorious that Turkish reporters generally succeeded in reporting the exact opposite of what was said to them. This is perfectly true, but Mr. Edmonds received one newspaper man and got the truth of the affair printed, briefly indeed but accurately, in the "Aksham"; and I myself have told the true facts to several persons who have enquired of me, both here and at Angora.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3005/32/65] No. 166.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 363.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 15, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 362 of the 15th instant on the subject of the Irak frontier question, I have the honour to report that at my interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 9th instant I called his attention to the persistent propaganda of an irredentist nature in progress in the Turkish press on this subject. I referred especially to the repeated suggestions that the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet were longing for inclusion in the frontiers of Turkey, and that the Irak authorities were taking severe measures for repressing these aspirations. In the course of the winter, I said, I had noticed a statement in the press to the effect that an association was being formed in Turkey for the defence of Turkish interests in Irak. I had then spoken to Nusret Bey about it, but in case he had not reported my language I thought it appropriate to repeat it now to his Excellency. It could be assumed, I said, that the two Governments both desired the solution of the frontier question to be brought about as quickly and as easily as possible and were looking forward to the League of Nations' verdict being rendered, whereby a long step would be taken towards the re-establishment of cordial Anglo-Turkish relations. At the same time it was likely that the League's decision, when given, would prove, after the manner of most judicial decisions, to be somewhat in the nature of a disappointment to both claimants. It was idle to imagine, I said, that this Turkish press propaganda could have the smallest influence on the judgment of the League's commission or council; on the other hand, it must have an effect of raising the hopes of the Turkish public, and so, when a verdict of a disappointing nature is rendered, of increasing their disappointment, and so of making a whole-hearted acceptance of that verdict more difficult. I had noticed that the propaganda to which I referred had been particularly vigorous since Jevad Pasha had returned from Irak, and I suggested that perhaps he had been feeding it, and that it would be wise for the Turkish Government, both in their own interest and in that of Anglo-Turkish relations, to discourage it. Point was added to my remarks by the fact that to my certain knowledge it was a common subject of discussion among Turkish political and military circles that the Turkish forces now concentrated in the eastern vilayets might be used to constitute a military menace to Irak. Such action would of course be sheer madness.

2. Tewfik Rushdi Bey entirely concurred in my view of the suggested military menace to Irak. He said that it was impossible to contemplate any such action; the Turkish Government were bound to accept the League's decision on the frontier question, and would never dream of embarking on any policy of such a nature as thus to destroy the possibility of good relations with Great Britain, with whom they desired to be on the best of terms. As to the propaganda, he said he had not noticed anything in particular; he had never heard of any association for the defence of Turkish interests

in Irak; he did not think that Jevad Pasha was conducting any campaign; and certainly no propaganda of any sort on this subject was ever given out to the papers by the Turkish Government.

3. I repeated that the propaganda which I noticed was copious and violent; I hoped he would bear my words in mind and check it in the interest of both parties.

4. For comment on Tewfik Rushdi Bey's words reported above, I can only refer to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 362 already referred to. His statements and assurances inspired no sort of conviction, but they were hardly capable of immediate refutation, and they therefore serve his immediate purpose. At the same time, when he says that Turkey does not contemplate a military menace against Irak, it is not necessary to infer the contrary.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 3015/3015/44**] No. 167.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 381.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 18, 1925.*

ARRIVING in Angora on the 9th May, I saw Tewfik Rushdi Bey the same day and asked him if he would arrange an interview for me with Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister.

2. Next day I received a visit from a subordinate official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to tell me that Ismet Pasha was extremely busy, as he was shortly starting on a tour in the provinces, that he therefore greatly regretted that he could not receive me then, but that he would make an appointment for me as soon as he returned to Angora. The pasha did, in fact, leave for a tour through Sinope, Samsun and Caesarea on the 14th May. I myself left the capital on the 13th.

3. When the Turkish authorities press foreign diplomats to come and reside at Angora in order to be in closer touch with them, it seems absurd that, in the course of three and a half days, the Prime Minister should not have found any time in which to receive me, and I interpreted his failure to do so as a slight. At the same time I am entirely unable to find any satisfactory reason why he should wish to slight me. Several occur to my mind, but they seem too far-fetched to be worth mentioning.

4. I came to the conclusion that the best course to pursue in these circumstances would be to wait till the pasha returns to Angora and offers me an appointment and then to decline it, explaining that I regard his failure to receive me as a slight which I resent.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 3020/194/44**] No. 168.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 386.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 20, 1925.*

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 322 of the 22nd April, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies* of the "Stamboul" containing the accusation against Husein Jahid Bey, the editor of the "Tanin," his defence and the sentence given against him. This case has already been discussed in the English press. It has caused a most unfavourable impression here and in other parts of the country. Husein Jahid Bey is the one person in Turkey who has some claim to be called a journalist. While keeping a most discreet silence during recent events, he was known to be generally opposed to the Government, although he never joined the official Opposition. The Government evidently determined to get rid of one whose criticism might become awkward, and to give a striking example of its power to deal with potential adversaries.

2. The accusation was firstly that the "Tanin" had reported as a "raid" on the offices of the Progressive (*i.e.*, Opposition) party what was in fact a raid, but was more

* Not printed.

prudently described by other papers as a police "enquiry." The second head of the indictment was that by ceasing to write political leaders—which he did as a protest against new restrictions—Husein Jahid was challenging the authority of the Government at a moment when the Kurdish rebellion was jeopardising the existence of the State. The third charge, namely that Jahid Bey gave no support to the Government, represented the real grievance against him and seems to be largely due to personal antagonism between him and Ismet Pasha.

3. Husein Jahid's reply to this frivolous indictment dealt with such facts as had been brought forward and ended with an appeal of some dignity to history. The sentence, which was considerably heavier than was anticipated by most people, was banishment for life to Chorum, a village in the interior where during the war interned British civilians spent many miserable months.

4. Besides these proceedings, the Angora Independence Tribunal has, during its two months' existence, dealt with many people of lesser importance, and the aggregate effect has been a very strong deterrent. From almost every town in the western half of Turkey one or two individuals have been haled before it. They have been newspaper men, hojas accused of "carrying on religious propaganda," officials of the Progressive party, Kurds charged with fomenting rebellion, and others alleged to be guilty of "anti-republican activities." The justice rendered has been rough at the best and a farce at the worst. Sentences have ranged up to banishment or prison for life and a few executions. The court is small and packed with the right people. The only account of the proceedings which emerges is garbled. The Independence Tribunal which is working concurrently at Diarbekir, and deals with those who have had a direct hand in the Kurdish rebellion, proceeds in a more wholesale manner. I hear that it has been executing thirty or forty men a day.

5. Two days before it was to escape for six months from Angora, the Grand National Assembly rushed with almost no discussion through some amazing legislation. Press regulations were tightened up still more. Penalties were doubled. It was made a capital offence to attempt to modify the Constitution or even to dissolve or obstruct the Assembly. To attempt to bring about the fall of Cabinet Ministers by forcible means was made punishable by at least ten years' imprisonment.

6. The result of all these measures is that, for the moment at any rate, the Government is stronger than ever. The Progressive party is silent and its growth has been effectively arrested. The Government paper, the "Hakimiet-i-Millieh," of yesterday invited it in rather menacing language to hold one more meeting in order to wind itself up. The policy of a "benevolent despotism" is being consistently applied. How long the country will tolerate its decreasing benevolence it is impossible to foresee. That issue seems to depend on the army, and the army is apparently solid with Mustafa Kemal and the Government. It is impossible not to sympathise with those in this country who, like Husein Jahid, are suffering for higher principles, but at the same time I fear that under any other ruler than Mustafa Kemal, Turkey would take still longer to return to those settled conditions which our interests demand.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 3132/175/44**] No. 169.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 534.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 27, 1925.*

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called this morning to pay his respects.

He began, in his capacity of a soldier, by paying a fine tribute to the qualities of the late Lord Ypres, whom he described as not only enhancing the glory of his own country, but shedding distinction upon the whole military profession.

He then referred to my recent intercourse with Zekiai Bey, saying that he took upon himself and his country the blame for what had occurred, which he begged might be imputed to the inexperience of a new Government and not to any intention to offend, and he expressed the hope that, in the short time during which he remained Chargé d'Affaires and under the new Ambassador, these difficulties might be removed and our relations be placed upon a more satisfactory footing.

I replied that I had been frankly puzzled by the conduct of the Turkish Government in our recent conversations and correspondence, but that I had said all that was necessary to be said on that subject both here and through you, and that, as far as I was concerned, I did not propose to recur to it or think anything more about it. At the present time the only serious conflict of interest between us was in regard to the frontier of Irak. This question we had agreed to refer to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision both of us had undertaken to accept. It was, therefore, in course of peaceful and friendly solution. Apart from this I saw no point at which our interests conflicted, and many matters in which a restoration of the old and intimate friendship which had so long prevailed between our two countries, and in pursuance of which we had engaged in a great war for the defence of Turkey, would be of mutual advantage to us both. He might be sure that it was my desire to forget as far as possible the unhappy recent past and to get back to the old good understanding. In this connection I had made allusion to a friendly statement by the President of the Council shortly after the murder of Sir Lee Stack.

Moukbil Bey replied that the President was an old soldier, who nourished no Chauvinistic spirit, and he suggested that he himself and the President of the Council represented more truly the real sentiments of the nation than some new men, who had perhaps by themselves or their ancestors made fewer sacrifices for the Turkish Empire. He repeated that it was his earnest desire while Chargé d'Affaires to improve our relations and to make the attitude and character of Great Britain better understood among his countrymen.

I regret that at the time of this conversation I had not received your despatch No. 381 recounting Ismet Pasha's refusal to receive you. Had I known of it at the time, I should not have failed to mark my sense of this discourtesy to His Majesty's Ambassador. Indeed, I should probably have cancelled the appointment.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 170.

Mr. Keeling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received May* 31.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, May* 30, 1925.

GRÆCO-TURKISH negotiations.

Secretary-General informs me negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily. Greek representative on mixed commission arrives here to-morrow, and unless Turkish Government put forward eleventh-hour demands he will be authorised to conclude agreement to settle outstanding differences between the two countries.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 17.)

[E 3299/55/44] No. 171.

Mr. Keeling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 167.)
Sir, *Athens, May* 27, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 89 of the 23rd May, I have the honour to report that the Ecumenical Patriarch Constantine notified the Holy Synod on the afternoon of the 22nd instant of his resignation.

2. The decision of his Holiness I understand to be gratifying to the Greek Government, who welcome it as being a concession to the Turks calculated to facilitate the favourable conclusion of the negotiations now progressing with Angora. In addition, they are most anxious to retain the Patriarchate at Constantinople in some form, as, on the one hand, its existence may be used in the future as a basis for claims, and, on the other, its removal to Greece would probably give rise to friction with the other orthodox Balkan States.

3. The Patriarch himself, however, has been averse from resignation, his opinion naturally being influenced less by the political motives inspiring the Greek Government than by the more immediate interests of the Patriarchate itself. He would have

preferred a temporary sojourn at Mount Athos or in Salonica, where he, technically at any rate, would still be living among his flock within the limits of his ecclesiastical province, and he would appoint a local representative in Constantinople. He considered resignation tantamount to an admission of the principle that the Turks may compel any Patriarch, to whom they may for any reason object, to resign, whilst the continuance of the Patriarchate at Constantinople under existing circumstances is, in his view, equivalent to the maintenance of an organisation which would be deprived of all freedom of action.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
E. KEELING.

[E 3339/434/44] No. 172.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 427.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 1, 1925.

A FEW weeks ago the Italian Embassy in Constantinople informed the Turkish Government that two small warships were proceeding to Galatz in connection with the opening of the sessions of the European Commission of the Danube, and asked that these two vessels should be allowed to pay a short visit to Constantinople on their way.

2. No reply was received, and the Italian naval attaché, who happened to be in Angora, was instructed to enquire when the necessary permission was likely to be granted. He was informed that the matter had been referred to the legal advisers as there was some doubt as to the legality of granting such permission in view of the stipulations referred to in article 2 annex, sections 4 and 5 (*a*) of the Straits Convention. The point over which doubt had arisen was the omission of any mention of section 4 of the annex in the first line of section 5 (*a*).

3. This is of course only a quibble, as it is clearly indicated in section 5 (*a*) that Turkey is entirely free to permit warships to visit Constantinople, in which ca would not come under the heading of "vessels in transit."

4. The Italian Embassy eventually received a note from the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that, owing to the disturbed condition of the country, it was regretted that the necessary permission could not be granted. In the meanwhile, however, the vessels had passed through on their way to Galatz.

5. A further difficulty then arose, as it was not possible for even the larger of the two vessels to reach Piræus without refuelling. The Turkish Government were therefore asked to give permission for fuel to be taken on in the Bosphorus. This permission has been granted provided that the vessels only stop long enough to enable the fuel to be drawn.

6. I am reporting this incident, details of which have been supplied to me by Commander Macdonald, as it appears to me to show quite clearly the intention of the Turkish Government not to allow any foreign warships to anchor at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3343/21/44] No. 173.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 432.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul, Adrianople, reporting on affairs in Adrianople.

Constantinople, June 2, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 173.

Consul Dawkins to Mr. Lindsay.

(No. 9. Confidential.)

Sir, *Adrianople, May* 28, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 1 of the 5th February last, and in view of my impending temporary transfer to Constantinople, I have the honour to submit the following further report on subjects of local interest:—

Military Matters.

2. Since the expulsion of the Greek Patriarch, there have been several signs of nervousness on the part of the local authorities. Behind the demilitarised zone considerable troop movements are supposed to have taken place, while in it there has been a certain amount of requisitioning of animals, &c., for military needs, recruiting and training of recruits.

3. A notable feature is the local organisation of irregular bands, the so-called "chetas." Although I have not been able to get precise information, yet there is no doubt that a considerable body of men exists in the demilitarised zone, armed and presumably more or less subsidised by the Government, who could be called up immediately in the event of trouble, either to invade Greek territory or to resist the onset of the Greek chetas. It seems fairly clear that, if the Greeks and Turks fell out, each side would keep its regular troops well in the background from fear of encirclement and these chetas would be used.

4. It will be recalled that, according to article 3 of the Thracian Frontier Convention, the Turks have a right to maintain in this demilitarised zone a maximum of 5,000 men, composed of gendarmes, police, custom officers and frontier guards. Here one sees a considerable number of men dressed in what is apparently the ordinary Turkish soldier's uniform, though many of them also wear the badge of the gendarme on their caps. The explanation of this appears to be that, as the superior pay of the gendarmes could not be afforded by Turkey, these men are drafted here from the army and receive the name of "soldats-gendarmes," *i.e.*, they are paid as soldiers and do the work of gendarmes. As regards the quota allowed for the zone, it is impossible to say whether or not this is exceeded in practice. It seems a pity that a walk round the barracks (which are in an isolated position about a mile to the north of the town) would be so liable to excite comment that it seems hardly worth taking.

Political.

5. The Popular party is said to have strengthened its organisation here recently, and, before the Kurdish rebellion, it was reported in the Constantinople press that the Progressives also were about to set up a branch in Adrianople. Since then, however, I have heard nothing of the matter, and it appears that, as the army is loyal and everyone is thoroughly frightened of the Government, a general subservience is the order of the day.

Local Administration.

6. I have not yet had time to study this very closely, but I gather that the vilayet manages to keep its municipal council fairly under control, while the greatest real power remains in the hands of the police, who are numerous and well organised. There seems little doubt that the usual amount of "graft" goes on, though the values involved may be smaller than in former days, since the vilayet itself is so much smaller, while Angora and the Deputies probably demand a large share. A noteworthy case is that of the administration of abandoned property, as to which the manager of the Ottoman Bank here assured me that it was a "known fact" that each of the last six directors had left with £T. 6,000 to £T. 7,000 in his pocket. Even although these figures may be exaggerated, one may fairly ask why it has been necessary, in the comparatively short time since the creation of the post, to change the directors so often. I have it also on the authority of my French colleague that the sales of furniture from abandoned property were farcical, no one daring to bid against local Turkish officials—not even he himself, for fear of reprisals against his colony.

Non-Turkish Elements.

7. The rapid reduction of these may be judged from the following figures, which, although for Adrianople alone, are probably fairly representative for the rest of Eastern Thrace:—

(a.) *Jews.*—Probably about 25,000 in 1912, now estimated, I think probably rightly, at about 5,000. They seem to be hardly dealt with by the Turks.

(b.) *Armenians.*—Probably numbered about 1,000 or so during the Greek occupation. Many of them were rich, and these mostly left with the Greeks and settled in Dedeagatch, whence I hear, however, that they have latterly been requested to "move on" to Old Greece. There now remain probably about 140 families in all, and many of these would leave if the Turks would only give them travel permits.

(c.) *Bulgars.*—The Bulgarian vice-consul informed me that, out of a pre-war population of 250,000 in Eastern Thrace, there only remain 150 Bulgar subjects and about 500 Bulgarophone Turks in Adrianople and about 1,000 Bulgarophones in Kirk Kilissé. Most of these are of the working classes. A Bulgarian bishop remains and the Bulgarian school continues its work. The above figures for the present population are probably correct.

(d.) *French.*—The French colony, never very numerous, is now composed mainly of the staff of the "Collège français," a school run by Assumptionist Fathers, and a few remaining railway and other officials.

(e.) *Italians.*—Were formerly in great strength, but are now reduced to less than 200 persons, including the staff of a Franciscan convent school, whose labours are now much restricted by lack of pupils as also by difficulties raised by the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.
J. McG. DAWKINS.

[E 3345/55/44] No. 174.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 434.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 2, 1925.

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with my despatch No. 382 of the 18th May relative to the Turko-Greek negotiations and the Patriarchate, I have the honour to state that for some time past the local press has been reporting that the Patriarch Constantine had agreed to resign his office. This news seems now to be confirmed, and the letter of resignation was, on the 29th ultimo, read out to the Holy Synod who then and there proceeded to choose Nicholas, Metropolitan of Cæsarea, as *locum tenens*. The election of a new Patriarch is deferred until the 20th June.

2. The action of Constantine in resigning should materially assist the course of the general negotiations between Greece and Turkey, notably by enabling the former to withdraw the Patriarchate question from the League of Nations to whom it is still under reference. However, there may still be occasion for difficulties in connection with the election of the new Patriarch.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3346/1091/44] No. 175.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 435.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 2, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 386 of the 20th May last I have the honour to report that the Independence Tribunals continue their activities uninterruptedly at Angora and at Diarbekir. The chief case concluded in the course of the last fortnight is that of Seyid Abdel Kader, a Kurdish ex-Senator, who had certainly been connected a good deal with the Kurdish autonomy movements of 1919 to 1921. He himself had certainly not been absent from the vicinity of Constantinople for many months past, but, with half a dozen others, he was put on trial, and the Diarbekir court found that

he had been a real instigator of the recent outbreak, and he was duly hanged with his accomplices. Attention is now concentrated on the trial of Sheikh Said himself, who, with a score or so of men who were captured with him, came before the Diarbekir Tribunal a few days ago.

2. It is impossible to report these trials to you in any detail. Though the accounts, especially those from the Diarbekir Tribunal, take up a good deal of space in the papers, they are too obviously garbled to allow of any reliance being placed on them and too fragmentary to enable a reader to get any connected idea of what passes. Judging, however, from what is printed in the papers, one or two general impressions do stand out :—

(*a.*) The papers represent Sheikh Said as an uncouth, semi-idiotic individual, worthy only of ridicule. His reported utterances are almost all those of a simple man, acting under a strong religious impulse. He had seen Islam menaced by the attitude of the Government, and, of course, it had been his duty to rise and fight.

(*b.*) The accused are brought before the court in batches, five or six at a time, even twenty or thirty. They seem almost invariably to indulge in violent recriminations against each other, each one seeking to show that he was forced to take up arms by the violence of some other, on whom alone the blame must lie. These mutual accusations must be an unedifying spectacle; they excite the hilarity of the court, and render it an easy task to find verdicts of guilty.

(*c.*) Curiously little has transpired or been allowed to transpire as to any British instigation of or participation in the Kurdish movement. Mention has been made of one, Templi (? Tamplin), who, three or four years ago, was supposed to be a British agent, but turned out really to be a Turkish *agent provocateur*. I have no idea who this man can have been. It is also said that Sheikh Said hoped, after taking Diarbekir, to get into touch with the British authorities viâ Gezireh. This is about all the mention made of British activity reported so far in the newspaper accounts.

3. On the 26th May a statement by Rejeb Bey, Minister of National Defence, was published to the effect that the partial mobilisation was repealed, and that certain reservists now with the colours in the east were to be dismissed to their homes. At the same time they were to be replaced on the spot by recruits who have been called up in the normal course in the western provinces and will now proceed to the east so that the effectives in those regions shall not fall too low. The situation thus brought about is not yet quite clear. I transmit herewith a despatch on the subject from Major Harenc, military attaché to this Embassy.

4. Yesterday a manifesto on this subject was issued by the Ghazi Pasha, of which I have the honour to transmit copies herewith.* I call attention to the curious tone of menace pervading the document. In the opening paragraph he says that new troops are to "complete" the cadres weakened by demobilisation; he reminds the public that courts-martial and independence tribunals will continue their activities; and, after congratulations to the troops and to the chief of the staff (Mustafa Kemal is always extraordinarily polite to Fevzi Pasha), he reiterates no less than four times the maxim that the first duty of a Turkish reservist to his country is to respond immediately and cheerfully to the call to arms.

5. This tone of menace has its obvious utility for purposes of internal consumption. Perhaps also it is addressed to others—to Great Britain in the first place and in a lesser degree to the French, whom the Turkish Government may like to keep in a state of wholesome uncertainty. Even in Turkey it costs money to maintain reservists indefinitely with the colours, and the postponement by the League of Nations of its decision on the Irak frontier has prolonged by three months the strain on Turkish resources which was involved in the maintenance of an unnecessarily large force in the eastern vilayets. Turkey may well find it useful to relax this strain on herself, but she considers it unnecessary to relax any anxiety that her southern neighbours may be feeling.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 175.

Major Harenc to Mr. Lindsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, June 2, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have not been able to obtain any definite information to prove that demobilisation of reservists has actually commenced.

2. The information, obtained through what has hitherto been a reliable source, that there were considerable troop movements in the Smyrna district during the week ending the 24th May, and that two troop trains a day, estimated to carry an aggregate of 1,000 men, had passed between Muslimiyeh and Darbisiyah between the 24th and 30th May, cannot be taken as accurate in the light of the information received from His Britannic Majesty's consul at Aleppo, who states that, according to his information, these trains have been empty and destined to bring westwards those reservists who are no longer required in the eastern vilayets. This statement fits in with the declarations of the Turkish Minister of War, that the reservists "who flocked to the colours at their country's call" were now returning to their homes. On the other hand, the French Embassy apparently has got no definite information regarding the situation. Now the French military attaché is usually better informed regarding troop movements than anyone else in Constantinople, and it is at least probable that, if the Turkish Government was really demobilising the reservists that had been called up, it would not have kept this information from the French.

3. According to the information that I have been given in all the military schools that I have visited during the past week, it is definitely established that the number of battalions in an infantry regiment has been raised from two to three. This year's class of conscripts has been called up and that of 1923 is not due for release till the autumn. A low estimate of the strength of a regiment is 2,100, or for a division 6,300. The following divisions have been located in the eastern vilayets: 2nd, 5th, 7th, 12th, 17th, 41st, and the 28th regiment. There are also two cavalry divisions. This gives a total of 37,800 bayonets, 3,000 sabres and, if the divisions have taken all their batteries with them, 192 guns, or a total of approximately 46,500 men.

4. Whatever may be the situation as regards the demobilisation of reservists who were called to the colours for the purpose of suppressing the Kurdish rising—and it is quite likely that these are being released to enable the crops to be gathered—the fact remains that a good half of the Turkish army, on a war footing, is concentrated in the triangle Diarbekir–Bitlis–Jezireh-ibn-Omar, and, what is equally pertinent, they are as pleased with themselves now as they were in September 1923.

I have, &c.
R. E. HARENC.

[E 3347/109/44] No. 176.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 436.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 2, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Albert Sarraut, the newly appointed French Ambassador, arrived in Constantinople on the 15th May and proceeded to Angora to present his credentials two or three days later. There was nothing noteworthy in the speeches exchanged on this occasion. M. Sarraut remained about ten days in Angora, lodging in a native house in the town that has been hired by the French Government and furnished in an extempore manner from spare material in the Constantinople Embassy. I made M. Sarraut's acquaintance on his arrival, and since his return here we have exchanged official visits and had conversations.

2. M. Sarraut tells me he did not attempt to do any business with the Turkish Government and confined himself, on his first visit to the capital, to learning as much as he could about the atmosphere. With Turkish Ministers he adopted a tone of friendliness, though he carefully avoided genuflexions. He was frank with them and did not hesitate to utter criticisms of their methods of procedure. He told them he was anxious to see Turkey as strong as possible, "for you owe us a lot of money and we wish you to be in a position to repay us the maximum amount." He had noticed before going to Angora that during the visit of M. Franklin-Bouillon there had been

talk in the Turkish press of a Franco-Turkish *entente* from which Great Britain should be excluded; he had been anxious that no such talk should be addressed to him, and he had therefore made an early opportunity of volunteering to the Turkish Ministers that the solidarity between the French and British Governments was stronger than ever, and that their co-operation in all fields was close and cordial. He gave me the same assurance, and expressed the hope that our two Embassies might be able to work closely together in all matters—a hope which I warmly reciprocated.

3. He informed Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and I think the President too, that he had come to Turkey to attempt a settlement of the various outstanding Franco-Turkish questions; if he met here with frankness, honest dealing and an honourable respect for engagements taken, then he did not think there would be any difficulty in reaching agreements advantageous alike to both sides; if he did not meet with these favourable dispositions, then, as he was a politician and not a diplomat—one who had been a Minister yesterday and might be one to-morrow—it would be a matter of complete personal indifference to him that he should take his leave and withdraw from Turkey. These remarks were received by Tewfik Rushdi Bey with profuse protestations of good intentions on the part of Turkey.

4. M. Sarraut has come early to the conclusion that real contact with Turkish Ministers cannot be had except at Angora, and though he is no more enamoured of the place than others (his roof was seriously damaged by a tornado while he was there, and floods of rain came through into the rooms), he proposes to return thither in about a month's time, and will then doubtless begin serious discussions with the Turkish Government.

5. General Mougin is still part of the Ambassador's staff, but I understand he will shortly be leaving Turkey. Colonel Sarrou has been appointed French military attaché, but from a confidential source I gather that this was not effected without objection on the part of the French War Office, who are still making some difficulties with regard to the employment of this officer. I do not, however, look on M. Sarraut as a man who would be unduly influenced by his subordinates; he is brisk, alert and, I think, open, and I hope for good relations between the French and British Missions in Turkey.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3384/3384/44] No. 177.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 9.)

(No. 440. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 2, 1925.

I HAD an interesting conversation yesterday with the newly-arrived French Ambassador on the position of France, Great Britain and Turkey in general world politics. The French Government, said M. Sarraut, had not yet fully realised to what an extent British policy had ceased to be English, and what an increasing influence was being exercised on it by the dominions. This process had been going on rapidly ever since 1919 and now, more than ever before, the centre of gravity of the Empire, and the point on which the thoughts of London were concentrated was to be found somewhere in the Indian Ocean. He himself had watched this evolution from the observation post of Indo-China, where he had been Governor-General. The main result of it had, of course, been the change of attitude towards Japan, and the pressure of the dominions alone had brought this about. Mr. MacDonald's abandonment of the Singapore scheme he had never regarded as more than temporary—a reluctance to face squarely an inevitable conclusion. Now it had again been openly resumed. Singapore on the one side and Hawai on the other, with Australia as the pivot between them, were the arms of a pair of pincers between which Japan felt herself menaced. She had therefore lost no time in coming to terms with the Russians, and the latter were losing no time in trying to improve the position of Japan and China. He anticipated that these efforts would succeed. It was quite certain, he said, that England and America would not be able to wage a successful naval war against Japan from bases so distant as Singapore and Hawai, nor would they be able to blockade Japan to the extent of cutting her off from the vast field of supply constituted by Siberia, Manchuria and China. And yet Japan, with her ever-increasing population, must expand somewhere

and a war must ensue. With Oriental nationalism still rampant everywhere, the war would develop into one of Asia *versus* Europe in which every effort would be made to inflame every Asiatic and subject race against the European from Indo-China to Turkey and even to Morocco; but the danger of this Yellow Peril would be infinitely greater than any previous manifestations of it, in that Russia, who had been the advance guard of Europe, would now be throwing the whole of her vast weight into the opposite scale. In these circumstances it behoved England and France to detach Turkey from any possible leanings she might have towards an Oriental line of policy. He was encouraged to mention the matter by reading a telegram in the press to the effect that M. Briand was contemplating a general liquidation of all outstanding Anglo-French differences as had been done in 1904, a liquidation not confined only to the question of the French position in Europe. Turkey he knew was a weak State at present, but she had in her hardy fighting population elements of considerable value, and she was certainly unattackable by invasion by French or British armies. She was well worth detaching from any Asiatic combination, and she should surely be detachable, for after all it was a patent fact, already known to her, that the Russian's desire to penetrate to the warm southern seas was instinctive and irresistible. The only point of doubt in his (M. Sarraut's) mind was that of Turkish sincerity. Had she really and genuinely renounced all idea of recovering her lost dominions? Was she content to remain, as now, within the boundaries of Anatolia only?

2. This summary represents a long disquisition by M. Sarraut in which I was called on to make no remark. At the end of it another foreign Ambassador who had been waiting some time was announced, and our conversation ended, M. Sarraut remarking, as I took my leave, that I was going to London and might think well to submit the above considerations to the Foreign Office.

3. On the general *strategy* of the French Ambassador's remarks I can hardly express an opinion, as I do not know whether the danger of a new Yellow Peril is preparing, and if it is, I should like to have some idea of when it is likely to mature. Assuming that his *strategy* is right, then I should say that his *tactics* as regards meeting the danger with Turkey on our side and not against us must be unquestionable; but the difficulties in carrying out these tactics are more numerous than he thinks, and perhaps if our conversation had not been interrupted he might have come upon some of them himself. For the Turk will not look far ahead, and he will not make preparations beforehand to meet eventualities that are approaching even obviously. He is at present sitting elaborately on a fence, and any effort made now to bring him down on our side of it will only redouble his determination to remain where he is while he profits by the occasion to wring concessions out of our entreaties. If and while a Yellow Peril matures in the Far East he will speedily realise his own value and greatly enjoy his position of being able to sell favours to two sides at once. This position he will prolong to the very last moment, and if and when a crisis comes elsewhere, then, as in 1914, one side or the other will have to push him violently off his fence into the turmoil. This is a state of affairs which, with Turkey's present weakness and suspiciousness must remain for some years to come at the least, and which will make calculations by other foreign Governments almost impossible.

I have, &c.
RONALD LINDSAY.

[E 3535/52/44] No. 178.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 460.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 8, 1925.

THE German Ambassador gave me yesterday some information about his dealings with the Turkish Government over tariff affairs, which affords some confirmation and some amplification of the intelligence conveyed to you in my despatch No. 317 of the 22nd April.

2. The Turkish Government had always told him that though they were unwilling to conclude a commercial treaty with Germany, they were willing to allow all German goods to enter the country under the tariff of the Lausanne Treaty. In practice, however, it was clear that in various respects the Turkish authorities were applying higher duties than that treaty authorised. Herr Nadolny made vigorous representations against this, and urged strongly the conclusion of a *modus vivendi* by which each

country should ensure to the other most-favoured-nation treatment, but he met with no success. On specific questions matters were complicated by the German prohibition of the import of carpets (a sumptuary measure of general application and of no fiscal significance) while the Turks refused to think of the most-favoured-nation clause. They said it savoured of an exaction by a victorious from a vanquished State—they themselves had had to grant it as the price of peace at Lausanne, and even the Germans in 1871 had imposed it on the French in the Treaty of Frankfort. Any suggestions for negotiations by Herr Nadolny were met with tergiversations and futile excuses, as for instance that the Turkish Foreign Office was negotiating treaties with other States, and had not the time to attend to Germany. Finally the German Government lost patience and sent an ultimatum to Angora to the effect that if by the 1st March Turkey would not consent to accord most-favoured-nation treatment to German imports, it would subject Turkish imports to the German ordinary or higher tariff. I think Herr Nadolny said that in response to Turkish requests a fortnight's delay was granted, but finally the threatened measure was put into force.

3. At first it had little or no effect and seemed to have fallen flat, but meanwhile the German had been negotiating too with the Greek Government, and these discussions came to fruition in the form of a treaty in virtue of which Greek raisins are now able to enter Germany under the conventional or lower tariff. This immediately set Smyrna into an uproar, and the Turkish Government is inviting Herr Nadolny to negotiate a treaty with them at once—indeed they keep on telegraphing to him to come up to Angora immediately.

4. Herr Nadolny says that the agreement is to take the form of a treaty, and that the Turks still decline to accept anything so simple and so derogatory to their dignity as a mutual assurance of most-favoured-nation treatment. He hopes also to negotiate an "Etablissement" convention; but he does not expect the Turkish Government to agree to anything outlasting the Lausanne Treaty. Its ideal still appears to be a state of affairs in which it will be bound to nobody by any commercial conventions whatever.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3537/58/44] No. 179.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 463.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 8, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith printed copies of the Turkish budget* for the year 1341 (March 1925–26), together with an explanatory memorandum* furnished to me by Sir A. Block. It will be observed from the latter that, with receipts at £T. 153 million and expenditure at £T. 183 million, an ostensible deficit of £T. 30 million is anticipated, but that this may in reality be reduced to about £T. 20 million. It is, however, worth while remembering that in this latter figure is included a sum of £T. 7 million for the payment of interest on foreign debt in Turkish currency, and it is probable that the Turkish Minister of Finance, when he included this provision in his estimates, hardly expected that he would have to disburse the money.

2. I venture to repeat the warning often uttered before that the figures furnished in the State budget cannot be accepted with confidence, and that, failing the publication of any State accounts at the end of the year, it is almost impossible to conceive any useful idea of the condition of Turkish finance. On the side of the receipts it is generally supposed that the Turkish Government will have great difficulty in realising as much as £T. 10 million from sale of State land (Chapter 35); that the largely increased revenue from the land tax is very speculative, as no cadastral survey is in existence (Chapter 1); and that the loss of revenue entailed by abolition of tithe, put down at £T. 13 million in Chapter 6, is mere guess-work. On the other hand, I am told that revenue from tobacco is coming in very well. With the abolition last March of the Régie, the work of suppressing contraband was entrusted to the ordinary police and gendarmerie, who so far have performed their duties efficiently, while the smugglers have not yet organised themselves. At a

* Not printed.

moment like the present, when repression is in the air, secret associations of any kind are at a discount.

3. Sir A. Block tells me that he hears on good authority that Ismet Pasha has ordered the Minister of Finance to produce him a sum of £T. 100 million by the end of the year. Hassan Bey, the same authority says, proposes to do what he can in this direction by creating Government monopolies of petroleum and sugar, by introducing a head tax and death duties, and by further increasing consumption taxes on certain classes of imports. It is to be presumed that none of these measures can be enacted without legislation, and that their realisation must therefore wait till the end of the year.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 3541/1091/44] No. 180.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 468.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 9, 1925.

SINCE the 2nd June, the date of my despatch No. 435, the most striking event in Turkey has been the decree in virtue of which the central and all the branch offices of the Progressive party have been closed. This decision, taken on the 3rd June, was promulgated on the following day. It recites that, according to the findings of the two independence tribunals, various Progressives, availing themselves of the article in the party's statutes on the "respect due to religious beliefs and customs," had indulged in reactionary activities. These were fomented by agents of the ex-Sultan Vahideddin, and the republic must therefore abandon its hitherto lenient attitude and put an end to the Progressive organisation. The Government draws the attention of the citizens of the republic to the danger of using religion, "*which is the means by which the soul communicates with God*," as a political instrument for the attainment of certain personal aims. This very modern and "laic" definition of the scope of religion is striking, and it contrasts strongly with utterances of Sheikh Said to the Diarbekir tribunal reported in the press. The sheikh, in giving the reasons for his acts of insurrection, has said *inter alia* that, according to a pamphlet he had read, the Nationalists had reduced the Caliph to the state of a parasite; at Ismid a hoja who spoke disrespectfully of the Prophet was condemned to a fine of £T. 100, but the judgment was quashed by Angora; and the Sheikh-ul-Islamat at Constantinople had been turned into a girls' school in which dancing and the playing of the piano took place.

2. The Angora and Diarbekir tribunals continue at work, but the trial of Sheikh Said has made little progress, other cases having been interposed. The papers are now suggesting that the authorities are on the track of some vast secret organisation that has been working in the interest of Vahideddin, and that the impending trial of those concerned in it will produce sensational revelations.

3. The papers have published some fairly precise details of the factors which led to the condemnation of Sayyid Abdul Kadir and his accomplices referred to in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 435 of the 2nd instant. I enclose a cutting from the "Aksham" giving an account of these revelations;* and you will see that it is preceded by the photograph of a very elaborate hanging. An agent of Abdul Kadir named Keur Sadi got into touch with Tampling, who posed as a British Government agent but was really acting on behalf of the Turkish police. Tampling drew Keur Sadi out and received written suggestions from him of a highly compromising nature.

4. I understand that Tampling was originally in the Allied police here but left it and set up as a private detective with a certain Hulse as his associate. They were looked at rather askance by the British authorities, as they were understood to be willing to work for foreigners, but they were sometimes employed, notably by Sir A. Block on the forged bank note case. They are certainly in touch with the Turkish police. Tampling is believed to be no longer here, but Hulse is still in Constantinople and believed to be in the pay of and working for the Russian Bolshevik authorities.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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* Not printed.

No. 181.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 87. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June* 17, 1925.

MY despatch No. 69.

Members of Embassy staff on arrival at Konia on 2nd June saw about 800 demobilised infantry received with public welcome on return from Kurdistan. Troops were stated to be first batch to return to Konia.

At Yenijeh on 4th June they found train of about thirty-two trucks of demobilised men from Kurdistan. Train apparently full.

Units of above troops not identified.

(Secret.)

Captain McCallum, former British liaison officer at Beirut, was informed at Adana on 14th June by Turkish railway official that 7th [? infantry] division was returning to Adana immediately and that the first of its regiments was due that night.

[**E 3666/362/65**] No. 182.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 22.)

(No. 469.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Turkish delegation respecting Turkish concentrations in Kurdistan.

Constantinople, June 10, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 182.

Turkish Delegation to Sir R. Lindsay.

Excellence, *Constantinople, le* 9 *juin* 1925.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre note du 6 courant. D'après les informations que je viens de recevoir de mon Gouvernement, lors de votre entretien avec M. le Docteur Tevfik Ruchdi Bey pendant votre dernier séjour à Angora, M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères attira votre attention sur les nouvelles récentes relatives à la réunion d'un grand nombre de Nestoriens sur différents points dans le voisinage de la ligne provisoire tracée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, et vous pria de bien vouloir demander au Gouvernement britannique que toute action de leur part contre la zone turque soit interdite.

A la seconde entrevue, votre Excellence ayant déclaré que d'après les nouvelles qu'elle venait de recevoir de l'Irak de telles actions n'étaient pas à prévoir, mais que l'on s'y plaignait de l'arrivée en ce pays d'agents provocateurs, venant de Turquie, M. le Docteur Tevfik Ruchdi Bey affirma que rien de pareil ne s'était produit ausu du Gouvernement turc, et déclara en effet "que le Gouvernement turc désirait cultiver les meilleures relations avec le Gouvernement britannique, et qu'il était loin de son esprit de prendre une action quelconque de nature à constituer une menace contre l'Irak."

D'ailleurs, en tenant compte de la région où éclata le mouvement réactionnaire, la concentration de nos troupes n'avait pas été effectuée au nord de l'Irak, mais directement dans les environs de Diarbekir et de Bitlis. Le décret mettant fin à la mobilisation, effectuée à la suite des événements réactionnaires, survenus dans les provinces orientales, a été promulgué.

Actuellement les opérations relatives à la démobilisation et celles ayant pour but de compléter par des recrues, dans la mesure où cela est rendu nécessaire par la situation locale, les troupes permanentes suivent leur cours normal. Les nouvelles concernant le renforcement des troupes, se trouvant dans cette région par l'envoi d'autres effectifs militaires, sont sans fondement. Mon Gouvernement n'a pas actuellement connaissance

d'une cause intérieure ou extérieure pouvant nécessiter l'envoi d'autres effectifs militaires. Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de déclarer et de confirmer que toutes ces mesures consistent uniquement en des opérations d'ordre local et intérieur et ne constituent nullement une menace à l'égard d'aucune Puissance voisine.

Veuillez, &c.
M. NOUSRET.

No. 183.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 23.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, June* 23, 1925.

MY despatch No. 382.

Turco-Greek Agreement signed yesterday

(Repeated to Athens, No. 13.)

No. 184.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, June* 26, 1925.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 89.

There are two agreements. The first deals with property owned in Turkey by Greek nationals and property owned in Greece by Turkish nationals. Compensation is to be paid by the two Governments in cases where land cannot be restored to owners. All other properties to be restored within four months of exchange, lists of such properties to be prepared by the two Governments.

The second agreement not yet published, as it must pass first through the Greek Chamber (and presumably through Turkish) and then be submitted to mixed commission for exchange of populations for approval. It determines interpretation of article 16 of Exchange of Populations Convention, with particular reference to movements and properties of persons exempted through exchange, namely, Greek inhabitants (Turkish subjects) of Constantinople and Moslem inhabitants (Greek subjects) of Western Thrace.

Despatch follows.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 20.)

[**E 3822/3822/44**] No. 185.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 29.)

(No. 489. Confidential.)
Sir, *Therapia, June* 22, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the accompanying memorandum by Mr. Edmonds on general conditions in Adana and Mersina, together with a note on Adalia. Mr. Edmonds was four days in Adana, one in Mersina and half a day in Adalia.

2. Some light on the situation further east, at Mardin, has been thrown by Captain McCallum, who has just passed through there. He tells me that the two American missionaries who are there are cut off entirely from the rest of the world. Though their relations with the local authorities are quite friendly, they are not allowed to send or receive communications in any language. The object of these restrictions is, I presume, to prevent the leakage of news regarding the rebellion and its repression and regarding the movement of troops.

3. It would have been of great value if at the present moment there had been a British consular officer in Adana or Mersina who could have reported military movements. I venture to suggest that, if possible, an acting consul should be sent there in case the Turkish Government should be inclined to indulge in military demonstrations before the Mosul award in September.

4. For the reasons put forward by Mr. Edmonds and by Colonel Woods (in another despatch), I would recommend that the consular officer should be appointed for Adana and Mersina, and that, subject to any observations which he may make after his arrival, he should reside at Mersina.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Memorandum by Mr. Edmonds.

ADANA AND MERSINA.

ADANA is dirty and ramshackle. The Christian quarters remain largely destroyed; but the town is busy. Everyone thinks about cotton. It seems to be the one place in Turkey which is making real progress. As the population which fled from the French occupation re-establishes itself, and as agricultural machinery comes into use, the area of cultivation increases. This year's cotton acreage will, it is hoped, be 30 or 35 per cent. more than last year's, which again was more than that of 1923. Everyone is said to put into cotton everything he makes, and this in a measure explains why houses are short and repairs not done.

Population.

2. No one knows what the population is, but it seems to be about as follows:—

Adana and Mersina vilayets	...	...	...	125,000
Adana town (included above)	...	...	...	30,000
Tarsus „ „	...	...	...	10,000
Mersina town „ „	...	...	...	10,000

The pre-war Moslem population of the Adana and Mersina vilayets (then sanjaks) was, according to the best figures, 165,000. The ravages of war the Turks admit to have been heavy. The French occupation, they also admit, drove large numbers of Moslems out of the district. These are now trickling back again, and the knowledge that almost any fool can make money in the district is bringing down settlers from Erzerum, Sivas, Kharput and other distant parts where it is harder to get a living. The above figures, although the Turks would make them higher, are probably near the mark.

3. A large number of labourers—put by the Turkish authorities at 100,000—come into the district every year for the cotton season. They make about £T. 5 (say, 12*s.*), a week, *plus* keep. They are nearly all Kurds.

4. The Greeks have been exchanged to a man. About 15,000 Moslem immigrants have come in their place and have given the Government a lot of trouble. The Vali was away at a conference called by the Minister of the Interior for discussing the difficulties which have arisen in settling the immigrants here and in certain other districts. In Cilicia the immigrants have suffered from the heat and malaria. The mortality has been heavy. Those who have been dumped in country places—*e.g.*, Yemurtalik—have often refused to stay there and trekked back to Adana. Those in Adana have wanted to go back to Smyrna. Many are Cretans, who only speak Greek, and are in consequence looked askance on by the good Moslems of the place.

5. The true Turkish population is small, but perhaps not much more so than it has always been. It includes the official class and the better town class, and some villagers. But most of the peasants are Arab fellahs more or less Turkised according to the strength of the Turkish influences to which they have been exposed.

6. There are 100 Armenian men left in Adana, and more women and children and a bishop. They are in a poor way; but in Mersina there is one unobtrusive Armenian merchant who is doing well.

7. The Jews have naturally stepped into many of the Greek and Armenian businesses, but stories of the arrival of numbers of Jews proved untrue. One has certainly come from Rhodes and is doing well in Mersina. But not many Jews have come into the district. They seem to be a little less worried by the authorities than at Constantinople or Smyrna, but conscription drives a number of them away.

8. In Mersina there are a few Orthodox Syrians and a priest. They speak Arabic and are of Turkish nationality. The Turks at first wanted to send them to Greece—as, from the text of the Exchange Convention, they appear entitled to do—but, after discussion, they desisted. There are also a few Maronites in Mersina.

9. There are a good many Germans in Adana. Some have got good work in partnership with Turkish merchants or as clerks or artisans. Others find little to do, and wander on. In some cases German workmen have been glad to accept less than the native. There are also Hungarians about.

Politics.

10. With the suppression of the "Tok Seuz" and the arrest of its editor, Abdul Kadir Kemali Bey, early this year, all approach to active opposition seems to have been stopped. There is plenty of discontent with the Government, but it is mute. The Ghazi's claim to have rid the place of the French is recognised, but met with the rejoinder that most of the population helped too. The people are religious to the point of fanaticism, and, although the policy of secularisation and the restrictions on the hojas are disliked, the Government is probably more in favour than elsewhere, because times are good, and people have less leisure and inclination for carping. Mustafa Kemal's personal popularity does not seem to have been great enough to give him the ovation he recently expected—that, at any rate, is the local explanation of the Vali's summons before the Independence Tribunal. Nor was the Ghazi confident enough of his reception to dispense with the usual precautions for his safety.

11. The Valis of Adana and Mersina—each called Hilmi Bey—are little more than cyphers. The real power in Adana is the representative of the Popular party—an evil-looking blackguard called Fazil Barki Bey. He was sent to the place when the "Tok Zeus" was closed down and the policy of repression and delation started. He has commandeered rooms at the hotel and seems to live there gratis. His great occupation at present is dunning all and sundry for subscriptions for the Aeroplane Association. The total is already £T. 160,000. Donors of £T. 1,000 have their photos posted up; donors of smaller amounts their names; foreigners who refuse to give as much as they are asked look out for trouble.

12. In the same way the correspondent of the "Jumhuriet," a renegade Syrian Christian, named Faruk, seems to be the power behind the Vali of Mersina, an anodyne official of the older school.

13. At Adana, as elsewhere, the members of the old C.U.P. had begun to come to the front before the present policy of repression was started. Remzi Pasha, a deunmeh, who was a leader of the revolution at Monastir in 1908 and commanded an army corps on the Caucasus front after Enver's defeat there in 1915, has retired to a farm at Jeihan, a big village near Adana. He remarked that as a Unionist he was naturally out of things; but he expressed a hope for British support and financial co-operation, and alluded to the early flirtations of the Turks with the Bolsheviks as folly. Like so many other Turks (if he may be called a Turk) he asserted that Turkey had abandoned all aspirations outside her present frontiers.

14. A man more likely to speak the mind of the Government was the son of Sadik Pasha of Tarsus, the big landowner of the Mersina vilayet, with whom the Ghazi recently stayed. The son is a good specimen of the modern Turk—active in business, intelligent, anxious to learn and to make something of his country. The great task of the Government, he said, was consolidation. They had given up the Caliphate and other ideas of thirteen centuries ago, which only led them to spend their strength. They had forgotten the war and the armistice period. They wanted friends and support. He quoted Fevzi Pasha, the chief of the General Staff, as saying: "Now we have to conquer the whole of Turkey," *i.e.*, to win it over to modern ideas.

15. The same man—who is agent at Mersina for the Seiri Sefain—spoke of the good work being done by two colonels, Behij Bey, manager of the Anatolian Railway, and Saadullah Bey, manager of the Seiri Sefain. The Turks are very proud of having these two services tolerably run by themselves. The national railway policy, which is Ismet Pasha's hobby, has in view not merely strategic and economic purposes, but also apparently the spreading of modern ideas by encouraging intercourse. An official who was Under-Secretary of Finance in the early days at Angora said that the Government knew quite well that they must have a foreign loan to make the railways they wanted. The Government seem to be no less keen on making a system of roads which would be tributary to the railways.

16. The Adana paper is now the "Turk Seuzu," and is run by Ferid Jelal Bey, a young man of obviously Arab origin, but genuine Turkish aspirations. He is the

mouthpiece of the Government. In one leading article he reminds the farmers and peasants of the boon the Government has given them in the abolition of the tithe. In another he assures them that the Progressive party was bent on designs fraught with danger to the peaceful development of the country, and that its suppression was essential if prosperity was to be maintained. Another article is addressed to the religious who may be inclined to sympathise with Sheikh Said. It asks what sort of a religion the Sheikh's was who was maintained by British money. His religion was not true Islam. If he had come into Adana he would have set all the church bells ringing.

17. The Mayor of Adana is Ali Munif Bey, who was Under-Secretary for the Interior before the war, Governor of the Lebanon during it and a Malta deportee. He is an Adana man and, judging by the dirt and disrepair of the town, a very bad mayor. He was friendly.

18. The Adana population is old-fashioned enough for the men, like the women, to go to the theatre by themselves It is commonly said to be fanatical, but the few European women there go about the town freely.

19. Mersina has a much larger Levantine element and, after Adana, a clean, tidy and civilised air. Foreigners are more at home there. There is not the same attempt as at Adana to squeeze out the Levantines. The place is prosperous. Houses are not much destroyed. The Greek church has been changed into a mosque without being damaged. The houses vacated by Greeks have been more than filled by incomers from up-country and from Greece. The different races are friendly, but the Mosul question causes some uneasiness and holds things back. The town reads the Adana paper, and is as discontented and dare say as little about it as Adana. The Government house was burnt down the other day. They say the Defterdar thought it better than having his books audited.

20. Discussions over the proposed Franco-Turkish Frontier Convention are still going on at Aleppo and Angora. There have been no incidents on the Turco-Syrian frontier for some time. The Turks are dissatisfied with the way the French run the Mersina–Nusseibin Railway, allowing material and service to deteriorate in order to extract the last sou from it. The Turks talk of taking it over at the first opportunity unless the French improve things. Foreign capital is wanted—on Turkish terms, for the Turks are scared of foreign penetration; but apparently it is possible for foreigners to do good business -in cotton, at any rate—in spite of the Turkish terms. The Turks seem particularly anxious to interest British capital. The British forces have left a good name, and the French a bad one.

21. Of the Italians the Turks are not seriously afraid, because they think they could dispose of them as they did the Greeks; but they feel that they have to beware of Italian penetration, and are on the look-out. Even in Adana an impression has been made by reports of Mussolini overhauling the Ministry of War and by the interest in Anatolia displayed by Italian Deputies.

22. Aintab is said to be little more than a heap of ruins. Marash, Sis, Hajjin, and other towns north of Adana are reported to be still in a bad state as the result of hostilities.

Education.

23. As elsewhere, the Turk ojaghi is the great instrument for spreading modern ideas. Its chief member is the above-mentioned Ferid Jelal of the "Turk Seuzu," who is a disciple of the Minister of Education, Hamdullah Subhi Bey, the leading spirit of the whole movement. Ferid Jelal explained that members were now selected with care. Formerly anyone had been admitted, including many undesirables who were after their own good rather than the country's. Now quality rather than quantity is sought. Prospective members are put up by several old members, their antecedents are enquired into for a couple of months, and their final election is by decision of the local committee. The Adana ojak has three main lines of activity. Firstly, it promotes lectures, lanterns and cinema shows; secondly, it promotes games; thirdly, it attempts practical hygienic measures. The ojaks get occasional grants from the Ministry of Public Instruction. They raise funds by lotteries, subscriptions, flag days. They get buildings given them by the Government. (The Angora ojak is the Greek archbishop's house.)

24. Ferid Jelal Bey confirmed what a schoolmaster told me, viz., that the Government is alive to the danger of education turning out a lot of boys who want to wear black coats and be effendis. The Government mean to avoid such a result. Schoolmasters are enabled to pick out one or two boys for higher education, but there

are strict injunctions against developing a townee class of youth. The plan is to provide as much practical education as possible, *e.g.*, at Malatia there is to be a motor school! Turkey needs 70,000 teachers, men and women, and turns out only 200–300 a year. Ferid Jelal Bey had no fears of industrialism. It was one of the things he hoped might come about in a generation. (In Adana ginning factories girls sit twelve hours a day on a machine that shakes incessantly.) He thought the profits to be made on the land would prevent too big a drift to the towns, and that industrial training was therefore an aim to pursue ardently. The industrial school at Adana is at present unedifying. Some hojas schools are said to be open on the sly. Schools are so few that they are reserved for Turks; Kurds and Arabs go uneducated.

Hygiene.

25. There is malaria all over the Cilician plain. There is a great deal of ophthalmia in Adana, and there is a lot of disease of all sorts. Three doctors have just been sent to the vilayet to tackle malaria. They have good salaries, but counting enlarged spleens and doling out quinine in one or two villages will be no use. Radical measures for draining swamps are wanted, and these are only being talked about at present. Doctors now have to put in two years' public service before private practice. A callow young doctor has been appointed to Hajjin. His wife has been so highly educated at the American Girls' College at Constantinople that she could not stay at the Adana Hotel (she wears no veil), nor face a donkey journey to Hajjin. On market day, when the villagers were in Adana, they were herded into the municipality to be vaccinated, and not allowed to cross the bridge to their homes unless they could show a vaccination mark on their arm. The efforts being made in matters of hygiene are often childish; but it may be said that, whereas ten years ago the Government were scarcely aware of the problems to be faced, now they are roused by them, but do not know how to deal with them in practice. People at Adana claim—no doubt extravagantly—that with drainage and irrigation the Cilician plain could support 10,000,000 people, and it is their dream to make it a second Egypt.

Foreign Consulates.

26. At Adana there is a salaried French consul and an Italian consular agent. No other Powers have consuls. The Turks had the Bolshevik consul (M. Platt, now at Smyrna) withdrawn, because he took rather too much interest in local affairs. The German consul-general at Smyrna recently visited Adana, and, it is said, decided against sending a consul to Adana or Mersina at present. At Mersina there is an Italian consul and a French vice-consul, and Spanish and Greek consuls-general (both the latter for mainly personal reasons). The French consuls have certain mission property (now unused) to look after, and there is a good deal of coming and going between Cilicia and Syria. The Italian consul's district embraces Adalia, but the place of residence has been changed from Adalia to Mersina, no doubt to allay Turkish suspicions. He finds that Italians who try to start small industrial enterprises meet with many difficulties, but he believes that by working unostentatiously he can achieve a good deal. The Italians are the biggest foreign colony in Mersina.

Establishment of a British Consulate.

27. There is a choice between Adana and Mersina. Until about 1908 our consul lived at Mersina; after that he was in Adana. He is to be appointed primarily for commercial reasons. The commercial secretary thinks he should reside at Mersina. I think this would be much the best place; but he should keep in close touch with Adana, as being for general purposes the most important centre. Rail communication between the two towns is easy, and he should be given an allowance for travelling to and fro once or twice a week and perhaps for keeping an office at Adana. These details could be considered finally when he has seen the district himself. It would be quite enough for a probationer or a vice-consul to be sent to act as consul, provided he had some knowledge of the ways of Turkey. But it is time we had someone in Cilicia. Every Turk, official and other, to whom the idea was mentioned welcomed it as helping commercial relations with England, and, in particular, Manchester.

28. There are two Canadian ladies at the American Mission in Adana, a Maltese family at the railway station there, and the Rickards family at Mersina. There seem to be no other British subjects. From the consul's point of view, Mersina would be the best place to live in; life there is both pleasanter and cheaper than in Adana.

ADALIA.

Population of Vilayet.

Pre-war	210,000
To-day	120,000
Greeks and Armenians gone	30,000
Moslems arrived from Greece	6,000
Adalia town to-day, say	10,000

There are no British subjects. Most of the few foreigners are Italians.

2. The Turks are said to be old-fashioned, if not fanatical, and to dislike the new-fangled ideas; but they have had a sound lesson in that one or two of them have been haled before the Independence Tribunal—for very little reason apparently—and sentenced to prison. The Government have the place well in hand therefore.

3. The Vali is Sefa Bey, a brother of Zekiai Bey, the former Turkish representative in London. He is a professional administrative official, but apparently not an enlightened one. The most striking evidence of his character is the destruction of the old city walls which is going on steadily. The stones are sold at 20 piastres for a cubic metre. (I will try to interest the director of the Stambul Museum in stopping this scandal.)

4. There is a Hungarian "afforestation expert" in Adalia. He is said to be doing nothing. He looks as if he had been a country policeman at home.

5. The Italians have a nice little hospital, with no patients at all in it. They seem to have a few out-patients. They also have a girls' school, which is open. There is an Italian consular agent; but Italian penetration is evidently up against a complete stone wall.

6. Commercially, Adalia is insignificant at present. The Lloyd Triestino and Servizi Marittimi steamers call on alternate weeks and often discharge and load next to nothing. Only raw goods from abroad can be cleared at Adalia. Manufactured goods must be cleared at Smyrna or Mersina. This is designed to stop Italian penetration from Rhodes. In any case Adalia is the distributing centre for only a very small area—the Sparta and Burdur districts.

7. A first experiment in cotton growing is being made by a Frenchman, or Belgian, in partnership with a Turk. It is hoped locally that, if the experiment succeeds, it may be an inducement for the building of a branch of the Aidin Railway to Adalia, for which the company is now making a survey at the instance of the Government.

8. It would be waste of a consular officer to send one there at present.

KONIA.

Crops are good this year. The German irrigation area is said to be worked by the Turkish authorities, but very little cultivation was to be seen from the train, which passes right through it. It has brought malaria to the neighbourhood.

2. Immigrants from Greece have been installed, but the total population is much less than before the war. The villagers are said to be thoroughly cowed by the Government.

3. The Grand Chelebi was away—they said in Constantinople. No teaching is now allowed at the Mevlevi tekkieh. There are no Moslem students there from other countries now.

MALATIA.

A director of education, who appears unusually competent, is being sent to the Malatia vilayet. He is an admirer of Hamdullah Subhi Bey, the Minister of Education and an ardent patriot. His task appears to be to make good Young Turks of the Kurds, Turks and others in his new district.

W. S. EDMONDS.

June 17, 1925.

[**E 3823/301/44**] No. 186.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 29.)

(No. 490.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 23, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 89 of to-day's date, regarding the signing of the Turco-Greek Agreement, I have the honour to inform you that the main part of the agreement was signed on the 21st, while the annexes were signed yesterday.

2. The full text of the agreement has not yet been published, but according to a statement which has appeared in the press it is divided into four parts, concerning respectively:—

(*a.*) The inhabitants of Western Thrace.
(*b.*) The Greeks of Constantinople.
(*c.*) Greeks who left without a passport.
(*d.*) The property belonging to Moslems, which has been confiscated in Greece.

3. According to the terms of the agreement it appears that Greeks who left without a passport will not be allowed to return to Turkey. They will, however, be permitted to liquidate their real estate through their local agents, but within a fixed period.

4. Greeks who left with a Turkish passport will be allowed to return.

5. The Greek Government will refund to the Moslems concerned the sums realised from the sale of their real estate.

6. The owners of immovable property will sell their belongings to the State. The value will be estimated by experts of the two parties and the total amount will be paid to the persons concerned.

7. All these questions must be finally settled within nine months.

8. The local press reports that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated that the present agreement has solved almost all outstanding issues between Turkey and Greece, and that the goodwill displayed on both sides is of hopeful augury for the development of satisfactory relations between the two countries. The agreement would be presented at the first opportunity for ratification by the National Assembly.

9. I will endeavour to obtain a copy of this agreement and forward it to you in due course.

10. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[**E 3830/32/65**] No. 187.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received June* 29.)

(No. 500.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 24, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 247 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the continuation of the anti-British campaign in the Turkish press.

2. The first of the articles enclosed* in my note is that summarised in my despatch under reference, while the assurances to which I refer were reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatches No. 363 of the 15th May and No. 469 of the 10th June.

3. As you are aware, the "Hakimiet-i-Millieh" is the only paper published at Angora, and is admitted to be the semi-official organ of the Government.

4. It is probably true that nothing that appears in the press is of any real importance, but it appeared to me desirable to endeavour to bring home to Tewfik Rushdi Bey the responsibility of the Turkish Government and the desirability of paying some attention to the representations of His Majesty's Ambassador.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 187.

Mr. Hoare to Nusret Bey.

M. le Délégué, *Thérapia, le 24 juin* 1925.

JE prie instamment votre Excellence d'attirer la sérieuse attention du Gouvernement turc aux deux articles publiés par le " Hakimiet-i-Millieh," dont je vous remets copie. En les transmettant, vous voudrez bien rappeler au souvenir de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères que Sir R. Lindsay a eu, le 9 mai, une longue conversation avec lui au sujet de la propagande assidue et violente dans la presse turque, et l'a prié, dans l'intérêt des deux nations, d'y mettre un frein. Son Excellence a répondu que, quant à la propagande, il n'avait rien remarqué qui dépassât les limites d'un commentaire légitime, mais dans tous les cas le Gouvernement turc désirait cultiver les meilleures relations avec la Grande-Bretagne.

2. Dans la note que vous m'avez remise le 10 juin, vous avez, en citant la déclaration verbale de Tewfik Ruchdi Bey, réaffirmé que le Gouvernement turc désire cultiver les meilleures relations avec le Gouvernement britannique.

3. Je ne doute pas que cette déclaration a été reçue avec entière satisfaction par Mr. Chamberlain, qui, le 27 mai, a assuré le Chargé d'Affaires de Turquie qu'il désirait oublier les tristes événements du proche passé et voir rétablir la bonne entente antérieure.

4. Il m'est pénible de constater qu'aucune suite n'a été donnée à la représentation de Sir R. Lindsay. A peine un jour passe sans que l'un ou l'autre des journaux et assez souvent la presse à l'unanimité ne publie un " télégramme " sur la pression—même la " torture "—à laquelle les éléments de la population de Mossoul favorables à la cause turque sont exposés. En outre, il n'est pas rare de voir que les esprits du public sont chauffés contre l'Angleterre par des articles qui parlent d'une participation anglaise à l'insurrection kurde.

5. En lisant tous ces articles, je ne peux pas oublier—et il est impossible que leurs auteurs l'oublient—qu'une des principales incriminations contre Hussein Djahid Bey a été de s'être abstenu de commenter les événements. En publiant les commentaires que je vous signale, les journalistes doivent croire qu'ils suivent une ligne acceptable au Gouvernement surtout quand ils lisent dans l'officieux " Hakimiet-i-Millieh " les violents articles que je vous signale et je ne doute pas que le public qui lit les journaux ait la même impression. Si la presse était libre de toute restriction la question de cette propagande serait d'une importance secondaire, mais puisqu'elle ne l'est pas, le Gouvernement a une certaine responsabilité pour les nouvelles et les commentaires qui paraissent. Je dois donc prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien informer son Excellence Tewfik Ruchdi Bey du contenu de cette lettre, en ajoutant que j'ai cru de mon devoir de signaler à mon Gouvernement la continuation d'une propagande qui tend à rendre impossible les cordiales relations dont son Excellence a déclaré souhaiter l'établissement.

Veuillez, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

[E 3852/175/44] No. 188.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Hoare (Constantinople).

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1925.

I RECEIVED the Turkish Ambassador to-day.

He talked fluently, but somewhat obscurely, of the desire of the Turkish Government for good relations with this country, but observed that for this desire to be realised the wish must be mutual, and we must not continue to treat Turkey as if it were in the enemy camp. It was easier, so he suggested, for the British Government to take the initiative in making some friendly gesture than for the Turkish Government to do the same. Other nations—he named Germany, but I suspect that he wished me to understand Russia—were steadily cultivating Turkish friendship. The Turkish Republic desired good relations with us above everyone, for the British Empire was a world-power and the acts of its Government were of greater importance than those of the Government of any other nation. But the Turkish Government could not let go any support which it derived from other sources unless it was assured of British friendship and had security on our side.

I told his Excellency that I entirely shared his view of the desirability of cultivating cordial relations. The Republic of Turkey and the British Empire were both great Mahometan Powers and had, therefore, much in common. The Ambassador hastily interjected that the Turkish Republic was now so completely secularised that the fact that the British Empire included large Mahometan populations was now really immaterial to the view taken by his Government.

I repeated that, in any case, we had every desire to revert, as time and circumstances permitted, to the cordial relations which had so long existed between Turkey and this country. I was not aware that there was any question of difficulty between us at the present moment except that of the frontier of Irak, and, since we had both agreed to refer this question to the League and had both agreed to accept the decision of the League, whatever it might be, we might regard that difficulty as being as good as settled. I added that I did not exactly understand what he meant by the phrase in which he had spoken of treating Turkey as if she were still in the enemy camp. This was not at all our attitude. I followed closely all that happened at Angora, and I had at once taken friendly note of any friendly expressions that were used by the representatives of the Turkish Government either in the Turkish Parliament or to Sir R. Lindsay. Of course, there could be no question of an alliance, for, except in a very restricted field, as indicated in my public declarations, His Majesty's Government were not prepared to enter into any new alliances, but, short of this, we were ready to cultivate friendship.

The Ambassador at once said that an alliance was not expected, but he repeated that some friendly utterances on our side were required before the Turkish Government could take any further steps. I replied that the very fact that no occasion for a declaration had arisen since I had been Foreign Secretary showed that nothing of a contrary kind had been said from any quarter in Parliament. If an occasion arose naturally, it might be taken for such a declaration either on the one side or the other, but I thought it would be a mistake to go out of the way to create an occasion for a declaration for which there was no necessity. What I hoped was that the conduct of the Governments on both sides would be such that our relations would steadily improve until relations of cordiality and confidence were again re-established.

His Excellency then expressed the hope that he would be received at an early date by His Majesty, and suggested that perhaps the opportunity might be taken for His Majesty to make some declaration of his friendly sentiments towards Turkey. I replied that this was scarcely possible. The practice of the Court of St. James was that the Ambassador, in presenting his credentials, should do so in a few simple phrases, to which His Majesty was wont to reply with equal simplicity and cordiality, but that no publicity was ever given to what passed at these interviews.

As in these last observations the Ambassador had appeared to betray at least a suspicion that I had not been in a hurry to receive him and that he might be kept waiting for his audience of His Majesty, I added that, as I had told him, I followed everything that went on at Angora with equal attention, whether it was agreeable or disagreeable, and I think this left his Excellency under no doubt that the discourtesy to Sir R. Lindsay had not passed unnoticed or unresented.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

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